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Introduction 
The rise of China and Middle Eastern instability are two of the early 21st century’s 
dominating themes in international relations. Both themes’ primary interface is the 
oil-exporting Persian Gulf region which is literally fuelling China’s energy-hungry re-
emergence, but which also lies in a geo-politically volatile neighbourhood that 
threatens this very development. In short, the growing China-Gulf relationship is 
increasing in economic and strategic importance – contributing to what have been 
called the New Silk Roads – but is potentially at risk if Middle Eastern turmoil spills 
over into the Gulf. What does the merging of these two themes entail? 
 
Background 
China’s rise has already had a major impact on the global economy and on the 
distribution of power in the international system. It has coincided with a perceived 
relative decline of the West especially after the Financial Crisis.1 These simultaneous 
developments constitute a watershed period in global history, because the West has 
dominated the world economically, politically, and militarily for roughly half a 
millennium. The current global economic re-convergence between the West and the 
emerging markets particularly in Asia, spearheaded by the world’s oldest and largest 
civilization, has led to the speculation that the 21st century will belong to China in the 
same way that the 19th century is said to have belonged to Great Britain and the 20th 
century to the United States.2 The subject matter of China’s re-emergence is one of 
the largest in the International Relations (IR) discipline, also because China’s impact 
is likely to go far beyond economic matters, as it turns into a potential superpower 
challenging the US’s so-called unipolar moment.3 
                                                          
1 Breslin, S. (2013), China and the Global Political Economy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; He, Z. 
(2016), China's Financial Stability: Inherent Logic and Basic Framework. Singapore: World 
Scientific Publishing Company; Jacques, M. (2012), When China Rules the World: The End of the 
Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order. London: Penguin; Kroeber, A. (2016), China's 
Economy. What Everyone Needs to Know. New York City: Oxford University Press; Zakaria, F. (2011), 
The Post-American World: And The Rise Of The Rest. London: Penguin, Chapters 1/4. 
2 Ferguson, N. (2012), Civilization. The Six Killer Apps of Western Power. London: Penguin; 
Maddison, A. (2003), The World Economy: Historical Statistics. Paris: OECD Publishing; Morris, I. 
(2011), Why the West Rules - for Now: The Patterns of History and What They Reveal about the 
Future. London: Profile Books; Nye, J. (2015), Is the American Century Over?. Cambridge/Malden: 
Polity Press; Pomeranz, K. (2001), The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the 
Modern World Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
3 Allison, G. (2017), Destined for War: can America and China escape Thucydides’s Trap?. London: 
Scribe UK; Brands, H. (2016), Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the 
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Middle Eastern instability has had its own fair share of seemingly diminishing 
American power. Many countries in the Middle East and beyond have been affected 
by domestic and regional insecurity. This has come in the form of terrorism, political 
and religious fundamentalism, violent regime crackdowns, outside powers’ military 
interventions, civil wars, interstate proxy wars, refugee crises, and the threat of WMD 
proliferation.4 These instability problems have also negatively impacted several 
Middle Eastern states economically. Only some have experienced economic growth, 
prosperity and even staggering wealth due to large natural resources. Half of the 
world’s proven oil reserves are located in a Middle Eastern sub-complex, the Persian 
Gulf region. The enduringly oil-dependent global economy is thus exposed to 
potential Gulf instability.5 Al-Qaeda’s 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US ushered in a 
period of intensified American military intervention in the region in order to counter 
security threats and to upgrade America’s already substantial geo-political position 
there. Yet, these interventions have largely been perceived as a colossal failure, and 
instability has intensified further in the wake of the post-Arab Spring turmoil.6 
Although the Gulf itself has so far been largely shielded from its immediate 
periphery’s instability there is a constant risk. The regional disorder and the US’s 
costly failure to prevent it, has raised the spectre of eventual American withdrawal 
from a region whose few but vital economic arteries are dependent on the US military 
security umbrella.7  
Both wider stories, China’s rise and Middle Eastern instability, with all their 
contributing elements and consequences are covered in the news on a daily basis, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Post-Cold War Order. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Kissinger, H. (2012), On China. London: 
Penguin; Paulson, H. (2016), Dealing with China. An Insider Unmasks the New Economic 
Superpower. London: Headline Publishing Group. 
4 Ehteshami, A. (2017), Iran: Stuck in Transition. Oxon: Routledge; Gerges, F. (2017), ISIS: A History. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press; Gerges, F. (2013), The New Middle East: Protest And 
Revolution In The Arab World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Halliday, F. (2010), The 
Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, chapters 5-9; Hinnebusch, R. (2015), The International Politics of the Middle East. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, chapters 7-9; Kepel, G. (2009), Jihad: The Trail of Political 
Islam. London: I.B. Tauris. 
5 Gause III, F.G. (2010), The International Relations of the Persian Gulf. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; Miller, R. (2016), Desert Kingdoms to Global Powers: The Rise of the Arab Gulf. 
New Haven: Yale University Press; Yergin, D. (1991), The Prize. The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and 
Power. New York City/London/Toronto/Sydney/Tokyo/Singapore: Simon & Schuster. 
6 Buckley, M., Singh, R. (2006), The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism. Oxon: Routledge; 
Gordon, M.R., Trainor, B.E. (2006), Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of 
Iraq. New York: Pantheon; Ricks, T.E. (2006), Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. New 
York: Penguin. 
7 Glaser, C.L., Kelanic, R.A. (2017), ‘Getting Out of the Gulf. Oil and U.S. Military Strategy’. In: Foreign 
Affairs, January/February 2017 Issue. 
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therefore both also feature prominently in the academic IR discipline. Less discussed 
is what both themes entail for each other, although a growing amount of literature 
has come into existence in the last half decade, as Chapter 1, the Literature Review, 
shows. Generally, measuring China’s impact abroad is a key indicator of China’s 
global power. Furthermore, such a measurement is especially important in the 
world’s most strategically relevant regions. The Middle East, located between three 
continents, has long been one such region, and even more so since the discovery of its 
oil reserves. Considering the historical record, it does not seem far-fetched to claim 
that a great power’s advanced global position has also often correlated with its 
advanced position in the Middle East, especially the Persian Gulf.8 Before the US’s 
relative regional hegemony, Britain’s role there was very similar, but so had been that 
of other outside powers, such as the Portuguese and Dutch trading empires. 
 
Research Question 
What is China’s impact on the Gulf and what is the Gulf’s impact on China? How does 
China’s ascent play out in the Middle East, or rather more specifically, the Persian 
Gulf? How does that region with all its resources, but also with its many actual and 
potential conflicts impact on China? The answers may be far from straight forward. 
China’s rise offers economic opportunities for Gulf countries, and the wider region’s 
insecurity may cushion or indeed propel China’s rise by way of alerted incentives to 
protect its interests there more assertively. The hydrocarbon-rich Persian Gulf region 
is now China’s largest import source of foreign oil and China has emerged as the 
Gulf’s largest oil export market.9 The potentially soon-to-be largest economy in the 
world seems to be increasingly dependent on the world’s most important oil-
producing region – a development which constitutes a vital relationship between the 
two territories and arguably has an impact not only on the global energy market but 
on the entire global economy. Is China therefore on the verge of becoming the Gulf’s 
most significant outside power, potentially replacing the US’s regional hegemony in 
some form or another? More precisely, will China’s already profound economic 
                                                          
8 Macris, J., Kelly, S. (eds.) (2012), Imperial Crossroads. The Great Powers and the Persian Gulf. 
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press [Kindle Edition]. 
9 Downs, E.S. (2013), ‘China-Middle East Energy Relations’. Brookings Institution, 6 June 2013 
[https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/china-middle-east-energy-relations/]. 
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importance to the Gulf states be followed by a game-changing geo-political effect? For 
example, could China one day even station its military forces on bases in the Gulf? 
This thesis seeks to address the theme of China’s recent, current, and ultimately 
possible future role in the Persian Gulf. However, merely assessing the nature and 
scope of China-Gulf relations does not lend any deeper meaning to them. They need 
to be contextualized in various ways and be analysed in reference to other structures 
and developments that influence them and which they need to be compared to. In 
order to do so step by step, the thesis is structured the following way. 
 
Thesis Structure 
First, contextualization involves a theoretical framework that integrates, more 
formally, this relatively new subject matter and introduces the research question to 
the IR discipline. The two most widely used IR theories, neo-realism and neo-liberal 
institutionalism, are chosen for this undertaking. Chapter 2, Methodology, explains 
this choice of theories, their underlying ontology and epistemology, and provides the 
theoretical framework, covering key texts of both theories. Whilst neo-liberal 
institutionalism emphasizes that economic interdependence constrains the actors’ 
flexibility and incentivizes the pursuit of absolute gains and multilateral cooperation, 
neo-realism stresses that the international system’s structural anarchy leaves states 
with little choice than to pursue relative gains and therefore rivalry or alliances. Yet, 
the author argues that both theories can, to a significant extent, be synthesized via the 
inclusion of geographical realities centred on strategic regions. For this objective, a 
theory of “regional hegemonic stability”, capturing elements from neo-liberal 
institutionalism and neo-realism, and the ideas of several key geo-political thinkers, 
is suggested. The theoretical framework ends with three according hypotheses about 
the Gulf. For the theoretical assessments at the end of each chapter and the overall 
conclusion, the two theories and their region-centred synthesis provide wider and 
more specific notions to consider in the analytical process and help to discuss the 
topic with an IR theory “language”. Section 2 of the methodology chapter outlines 
research methods and the research design. 
Second, the modern historical context of Gulf outside powers, from the Portuguese in 
the 16th century, to the Dutch Empire in the 17th, and to the British Empire in the 19th 
and partly 20th century, is provided in Chapter 3. This enables the author to identify 
19 
 
some historic patterns and general analogies that should be helpful to illuminate the 
meaning and possible trajectory of current structures and developments regarding 
the Gulf, China, and other present outside actors, such as the US.  
Third, recent history and the current Gulf situation which sees the US dominating the 
region, forms the current geo-strategic context, described in Chapter 4. After covering 
the US Twin Pillar strategy, the origins and implementation of the Carter Doctrine, 
and finally the post-9/11 era of enduring but contested Pax Americana, the chapter 
also covers the economic sides that brought about and might end the US’s Gulf 
hegemony. Whether the status quo prevails or not, the US Gulf role heavily influences 
China’s interests, positions, and options there. 
Fourth, it is necessary to emphasize that China and the US are far from being the only 
relevant Gulf outside actors, as Chapter 5 highlights. The very story of Asia’s recent 
economic development that brought China to the region as an economic actor, also 
brought in other major Asian states and markets. Japan’s, South Korea’s, and India’s 
growing ties to the Gulf states, contributing to what have been dubbed the New Silk 
Roads, thereby form the inter-regional context within which China operates. 
Fifth, China’s own particular New Silk Roads to the Gulf markets are merely another 
part of its much wider evolving trade and investment networks across Asia and 
beyond. China’s economic and potential geo-political rise plays out in new financial 
institutions and across much of the Eurasian landmass, particularly with the 
announcement of the so-called Belt-and-Road Initiative. The Gulf states form just 
one important example of regions on China’s New Silk Roads. This example is 
elaborated upon in Chapter 6 and provides the China-Gulf context for the following 
case studies. 
Sixth, the first case study covers China’s ties with Saudi Arabia. Chapter 7 looks at 
their bi-directional trade and investment flows, diplomatic relations, and their 
strategic underpinning. Saudi Arabia is chosen as a case study, especially because it is 
usually China’s largest foreign oil provider and therefore its most important Gulf 
partner. 
Seventh, China’s ties with the UAE are covered in Chapter 8. This bilateral 
relationship forms the second case study, because, in terms of value of economic 
transactions, the UAE is China’s second most important partner in the Gulf, and in 
terms of diversity of connections, it is indeed China’s number one Gulf partner. 
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Finally, all these threads are woven together in the Conclusion in order to summarize 
the nature and scope of China-Gulf relations and characterize China’s recent, current, 
and possible future role and extent of power in the region. Using historical analogies 
from Chapter 3, balancing Chapter 4’s core insights on the US Gulf position with 
China’s regional impact and interests, assessing China’s prospects for competition or 
cooperation with other Asian actors in the Gulf, first addressed in Chapter 5, and 
thereby integrating the core analysis of Chapters 6-8 into all these contexts, serves to 
tackle the research question in a meaningful way. This is undertaken via a discussion 
which of the three theory-based hypotheses is the most accurate, first in terms of 
recent and current developments, and second in terms of their extrapolation towards 
imaginable futures. 
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1. Literature Review 
The narrower subject matter of China-Gulf relations, and the broader one of Asia’s 
so-called New Silk Roads and of the question how the Gulf region fits into them, are 
relatively new. A few individual exceptions were published in the 1990s and early 
2000s, when China’s economic ties with the Gulf states started to blossom but were 
clearly not yet of strategic importance. However, it was especially from the time of the 
Financial Crisis onwards, when commentators and analysts increasingly focused on 
China’s rise and the West’s relative decline that curiosity also grew on China’s new 
value to other regions, such as the Middle East. Most of the secondary literature in 
the field was produced after 2008. The topic can still be regarded as a niche. 
Nonetheless, there is certainly a stirring academic engagement with a topic of 
increasing economic and strategic relevance in the IR discipline.  
A growing number of journal articles and online think tank and business reports are 
approaching the subject matter from different angles. For the sake of brevity, the 
author only reviews major academic publications in this literature review, including 
mostly books in the form of edited multi-author volumes and single-author 
monographies. A few expanded online journal publications with multiple chapters 
and authors are covered. Further secondary literature is discussed in the next chapter 
in the section on data collection methods, as is a reference to the author’s inevitably 
limited Western-based literature. IR theory literature is not covered here either, but 
in the methodology chapter, where a summary and discussion of notions for the 
thesis’ theoretical framework takes place.  
Before turning to the core subject matter’s literature on China-Gulf relations, this 
literature review broadly follows the thesis’ chronology of its main body of work – 
starting with Gulf history with a particular focus on outside powers in this region. It 
then covers contemporary Gulf history up to the present day, reviewing the most 
important major works on the US role in the Gulf during and after the Cold War. 
Thereby, it briefly touches upon the region’s security environment and political 
economy in terms of the global financial and energy landscape. Afterwards, in the 
literature review’s second section, the most important academic works on Asia’s and 
China’s rise and the New Silk Roads to the Gulf are discussed, building a thematic 
bridge to the core subject matter of China-Gulf relations. 
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1.1 The Gulf and the World: History, Security, and Political Economy 
No chapter-long literature review could do justice to the vast amount of literature 
focused on Middle Eastern history. Among the most prominent and widely-cited 
general works in the English-speaking world are Bernard Lewis’ landmark book The 
Middle East: 2000 Years of History from the Rise of Christianity to the Present Day, 
Albert Hourani’s History of the Arab Peoples, and Eugene Rogan’s The Arabs: A 
History. Similarly, Michael Axworthy’s Iran: Empire of the Mind: A History from 
Zoroaster to the Present Day has also been lauded as the best long-term historical 
overview of the Persian Gulf’s eastern lands. Yet, here, too, it merely represents the 
tip of the iceberg’s tip. For other examples and further readings on very general or 
indeed highly specific themes, numerous references on a multitude of macro- and 
micro-historical literature throughout this thesis are provided. 
These four important examples provide crucial overviews of Middle Eastern time and 
space, capturing the region’s essence in its global context and its historical 
development over the long term. The Persian Gulf sub-region, as it could be called, 
features prominently in all of them, although cannot possibly be discussed there in its 
entirety and indeed in its peculiar geographical, political, economic, and cultural 
distinctiveness. For an overview prioritizing the last half-millennium, it is David 
Commins’ The Gulf States: A Modern History, that stands out as a single-author 
volume – brilliantly summarizing the most important developments and incidents. 
He successfully outlines how the Gulf’s near and far periphery has influenced the 
region and has been influenced by it without losing his spacial focus. Starting with the 
Gulf in ancient times, and summarizing the Gulf’s role in the Middle Ages, the book 
then turns to the early-modern and modern era charted in seven chapters. Though 
Commins’ use of primary sources is moderate, the overview-character of his book 
could be seen as an acceptable justification for what otherwise would be a risky 
omission for a History book. This thesis’ first context chapter has made significant 
use of the thematic accessibility of Commins’ creation. 
Before turning to the specialized literature of the Persian Gulf’s modern interaction 
with outside powers – the focus of this section and this thesis’ first context chapter – 
it is also necessary to mention the most important recent works on the pre-modern 
counterpart of this topic from a broader trans-regional perspective. This largely 
revolves around the notion of the old Silk Roads – connecting the Middle East and 
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the Gulf with Asia and Europe via trade corridors on land and sea. Among the most 
important recent books on this wider subject matter, five have stood out in their 
impact. 
In 2004, John Hobson published his landmark work on The Eastern Origins of 
Western Civilisation, persuasively showcasing not only the pioneering level of 
oriental globalization for the millennium between the 6th and the 16th century – to 
which the West only really caught up around 1800. He also demonstrates the 
extensive transfer of, not only goods and art, but also of ideas, institutions, 
knowledge, and technology along Silk Roads encompassing what he calls the ‘Afro-
Asian’ space. East Asian civilizational elements, spearheaded by Chinese culture, 
flowed towards Europe via Central Asia, West Asia, and Africa, all of which 
respectively left their decisive civilizational mark on a, for long, backward Occident. 
The Middle East in particular served not only as a centre of innovation and discovery, 
but represented a vital bridge facilitating transactions for a surprisingly global 
economy. As this thesis shows, Hobson’s observations regarding the Middle East, 
including the Persian Gulf, continued to be relevant throughout most of the modern 
era, the Western Age, and are now experiencing a renaissance on the New Silk Roads. 
For an easily accessible overview on the ancient land-and-sea Silk Roads in their 
global context, Xinru Liu’s The Silk Road in World History is highly recommendable. 
Though the book often takes its label very literally and predominantly focuses on the 
commodity of silk, its argument is that the three largest civilizations that produced 
and consumed that commodity in the early Middle Ages – Tang China, Byzantium, 
and the Islamic empires – contributed to a much greater economic and cultural 
fusion than might have been expected. 
A more detailed, grand historical analysis and conclusion was reached by Christopher 
Beckwith in his award-winning Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central 
Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present, which was first published in 2009. He 
defines and describes the Silk Road as a trans-continental economic and cultural 
system, with ups and downs between the Bronze- and Industrial Ages. This broadly 
echoes Hobson’s and Liu’s arguments, but differs in two important aspects. Firstly, 
Beckwith takes a considerably critical stance not only towards the pre-modern West, 
e.g. Rome or Byzantium, but also towards the large Asian civilizations of China, India, 
and the Middle East. All four civilizations he labels as ‘peripheral powers’. He does 
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not deny their achievements at different points in time. However, he emphasizes that 
the principal reason for their triumphs was their openness towards outside influences 
and the principal reason for their occasional downfalls their assertive imperialism. 
Although this could be synthesized with Hobson, Beckwith puts one region of the 
world centre stage: nomad-dominated Central Eurasia acting not only as his crucial 
“middle man” in the transactions but functioning indeed as the principal driver of 
global commerce and economic and cultural output. It was the modern rise of the 
West to global dominance in geo-politics, art, trade, technology, and transport that 
gave the final blow to the Silk Road, because trade by sea – a ‘littoral system’ – 
became relatively cheaper, faster, and safer. What Beckwith fails to clearly 
acknowledge, is that, unlike Central Eurasia, the Middle East, and especially the 
Persian Gulf region mostly had access to the trade routes on land as well as at sea. In 
both the pre-modern era and today, the Gulf formed and forms again a crucial global 
trade hub that Central Eurasia could never match geographically. Beckwith not only 
largely omits the Gulf’s proven long-distance trade by sea in the pre-modern era. By 
correctly pointing towards Middle Eastern productivity-decline in the modern pre-oil 
age as the harbinger of a relative Gulf isolation, he misses the fact that even during 
this period the Gulf was central to the Western empires doing business and wielding 
power in the Orient. 
Valerie Hansen’s The Silk Road: A New History largely resembles Beckwith’s focus 
on trade, art, and cultural transmission on land across Central Asia. Her attention to 
the micro-elements of the wider story, putting seven landlocked Steppe hubs of the 
ancient Silk Road under the microscope are what makes her work powerful and 
informative. Yet, since geo-political dynamics and the Gulf region are largely side-
lined, the book is of lesser relevance to this thesis.  
An author who does cover geo-politics and places the world’s centre of gravity in the 
Middle East, especially in Persia, with both its Central Asian and Gulf outlets, is Peter 
Frankopan. His 2015 publication The Silk Roads: A New History of the World bares 
an overly-ambitious sub-title, because, contrary to its cover’s promise, it largely 
brushes over Africa, the Americas, and East- and South Asia, but nevertheless 
persuasively shows how the Middle East served as the primary motor for the world’s 
flow of goods, ideas, and conflicts throughout the ages. Although, unlike his preface 
seems to imagine, Frankopan is not the first to criticize a Western-centric view of 
world history, and although he fails to explain why the West became so dominant, his 
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narrative still demonstrates impressively the impactful long-distance networks, 
connecting regions via multiple arteries labelled Silk Roads. The Gulf features 
prominently in this beautifully written story from antiquity to the 21st century. 
Even so, these books’ focus on the old Silk Roads does not offer a specialized and 
detailed analysis of this sub-region and the specific theme of outside power influence 
there. Lawrence Potter’s edited 2010 volume The Persian Gulf in History does. The 
book is a collection of individual papers on various elements of Gulf history from 
antiquity to the present. It deals with socio-cultural and geographical aspects, 
emphasizing the unique and cosmopolitan Khaleeji-identity on both the Arabian and 
Persian coastline compared to their different hinterlands, as well as geo-political 
aspects, discussing internal and external actors. Among the latter, João Teles e 
Cunha, Willem Floor, Frederick Anscombe, J.E. Peterson, and Gary Sick respectively 
include the Portuguese, the Dutch, the Ottomans, the British, and the Americans. 
Particularly their part of the book, is thus of profound importance to this thesis. 
Potter’s follow-up work, The Persian Gulf in Modern Times, was published in 2015. 
Unlike its predecessor, this volume has a much narrower time-frame, analysing 
merely the last two centuries. Furthermore, outside powers as political actors in the 
region, such as the British and the Americans, are only indirectly discussed. Rather, 
the papers concentrate predominantly on anthropological matters, such as the 
changing roles of different port cities along the coastline, and Gulf demographics and 
migratory flows from within and from outside the region. The book is therefore 
slightly less applicable to this thesis’ priorities. 
That cannot be said about Jeffrey Macris’ and Saul Kelly’s edited 2012 volume 
Imperial Crossroads: The Great Powers and the Persian Gulf. Focusing exclusively 
on the subject matter of modern Gulf outside powers, the papers of this book are all 
highly relevant for this thesis’ context chapters. Rudi Matthee’s chapter on the 
Portuguese, Virginia Lunsford’s chapter on the Dutch, and Robert Johnson’s, Saul 
Kelly’s, Jeffrey Macris’, Tore Petersen’s, Clive Jones’, Frank Jones’, and Jason 
Campbell’s respective chapters on the British and the Americans each contribute to 
the specific case-illuminations, as well as the bigger picture. Indeed, since the editors, 
Macris and Kelly, and their fellow authors, follow the same motivations as the author 
of this thesis – showing the long-term similarities, highlighting the differences 
between various modern outside powers in the Gulf, and how their analysis can 
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provide critical analogies for current regional affairs – important legwork has already 
been done. This is crucial, because the author of this thesis does not have the same 
amount of space available for the historical analysis as did the authors of Imperial 
Crossroads had for theirs. On the other hand, Macris’ and Kelly’s publication only 
briefly discusses the re-emergence of India and China to the Gulf in two of the final 
chapters, in which James Holmes, Toshi Yoshihara, and Ben Simpfendorfer look at 
the recent developments and the future. Furthermore, since the book is composed of 
many stand-alone chapters, it can neither offer a consistent narrative, nor a holistic 
interpretation towards the end. Both inevitable shortcomings are compounded, 
because the book contains no overall conclusion chapter, which would have been 
fascinating and useful. 
Jeffrey Macris had already undertaken this to an extent with the conclusion of his 
2009 monography The Politics and Security of the Gulf: Anglo-American Hegemony 
and the Shaping of a Region. As the title of the highly impressive book shows, Marcis 
largely excludes coverage of the Gulf’s early-modern period with the Portuguese and 
the Dutch, as well as the Gulf’s recent “look east” policy to India and China. 
Nevertheless, the scope of his work is large enough to produce some critical historical 
lessons for future Gulf and US interests – derived from recurring geo-political 
dynamics. He is also in a position to highlight the repercussions as well as the 
benefits of two similar Gulf orders in the 19th and 20th century – Pax Britannica and 
Pax Americana. They did not witness a smooth transition though, but an unstable 
and ultimately violent geo-political anarchy due to the post-British vacuum that 
Washington was not immediately willing to fill. The status quo has been defined by 
an American outside power essentially functioning as the principal arbiter of war and 
peace in the region. This fact has led to many problems, as Macris concedes. 
However, the alternative to American influence he sees as even more dangerous. His 
book thereby offers a clear warning of the great risks inherent in a potential US 
military withdrawal from the Gulf. 
Before turning to further works on the more contemporary matters, three books on 
the British Gulf role need to be mentioned. Donald Hawley’s The Trucial States, 
published in 1971, in the year of the UK’s granting of independence to its Gulf 
protectorates, offers a comprehensive examination of the Gulf era of Pax Britannica 
and the UK’s administration of the coastal sheikdoms post-World War Two. 
Similarly, Frauke Heard-Bey’s landmark From Trucial States to United Arab 
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Emirates has an even longer-term time-frame and provides a detailed analysis of the 
domestic environment in the small sheikdoms on the lower Gulf’s Arabian coast over 
the centuries, including post-independence. Her coverage of the British role is 
extensive though and is highly useful for this thesis. Finally, James Onley’s The 
Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the British in the 
Nineteenth-Century Gulf is the most recent major work on Pax Britannica in the 
region. Although it predominantly discusses the 19th century and thereby has a 
narrower historical focus on a particular era, it has a wider view in terms of 
geographic space – incorporating the entire sub-region as an informal part of the 
British Raj, rather than merely the lower Gulf on its own. Studded with an 
unsurpassed amount of primary source material, Onley’s work has been heralded as a 
much-needed update on Anglo-Gulf history. 
The 20th century’s first half, including World War One, the interwar period, and 
World War Two is subject to countless older and newer influential books on Middle 
Eastern and Gulf history and the important British role played in it. This list is too 
long, and the number of important books too high to do justice towards in a literature 
review merely concerned with long-term historical contextualization. As with other 
short and specific periods, numerous examples and recommendations for further 
readings are provided in the footnoted references throughout this thesis. 
More directly relevant subject matters are the Gulf’s very young modernization, its 
political economy, and the contemporary US role in the region. The best detailed 
overview, discussing the entire region’s contemporary history from around 1971 
onwards and within the context of the Cold War and post-Cold War international 
systems, Gregory Gause’s The International Relations of the Persian Gulf cannot be 
rated too highly. Outlining the British withdrawal from the Gulf and its immediate 
consequences, explaining the transformative developments surrounding the OPEC 
oil-embargo, the rise of the Gulf’s petro-states, the Iranian Revolution, the three Gulf 
Wars, and the post-9/11 US-Gulf security complex, Gause excels at constructing a 
fluent and connected narrative around the most important developments, incidents, 
conditions, and actors in and around the Gulf. The book has a limited time-and-space 
horizon, however, ignoring both long-term history as well as the Gulf’s recent 
economic re-orientation towards Asia. Although Gause’s work clearly requires an 
update after almost a decade has passed since his book’s publication, it would have 
been possible nevertheless to at least briefly discuss the emergence of the New Silk 
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Roads. Yet, for Gulf history between 1968 and 2008, this book has to rank amongst 
the most commendable. 
Despite these 40 years of direct US influence, the latter had its hidden origins earlier 
in the 20th century. Whereas Britain was the immediate security guarantor on the 
Gulf coastline, the US, prior to the Second World War, started to build strong 
relationships with the emergent regimes in Saudi Arabia and Iran and cemented 
those relationships immediately with the start of the Cold War. Stephen Kinzer’s two 
books Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America's Future and All the Shah's Men: An 
American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror offer an interesting glimpse into 
the US’s early and later diplomatic interactions with Saudi Arabia and Iran. The 
origins of the US-Saudi special relationship are also explored in detail by Robert 
Vitalis in his forceful polemic America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil 
Frontier. Meanwhile, the military and energy alliance between the US and Pahlavi 
Iran during the 1970s is painstakingly analysed against the backdrop of Middle 
Eastern insecurity, the Cold War, and the global energy crisis, in Andrew Scott 
Cooper’s The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance 
of Power in the Middle East. Especially the latter two books present a formidable 
enrichment through Vitalis’ and Coopers’ analysis of primary sources and are of great 
use to this thesis’ second context chapter. Though all four books incorporate 
sometimes strong normative tones, their often-controversial analysis has been 
impactful. 
Then, there is Madawi al-Rasheed’s celebrated History of Saudi Arabia from 2010. 
As the title suggests, the book is focused on one country alone, and although the pre-
20th century history is relatively brief too, its analysis of Saudi post-World War Two 
society and politics, including the alliance with America, is highly detailed and 
informative. The US-Saudi alliance post 1979 is furthermore comprehensively 
analysed in Robert Lacey’s 2010 book Inside the Kingdom and Rachel Bronson’s 
2008 book Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia. 
Lacey offers a gripping journalistic account of the evolution, not only of US-Saudi 
relations, but particularly of Saudi Arabia’s home-grown Salafism and jihadism – 
both prior to and after 9/11. Bronson’s perspective covers the entirety of the bilateral 
US-Saudi relationship from World War Two to the post-9/11 era. Her analysis is 
backed up by a large number of primary sources, both archival and through 
interviews and is surely one of the most important contributions to that specific 
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subject matter. For a more updated account, Bruce Riedel’s 2017 publication Kings 
and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States since FDR relies mainly on its 
anecdotes and on its unprecedented coverage of the complete Obama era, as well as 
the new US-Presidency of Donald Trump. 
For a more regional picture on the US role in the Gulf, which goes beyond the 
Washington-Riyadh relationship and incorporates the latest geo-economic 
developments regarding the New Silk Roads, Stephen Hook’s and Tim Niblock’s 
edited 2015 volume The United States and the Gulf. Shifting Pressures, Strategies 
and Alignments is a formidable analysis of the US regional security role. The authors 
cover the latter’s nature and scope and its potential future developments, including 
challenges from within region and within Washington itself. Future extrapolations 
are also set against the hypothetical evolution of Asian and European actors playing a 
future role in Gulf security. The book is thus of high relevance for many of this thesis’ 
chapters. 
Regarding the wider subject matter of the Gulf’s security environment and the Gulf’s 
position in the global political economy, countless books provide general overviews 
and specific discussions. The most recent works include Anoushiravan Ehteshami’s  
Dynamics of Change in the Persian Gulf: Political Economy, War and Revolution, 
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen’s Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition 
to the Post-oil Era and The Gulf States in International Political Economy, Matteo 
Legrenzi’s The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf: Diplomacy, Security 
and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East, Bessma Momani’s and 
Matteo Legrenzi’s Shifting Geo-Economic Power of the Gulf: Oil, Finance and 
Institutions, and Mohamed Ramady’s The GCC Economies: Stepping Up To Future 
Challenges. These books all brilliantly capture the interface of economic, political, 
and security issues, which is crucial to understand the region’s overall situation in 
every sphere. Energy issues are discussed as much as the GCC’s financial importance 
to the global economy, as well as the GCC’s ambitions to build knowledge economies. 
Regional security issues include the feared Iranian role in the GCC neighbourhood, 
including its nuclear programme, as well as Islamist terrorism, sectarianism, and the 
Middle East’s post-Arab Spring turmoil that is surrounding the hitherto stable GCC 
countries. 
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When it comes to the Gulf’s position in the global oil and wider energy landscape, no 
study of that topic can avoid Daniel Yergin’s two bestsellers The Prize: The Epic 
Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, and The Quest: Energy, Security and the 
Remaking of the Modern World. As one of the world’s leading experts on the history 
and geo-politics of oil and energy in general, Yergin’s chapters on the Gulf centrality 
for global energy security provide the best portal to this issue. His strength is his deep 
understanding of the many threads that make up this theme: economics, geology, 
finance, technology, history, strategy, and geo-politics. 
Directly descending from its dominance of global energy markets, the Gulf’s 
increasing financial power encompasses not only the rise of sovereign wealth funds, 
but also the petro-dollar history and the potential future shifts in global monetary 
power. For an introduction to the theme of sovereign wealth funds, the GCC’s among 
them, Gordon Clark et. al.’s Sovereign Wealth Funds: Legitimacy, Governance, and 
Global Power, is highly commendable. For an introduction to global monetary 
affairs, Jonathan Kirshner’s edited Monetary Orders: Ambiguous Economics, 
Ubiquitous Politics or Alan Wheatley’s edited The Power of Currencies and 
Currencies of Power are among the most accessible in-depth analyses by experts. 
James Rickards’ The Death of Money: The Coming Collapse of the International 
Monetary System is a more provocative polemic but offers a refreshing critique of the 
more conventional and cautious takes on the subject matter. His analysis 
demonstrates how vulnerable the prevailing monetary order could turn out to be. The 
Gulf states, and especially China, feature prominently in his book. 
All these works are the most important examples for the literature used in the 
background and contextualization section of this thesis.  
 
1.2 The Gulf, the Rise of Asia, and the New Silk Roads 
The re-emergence of China on the world economic, political, and cultural stage is one 
of the most important developments in recent times. It has already contributed to the 
closing of the income and power gap between Western civilization, Asia and the 
global South. This is so because other non-Western countries have accompanied and 
partly even preceded China’s rise. For the past half-millennium, the West has 
dominated the globe in economic, cultural, and geo-political terms. Economic 
historians have come to call this the “great divergence”. Among the most influential 
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works on this topic, but partly also on the recent story of the great re-convergence are 
Kenneth Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the 
Modern World Economy, Angus Maddison’s The World Economy: Historical 
Statistics, Ian Morris’ Why the West Rules - for Now: The Patterns of History and 
What They Reveal about the Future, Niall Ferguson’s Civilization: The Six Killer 
Apps of Western Power, and Kent Deng’s Mapping China's Growth And 
Development In The Long Run, 221 BC To 2020. John Hobson’s book has already 
been mentioned above. These works, with their own distinct methodologies, all seek 
to explain why the West forged ahead of the rest and made the modern world, even 
though there is some disagreement among these and other scholars on the exact 
point in time when and why this happened. This question is not the subject matter of 
this book and thus does not need to be discussed here. However, it is important to 
emphasize this discussion as a context within which China and other Asian countries 
are rising in economic and geo-political importance to other regions of the world. The 
New Silk Roads across Asia, including to and from the Gulf, are a central example in 
this story. 
Before turning to the literature of Asia-Gulf, and especially China-Gulf relations, it is 
also necessary to briefly cover the most influential and helpful publications on the 
rise of China and other non-Western countries. Fareed Zakaria’s The Post-American 
World: And The Rise Of The Rest was published after the Financial Crisis and 
addressed a topic that had sprung to sudden interest following the West’s sudden 
economic malaise and China’s comparatively successful weathering of the storm. 
Whilst addressing the credit crunch, the book’s main focus is on China’s, India’s and 
other emerging markets decade-long catch up in economic performance. Zakaria 
shows that the 21st century is not likely to see the absolute, but rather a relative 
decline of the West. This would usher in a world in which the US is the first among 
equals, but in which its unipolar dominance is over, as especially China surges ahead 
in GDP measures. 
Similarly, Gideon Rachman’s Easternisation: War and Peace in the Asian Century 
provides an update to Zakaria’s book and explores China’s, Russia’s, Japan’, and 
India’s geo-strategic relations and influence in other regions, the Middle East among 
them. Despite the West’s declining capabilities and influence to guarantee global 
outcomes in its interests, Rachman still sees an institutional advantage in Europe and 
America. 
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This is not something that Martin Jacques believes. His landmark book When China 
Rules The World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global 
Order strikingly demonstrates that China’s abandonment of communist economics 
and its embrace of capitalism, fused with its millennia-old civilizational self-
confidence and its sheer size, will fundamentally re-shape the international system, 
not only economically, but also politically, institutionally, and culturally. David 
Shambaugh’s China Goes Global: The Partial Power, reaches similar conclusions, 
but does not go as far as Jacques, stating instead that China’s global influence – while 
being felt everywhere – would not (yet) usher in a completely Sino-centric world. 
Henry Kissinger’s On China is more concerned with China’s 20th century history – 
partly shaped by the author himself – and focuses more on diplomatic and strategic 
culture than on economics. Towards the end of the book, Kissinger outlines his 
concerns about a future clash between the US and China, but also suggests measures 
on how to avoid such a potential geo-political cataclysm. Graham Allison picks up 
this question in his recent and highly celebrated work on the US-China relationship. 
His book is titled Destined for War: Can America and China escape Thucydides’ 
Trap?. In it he covers China’s economic rise and the US response so far, but, 
crucially, presents numerous historical case studies in which he tests the outcomes of 
previous rivalries between ruling powers and rising powers. His analogies are highly 
illuminative and should stand as a strong warning about the dangers of Sino-
American conflict, but also as a potential blueprint for how to prevent a possible 
World War Three. 
Much depends on the potential antagonists’ strategies, but also their capabilities. 
Bernard Cole’s China's Quest for Great Power: Ships, Oil, and Foreign Policy 
explores both these things, thereby supplying the critical facts without which no ideas 
for the short-term future have much credibility. The book renders a useful 
background when assessing especially China’s maritime Silk Road plans. 
The New Silk Roads, both at sea, as well as on land, have many origins, directions, 
and destinations. The so-called Belt-and-Road-Initiative, PRC-President Xi Jinping’s 
signature foreign and economic policy project, is a relatively recent story – at least 
with this slogan and with regard to new institutions like the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank. Nevertheless, Tom Miller has written a comprehensive overview 
and journalistic account on the subject matter. His book China's Asian Dream: 
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Empire Building along the New Silk Road provides another crucial pan-Eurasian 
backdrop to the more specific China-Gulf Silk Road-branches that are the focus of 
this thesis. 
 
John Calabrese was one of the first Western scholars to write on the topic of Middle 
East-Asia relations. After having introduced the topic via an article in the Asian 
Survey, he published his book China’s Changing Relations with the Middle East in 
1991. Considering that no New Silk Roads existed at that time, as China’s ties with 
most of the Middle Eastern states until then had only been vague at best, the book 
was visionary. It can serve as a useful basic read on the historic backgrounds of how 
China’s modern relations with the Middle East came into existence. However, since 
this manuscript deals with their development from around the millennium onwards, 
Calabrese’s 1991 book does not play an eminent part in this thesis. 
In 2002, it was the Emirati scholar Muhammad bin Huwaidin who published the first 
specific book on China’s Relations with Arabia and the Gulf: 1949-1999. Spanning 
half a century, it remains one of very few modern histories of Sino-Arab relations. 
Therefore, it too falls largely outside the time frame which this manuscript addresses. 
It finishes at that point in time when the New Silk Roads were only just starting to 
take shape. 
In 2004, at the time when especially the inter-regional energy-trade began to surge, 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami produced an update on developments by editing a volume 
on the broader inter-regional connections. Going beyond economic ties, The Middle 
East’s Relations with Asia and Russia examines geo-strategic realities and China’s 
approach to its future role. In this book, Ehteshami drew upon his somewhat 
prophetic 1992 book-chapter, The Rise and Convergence of the “Middle” in the World 
Economy: The Case of the NICs and the Gulf States, in Charles Davies’ Global 
Interests in the Arab Gulf. It was the early start of an ongoing series of publications 
edited by Ehteshami, which are discussed below. 
A detailed case study on the modern history of a potentially game-changing bilateral 
relationship between an Asian power and a major Gulf power was published by John 
Garver in 2006. China and Iran – Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World is 
essential reading also for anyone dealing with China’s relations with West Asia 
around the millennium. Beijing’s declared interest and strategy of pursuing the best 
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possible relations with any state in the name of purely economic interests are of a 
very pragmatic nature and may seem rather facile. However, as Garver shows, not 
only do China and Iran stress the fact that they are both proud ancient civilizations 
later suffering similar experiences during certain stages of Western imperialism, but 
also that their relationship had and may again have significant strategic potential. 
These factors are essential to keep in mind when investigating China’s relations with 
other Gulf states. Even so, over a decade since its publication, there is still no updated 
edition or any other landmark book on Sino-Iranian relations, although there is much 
new material to cover. Hence, there is desperate need to fill this gap in the literature. 
This thesis, as stated above, does not cover Iran as a case study and therefore does 
not attempt to fill this gap, but emphasizes the country’s importance in China’s 
overall Gulf strategy in Chapter 6. 
Contributing further to the wider development, Yukiko Miyagi wrote the first book on 
Japan’s Middle East Security Policy which was published in 2008. Since this 
manuscript only briefly discusses Japan as one of several Asian actors in the Gulf, 
Miyagi’s book merely serves this thesis briefly. Her later publications, in the form of 
book chapters, are more up-to-date and thus more valuable for the very limited space 
the text offers on Japan-Gulf relations. 
The same year, Jon Alterman and John Garver published a landmark book called The 
Vital Triangle – China, The United States, and the Middle East. Strictly spoken, it 
covers a broader spectrum than most of the books mentioned in this literature 
review, as it not only assesses China’s relations with all Middle Eastern states, but 
also includes the United States in a three-dimensional and global analysis on broader 
strategic questions. The book is particularly useful for parts of this thesis’ that 
address the rather specific question of America’s response to China’s emergence and 
consolidation in the Persian Gulf. 
Listing the data of the most significant Sino-Arab/Iranian deals and contracts, 
describing their formations and interpreting their wider outlook and impact, 
Alterman and Garver demonstrate how especially China’s hydrocarbon-based 
relationship with Middle Eastern states has constantly intensified. On top of that, 
they explain why Beijing, currently free-riding on the US security umbrella, has no 
interest yet in challenging America’s strategic primacy in the region, let alone 
strengthening the capability to do so. Furthermore, they also highlight how Saudi 
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Arabia is using its now closer relationship with China to put pressure on the weary 
American titan, its key ally. The US is generally facing the problem that in the Middle 
East it is ‘easy for [America] to look bad’, where it is ‘easy for China to look good’ in 
both the economic as well as the political spheres.10 In the end, Alterman and Garver 
clearly demonstrate the potential dangers of a clash over geo-strategic and geo-
economic interests between the superpowers in the Middle East. Additionally, they 
clarify how unnecessary such a scenario would be and show the immense potential 
for Sino-American and multilateral cooperation in the region. 
The book leaves two gaps open though. The first is the simple fact that its publication 
now also dates from almost a decade ago. Therefore, the subject matter clearly 
requires an update. Yet, it also lacks a theory-based methodology which would have 
been interesting for analysing the triangular nature of the China-Gulf-US 
relationship. The critique on this lack of theoretical guidance, in fact, applies to all of 
the essential books that are reviewed here. As further outlined below in the 
methodology chapter, this is one of the major gaps the author is seeking to begin to 
fill with this thesis. 
The critique also applies to the next important analysis of the subject matter, which is 
more of a journalistic account. In 2009, the Royal Bank of Scotland’s then chief China 
economist Ben Simpfendorfer published his innovative and fascinating book The 
New Silk Road – How a Rising Arab World is Turning Away from the West and 
Rediscovering China. It was the first book coining this rather romanticized label, at 
least for the subject matter of current Sino-Arab ties. However, it brings out much 
more. Though Simpfendorfer is primarily an expert in finance and global economics, 
the well-travelled and both Arab- and Mandarin-speaking Simpfendorfer not only 
analyses the inter-regional energy trade, petrodollar-redistributions, and sovereign 
wealth funds’ activities, but highlights how far and deep the links between China and 
the Middle East already go in several other spheres, including increasing cultural 
convergence. China’s large Muslim population in the Xinjiang Province, for instance, 
is beginning to serve as a cultural bridge to the Middle East by building a pan-Asian 
Islamic Corridor. Generally spoken, what Simpfendorfer’s coverage, anecdotal 
reporting and analysis excels at foremost, is the integration of the micro-level into the 
macro-level and creating a whole new story in the process. 
                                                          
10 Alterman, J.B., Garver, J.W. (2008), The Vital Triangle. China, The United States, and The Middle 
East. Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, p. 112. 
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Simpfendorfer’s first interpretation of the reasons why we are experiencing the birth 
of a new Silk Road is that China’s rise has been accompanied by the rise of the Arab 
world. His report is not confined to the Persian Gulf states where China’s growing 
energy demand has led to increasing oil prices and thus, to a significant extent, the 
Gulf wealth boom in the last decade. He also discusses poorer North Africa, Egypt 
and Syria, countries that are just as awash with cheaply produced Chinese consumer 
goods as the rich oil monarchies. However, even though this being a recent 
phenomenon with further enormous potential, his rather optimistic interpretation 
has clearly been overtaken by events, especially the post-Arab Spring turmoil. This 
fact has no immediate ramifications though for this thesis, since it does not cover 
Chinese-Levantine or Chinese-North African relations. 
Someone who does indeed capture the new Asia-Gulf Silk Roads with a more rigorous 
analytical approach, albeit also without using theories, is Christopher Davidson in his 
pioneering publication on inter-regional connectivity, The Persian Gulf and Pacific 
Asia – From Indifference to Interdependence (2010). He offers the first overview of 
the relationship of what are the two economically most important sub-regions of Asia 
and of the Middle East. Rather than dealing with all of Asia and all of the Middle East 
or simply with a single bilateral relationship, he offers the first closer integrated 
overview of the ties between the most advanced economies of both regions – the 
GCC-states, and the East Asian powerhouses of China, Japan and South Korea. 
Primarily focusing on economic relations, it makes sense to select the most 
significant commercial players and measure the impact of their bi-directional trade 
and investment. Therefore, his book gives an insightful overview along with many 
individual examples and illustrates important data in various charts and tables. 
His structure is built on parameters similar to this thesis’ New Silk Roads- and case 
study chapters. He covers hydrocarbon trade, non-hydrocarbon trade, investment 
and joint ventures, as well as construction and labour contracts. Davidson has also 
offered chapters on the historical background, a demographic and economic 
comparison of both regions, the question regarding the possibility of an Asian 
security umbrella in the Gulf, diplomatic ties as well as possible future developments.  
The differences of this thesis are five-fold. Firstly, it is more extensive and allows for 
more room in discussing both contexts and case-study-related details that Davidson 
covers relatively briefly. Secondly, the author focuses on China and, in one chapter 
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alone, discusses the other Asian powers Davidson covers, plus India, a vital South 
Asian power with high stakes in the Gulf. Thirdly, particularly when discussing geo-
political aspects, the story is more complete when also incorporating Iraq and Iran, 
too. China’s relations with both of them, especially with Iran, will automatically affect 
the closeness or distance of China towards the Arab Gulf states. By no means can 
China become a regional military stabilizer – something that seems highly unrealistic 
at least in the short-term future anyway – if the weaker Arab/Sunni side of the Gulf 
perceives Beijing to be too soft on Tehran, let alone act as an Iranian ally. Iran is 
exactly what the monarchies claim they are seeking protection from. Less than twenty 
years ago, it was Saddam Hussein’s Iraq that needed to be driven out of Kuwait and 
then deterred by the US military. To generalize, the author adopts Gregory Gause’s 
concept, who in his book The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, treats the 
sub-region – composed of the GCC countries plus Iraq and Iran – as a specific 
security complex and regional system. Fourthly, this thesis provides a 
contextualization into Gulf outside power history, portraying the New Silk Roads as 
the latest potential example of a long chain of cases. Last, but not least, it also makes 
use of IR theories in order to guide the subject matter’s analysis, something 
Davidson’s facts-based overview did not have the necessary room for. 
Neither did the otherwise impressive online volume of essays, China and the Persian 
Gulf – Implications for the United States, published in 2011 by the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars. Edited by Bryce Wakefield and Susan Levenstein, it 
incorporates six essays written by Wu Bingbing, Jon Alterman, Emile Hokayem, 
Afshin Molavi, Jean-François Seznec, and Erica Downs. They respectively present 
China’s perspective, the various Gulf perspectives, the US’s position between China 
and Saudi Arabia, briefly India’s relevance within both its relations with China and 
the Gulf, and explicitly discuss the most important issue area, energy, in China-Gulf 
relations. Although the volume focuses primarily on the three larger Gulf states, 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran and neglects the smaller Gulf monarchies, it primarily 
takes a regional approach when evaluating China’s and the Gulf’s mutual interests 
and how the US fits into these. Only where the types of economic transactions differ 
or the Gulf states are antagonistic towards each other does the volume highlight the 
unavoidable differences concerning China’s regional strategy. It goes without saying 
that a short volume like this one does not have the space to delve into many details 
across the board. Nevertheless, even though long-term historic contexts and Asia’s 
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wider context mostly remain untouched, the publication offers a stream-lined 
overview of the subject matter’s essence. 
One of the more recent publications extensively covering the subject matter in very 
similar ways to this thesis, is Geoffrey Kemp’s The East Moves West – India, China, 
and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East (2012). As the title indicates, it 
covers several important Asian players, apart from China, Japan, South Korea and 
the ASEAN-members, integrating the South Asian countries of India and Pakistan. 
This is particularly interesting as it blurs the boundaries of regions – and thus shows 
how complex the economic as well as the political and strategic affairs of the New Silk 
Roads are and will be. The China-Gulf relationship does not only have to consider the 
US as a regional outside power, but India too, arguably one of China’s potential major 
rivals in the future. Although the commercial interdependence between these two 
Asian giants is constantly increasing, an intensifying competition in both the 
economic as well as strategic landscape, including the Gulf, seems plausible. 
As Kemp underlines, both keep essential interests in the Gulf and are heavily reliant 
on energy security. This entails access to vital sea-lanes and maritime bottlenecks like 
the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz. Hence, geographically, a powerful 
India could imply a potential barrier for China’s control on free-flowing energy 
imports. Kemp demonstrates that India in the long run wants to play a dominating 
role in its backyard, including the Gulf. However, India has even less interest in 
challenging the US than China may have and would benefit far more from the US 
Navy’s presence than from its exodus. Generally, India cultivates a multilateral mind-
set when it comes to strategic questions – whereas China has always sought to 
expand its influence bilaterally. Kemp lists the multilateral initiatives, symposia, fora, 
military exercises as well as actual maritime operations that have been developing 
over the last decade. He does not merge India’s multilateral strategy with these actual 
developments and thereby might neglect a point. Could it be that China is less 
involved in these activities not so much due to US reluctance or China’s geographical 
distance, but due to her less cooperative political will on a multilateral basis? Could 
China’s naval role grow faster if it adopted a more multilateral initiative? This is an 
interesting and important question to tackle. 
Awarding India rather than China better chances in having a direct say in Gulf 
security is of great significance. Kemp seems sceptical of the fact that the US will 
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remain welcome enough throughout the Indian Ocean in the longer run. He does not 
shed light on the growing level of alarm China’s rapid rise and expansion of influence 
causes typically in East Asia and how this fact can impact strategic developments also 
in West Asia. Consequently, his pessimism regarding the perception of US hegemony 
in the entire Indian Ocean may still be exaggerated at this point. Generally, Kemp’s 
book’s wide scope does not include more detailed case studies on China’s economic 
ties to Gulf states. Neither does it make use of IR theories or historical 
contextualization of previous Gulf outside powers. Last but not least, half a decade 
has passed since the publication which requires updates in the dynamics he 
describes. 
Highly important for the author’s case study on Sino-Saudi relations is Naser Al-
Tamimi’s 2014 book China-Saudi Arabia Relations, 1990-2012 – Marriage of 
Convenience or strategic Alliance. It offers the most comprehensive material for this 
thesis’ case study. It goes without saying that this thesis’ one chapter on Sino-Saudi 
relations cannot match the scope of Al-Tamimi’s thematic devotion to an entire 
manuscript. His book’s wholly bilateral analysis offers a much larger range of details 
and their fascinating interpretation. Al-Tamimi’s context chapters discuss China’s 
rise and the oil background to China-Middle East ties, as well as their general 
political and strategic interests. Subsequently, the book covers both China’s 
perspective and Saudi Arabia’s perspective on their relationship and their interests. It 
then goes on to cover the scope of Sino-Saudi economic relations and focuses 
especially on oil trade and investment. Finally, it discusses bilateral military 
cooperation between the two and what this entails for the US – maximizing an 
analysis of what little relevant developments occurred prior to its publication. All 
chapters are rich in information and backed up with tables and charts. 
However, three problems arise from it. Firstly, the book’s main body and its 
conclusion almost entirely lack a discussion of theories, a fact that inflicts all the 
more harm since its proclaimed methodology sets out to discuss IR realism and 
liberalism. Although Al-Tamimi briefly introduces some of the theories general 
concepts, he does not make use of them at all, apart from a very brief exception in one 
of the conclusion’s paragraphs – only to suddenly dismiss the theories as unfit for the 
subject matter. 
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Secondly, the book not only misses a historical contextualization, which means its 
sudden coverage of America’s Gulf role towards the end of the book seems 
argumentatively complicated and takes important structures for granted within a 
more short-sighted time horizon. More importantly though, it is the absence of a 
regional context, particularly regarding the Gulf, that China’s interests in and 
relations with Saudi Arabia cannot be convincingly separated from. Consequently, the 
narrow bilateral focus struggles with clearly reasoning its subject matter’s relevance 
to regional and global affairs. 
Thirdly, the book’s content is not structured via chapters with a clear thematic 
distinction. The context chapters all cover issues that are re-visited in the deeper 
thematic chapters – with the result that the book is often repetitive. Hence, it might 
not be surprising that two of Al-Tamimi’s three scenarios for the future of Sino-
Saudi-US relations partially do not differ greatly in their respective characterizations, 
with relatively unpersuasive distinctions. 
Despite these three points of critique, Al-Tamimi’s book is pioneering in its choice of 
subject matter and therefore already merits frequent discussion in this thesis’ case 
study chapter. The book is a highly useful and integrated source of detailed 
information. Since a comparably comprehensive work on Sino-Emirati relations does 
not exist to date, the research and writing of this thesis’ second case study inevitably 
poses a greater challenge. 
So far, there are merely online articles or book chapters that cover China-UAE ties. 
One such secondary source is a chapter in Muhamad Olimat’s 2015 book on China 
and the Middle East – From Silk Road to Arab Spring. Although the chapter on 
Sino-Emirati relations, like all of Olimat’s other bilateral case studies in the book, is a 
helpful overview, it does not have the space for a comprehensive analysis of details. 
This is due to Olimat’s much wider regional approach which covers not only the Gulf, 
but the entire Middle East – selectively discussing also Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and 
Algeria. This offers an interesting and wider, though incomplete perspective, because 
states like Libya, Egypt, Turkey, Syria, or Iraq, or other Gulf monarchies are left out 
without a deeper explanation. However, the book’s main strength lies in Olimat’s tri-
dimensional approach to China’s relations with Middle Eastern countries – which 
goes beyond narrow bilateral observations and analyses these in reference to third 
parties. For example, Olimat shows that Sino-Saudi relations cannot be discussed 
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without offering the context of both countries’ relations with Iran, or without 
incorporating the US when talking about Sino-Middle Eastern relations in general. 
The book’s shortcomings lie in the randomness of case studies, their lack of 
demonstrated connection, and the randomness of some of the analysis’ paradigms. 
Furthermore, the book’s subtitle is slightly misleading, because it gives the 
impression of extensive historical coverage. Though Olimat devotes an entire chapter 
to China’s reaction to the Arab Spring, the old or new Silk Roads receive only sparse 
mention. Neither are other China-and-Middle East-connected Asian states and 
markets examined, nor are long-term historic patterns. Instead, the book is more of a 
patchwork of various specific themes within the wider subject matter, rather than a 
wholly connected narrative. 
Due to the very nature of edited volumes with multiple authors, a connected narrative 
is also not fully possible with what are two recent series of academic books on Asia-
Middle East ties. First, Gerlach Press’ ongoing book publications of edited papers 
from the Gulf Research Center’s annual conferences in Cambridge is a formidable 
source of information about and rigorous academic analysis of the wider subject 
matter. Tim Niblock, one of Britain’s front-line experts on Gulf affairs and on Gulf-
Asia ties, stands out as a recent major contributor to the subject. Two of his 
numerous edited Gerlach Press volumes tackle it. In 2013, he and Monica Malik 
published Asia-Gulf Economic Relations in the 21st Century – The Local to Global 
Transformation. Niblock provides the book’s introduction and its first chapter 
himself, contextualizing an overview over the wide subject matter. Relevant to this 
thesis’ slightly more streamlined focus are further chapters from the book, written by 
Naser Al-Tamimi, Sara Bazoobandi, Girijesh Pant, K.M. Seethi, Chen Mo, Huang 
Minxing and Ji Kaiyun, as well as Ho Wai-Yip, Joachim Kolb, Yukiko Miyagi and 
Yoshio Minagi. Respectively, they cover specific issues such as Saudi or Iranian 
perspectives on Asia, India’s strategic position in the pan-Asian and Gulf contexts, 
China-GCC economic relations, China-Iran relations, Ningxia Province as a Chinese 
bridge to the Arab world, as well as both South-Korea’s and Japan’s relations with the 
Gulf states. 
A Year later in 2014, Niblock and Yang Guang edited and published another Gerlach 
Press volume, building on the previous one. A slightly different focus, Security 
Dynamics of East Asia in the Gulf Region completes what a year before had primarily 
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been an economic analysis. Niblock once again uses the introduction and the first 
chapter as an overview and a highly useful contextualization over what follows. The 
book’s further chapters, all of which are linked to this thesis, are written by Talmiz 
Ahmad, Muhammad Al-Sudairi, Dania Thafer, Nikolay Kozhanov, Yang Guang, Chen 
Mo, Ho Wai-Yip, Yukiko Miyagi, Keiko Sakai, Hirotake Ishigruo, and Jeongmin Seo. 
Respectively, they cover normative arguments for a new Gulf security architecture 
contributed towards by Asian stake-holders, and the Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Iranian 
perspectives on this. Furthermore, China-GCC relations in energy and beyond are 
approached, as are specific elements of these, such as Hong Kong’s potential role as a 
Chinese Islamic Finance hub. Finally, several chapters are devoted to Japan’s 
strategic interests and options in the Gulf and both their hitherto domestic 
constraints and possible future developments. A similar analysis is conducted on 
South Korea’s recent military and nuclear cooperation with various Gulf states. 
These two volumes are highly complementary and provide not only very specific 
factual details, but also wide-spectrum analyses on the subject matter. In several 
parts of the thesis, these books are among the most useful academic sources of 
secondary data and analytical arguments. Where edited multi-author books are 
strong, is their flexibility in offering a collection of distinctive sub-topics, which 
single-author monographies cannot do without risking methodological 
inconsistencies or their connected narrative. The latter, on the other hand, Niblock’s 
edited volumes cannot easily provide. Finally, neither of the two books offers 
theoretical frameworks as lenses for interpretation, which can prove to be a strength 
in flexibility and in its focus on facts, as well as a weakness in analytical substance 
simultaneously. History neither was offered much room in any of the books, which is 
forgivable because of the determined specialization on very recent conditions and 
their facts. Yet, when it comes to the normative parts, especially written by Talmiz 
Ahmad, a wider and long-term historical perspective plus historical analogies would 
have made the argument more persuasive. 
In early 2015, two further edited volumes on the subject matter were published. The 
first, edited by Niv Horesh, discussed China’s most recent energy relations with the 
Gulf states and its diplomacy with the wider region. Toward Well-Oiled Relations? – 
China’s Presence in the Middle East Following the Arab Spring brought together a 
range of diverse experts on the topic. Horesh, Yitzhak Shichor, Zan Tao, Christina 
Lin, Robert Bianchi, Mohammed Shareef, Yasser Gadallah, Gawdat Bahgat, Neil 
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Quilliam, Michael Singh, John Garver, Manocher Dorraj, and Ruike Xu tackled 
individual sub-themes around bilateral relations or various issue areas, ranging from 
China, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, and Iraq, to the GCC and Iran, and from energy trade to 
Arab Spring ramifications. However, given this thesis' focus on the Gulf, not all of the 
chapters from this thought-provoking book are relevant here. 
A similar edited volume was published by Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Yukiko 
Miyagi almost simultaneously, with The Emerging Middle East-East Asia Nexus, as 
part of Routledge’s Durham Modern Middle East and Islamic World Series. 
Extending his specialization on the subject matter, first started in his above-
mentioned 2004 volume The Middle East’s Relations with Asia and Russia, 
Etheshami has also emerged, alongside Niv Horesh from the University of 
Nottingham’s former China Policy Institute, as one of UK academia’s most active 
specialists on Asia’s and the Middle East’s New Silk Roads. The 2015 volume rounded 
off papers from a 2014 conference at Durham University’s School of Government and 
International Affairs and features chapters written by Ehteshami, Miyagi, Raymond 
Hinnebusch, Yoshikazu Kobayashi, N. Janardhan, Namie Tsujigami and Koji 
Horinuki, as well as Janet Xuanli Liao, Baris Adibelli, Naser Al-Tamimi, Robert 
Bianchi and Flynt and Hillary Leverett. Their contributions cover the growing inter-
regional connectivity as well as more bilateral cases, mostly surrounding China, 
Japan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, and thereby inevitably including the US’s Middle 
Eastern position and focusing primarily on energy, diplomacy, and strategy. 
Although Asian countries like South Korea and especially India, and the smaller Gulf 
monarchies for example do not feature in chapters with an according bilateral focus, 
the volume comes close to this manuscript’s approach for two reasons. Firstly, the 
inter-regional contextualization is extensive and indeed the book’s major rationale. 
Secondly, and so far, uniquely, some of its chapters feature IR theoretical concepts. 
Indeed, particularly Miyagi and Ehteshami make use of two of this thesis’ theories – 
complex interdependence and neo-realism. Furthermore, they go beyond, employing 
concepts of regionalism and foreign policy analysis. The book is thus the most in-
depth academic analysis of the subject matter and firmly rooted within the IR 
discipline. 
Yet, given its edited character with multiple authors, not all of whom use these 
theories, and since each chapter on its own does not allow for the same kind of space 
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the author of this thesis enjoys, the theoretical discussions in the book cannot hope to 
be as consistent across different stand-alone chapters and cannot hope to be as 
extensive. Nevertheless, the book’s content is of high importance for many of this 
thesis’ chapters. 
Later in 2015, Etheshami complemented his editing activity on the subject matter in a 
special issue of the East Asia journal, titled Regionalization, Pan-Asian Relations 
and the Middle East, for which he served as guest editor. Adopting a similar approach 
to his preceding edited book, the journal’s issue features seven articles. Ehteshami 
introduces its subject matter with a pan-Asian IR regionalist analysis of Middle 
Eastern affairs. The other authors, John Hobson, Sara Bazoobandi, Mhabeni Bona, 
Ceren Ergenc, Sanjay Sharma, Neil Quilliam and Maggie Kamel cover a much more 
diverse range of topics compared to the previously discussed books, both from a 
topical and methodological view-point. Hobson engages in a long-term historical 
analysis of East-West modernization flows across the Eurasian landmass, Bazoobandi 
shows how the nuclear-related sanctions on Iran affected its relations with China, 
Bona conducts discourse analysis of pan-Asian values influencing the Gulf 
monarchies, Ergenc gives an overview of Sino-Turkish relations, Sharma does the 
same for South Korea and the Middle East, and Quilliam and Kamel examine the 
same particular inter-regional relations between the GCC and Asia that are highly 
relevant for this thesis. 
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2. Research Methods, Methodology, and Theoretical Framework 
This thesis aims to outline and analyse the nature and scope of China’s relations with 
the Gulf states and to provide meaning to this subject matter by situating it into 
various contexts. The Literature Review has demonstrated several gaps in the works 
on this relatively new subject matter. Most of the more significant gaps revolve 
around its deeper analysis via contextualization. This thesis first covers the modern 
historical context of former and current outside powers in the Persian Gulf region 
and thereby interprets China’s recent regional economic arrival through this light. 
Second, the thesis also covers the inter-regional context of the New Silk Roads, 
thereby providing overviews of the Gulf states’ economic and diplomatic relations 
with other potential outside powers from Asia, all of which are China’s economic and 
likely geo-political competitors. Third, the thesis briefly outlines China’s general 
economic and diplomatic relations with the whole Gulf region. This is necessary in 
order to provide the direct China-Gulf context for the two case studies chosen by the 
author. In terms of assessing nature and scope of China-Gulf relations, the two case 
studies, on Saudi Arabia and then on the UAE, are therefore the most detailed part of 
the subject matter’s analysis. Hence, this thesis is, to a significant extent, case-study 
driven. Yet, before turning to the methodological discussion around the thesis’ main 
body of work, another important originality lies in the theoretical context. The author 
seeks to introduce the relatively new subject matter of China-Gulf relations and their 
historical and inter-regional contextualization to the International Relations 
discipline on a more extensive scale than previous literature has done, as the 
Literature Review has shown. This undertaking is conducted by utilizing a theoretical 
framework which is to be applied, discussed, and also critiqued throughout the 
manuscript. The two chosen IR theories come under the names of neo-liberal 
institutionalism and neo-realism.  
Hence, the first section of this Methodology Chapter explains the choice of these two 
theories. It then goes on to summarize the core assumptions, notions, concepts, 
arguments and hypotheses of both theories. The second section, Research Design, 
continues to explain the forms of contextualization, as well as the choice of case 
studies, before discussing the research and data collection methods for the thesis. 
Finally, the author characterizes the limits of the thesis’ coverage, briefly outlining 
examples for ideas, methods, and concepts for further research, and thereby 
emphasizes what this thesis does not investigate. 
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2.1 Theoretical Framework: Neo-Liberal Institutionalism vs Neo-Realism 
2.1.1 Choice of Theories and their Ontology and Epistemology 
The subject matter of China’s and wider Asia’s relations with the Gulf states has so far 
been dominated by economic transactions. Trade and investment flows in their 
various forms thereby take up the bulk of the case study chapters, the China-Gulf 
context chapter and the inter-regional context chapter. The historical and 
contemporary context chapters, covering various Gulf outside powers, were and are 
also characterized by economic transactions. However, given that these powers acted 
and act as empires and hegemons, their ties with the Gulf were not confined to trade 
and investment, but had important geo-political, including military dimensions out of 
security and overall power interests.  
The author has chosen and tested two theories which both prioritize these basic 
economic, diplomatic, and strategic interactions, though both have their respective 
priorities. Neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-realism are not only particularly 
fitting to analyse the subject matter and its historical and inter-regional contexts. 
Furthermore, both theories, roughly over the past forty years, have been dominating 
International Relations (IR), a discipline which methodologically mostly works with 
theories.11 Consequently, for an integration of the thesis’ relatively new subject matter 
into the IR discipline, there is a strong case for starting this ongoing process by 
utilizing the discipline’s most important theories. It does not imply that this approach 
ultimately suffices. Rather, it should be seen as a vital starting point for future 
research. Since many other IR theories were coined in reference to and as a critique 
of neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-realism, this invitation for future research 
requires a preceding coverage of both dominant theories. Only after this has been 
provided, which this thesis seeks to contribute towards, can other IR theories be used 
more elegantly as a critique.  
The IR discipline and its specialized sub-discipline, called International Political 
Economy (IPE) have long been dominated by these themes, economic and diplomatic 
relations, and their potential geo-political underpinnings or consequences.12 Yet, 
several other aspects in IR, such as cultural relations and identity politics have also 
                                                          
11 Brown, C., Ainley, K. (2009), Understanding International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, chapters 2-3. 
12 Ibid.: chapter 8. 
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come to play an increasing role – all of which have led to the establishment or revival 
of various and highly different theories, such as IR Marxism, constructivism, the 
English School, or post-modernism. All of these theories are contenders with both 
neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-realism, as well as with each other. This is not 
only because different priorities define them, but also because of their different 
underlying philosophical roots. Their different ontologies and epistemologies in the 
wider area of Social Sciences result in different definitions of what constitutes the IR 
discipline.13 
Here, neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-realism have come to share the same 
paradigm. In view of the author’s choice of the two theories, he therefore necessarily 
adopts the underlying ontology and epistemology of his two theories. This does not 
entail his rejection of other definitions of IR, of other ontologies and epistemologies, 
as indeed he has pointed out that the subject matter requires an ongoing analytical 
enrichment through other methodologies. How useful they all would turn out to be is 
another question and would have to be seen. This invitation for future research, both 
within the IR discipline, but also beyond it, is addressed at the end of this chapter. 
Both neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-realism have their philosophical roots in 
their much older predecessors, classical liberalism and classical realism.14 Yet, their 
neo-versions hold distinctly different ontologies and epistemologies than their 
classical predecessors, from which they are further apart than from each other.  
First, neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism share the same ontology and 
epistemology and by and large also the same methodology. Both assume rationalism 
and self-interest among the actors and thus make use of rational choice theory in the 
methodological tradition of Karl Popper.15 Broadly, this entails a positivist 
epistemology. Positivism is neither a purely empirical theory nor is it a normative one 
but placed neutrally in between.16  Despite the problem of the scholar’s subjectivism, 
positivists believe that objective observation and knowledge is possible. They can use 
                                                          
13 Ibid.: chapters 2-3. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Hindmoor, A. (2010), ‘Rational Choice’. In: D. Marsh, G. Stoker (eds.), Theory and Methods in 
Political Science. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, p. 42.   
16 Furlong, P. Marsh, D. (2010), ‘A Skin not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science’. 
In: D. Marsh, G. Stoker (eds.), Theory and Methods in Political Science. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillian, p. 29. 
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theories ‘to generate hypotheses which can be tested by direct observation’.17 
Empirical proof can be delivered, also due to positivism’s deliberately limited 
ontology which excludes irrational and, crucially, non-material factors. The ontology 
is therefore foundationalist, meaning that a material reality and truth exists in the 
world, independent of human knowledge of that reality and humans’ discursive 
constructs.18 In the IR context, this again entails that a foundationalist ontology and a 
positivist epistemology assume that the international system holds the same 
knowable laws as systems in the natural world and that these can be extracted by a 
rationalist and materialist focus.19  This makes them explanatory and predictive 
theories, rather than for example, normative theories. Using a framework of neo-
liberal institutionalism and neo-realism thus requires the author to test their broader 
or more detailed hypotheses. From a positivist viewpoint, the results are falsifiable 
truths.20  
Second, both are structural theories, not behavioural theories. In the agency-
structure debate they consequently fall on the latter side, even though their 
epistemology is diametrically opposed to philosophical structuralism and should not 
be confused. Both theories are state-centric, even as they acknowledge the existence 
and relevance of other actors, especially neo-liberal institutionalism. This assumption 
and the theories’ structural nature are addressed in more detail below, as some of the 
major texts of both theories are discussed.  
In the interest of brevity, and due to the more general nature of the hypotheses at the 
end of this section, the author merely covers some of the most representative and 
helpful theoretical works, more precisely, what could be understood as the 
“foundational” texts of various strands in both theories. The following section does 
therefore not intend a complete overview of what has been dubbed the ‘neo-neo 
debate’.21 
 
                                                          
17 Ibid.: p. 194. 
18 Ibid.: pp. 186-190. 
19 Ibid.: pp. 212-215. 
20 Ibid.: pp. 27-28.  
21 See: Keohane, R., (ed.) (1986), Neorealism and its Critics. New York City: Columbia University 
Press; Nye, J. (1988), ‘Neorealism and Neoliberalism’. In: World Politics, 40:2, pp. 235-251; Waever, 
O. (1996), ‘Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate’. In: S. Smith, K. Booth, M. Zalewski (eds.), 
International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 149-185. 
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2.1.2 Complex Interdependence 
Though the term neo-liberal institutionalism was only used from the 1980s onwards, 
the theory was born in the 1970s. Among its most important founders are Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye. Their 1977 book Power and Interdependence launched one 
of neo-liberal institutionalism’s most important sub-theories.22 Complex 
interdependence theory (CIT) is indeed also this thesis’ most usable and significant 
component in its wider theoretical framework, because the specific condition, level, 
nature, scope, and respective relevance of interdependence between China and the 
Gulf is a fundamental element in the research question.  
According to Keohane and Nye, interdependence is a condition between a specific 
number of actors. The currently popular terms globalism or globalization describe an 
overarching condition of the world that interdependent states bring about.23  
 
Levels and Distributions of (Inter-)dependence 
An interdependent relationship reigns when its potential breakup would have 
‘reciprocal costly effects’.24 This is different from a relationship where simply 
interconnectedness reigns, because the latter would enable a breakup without paying 
a noteworthy price. 
Furthermore, Keohane and Nye make clear that there are often different levels of 
power recourses involved in an interdependent relationship. With this in mind, they 
differentiate between ‘symmetrical’ and ‘asymmetrical interdependence’ – mutual 
benefits and mutual costs, but to different degrees, and therefore with differing 
values of stakes, for both actors.25  
Last, but not least, the level of interdependence for both actors is a crucial variable 
when assessing unilateral freedom of action. Whereas interconnectedness involves no 
costs for both actors in case of a breakup, interdependence does. However, to what 
degree? Here, Keohane and Nye again differentiate between ‘sensitivity 
interdependence’ and ‘vulnerability interdependence’, with the former implying a 
significant, but still bearable cost for the actors. The latter would constitute an 
                                                          
22 Keohane, R., Nye, J. (2011), Power and Interdependence. London: Longman. 
23 Ibid.: chapter 10. 
24 Ibid.:  p. 15. 
25 Ibid.: pp. 15-16. 
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unacceptable cost.26 Ending a vulnerably interdependent relationship would cause 
such an amount of damage that this is at least very unlikely to occur. 
 
The Characteristics of Complex Interdependence 
Therefore, what does this condition entail for the characteristics of an interdependent 
relationship between two (or more) states? For Keohane and Nye, complex 
interdependence is an ideal type, formulated in direct opposition to another ideal 
type – realism.27 Neither of both ideal types are ever quite met in the real world, but 
for the IR scholar, the interesting question is when and where on a scale between 
these two opposite poles reality can be placed. This is likely to differ case by case. 
Realism, Keohane and Nye observe, holds three core assumptions: Firstly, it is a 
purely state-centric theory disinterested in placing value towards non-state actors 
and their relationships. Secondly, in a realist world, force or the threat of force is the 
most effective tool for states to secure their interests. And thirdly, there is a clear 
‘hierarchy of issue areas’ with ‘military security dominating’ all others.28  
The ideal type of complex interdependence, on the other hand, challenges all three of 
those assumptions: Firstly, in an interdependent world, ‘multiple channels’ connect 
societies at various state levels and far beyond – and these diverse connections have 
an impact on political and economic conditions. Secondly, no military force is 
exercised when complex interdependence prevails. And thirdly, interdependence 
ensures an ‘absence of hierarchy among issue areas’ where security and geo-political 
power is only one of many equally serious sectors, concerns and interests of states.29  
 
The Political Process of Complex Interdependence 
After defining the characteristics of complex interdependence, Keohane and Nye turn 
to the ‘political process’ that shapes it. They outline five different variables. 
                                                          
26 Ibid.: pp. 10-11. 
27 Ibid.: p. 19. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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Firstly, actors need to ‘translate power resources into power […] over outcomes’.30 
This will be more difficult under complex interdependence conditions, because a 
variety of state goals (across various internationally connected ministries and offices) 
makes it impossible to satisfy everyone’s interests via one overarching strategy.  
Secondly, the extent of ‘linkage strategies’ can influence policy outcomes. Usually, 
linkage is resisted, because domestic and transnational actors in specific issue areas 
have different interests than those in other issue areas. Whilst for realists world 
politics is one issue area where military and economic dominance ensures positive 
outcomes for great powers, in a complex interdependence world it is the power within 
each issue area that matters. Joint interests of various actors incentivize policy-
makers to resist issue linkage.31  
Thirdly, a world of multiple issues of equal importance will necessitate the decision-
makers to prioritize issues. ‘Agenda setting’ of issues shape part of the political 
process that brings about growing interdependence.32 This usually involves a cost-
and-benefit analysis that seeks gains somewhere and accepts losses elsewhere. 
Fourthly, the level of ‘transnational and transgovernmental relations’ becomes more 
extensive and diverse and therefore different networks that form multiple channels 
connecting societies and governments have an impact on a policy formulation. This 
process blurs the line between domestic and foreign policy in each country.33 
Last but not least, the ‘role of international organizations’ is increased in a world of 
interdependent states. IOs group issues together productively and advise 
governments. The latter do not have to follow the IOs’ advice, but need to be aware of 
reputation, which can be damaged if too much unilateralism is pursued.34 A damaged 
reputation seeds distrust and ultimately harms a state’s interests in future deal-
making capacity. 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 Ibid.: p. 25. 
31 Ibid.: p. 25-26. 
32 Ibid.: p. 27. 
33 Ibid.: pp. 28-29. 
34 Ibid.: pp. 29-30. 
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The Management of Interdependence 
In order to avoid excessive unilateralism and revisionism, a world of complex 
interdependence relies on international regimes that establish rules everyone is 
expected to follow in the name of stability, transparency, and joint gains. The politics 
of regime-creation, -maintenance, and -change is what Keohane and Nye focus on 
last. They observe four processes that help create, help to maintain or change 
international regimes. 
Firstly, the ‘economic process’ explanation sees market forces on their own shaping a 
regime in favour of free trade and relatively open borders. As Keohane and Nye point 
out, this goes in line with Neo-Classical Economic Theory in the broad tradition of 
e.g. Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Richard Cobden.35 The idea of the market’s 
invisible hand ensuring gains for all societies and their individuals takes on a world-
wide dimension in the era of globalization and therefore sees more states than ever 
before subscribing – under formally sovereign conditions – to a regime in favour of 
relatively free trade. 
Secondly, often regimes require a creator and leader who enforces, or changes it if 
considered necessary. An eroding regime can see a superpower interfere in order to 
save it or build a new one – if that is possible. This is because there is often a 
correlation if not a causation of the superpower’s eroding hegemony. Keohane’s and 
Nye’s ‘overall power structure’ explanation is more in line with what has been called 
hegemonic stability theory (HST) and even realism where great powers need to act as 
a stabilizer and public goods provider.36 
Thirdly, Keohane and Nye assign huge importance to the ‘issue structure’. According 
to this explanation, power is often distributed differently among issue areas instead 
of across the board. In an interdependent world, where destructive issue-linkage is 
mostly avoided, merely emphasizing states’ general capabilities without examining 
specific issue areas clouds the actual power of states over international regimes. 
Nevertheless, just like the overall power structure explanation, the issue structure 
model defines power as control over resources which influence a regime.37  
                                                          
35 Ibid.: pp. 33-34. 
36 Ibid.: pp. 35-39. For more on HST and realism, see below. 
37 Ibid.: pp. 42-45. 
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Last but not least, the ‘international organization’ model captures the less state-
centric world of complex interdependence where transnational elites and their 
networks influence regime creation, maintenance, or overthrow.38  
To recapitulate, Keohane and Nye provide this thesis with four levels of analysis: the 
extent and distribution of (inter)dependence; the characteristics of complex 
interdependence which are set directly against the opposing ideal type of realism; the 
political process that brings about complex interdependence; as well as 
interdependence-related creation and/or change of international regimes. In the IR 
theory landscape, these levels of analysis have been widely embraced and refined, as 
well as critiqued. Keohane’s and Nye’s key intra-paradigm antagonist, Kenneth Waltz, 
did so only shortly after – with a re-definition of IR’s oldest school of thought, 
including a re-interpretation of interdependence in world affairs. His transformative 
work marked the birth of neo-realism. 
 
2.1.3 Systemic Anarchy 
Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979) is considered one of the 
landmark works in the IR discipline and enjoys a constitution-like status for neo-
realists (also called structural realists).39 As the latter’s name and the book’s title hint 
at, Waltz’s theory is a structural, or a systemic theory. This mirrors much of 
Keohane’s and Nye’s methodology in their CIT. 
 
Systemic Theory 
‘One cannot infer the condition of international politics from the internal 
composition of states, nor can one arrive at an understanding of international politics 
by summing the foreign policies and the external behaviors of states’.40 Rather, Waltz 
emphasizes the necessity to analyse ‘how [they] stand in relation to each other’.41 This 
does not imply ignoring the capabilities of a state – i.e. looking inside the unit. What 
matters is how the capabilities compare to those of other states in the system. And 
these comparisons automatically influence foreign policy behaviours, even if they do 
                                                          
38 Ibid.: pp. 46-49. 
39 Waltz, K. (2010), Theory of International Politics. Long Rove: Waveland Press. 
40 Ibid.: p. 64. 
41 Ibid.: p. 82. 
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not completely determine decisions. These systemic factors though, Waltz notes, are 
constantly central enough to enable the IR scholar to extract relatively regular 
patterns of conduct in international relations, even though his theory does not equip 
him with specific predictive instruments. 
Still, it is possible to specify conditions under which different developments stand a 
higher or lower chance of occurring. Especially because of great powers’ shifting 
capabilities ‘[s]tructures […] may suddenly change. […] Distinguishing between 
anarchic structures of different type permits somewhat narrower and more precise 
definitions of expected outcomes’.42  
Waltz stresses though that structures should not be treated as agents, simply because 
they influence the behaviour of units. Structures have an indirect impact. Effects in 
international politics ‘are produced in two ways: through socialization of the actors 
and through competition among them’: A influences B and vice versa; But: ‘Each is 
not just influencing the other: both are being influenced by the situation their 
interaction creates’.43 The regularity of this dynamic is what then encourages ‘norms’ 
and ‘conformity’.44 
This points to one of Waltz’s key assumptions: Systemic factors force units to behave 
in a rational way. The least irrational units will be the most successful actors. Thus, a 
successful unit entices other units to try and compete. Some then do so successfully, 
others fail. ‘And thus the units that survive come to look like one another. Patterns 
are formed’.45 
 
Political Structure 
Yet, units, as Waltz points out, and unit-level phenomena need to be left out of any 
structural theory.  
‘Abstracting from the attributes of units means leaving aside questions about the kinds of political 
leaders, social and economic institutions, and ideological commitments states may have. Abstracting 
from relations means leaving aside questions about the cultural, economic, political, and military 
interactions of states’.46 
                                                          
42 Ibid.: p. 70.  
43 Ibid.: p. 74. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid.: p. 77. 
46 Ibid: p. 80.  
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In order to identify what needs to be ignored and what included, a definition of 
“relations” is required. Waltz differentiates between two relevant meanings: the 
‘interaction of units’ as well as ‘the positions they occupy vis-à-vis each other’.47 The 
structure and its interacting parts form the system. 
The units of the international system face a different structure than domestic units 
inside the state, where they are hierarchically ordered. In the international arena 
‘[f]ormally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is 
required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic’.48 Here, Waltz 
draws from Adam Smith’s classical economic theory, pointing to the fact that as firms 
and individual persons (units) act as “economic men” to maximize profits (micro-
economic theory), they thereby produce an outcome – the market (laissez-faire) – 
which forms a structure that does not resemble the units’ intentions. In a world of 
sovereignty, following the incentive to survive, states help themselves. This 
assumption forms the central pillar of Waltz’s theory. Acknowledging the existence of 
other international actors than survival-seeking states, he observes that it still is at 
least the major states, i.e. the great powers, who are the most influential units of the 
system. ‘[A] theory that denies the central role of states will be needed only when 
nonstate actors develop to a point of rivalling or surpassing the great powers, not just 
a few of the minor ones’.49 
The structure of the system is largely formed by the number of great powers 
exercising most influence (on others and therefore on the system itself). More 
specifically, this means the following: 
‘The structure of the system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system’s 
units. And changes in structure change expectations about how the units of the system will behave and 
about the outcomes their interactions will produce. […] Power is estimated by comparing the 
capabilities of a number of units. Although capabilities are attributes of units, the distribution of 
capabilities across units is not. The distribution of capabilities is not a unit attribute, but a system-wide 
concept’. 50 
 
Anarchic Conditions and the Balance of Power 
The resulting structure of the international system may be a balanced or unbalanced 
one. However, Waltz is convinced the units strive to create a balance over time, even 
                                                          
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid.: p. 88. 
49 Ibid.: p. 95.  
50 Ibid.: pp. 97-98. 
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if they constantly upset it again through war. Due to anarchy, war or the constant 
threat of war is a natural state of affairs and will always occur from time to time.51 
This happens despite interdependence – contrary to Keohane’s and Nye’s 
interpretation. Waltz maintains that as long as the world is composed of sovereign 
states, interdependence will only leave nations or citizens relatively loosely connected 
across borders.52 Whilst interdependence might facilitate easier and more regular 
cooperation, still ‘the structure of international politics limits the cooperation of 
states in two ways’:53 
Firstly, in a self-help system relative gains matter more than absolute gains – another 
key disagreement with neo-liberal institutionalism. A state needs to ask the question 
whether the other state will use its enhanced capability against it. ‘[T]he condition of 
insecurity – at the least, the uncertainty of each about the other’s future intentions 
and actions – works against their cooperation’.54  
Secondly, political or economic cooperation creates dependence and dependence 
limits autonomy – making the state more vulnerable. ‘States that are heavily 
dependent, or closely interdependent, worry about securing that which they depend 
on. […] Like other organizations, states seek to control what they depend on or to 
lessen the extent of their dependency’.55 These observations indeed mirror CIT. 
However, neo-realism underlines the dependent state’s structural incentives to 
reduce that dependence. CIT believes such an undertaking to be impossible without 
efficiency- and gains loss. 
Waltz does not further elaborate on these potential consequences, because he 
assumes their relative irrelevance for one important reason: his assumption mirrors 
Keohane’s and Nye’s characterization of realism when they assume it to believe in a 
hierarchy of issue areas and the supremacy of security. Waltz explains this by 
emphasizing that all organizations have two goals: ‘to get something done and to 
maintain themselves as organizations. Many of their activities are directed toward the 
second purpose’.56  
                                                          
51 Ibid.: p. 102. 
52 Ibid.: p. 105. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid.: p. 106. 
56 Ibid.: p. 111. 
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This purpose Waltz stresses to be particularly pressing, because in a self-help system 
governed by international anarchy rather than legitimacy, uncertainty of other states’ 
intentions is the only certainty. In international politics, a struggle for capabilities, 
‘force serves, not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and constant one’.57 
The only reason why outright war is not a constant is that its prospect has ‘sobering 
effects’ on the relations between states.58 Yet, these sobering effects, as Waltz 
underlines, are not part of the structure. They are part of a process that has its impact 
on international politics but cannot change the structure of anarchy itself. Realpolitik 
is the necessary result of these structural constraints. The logical result of every 
state’s Realpolitik then, at least over time, is a rough balance of power – even if the 
theory cannot predict when and how it will be brought about. 
 ‘In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other 
goals as tranquility, profit and power. Because power is a means and not an end, states prefer to join 
the weaker of two coalitions. They cannot let power, a possibly useful means, become the end they 
pursue. The goal the system encourages them to seek is security. Increased power may or may not 
serve that end. […] If states wished to maximize power, they would join the stronger side, and we 
would see not balances forming but a world hegemony forged. This does not happen because 
balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behavior induced by the system. The first concern of states is not 
to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system. […] Secondary states, if they are free 
to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them […] provided […] that 
the coalition they join achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from 
attacking’.59  
This is where Waltz is challenged not only by neo-liberal institutionalists, who would 
indeed point towards a considerably enduring hegemonic liberal order. He is also 
challenged by his fellow neo-realists Stephen Walt – who seeks to specify more 
clearly when states balance and when they bandwagon – and by John Mearsheimer – 
who disagrees with Waltz’s defensive interpretation, at least when great powers are 
involved (see below). 
 
Interdependence and (In-)stability 
The crucial neo-realist observation here though, is that due to the anarchic 
international system, units always face the same constraints over time – even if 
admittedly at different levels. Large units with great capabilities can influence the 
                                                          
57 Ibid.: p. 113. 
58 Ibid.: p. 114. 
59 Ibid.: pp. 126-127. 
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structure.60 In terms of stability, Waltz observes that a small number of (large) units 
is better than a large number of (small) units.  
‘Smaller systems are more stable, and their members are better able to manage affairs for their mutual 
benefit. Stable systems are self-reinforcing, moreover, because understanding others’ behavior making 
agreements with them, and policing the agreements become easier through continued experience’.61  
This realization entails another vital disagreement with neo-liberal institutionalism 
and CIT. Higher complexity does not reduce the danger of conflict, it increases it. And 
higher interdependence makes the world more complex. This is why Waltz concludes 
the opposite of Keohane and Nye: 
 ‘In a self-help system, interdependence seems to loosen as the number of parties declines, and as it 
does so the system becomes more orderly and peaceful. As with other international political concepts, 
interdependence looks different when viewed in light of our theory. Many seem to believe that a 
growing closeness improves the chances of peace. But close interdependence means closeness of 
contact and raises the prospect of occasional conflict. It is impossible to get a war going unless the 
participants are somehow linked. Interdependent states whose relations remain unregulated must 
experience conflict and will occasionally fall into violence. If interdependence grows at a pace that 
exceeds the development of central control, then interdependence hastens the occasion of war’.62 
Waltz points towards history which demonstrates that such an order is not safe from 
a breakdown, because a definition of ‘interdependence as sensitivity leads to a[…] 
[purely] economic interpretation of the world’.63 He again stresses the importance of 
overall capabilities, because their relative distribution affects how flexibly a country 
can adapt to “quantitative” and “qualitative” interdependence, even if he does not 
incorporate Keohane’s and Nye’s concept of interdependence’s different 
(a)symmetry-levels.64 One could add, that where realists are accused of elevating the 
security issue area, neo-liberalists could be accused of elevating economic ones. 
 
Military Power and the Security Dilemma 
Military power remains the most important variable with which to determine the 
structure of the international system, Waltz underlines. It sets the stage on how to 
measure it via the identification of alliances and antagonisms. A bipolar structure he 
identifies as the most stable. This is partly, because he believes that the resulting 
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62 Ibid.: p. 138. 
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60 
 
unequal alliances do not give the junior partners any good options, entailing them to 
follow their superpower leaders.65  
Force is meaningful primarily not through direct usage – which reduces its “value” – 
but through the power that derives from a military deterrent. Hence, it is a question 
of structure which causes its units to face what John Herz defined as the “security 
dilemma”. Since capabilities are the only “certainty”, states find themselves in a 
condition in which they, ‘unsure of one another’s intentions, arm for the sake of 
security and in doing so set a vicious circle in motion’, even if they are not aiming for 
that result.66  
 
Great Power Management 
If for a state the outcome of a struggle is the accumulation of power, then what are 
that state’s subsequent intentions? Waltz emphasizes the impact of great power 
status. His most important realization involves the great power’s interest in “system 
management” – the greater the power the greater the ability to shape and maintain 
the international system. Here, Waltz’s theory is moving closer to Keohane’s (and 
Nye’s) writings (even though significant differences remain). Since superpowers hold 
a much higher stake in the stability and maintenance of “their” system, ‘absolute 
gains become more important as competition lessens’.67 A superpower with system-
wider interests will be interested in defending all those concerns and thereby will be 
interested in defending the system as such, even if it requires seemingly altruistic 
costs and sacrifices. 
This does not mean that the existence of great powers with those interests will make 
‘collective action for the common good’ easy. Even great powers will be hesitant 
spending and sacrificing where their own direct interests or the system’s interests are 
not significantly affected. ‘Internationally, collective goods may not be provided 
because the providers would be serving some who evade paying their share of the 
costs’.68  
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The extent of the superpower’s power will be a variable for its likelihood to get 
involved.69 Hence, the more superpowers compose the system, the larger the room for 
major disagreement and conflict – and the higher the likelihood for a major ‘system-
transforming war’.70 Bilateral disagreement need not even be the cause of this 
conflict. The extended system-wide interests that great powers follow often involve 
these principal actors in international politics having potentially vital stakes in far-
flung regions. ‘Great powers have an interest in areas whose instability may lead to 
their involvement and, through involvement, to war’.71 If such areas are of crucial 
strategic importance – in other words if the great powers are somewhat dependent on 
them – the likelihood of escalation increases still. 
It is obvious though, as Waltz admits, that in the industrial and nuclear age, great 
power wars, and even smaller wars, quickly bare high costs and existential threats. 
How do superpowers therefore seek to avoid conflict and hence such costs, both 
during their global dominance, but especially once their hegemony declines? In his 
responses to Waltzian neo-realism this constitutes Robert Keohane’s central question 
in his key publication After Hegemony.72  
 
2.1.4 Eroding Hegemony and International Regimes  
Both neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists are not only systemic or structural 
theorists, but are considered “state-centric”, even if at varying degrees. This results in 
the assumption that the system is made up of units (rationally acting states), and that 
domestic factors are constants, not variables.73  
Both also believe that the international system is composed of different kinds of 
structures at different times and that the differences are by and large determined by 
the number of great powers and their blocs and alliances. Most would broadly 
differentiate between bipolar and multipolar systems, and some would further 
differentiate within the two concepts. Others also acknowledge the possibility of 
completely unipolar systems. 
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Whether they acknowledge the latter or not, most would agree with the notion that 
often any kind of the aforementioned polarities is dominated by a hegemon – a first 
among equals setting the rules of the game. Such a hegemon, as Waltz himself hinted 
at towards the end of his Theory of International Politics, not only enjoys larger 
power and autonomy, but also “tragically” inherits more interests to defend as a 
result. These include the interest of sustaining the system itself – necessitating the 
sometimes costly role of a global public goods provider. This line of thought has 
found its representation in hegemonic stability theory (HST) which finds its 
adherents in both neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism. Robert Gilpin is one 
of its most prominent realist representatives, whereas Charles Kindleberger and 
Stephen Krasner belong to the liberal school.74 
Robert Keohane also acknowledges HST’s basic insights and the historic usefulness of 
a hegemon creating and successfully spreading institutions that inherit its beliefs and 
goals. In an increasingly interdependent world this means that such global 
hegemonic institutions group some issues together in order to coordinate and 
manage them via international regimes.75 He adopts Stephen Krasner’s definition that 
regimes are ‘principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures’.76 
However, whereas realists and most neo-liberalists who subscribe to HST predict the 
inevitable erosion of these institutions following the hegemon’s own decline, Keohane 
challenges the notion of hegemony being the only way to reach international stability 
via the same set of rules. A unipolar kind of Pax Romana, Pax Britannica, or Pax 
Americana might be a helpful asset. Yet, neither is it a guarantee for stability and 
cooperation, nor is it an ironclad prerequisite – as international regimes may be more 
than capable to prevent disorder. Once these have been established, ‘post-hegemonic 
cooperation is also possible’.77  
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Harmony, Cooperation, and Discord 
Yet, mutual effort needs to be actively enabled and implemented. Keohane identifies 
three distinct, possible conditions of the relations between at least two states: 
harmony, cooperation, and discord. ‘Harmony refers to a situation in which actors’ 
policies (pursued in their own self-interest without regard for others) automatically 
facilitate the attainment of others’ goals’.78 In this idealized scenario cooperation is 
not even necessary, since the latter ‘requires that the actions of separate individuals 
or organizations be brought into conformity with one another’.79 If in the absence of 
harmony, no such attempts of ‘policy coordination’ and adjustment are made, ‘the 
result is discord’.80 This again can be reacted to with coordination or without. Either 
cooperation or further discord (and conflict) will ensue.  
All in all, cooperation usually tends to be the most likely state of affairs in 
international relations as Keohane seeks to demonstrate in his book. Discord, 
however, ‘tends to predominate over harmony as the initial result of independent 
governmental action’ even where generally benign intentions reign.81 
 
International Regimes 
Under the rational actor assumption, international and supranational institutions, 
including international regimes, Keohane shows, are the most efficient and promising 
vehicles to achieve that cooperation. A strong regime sees tight connections between 
a certain set of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures regarding 
the management of a corresponding issue area. Such strong connections are realized 
not through a hegemon’s enforcement, but once the regime’s plenty subscribers 
cherish its institutional automatism, clarity, and efficiency in a complex and 
interdependent world. Absolute gains are achieved out of the same self-interests 
Waltz’s sovereign units follow. This does not entail that the reign of regimes is a static 
condition:  
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‘Since issue-areas depend on actors’ perceptions and behavior rather than on inherent qualities of the 
subject-matters, their boundaries change gradually over time. […] Issue-areas are defined and 
redefined by changing patterns of human intervention; so are international regimes’.82  
A further important aspect is that ‘injunctions of international regimes rarely affect 
economic transactions directly’.83 These are done by state institutions; so are specific 
interstate treaties and agreements that govern the states’ injunctions. However, these 
agreements rarely exist in a vacuum. Indeed ‘a major function of regimes is to 
facilitate the making of specific cooperative agreements among governments’ in the 
first place.84  
 
Game Theory and Interdependence 
Keohane demonstrates that the same rational-choice-assumption that neo-realists 
utilize to explain an anarchy-induced and Machiavellian “all against all” can have 
very different outcomes under different conditions. He does this by highlighting the 
limitations of neo-realism’s favourite game theory: the prisoners’ dilemma. The 
latter’s calculation acknowledges the actors benefiting from ‘mutual cooperation, but 
[…] more from double-crossing’ one another.85  
The neo-liberalist’s problem with the constants and variables at the disposal of the 
classic prisoners’ dilemma is that they are not complete. Whilst not dismissing the 
prisoner’s dilemma’s value entirely Keohane identifies a major problem with what he 
calls the “single play prisoners’ dilemma”. The latter’s ontology, Keohane stresses, 
ignores a world beyond the moment of that one game – a dangerous 
oversimplification. The reality of having to “play multiple games” over time and 
involving the same participants creates an entirely different decision-making 
calculus. Defection in one game will haunt the defector in the next. In other words, 
actors need to take into consideration not only the immediate benefits, but especially 
their long-term liabilities and the overall consequences of their decisions. The 
‘Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma’ accounts for this – not only from a rational but even 
from an egoistic point of view. Robert Axelrod has demonstrated how cooperation 
can emerge from a policy of “tit-for-tat” that allows for defection and retaliation and 
the learning-effect this has on the actors in terms of egoistically seeing the benefits of 
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cooperation.86 The incentive to defect is greatly reduced.87 This is even more the case 
in an interdependent world with high ‘issue-density’.88  
The theory of collective action reaches the same conclusion. A group’s members that 
monitor each other closely can reward and punish. They can thus replace a single 
hegemon from taking over the enforcement role. This is exactly what international 
regimes frequently enable.89  
 
Functioning Regimes 
A problem with rational-choice analysis, Keohane underlines though, is that it leads 
‘immediately […] to functional arguments’.90 Functionalism’s post hoc nature does 
not allow for contingency in the outcomes of potentially different initial motivations. 
However, Keohane sees functionalism as a useful first step to address why ‘political 
market failure’ occurs and how regimes can help prevent this from happening.91  
Regimes are created as a reaction to increased issue density. Closely connected issues 
are then grouped together to form issue areas that the regime “governs”. Successful 
regimes therefore organize a ‘productive issue-linkage’ that enables more effective 
problem-solving.92 Simultaneously, this process inhibits ‘destructive issue-linkage’ 
and incentivizes states to clearly define and separate the issue areas.93 Once an 
interdependent world is collectively managed, transparency is elevated, and breaking 
the rules of such a system involves higher costs for everyone. ‘Political market failure’ 
is more likely when there is less or no transparency and the threat of destructive 
issue-linkage incentivizes cooperation. Even though enforcing ‘retaliatory linkage’ 
following a breach, involves high costs also for the “punisher(s)” and is thus only 
likely when the initial rule-breaker has caused severe damage, the long-term losses in 
efficiency, information-access or wealth are usually feared enough by the members of 
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a regime.94 Keohane highlights how a state’s ‘reputation’ and therefore its future 
attractiveness to others for deal-making can be at stake. 
Deal-making essentially involves the written or unwritten rules of reciprocity. 
Interstate cooperation executed in a reciprocal manner is assisted by the relevant 
regimes. Having touched upon the reciprocity logic in After Hegemony, Keohane 
analyses it more closely in his follow-up publication International Institutions and 
State Power (1989).  
 
Reciprocity 
Keohane differentiates between a stricter and more direct ‘specific reciprocity’ which 
is often followed by newly cooperating and therefore considerably distrustful actors, 
and ‘diffuse reciprocity’ which allows for a loose, open, and more trustful relationship 
where actors do not require an instant quid pro quo.95  
He then discusses two essential forms of the concept. First, ‘contingency’ refers to a 
dimension where conditionality is the focal point. ‘Reciprocal behavior returns ill for 
ill as well as good for good’.96 Second, ‘equivalence’ serves as a rough guide word to 
what equals in international relations expect from each other’s obligations.97 Good 
can not only be traded for good and bad for bad – the nature and extent of the deed 
requires a fairly equally valued deed in return. Yet, reciprocity ‘can also characterize 
relations among unequals, for instance, between a patron and his client, when there 
is little prospect of equivalent exchange. Patron-client relationships are characterized 
by exchanges of mutually valued but noncomparable goods and services’.98 
However, measuring exact equivalence will be somewhat impossible unless the 
reciprocal agreement is the trade of economic goods with exact values/prices.99 
Saudi-American “oil for security”-agreements though are hardly calculable in value. 
Keohane even gives an example reflecting a scenario not unlike the story behind more 
recent US-guaranteed Gulf security. ‘How is one to ascertain the relative value of a 
superpower’s pledge to protect an ally from attack, on the one hand, and the ally’s 
                                                          
94 Ibid., p. 85-105. 
95 Keohane, R. (1989), International Institutions and State Power. Essays in International Relations 
Theory. Boulder: Westview. 
96 Ibid., p. 135.  
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid.: p. 136 
67 
 
willingness to accept stationing of the superpower’s troops in its territory, on the 
other’.100 Nevertheless, Keohane insists on the possibility of determining at least 
approximate equivalence in reciprocity. 
In specific reciprocity, the actors’ behaviour equals a “tit-for-tat” – which can 
encourage and cement cooperation but can also go disastrously wrong. Instead of 
trading good for good, the actors could end up trading bad for bad and creating a real 
deadlock.101  
The problems reciprocity faces in the multilateral rather than merely bilateral context 
are quite different in nature. A context in which a group of states benefit from 
somebody else’s provision of a public good creates incentives for individual states to 
“free-ride”. Hence, cooperation in producing the public good is less likely than in a 
bilateral relationship.102 Why reciprocal behaviour would suffer from this free-rider 
problem is easily understood:  
‘Incentives to police an agreement by retaliating against defectors are likely to be much lower than in 
bilateral games, since the “policeman” will suffer the opprobrium of other actors, while gaining only a 
small portion of the benefits of enforcing the rules. Thus if a given actor’s violation of a particular rule 
does not directly threaten the benefits received by the group, retaliation is unlikely to be severe. As a 
consequence, the incentive to cooperate provided by reciprocity – that defection will lead to 
punishment by one’s partners – may not prove compelling in a multilateral situation’.103  
Yet, these observations by Keohane are probably more accurate inside a more 
established alliance or cooperative multilateral grouping where diffuse reciprocity has 
already become the norm. Defectors in such a grouping where specific reciprocity still 
reigns are more likely to spawn entirely different consequences. Since specific 
reciprocity is conditional, a country adopting this policy in a multilateral context and 
in circumstances of significant interdependence with several countries will create a 
negative reciprocal chain reaction amongst all those other countries. ‘Where many 
issues and many countries are involved, insisting on specific reciprocity can create 
administrative and diplomatic nightmares’.104  
This scenario leads to Keohane’s concept of ‘diffuse reciprocity’. Its key term is 
“obligation”, which is far too vague to fall under the concept of specific reciprocity. 
‘Since practitioners of diffuse reciprocity do not receive direct rewards for their 
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cooperative actions, a pattern of diffuse reciprocity can be maintained only by a 
widespread sense of obligation’.105  
The success of diffuse reciprocity in a multilateral or bilateral relationship is often 
based on a successful process of specific reciprocity first. Timing is one of the key 
variables. For specific reciprocity to become successfully institutionalized, much less 
to lead to diffuse reciprocity, exchange must take place sequentially rather than 
simultaneously’.106 The latter timing, on the contrary, as Keohane exemplifies, is more 
a sign of hostility and distrust, as parties fear to be double-crossed. It is sequential 
reciprocity that creates more benign perceptions and actions.107  
This can lead to the rarer condition of diffuse reciprocity. The latter though carries 
with it many advantages, but also the danger of hosting a free-rider in the midst of 
the group who would then create a dilemma for the other states contributing to the 
public good.  
 
Narrowing the Debate’s Gap 
When a mixture of these circumstances becomes the norm and trade and investment 
is facilitated through treaties and political cooperation the central argument that neo-
liberal institutionalism holds onto is that such relationships can foster peace and 
stability rather than anarchic rivalries and conflict. Political order underpinned by a 
public-goods-providing hegemon or even by efficient and accepted international 
regimes though is the precondition for the more idealistic commercial peace theory 
associated with classical liberalism. Keohane’s contributions have moved liberal 
arguments closer to accepted neo-realist constraints.  
 
2.1.5 Defensive Realism and Alliance Formations 
Placed in the same theoretical tradition as Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt’s The 
Origins of Alliances (1987) stands among neo-realism's key texts. What sets Walt's 
book apart is merely a specification of a narrower topic within international politics. 
As the book’s title shows Walt deals with alliances and their formation and break up, 
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rather than international politics as a whole. Walt seeks to answer the following 
questions: 
'What causes states to support one another's foreign policy or territorial integrity? How do statesmen 
choose among potential threats when seeking external support? How do great powers choose which 
states to protect, and how do weaker states decide whose protection to accept? In short, how do states 
choose their friends'.108  
These questions involve a debate between two different alliance incentives and 
outcomes that states face – do they tend to balance or bandwagon? 
 
Balancing vs. Bandwagoning 
Balance-of-power theory hypothesizes that ‘states join alliances to protect themselves 
from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat’.109 It would 
predict the states in question to join the weaker of two sides in order to avoid 
domination by those states or coalitions with superior resources. ‘Joining the weaker 
side increases the new member’s influence within the alliance, because the weaker 
side has greater need for assistance. Allying with the stronger side, by contrast gives 
the new member little influence (because it adds relatively less to the coalition)’.110  
Bandwagoning behaviour though claims the opposite. Deterred by a great power and 
its threat potential, weaker states choose the presumed safer option of joining the 
great power rather than resisting it. Why should this be considered safer? ‘The belief 
that states are prone to bandwagoning implies that most alliances are extremely 
fragile’ for two motives: ‘First, bandwagoning may be a form of appeasement […] 
Second, a state may align with the dominant side in wartime in order to share the 
spoils of victory’.111 The former reason inherits a defensive, the latter an offensive 
motivation. 
Choosing between balancing and bandwagoning, Walt shows, depends to a large 
extent on the nature of the threat, not merely the extent of the threat’s power, as 
traditional balancing and bandwagoning theories have asserted. ‘It is more accurate 
to say that states tend to ally with or against the foreign power that poses the greatest 
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threat. For example, states may balance by allying with other strong states if a weaker 
power is more dangerous for other reasons’.112 
Walt identifies four different sources of threat: ‘aggregate power, geographic 
proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions’.113 Aggregate power plays a 
fundamental but not necessarily the most decisive role. For example, a country’s 
neighbouring states might have less aggregate power than a distant hegemon, but 
pose a larger threat due to their geographic proximity when coupled with enough 
offensive power to do harm. As a result, alliance formations resembling chess-boards 
can be the outcome, which is not seldom the case. Yet, this is an oversimplification 
because what ultimately makes the combination of threat-sources decisive is the 
“threatening” state’s perceived or actual intentions. Only if these are considered or 
proven aggressive will a state balance rather than bandwagon.114 Here, Walt 
effectively abandons Waltz’s (and Mearsheimer’s, see below) belief that in the 
anarchic world of international relations between sovereign states, in which only 
capabilities can be judged, intentions do not matter, because they are uncertain. 
Walt then summarises his ‘Hypotheses on the Conditions Favoring Balancing or 
Bandwagoning’:115 
‘1. Balancing is more common than bandwagoning. 
2. The stronger the state, the greater its tendency to balance. Weak states will balance against other 
weak states but may bandwagon when threatened by great powers. 
3. The greater the probability of allied support, the greater the tendency to balance. When adequate 
allied support is certain, however, the tendency for free-riding or buck-passing increases. 
4. The more unalterably aggressive a state is perceived to be, the greater the tendency for others to 
balance against it. 
5. In wartime, the closer one side is to victory, the greater the tendency for others to bandwagon with 
it’  
 
Balance of Threat 
The ‘Dominance of Balancing’ over bandwagoning, which Walt’s Middle Eastern case 
studies predominantly reveal, has several consequences for the expectations 
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regarding both small states as well as great powers. For the latter, threats from rival 
great powers are more significant and mostly are logically prioritized.116  
Involvement in foreign regions by one great power can easily be the catalyst for 
another great power to join in. The ensuing rivalry entails competition between the 
great powers in the region, a competition regional powers then have the freedom to 
exploit.117 The more important the superpowers’ interests, the more encouraging for 
the regional states to threaten realignment.118 
Walt goes on to show how great powers seek to manage these dangers to and 
opportunities for their national interests in the region. ‘One form is to counter the 
other superpower by opposing its regional clients, either directly or by supporting 
other regional states. […] The second form is to try to entice the opponent’s clients 
into realigning (either by offering more or by subverting them)’.119  
Both superpowers and smaller states form different alliances for different motives. 
Based largely on his Middle Eastern case studies, Walt offers three reasons for this. 
‘First, regional states are indifferent to the global balance because they are much 
weaker than either of the superpowers and can therefore do little to change the global 
balance’.120 Instead, they ‘will ally with the superpower that is most willing to support 
their own political objectives’.121 The relative power of a superpower vis-à-vis another 
superpower matters little to regional states, as any significant outside capabilities will 
be enough in order to deter or defeat regional threats. 
‘Second, the regional powers in the Middle East are unlikely to view either 
superpower as posing an imminent and direct threat’.122 Proximate threats are usually 
more urgent and constant. 
Finally, ‘because each superpower will oppose expansion by the other, regional states 
can be less worried about either one’.123 Hence, it can be concluded that regional 
states even have an interest in a certain level of superpower rivalry for defensive 
reasons. 
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Regional states enter alliances with outside powers also for offensive reasons, as their 
offensive capabilities will be enhanced. However, there is one scenario in which 
regional states will be more likely to resist outside power involvement. When the 
outside power becomes too dominant and when the bilateral relations and the 
alliance becomes too asymmetrical, small states will have an interest in resisting 
superpower muddling in their internal affairs. Thus, though the offensive capabilities 
of outside powers enrich smaller states’ security, ‘Aggressive Intentions’ by the 
outside powers can encourage balancing behaviour by the small states and even a 
realignment ‘with the superpower that seems least aggressive’.124  
A balancing coalition of smaller states though, as Walt highlights, is more likely to 
form against aggressiveness and threats from other regional states.125 These inherit 
far less aggregate power than superpowers do. However, other factors increase the 
threat and threat perception posed by proximate aggressors. The global distribution 
of capabilities has less of an impact within each region’s alliances.126 Consequently, 
Walt concludes that his ‘balance of threat theory is superior to balance of power 
theory’.127  
His contribution will be of high value when assessing so-called “patron-client” 
relationships between the Gulf states and outside powers such as the US and China, 
as well as the interplaying dynamics of intra-regional rivalries. Yet, Walt’s so-called 
defensive realism was contested by his fellow scholar, John Mearsheimer, who set out 
to emphasize different structural conditions and incentives for the great powers of the 
international system.  
 
2.1.6 Offensive Realism and Great Power Rivalry 
John Mearsheimer’s landmark Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001) is in many 
ways complementary to Waltz’s and Walt’s manuscripts.128 Sharing their positivist 
epistemology of neo-realism, Mearsheimer’s different focus, or rather his nuance, as 
the title insinuates, mostly entails a divergent set of beliefs regarding the incentives 
and actions of great powers. The book includes a theory of great power politics, not of 
                                                          
124 Ibid.: p. 170.  
125 Ibid.: p. 171.  
126 Ibid.: p. 179, 
127 Ibid.: p. 172. 
128 Mearsheimer, J. (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York City: W. W. Norton & 
Company.  
73 
 
all states in the international system. These very few actors face a unique set of 
opportunities, freedoms, constraints, and perceived obligations. He defines his theory 
as offensive realism.  
 
Power Maximization 
Mearsheimer believes that all states are ‘power maximizers’, not ‘security 
maximizers’, as Waltz and Walt claim.129  
‘The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power 
at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all powers, 
although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to become a hegemon – that is, the only 
great power in the system. […] This unrelenting pursuit of power means that great powers are inclined 
to look for opportunities to alter the distribution of world power in their favor. They will seize these 
opportunities if they have the necessary capability. Simply put, great powers are primed for offense’.130  
Why, according to Mearsheimer, is this so? ‘[T]he structure of the international 
system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively 
toward each other’.131 He bases his observation on five key assumptions about the 
international system:132 
 
1. The system is anarchic. 
2. Great powers usually have some form of offensive military capability. 
3. There is always uncertainty about other states’ intentions. 
4. Survival is the prerequisite for all other foreign policy objectives. 
5. States are rational actors. 
These five assumptions, in Mearsheimer’s thinking, dominate the international 
relations of actual and potential great powers. This does not mean that non-structural 
issues cannot have an impact. Echoing Waltz, Mearsheimer is well aware of other 
factors in human behaviour, including irrationality, ideology and domestic politics, 
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but also believes it is impossible to construct one grand theory including all these 
things.133  
Mearsheimer specifies that in an anarchic world, survival interests require relative 
power accumulation to be more important than absolute power accumulation. Great 
powers employ the use or the threat of ‘Calculated aggression’.134 This has three 
consequences. 
The more relative power a state acquires, the more likely it acts offensively, because it 
simply can afford to; as rational actors, states carefully way the costs and benefits or 
offensive vs defensive behaviour, because states are not ‘mindless aggressors’; and 
finally, miscalculation happens very often too and great powers thus ‘end up doing 
themselves serious harm’.135  
 
Regional Hegemony  
How do these behaviours translate into strategy? Since, according to Mearsheimer, 
global hegemony is impossible, due to the ‘stopping power of water’ and the lack of a 
decisive first strike capability of any actor so far (including the US), a great power will 
seek to become a regional hegemon. Dominating its backyard and its periphery is 
possible for a great power. Once this exclusive status has been reached, the hegemon 
enjoys the luxury of being ‘free to roam’.136 With this capability, it will seek to tackle 
potential and actual threats to its hegemony and will thus try to prevent other 
potential and actual great powers from dominating their respective regions also. Peer 
competitors free to roam should not be tolerated, because they would pose a direct 
threat to the hegemon’s status.  
The objective of preventing the emergence of other regional hegemons can be 
pursued via various strategies, for example ‘offshore balancing’ or, at least as a last 
resort, military intervention (see below). Global hegemony is an impossibility 
according to Mearsheimer. Hence, the ultimate aim for a great power is to become 
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the only regional hegemon in the world. This is what Mearsheimer defines as a ‘status 
quo power’.137  
Power has been defined by IR scholars in various ways. Mearsheimer sees a country 
with a relatively large population and vast wealth as a potential or actual great power, 
because these ingredients can be transformed into a formidable military force.138  
 
Bipolarity, Balanced Multipolarity, and Unbalanced Multipolarity 
Such a transformation has the potential to alter the structure of the international 
system. Since Mearsheimer has already discarded true unipolarity as near on 
impossible, there are three different possible structures: ‘unbalanced multipolarity’, 
‘balanced multipolarity’, and ‘bipolarity’. The ‘level of fear’ in the international system 
varies in degrees, with bipolarity being the most stable structure generating relative 
tranquillity, to be followed by balanced multipolarity which is less stable and tranquil, 
to be followed by the most unstable, uncertain, and fear-generating condition of them 
all: unbalanced multipolarity.139  
The latter structure allows for several possible alliance formations, defections and 
escalations. These potentialities are more likely when the system is unbalanced, 
because survival dictates states to establish a dominance or at least a balance of 
power. In an unbalanced system, there are likely to be disrupters and challengers of 
the status quo power. The status quo power has no interest in giving up that status 
and will resist attempts by its rivals to change the system.140  
 
Offshore Balancing vs. Military Intervention 
How is the hegemon – or indeed the challenger – likely to succeed? Controlling 
territory and wider space remains the most critical element of global power. 
Mearsheimer notes that not all space is equal and identifies a ‘Primacy of land 
power’.141  
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Yet, sea power is the second critical element in a superpower’s control of space. 
Offensive realism defines it as follows: 
‘A navy bent on projecting power against a rival state must first gain command of the sea, which is the 
bedrock mission for naval forces. Command of the sea means controlling the lines of communication 
that crisscross the ocean’s surface, so that a state’s commercial and military ships can freely move 
across them.  For a navy to command an ocean, it need not control all of the sea all of the time, but it 
must be able to control the strategically important parts whenever it wants to use them, and deny the 
enemy the ability to do likewise’.142  
This kind of strategy becomes possible with capabilities based in ports and bases both 
at home and abroad. However, where possible, Mearsheimer believes that states and 
especially great powers usually seek to pursue interests and ensure survival through 
‘balancing’ or ‘buck-passing’, and not necessarily the stationing of a vast number of 
troops and amount of material all over the world. Yet, despite offshore balancing 
being something like an empire on the cheap, Mearsheimer does not identify 
‘appeasement and bandwagoning’ as ‘particularly useful for dealing with 
aggressors’.143 This echoes Walt’s observations in his defensively realist balance of 
threat theory. 
In offensive realism though, hegemons are sensitive to potential threats emerging in 
the first place. If possible, hegemons will try to pre-empt this through offshore 
balancing, buck-passing and, when necessary, direct military intervention: 
‘Not only do great powers aim to dominate their region, they also strive to prevent rivals in other areas 
from gaining hegemony. Regional hegemons fear that a peer competitor might jeopardize their 
hegemony by upsetting the balance of power in their backyard. Thus, regional hegemons prefer that 
there be two or more great powers in the other key regions of the world, because those neighbors are 
likely to spend most of their time competing with each other, leaving them few opportunities to 
threaten a distant hegemon’.144  
If power is distributed evenly amongst states of another region the distant hegemon 
can stay out. However, if that balance is threatened the first option for the distant 
hegemon would be to buck-pass (i.e. to be an ‘offshore-balancer’). If even that does 
not suffice, the distant hegemon intervenes in one way or the other.145  
 
Strategic Regions 
A hierarchy of global interest nevertheless entails different regions inheriting a 
varying degree of importance for the hegemon. Regions with other great powers are 
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important due to the very existence of the other great powers there. Yet, this is only 
one of several potential reasons. 
‘Great powers also seek to prevent rival great powers from dominating the wealth-generating areas of 
the world […] [such as also areas with] critically important raw materials. Great powers sometimes 
attempt to dominate those regions themselves, but at the very least, they try to ensure that none falls 
under the control of a rival great power’.146  
Mearsheimer identifies three regions of critical importance to the only current 
regional hegemon in the world, the United States, during its 20th and 21st century 
hegemony: Western Europe and East Asia host other great powers and wealth which 
provide the most important markets. The third region, according to him, was and is 
the Persian Gulf, which holds around half of the world’s proven oil reserves – a 
critical resource for every state and especially every great power, as long as the 
technological status quo in the energy industry prevails.147 Hence, Mearsheimer’s 
offensive realism (and his current strategic observations) are an essential component 
to the framework built to analyse this thesis’ subject matter. 
However, Mearsheimer, just as most of the other theorists reviewed in this section 
have one critical aspect in common: their omission of regions and geography, not so 
much in their discussions, but in their very theories. Both neo-realism and neo-liberal 
institutionalism lead the author of this thesis towards two according hypotheses 
regarding his research question. These will be formulated at the end of this section. 
However, a third hypothesis is possible via a critique of both theories’ omission of 
regions and via a theoretical synthesis based partly on the inclusion of this concept. 
 
2.1.7 Regional Hegemonic Stability: Towards a Neo-Neo Synthesis 
Some of these neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists mention regions in 
passing, as just witnessed with Mearsheimer. And although that confirms 
geography’s relevance to their analysis, these scholars do not seem to notice their 
omission and thereby fail to incorporate the concept into their theories. In this 
section, the author of this thesis seeks to critique some of the theories’ shortcomings 
by seeking to demonstrate the room for a neo-neo synthesis, centred particularly on 
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regions and geography, and allowing him to introduce the concept of regional 
hegemonic stability. 
 
Complex Interdependence under Region-specific Conditions 
Keohane and Nye’s CIT is the first example in which the omission of regions and 
geography has noteworthy consequences for the theory in several ways. Implicitly, 
when describing the conditions of complex interdependence, Keohane and Nye have 
in mind either certain bilateral relations, such as between the US and Canada and 
between the US and Australia, or regions such as Western Europe, as their case 
studies demonstrate. The CIT ideal type therefore describes a condition in which 
transnational flows of goods, capital, people and institutions is so advanced that 
inter-state military rivalry and security concerns are completely off the table. 
However, firstly, Keohane and Nye do not give enough attention to causality. Thus, 
they do not explicitly address the question whether the ideal type of complex 
interdependence has caused a demilitarization of ties or whether a hitherto 
demilitarization of ties has helped bring about the interdependence and cooperation. 
Secondly, they therefore do not account for the possibility that interdependence 
between states, in a bilateral or multilateral context, or between states and other 
regions of the world, can develop despite ongoing security concerns.  
This serious omission has come about precisely because CIT does not address 
causation. A further reason revolves around Keohane’s and Nye’s limited concept of 
interdependence. They correctly accuse realists of elevating the security issue area 
over all others. Yet, CIT could be accused of disregarding its own notion that there is 
no hierarchy of issue areas, because it unwittingly seems to elevate economic matters 
above all others. 
Interdependence though, can involve security interdependence. This could simply 
mean that two or more states have significant military capabilities in combination 
with bilateral or multilateral political disagreements and even potential conflicts. 
Such a condition will be all the more relevant in cases in which insecurity and geo-
political uncertainty is a reality in at least one of the regions in which at least one of 
the states is located. This is a potentiality even if the bilateral or multilateral 
relationship is also defined by economic interdependence. As an example, would US-
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Canada relations be as tranquil and non-militarized if the North American region 
were highly insecure and geo-strategically critical for many other actors? In 
answering that hypothetical question, the assumption that under those hypothetical 
circumstances no economic interdependence and political cooperation between the 
US and Canada would flourish to the same extent is an invalidated speculation. 
Furthermore, it is far from clear whether interdependence between regions, 
composed of several actors, heightens the chance for peaceful cooperation when 
insecurity reigns in at least one of the regions or an antagonistic relationship exists 
between at least two actors inside one of the regions. Neo-realists like Waltz already 
see interdependence per se as making conflict and war more likely, not less likely. 
Even under the assumption that he is wrong, the question of inter-regional, rather 
than merely inter-state interdependence, needs to be addressed: Clearly, all 
interdependent actors would derive important absolute gains from multilateral 
cooperation over mutual interests. However, if neo-realists are right in that relative 
gains matter more, especially in a relationship between potentially antagonistic states 
– be they themselves economically interdependent or not – then how likely is 
multilateral cooperation? Would not the fear of relative losses also trump the fear of 
absolute losses? 
Such a scenario would entail the following realization: Inter-regional 
interdependence may not automatically lead to multilateral cooperation but could 
indeed intensify intra-regional rivalry. If all actors know about their own and their 
unloved neighbours’ dependence on another region, then their fears of being 
outperformed by them in that region could easily sabotage cooperation and lead to 
unilateralism. This scenario leads back to realist insights. 
In other words, regional conditions matter, and regional conditions are critically 
shaped also by geographical location and indeed further geographical characteristics. 
 
Geography’s Hidden Relevance for Neo-Realism 
The same observation holds true for the basic neo-realist world-view. According to 
Waltz, the structure of the international system is made up of states. Neo-realism 
determines power by the distribution of capabilities across the system’s units. These 
capabilities are to an important extent made up of demographics – i.e. human 
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geography. A state’s demographic size matters if that is translated into wealth and if 
that again is translated into military capabilities. Unacknowledged by Waltz, 
geography thus matters to his theory. 
On top of that, if geography matters to the theory, then physical geography clearly 
also does. The distribution of capabilities across the system’s units should 
consequently incorporate the distribution of geographical conditions across the 
system’s units. These include aspects such as location, regional environment, 
territorial size, terrain, natural resources, and climate. Such an amended theory need 
not specify what exactly those conditions are inside every state’s territory, as that 
would indeed destroy the structural nature of the theory. However, when viewed 
comparatively, Waltz’ system-wide distribution-focus comes back into play and can 
be made to work. 
Neo-realism is often characterized as treating states like billiard balls lying on a 
billiard table. This comparison is at best incomplete and at worst inaccurate. Firstly, 
what it ignores is the individual billiard ball’s location on the billiard table. This 
factor can be critical though, as it enhances or diminishes the billiard ball’s chances of 
being slotted home or not. The location of a state is a geographical matter.  
Secondly, when viewed with geography and the diversity of regions in mind, a game 
of billiards might not be the most useful analogy for describing the international 
system. A billiard table is flat and thereby equal in terms of terrain – an unnecessary 
and dangerous oversimplification of the world. The world’s terrain is wholly diverse. 
A more useful analogy could be the game of golf. This continues to treat states like 
balls – not looking inside the unit – but accounts for diverse geographical conditions 
of the terrain whilst also easily acknowledging the balls’/states’ location as crucial. 
These observations lead to further realizations about Waltz’s theory. If geography 
matters, then it is not only the inherent capabilities of great powers that can influence 
the structure of the international system, which is what Waltz claims. If the 
distribution of capabilities across units incorporates important geographical realities, 
then these realities can find themselves distributed among other units that are not 
great powers. However, if these potentially far-flung geographical properties happen 
to matter significantly to the great powers, then they influence the great powers’ 
interests, actions, and capabilities. In short, certain regions that are not composed of 
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great powers can nevertheless influence the international system due to their location 
or natural resources, for example. 
The author elaborates further on this notion when returning to Stephen Walt’s ideas, 
below. First, it is necessary to also discuss Robert Keohane’s work on eroding 
hegemony and international regimes in light of regions. 
 
Hegemony, Regimes, and Regional Insecurity 
Keohane’s analysis of states in the global political economy involves a discussion of 
both superpower hegemony and international regimes as means to avoid discord and 
facilitate cooperation. Although he accepts basic neo-realist constraints, he does not 
fully highlight the available room for an explicit synthesis between neo-realism and 
neo-liberal institutionalism. His brief discussion of hegemonic stability theory is only 
brought up to sketch the older hypothesis that successful international regimes 
require a powerful policeman to protect and enforce them when necessary. Since HST 
has neo-liberal institutionalist and neo-realist proponents, the case for synthesis 
should be evident. Keohane and Nye, in their previous construction of CIT, 
acknowledge that the overall power structure in which a hegemon builds and defends 
the rules of the game stems from realist notions. 
Keohane does not develop this insight further, because he is eager to stress the 
potential irrelevance of hegemony in regime maintenance. Yet, HST could have led 
him to an important question which is wholly absent from his analysis: how can 
regimes possibly suffice to uphold a cooperative order, especially in unstable and 
insecure regions, when the regimes’ prerequisites – basic trust and “diffuse 
reciprocity”, as he calls it, – are absent there? As outlined above, unstable and 
insecure regions can nevertheless be fully integrated into the global political 
economy. Such regions, with which outside powers are economically interdependent 
despite insecurity, are unaccounted for in Keohane’s neo-liberal institutionalism. 
Keohane merely worries about the nuisance of free-riders, especially in a multilateral 
context. Yet, from the status-quo power’s point of view, it might be a price worth 
paying, because, firstly, it allows for its potential rivals’ appreciation of an absolute-
gains-driven system, and secondly, it continues to provide the status-quo power with 
a relative-power-dividend that comes with being the “policeman”. 
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In his employment of an amended “iterated” prisoners’ dilemma, Keohane correctly 
highlights how long-term interests can lead rationally-acting and egoistic states to 
choose cooperation over double-crossing. However, from a neo-realist viewpoint, this 
choice necessitates a relatively low level of short-term fear. And, as Mearsheimer 
stresses, fear is a constant element due to uncertainty over intentions. 
Interdependence, under which multiple channels connect societies and governments, 
admittedly lessens the amount of uncertainty. Yet, if greater certainty and 
transparency happens to confirm that fear is justified, Waltz’s claim that 
interdependence can make conflict even more likely would be accurate. 
Mearsheimer would also stress that unstable and insecure regions in which and with 
which geo-political antagonisms exist, fear will be hard to avoid. Furthermore, this 
can be contagious beyond that region if the region is important to several great 
powers. On top of that, his offensive realism observes that an international system 
composed of unbalanced multipolarity incorporates the highest level of fear in great 
power politics. 
These are hardly the best circumstances for an absolute-gains-driven iterated 
prisoners’ dilemma. Once again, the conditions of certain regions can produce quite 
different incentives and outcomes. As seen in the previous section, Stephen Walt 
would agree. 
 
Geography and Defensive Realism’s Synthesis Potential 
Among the utilized theoretical texts in this thesis, Walt’s is the one which most 
incorporates geography. He does not emphasize this vividly, but still touches upon it 
in his framework. His balance of threat theory highlights geographic proximity as a 
crucial component as to when and how states feel endangered. Although state B can 
be weaker than state C, state A can nevertheless perceive a greater threat by state B if 
the latter is located within its neighbourhood, than by the more powerful state C 
which is geographically more distant. 
This notion could be taken further by stating that because of the greater threat level 
through geographic proximity, it is the regional distribution of capabilities that has a 
serious influence on the region as well as beyond. Walt indeed claims the global 
balance of power is of lesser relevance inside such regions. 
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Although that is correct from his theoretical viewpoint, it too underestimates the full 
potential meaning of geography, as well as the potential room for neo-liberal 
institutionalist notions. Only because weaker states in certain regions do not have 
much aggregate power, this does not entail that such states cannot influence the 
global balance of power. CIT rightly points towards the necessity to measure the 
distributions of power within different issue areas. Inside some issue areas, weaker 
states can exercise significant global influence. Geography, in the case of the Gulf 
states, for example, has produced two areas in which weaker states are globally 
influential. Firstly, their very location between the three continents of Asia, Africa, 
and Europe, automatically turns them into a strategically vital region. Secondly, their 
vast oil resources make them powerful actors in the energy issue area.  
If this means that the global political economy is dependent on a region, and that 
several outside powers have a strong interest in the region, this elevates the regional 
states’ power despite their weakness in aggregate terms. Hence, defensive realism 
should be regarded as a useful instrument to highlight the relevance of geography and 
intra-regional conditions, as well as to build a further bridge between neo-realism 
and neo-liberal institutionalism. 
 
Offensive Realism’s Unchartered Territory 
Bridge-building between the two theories is admittedly more difficult when it comes 
to John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. The only exception revolves around his 
important realization that interdependence very much exists also outside the 
economic arena. Great powers with overwhelming military capabilities are 
automatically security interdependent, because they have the power to completely 
destroy each other and thus cannot exist in absolute security. Other than that, 
Mearsheimer does not see economic interdependence as a guarantor for peace. 
Regarding the criticality of regions and geography in general, however, Mearsheimer 
has much to say. Yet, he is the most dramatic example for failing to incorporate 
geography into the theory itself. Several examples illustrate this. 
Global hegemony is impossible, according to Mearsheimer, due to, among other 
things, the stopping power of water – an obvious geographical observation. Then, like 
Waltz, Mearsheimer sees demographics (a country’s large population) as a likely 
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precondition for great power status, and thus again fails to highlight that it is human 
geography which helps determine that status. He also devotes an entire chapter to the 
primacy of land power in great powers’ race to control territorial space, another 
geographical observation. The same goes for offensive realism’s reflexion of the 
importance of sea power also. Mearsheimer specifically emphasizes a great power’s 
incentive to control the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and the global strategic 
bottlenecks with its navy. This argument therefore leads to the importance of specific 
locations on the planet. 
Despite this critique, Mearsheimer, at least implicitly, acknowledges how regions 
matter to great power politics: firstly, they are critical to the emergence or non-
emergence of a hegemon, because Mearsheimer’s definition of the latter depends on a 
great power’s clear dominance of its back-yard in order to be free to roam. Secondly, 
Mearsheimer believes different regions vary in global importance. Strategically vital 
regions can be just that, not only due to their inhabitation of one or more great 
powers, but also when the regions simply hold wealth-generating properties, 
especially critical raw materials. In his empirical findings, Mearsheimer sees four 
regions in the world that presently matter: next to the western hemisphere, which is 
important because it is the backyard of the US – the world’s currently sole hegemon – 
the other three regions are Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. 
These are convincing observations. However, Mearsheimer’s omission of geography 
as an official element to his theory not only results in awkwardness, because he 
constantly mentions geographical matters, such as the Gulf’s importance due to 
natural resources. It also causes him to brush over the fact that regions can be vital to 
the international system simply due to their geographical position on the map. 
In a final step, it is now necessary to first give a very brief overview of the academic 
tradition of geo-politics, building on the work of several key authors who have 
demonstrated geography’s impact on strategic regions and who have so far not been 
aptly integrated into the neo-neo debate. This leads to one final, but crucial 
hypothesis: The Persian Gulf’s centrality to global affairs. 
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Heartland, Rimland, and Sea: Geo-Politics and the Persian Gulf Region  
Although various academic disciplines have always differed over how much 
geography matters to human life and although the age of hyper-globalization might 
have suggested that it matters less and less, many have proven that world affairs are 
to a certain extent always influenced by it. Whilst for example the 
biologist/geographer Jared Diamond could, to an extent, be regarded as a 
geographical determinist, the archaeologist Ian Morris takes a slightly more nuanced 
view – showing that geography has always mattered and matters, but that it mattered 
in different ways at different times, depending on the changing circumstances of 
social development.148 Similarly, the political scientist Parag Khanna sees the 21st 
century through the prism of both technology-charged globalism and geographical 
factors.149 Yet, even economists such as Ruchir Sharma, see certain locations, 
including the Persian Gulf and in particular Dubai, as a ‘geographic sweet spot’.150 
As this thesis’ literature review has partly already shown, many scholars have not 
only argued for the importance of Asia to human civilization, but either implicitly or 
explicitly of West Asia, i.e. the Greater Middle East region. They have done so for 
many reasons, but geography has been a crucial element.  
John Hobson’s concept of Afro-Asia and the Eastern origins of Western ascendancy 
takes a holistic view of civilizational history and, also for geographical reasons, places 
the Middle East at its core. Although Christopher Beckwith could be accused of 
underestimating the extent of pre-modern maritime commerce and the Middle East’s 
centrality to it, his arguments go in a similar geographic direction. Peter Frankopan 
on the other hand, clearly acknowledges the Middle East’s positional advantage, 
showing how especially the Persian empires and their periphery benefited from 
access to both the Silk Roads on land in Central Eurasia, as well as to the sea routes of 
the Indian Ocean via the Persian Gulf.  
Yet, these observations are not new. It was already the Greek philosopher Herodotus 
who stressed the centrality of the region between the Mediterranean and Central Asia 
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as essential to the very advance of civilization.151 The Arabian historiographer Ibn 
Khaldun argued along similar lines and emphasized how the very origin of civilization 
was spurred first by desert nomads seeking an easier sedentary life that created 
agriculture, literacy, and the first cities in ancient Mesopotamia.152 In the modern 
age, it was especially the historian William Hardy McNeill who showed that the 
history of civilization, including Western civilization, was enabled by cross-cultural 
interactions, in which the Middle East functioned as the vital bridge between Asia 
and Europe.153 Similarly, and as determined as his current successors, the historian 
Marshall Hodgson passionately argued against Western exceptionalism in world 
history. Picking up the ancient Greek concept of Oikumene – more or less the same 
region Herodotus first focused on – Hodgson’s work demonstrated how the locus of 
“Islamdom” later continued to shape world history.154 
Such ideas have geo-political relevance and have long featured in the works of many 
academics and strategists from different generations. For the focus of this thesis, five 
famous names stand out.  
First, it was the English academic Halford Mackinder, often referred to as the 
founding-father of geo-politics, who interpreted global affairs via the study of the 
map. In 1904, in an essay that partitioned the world into various zones, he came up 
with the concept of the “heartland”.155 A child of the late-19th-century “Great Game” 
between the British Empire and Tsarist Russia, Mackinder’s most famous, though 
simplistic dictum would ring across 20th century geo-politics: ‘Who rules East Europe 
commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island: 
Who rules the World-Island commands the World’.156 The world-island described 
Eurasia as a whole which, according to Mackinder, formed the most important 
geographical, economic, cultural, and political space on the planet, with the 
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Americas, Africa, Australia, and all islands representing the ‘lands of [the] outer or 
insular crescent’.157 At the centre of the world-island, the heartland describes the 
approximate territory of the later Soviet Union. The control of this space ensured 
control of the world’s most important land-mass.158 Hence, Mackinder also only 
implicitly viewed the Middle East and its Persian Gulf as important to world affairs, 
because it touches the heartland’s southern edge, just as Eastern Europe touches its 
western edge. 
On the other side of the geo-strategic debate, at the time, was the 19th-century US-
Navy officer Alfred Thayer Mahan, who in his 1890 publication The Influence of Sea 
Power upon History, saw naval power as the most important geographical domain in 
global mastery. Its potential world-wide reach, rather than the more limited control 
of territory, would give a seafaring great power a much more holistic access to global 
affairs. Especially the Indian and Pacific Oceans which had long been the world’s 
primary trade routes and naval playgrounds he saw as critical, also to project power 
into Eurasia.159 
It was another geo-strategist from the first half of the 20th century who, building on 
both Mackinder’s and Mahan’s ideas, specified the various zones and consequently 
reached a slightly different conclusion – literally occupying the middle ground. 
Nicholas J. Spykman, in his influential academic work during World War Two, 
labelled the Eurasian area semi-circling Mackinder’s heartland as the “rimland” – 
reaching from Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia over to East Asia. Spykman 
placed the rimland’s importance over the heartland’s. The more heavily populated 
rimland serves also as a buffer zone between the heartland and the ocean, 
sandwiched between them, and influenced by land power and sea power. The oceanic 
powers’ access to and potential control of the rimland would leverage their sea power 
via littoral bridgeheads, but from their positions there would also give them power 
over the heartland and therefore the world.160 
These ideas found an update in the second half of the 20th century. Serving as US 
National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski put many 
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of his ideas into practice in the 1970s and later penned them in his bestselling 
publication The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic 
Imperatives. Heavily influenced by Mackinder and Spykman, Brzezinski saw US 
dominance over Eurasia as crucial to its global power status. This included influence 
over the heartland and more directly, the rimland. With regards to the latter, he 
formulated similar ideas to Mearsheimer’s later perspective on strategic prioritization 
of the three regions of Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. As briefly shown in 
this thesis, Brzezinski himself, as a National Security Advisor, was to a great respect 
responsible for the elevation of the Gulf in Washington’s geo-strategic investment. 
Yet, in both his official advisory as well as his later academic writing, Brzezinski 
clearly regarded the three regions as equally important, first in the containment of 
the USSR and later in the strategic objective to prevent the emergence of any other 
superpower dominating Eurasia.161 
In retrospect, this imperative might have been much easier said than done. Although 
in the late 1990s Brzezinski was already well aware of China’s growing economic and 
geo-political clout, circumstances had already intensified fast by the end of the 21st 
century’s first decade. Accordingly, the journalist and strategic consultant Robert 
Kaplan was the next to draw on his predecessors’ ideas – demonstrating Mahan’s, 
Mackinder’s, Spykman’s, and Brzezinski’s utter relevance today. In his 2010 
publication Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, Kaplan 
provides an historical and contemporary geo-political analysis of much of Spykman’s 
rimland and Mahan’s sea power, advocating a US shift in strategic attention towards 
the Indian Ocean. 21st century global trade and conflict are likely to occur primarily in 
this zone according to him.162 In 2012, just two years later, Kaplan’s follow-up book, 
The Revenge of Geography: What the Map tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the 
Battle against Fate, recapitulates the central ideas of Mackinder’s heartland and 
Spykman’s rimland, and demonstrates two things: their rebooted importance whilst 
the world is beginning to witness a new Great Game over these zones, as well as 
geography’s indisputable impact on 21st century globalization.163 
                                                          
161 Brzezinski, Z. (1997), The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. 
New York: Basic Books. 
162 Kaplan, R.D. (2011), Monsoon. The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. New York 
City: Random House. 
163 Kaplan, R.D. (2012), The Revenge of Geography: What the Map tells Us about Coming Conflicts 
and the Battle against Fate. New York: Random House. 
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Hence, these prominent examples argue how regions and geography have continued 
to influence thought and strategy in international relations and great power 
competition. Their empirical generalizations have also validated that some regions 
and zones often matter more than others. Yet, when viewing both neo-realism and 
neo-liberal institutionalism through the amended geographical prism and when also 
considering the works of these five geo-strategists, two observations emerge: Firstly, 
the concept of regions creates more room for a neo-neo synthesis. Secondly, a 
potential hierarchy of important regions is detectable. 
If the insights of Mahan, Mackinder, and Spykman are merged, the following picture 
appears: The Middle East lies at the geographical centre of the extended Afro-
Eurasian world-island. It is the Indian subcontinent that is situated at the centre of 
Eurasia’s crescent, the rimland. The rimland semi-circles the heartland and is directly 
accessible also by the sea. Yet, because the Indian subcontinent is, first, partly cut off 
from easy access to the heartland due to mountainous terrain and, second, because 
the subcontinent’s sheer size entails much greater distance from the heartland 
anyway, it is the Persian Gulf, directly west to the rimland’s centre that becomes the 
true centre of it all: it is the rimland’s only central region with access to both the 
heartland and the sea. 
This leaves the author with the recognition that the Persian Gulf, geo-politically 
spoken, becomes the most important region of the world, according to the synthesis 
of the reviewed writers, and backed up by many historians across the ages. Having 
utilized the case of the Gulf region – the focus of this thesis – as further ammunition 
for the argument that geography and regions have a clear influence on the 
international system and the relations of its units, it is now time to fuse the essence of 
these insights with both theories. 
 
Mixing the Ingredients for a Neo-Neo Synthesis 
1. Regions: Geography can influence why some regions matter more than others. 
2. Complex Interdependence: It cannot exist in a regional security vacuum for long, 
in which case inter-regional interdependence could perpetuate intra-regional rivalry. 
3. International Regimes: Their basic flexibility is required to allow all of the system’s 
participants to appreciate and mostly adhere to the order, under ideal conditions of 
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reciprocity. Yet, the latter are not easily found in insecure regions. In order for the 
system to function, someone needs to secure the region. 
4. Offensive Realism: Global security interdependence constrains great power rivalry. 
The status quo power’s military security provision in regions that are critical for all, 
can discourage the potential revisionist powers’ very own security competition in 
such regions. 
5. Defensive Realism: Unstable, yet globally important regions primarily balance 
against intra-regional proximate threats, and thereby form defensive balancing 
coalitions with capable outside powers. The alliance with a particular outside power 
only holds as long as an absolute-gains-system, that helps secure the basic interests of 
most regional and most outside actors, is maintained. 
These five ingredients can theoretically feed on each other and thereby coexist. When 
combined they form a phenomenon that could be described as “regional hegemonic 
stability”. However, what is also obvious from these deductions is that such a system 
is highly complex and highly fragile. Distinct elements from both neo-liberal 
institutionalism and neo-realism are part of it. Yet, they depend on a sensitive 
balance between them which is far from guaranteed, especially as time goes by. 
Although this synthesis clearly pulls CIT and neo-liberal institutionalism more 
broadly onto the neo-realist side, the latter thereby clearly constrains itself. An 
absence of security provision in unstable regions would likely start to dismantle 
economic interdependence. An unhinged neo-realism on the other hand, either by the 
status quo power or by a rising power (and then by both), would end regional 
hegemonic stability. 
All of this theoretical and empirical material, and the author’s own theoretical 
synthesis, leaves him with three theory-based hypotheses for his thesis. 
 
2.1.8 Hypotheses 
The author analyses the subject matter and the research question via his theoretical 
framework in assessment sections that function as individual chapter conclusions. 
The essence is then brought together in the thesis’ overall conclusion and 
extrapolated upon. For the sake of simplicity and room for the thesis’ multiple 
methods to deliver meaning to the analysis, only three very broad hypotheses are 
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offered. In reference to the research question, each hypothesis captures the most 
general interpretations of both theories and their region-centred synthesis 
respectively: 
H1 (neo-liberal institutionalism): China-Gulf, Asia-Gulf, US-Gulf, and US-Asia 
interdependence prevents direct, hard great power rivalry in the Gulf region, 
incentivizing all actors to institutionally cooperate, with military security provided 
collectively, but playing less and less of a role the more interdependence grows. 
H2 (neo-realism): China’s, the US’s, and other Asian outside powers’ strategic 
interests in the Gulf makes geo-political great power rivalry there inevitable, leading 
the US to adopt a strategy that seeks to prevent China from playing a military security 
role in the region and leading China to a revisionist Gulf strategy. 
H3 (regional hegemonic stability): The Persian Gulf region’s centrality to global 
affairs promotes both diverse interdependencies and geo-political insecurity 
simultaneously, intensifying the need for Asia-Gulf-US cooperation, but reducing its 
likelihood, should economic flexibility and the American-led military stabilizing force 
not be maintained. 
 
2.2 Research Methods and Research Design 
2.2.1 Qualitative Research Methods and Analysis 
The research design of this thesis is centred on qualitative methods integrated into 
the foundationalist ontology, the positivist epistemology, and the rationalist 
methodology. The theoretical framework presented above provides lenses through 
which to analyse and interpret the subject matter and help answer the research 
question. 
Qualitative methods might not be as widely used in positivist research as quantitative 
ones but can still be employed in a straight-forward manner if the nature of the 
research question makes this advisable. Vromen writes that qualitative methods in 
political science, and therefore also in its sub-discipline IR, emphasize ‘the centrality 
of meaning, context and history’ and ‘an in-depth understanding of their research 
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subject’.164 This is meant to challenge the dominating quantitative methods, which 
necessarily inherit more difficulty in capturing such ‘thick’ ingredients.165  
Qualitative research also involves an appreciation of the ‘distinctiveness of particular 
cases’.166 The consequences of such a view are that, for example, case studies are not 
chosen randomly, the way quantitative analyses would. Rather, the researcher will 
choose cases that are ‘substantively important’.167 Case studies that might be enriched 
or even enabled by documentary primary sources or field interviews also produce a 
more in-depth qualitative approach correspondingly.168  
The non-random nature of these methods and choices unavoidably involves a certain 
bias, which should always be acknowledged. Nevertheless, as stated above, the 
positivist researcher aspires towards and claims objectivity at least in his analysis 
after the data collection process. His presented results are seen as falsifiable truths.169  
The author regards his qualitative approach as elemental to his way of tackling the 
wider subject matter and especially the research question. A quantitative analysis 
would have been much more viable if the research question had been reduced, at 
worst, to merely analysing the nature and scope of China’s economic relations with 
the Gulf states, and at best, to contextualize these transactions merely in other 
contemporary ones, such as inter-regional Asia-Gulf economic relations and/or US-
Gulf economic relations. Such a focus would have ventured more towards the 
Economics discipline, reducing the research question to a transactional, but not a 
geo-political/geo-strategic assessment which has more substance through wider 
contextualization.  
In order to maximize the ability to assess the wider strategic meaning of the subject 
matter, the author sees the usefulness and even necessity to capture a much longer 
historical context in the geo-political sense. An analysis of pre-20th-century history 
though gives little opportunities for a quantitative analysis due to the lack of 
numerical data. A thorough and profound analysis is required to do so, and hence, 
                                                          
164 Vromen, A. (2010), ‘Debating Methods: Discovering Qualitative Approaches’. In: D. Marsh, S. 
Stoker (eds.), Theory and Methods in Political Science. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 255. 
165 Ibid.: p. 251. 
166 Ibid.: p. 256. 
167 Mahoney, J., Goertz, G. (2006), ‘A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative 
Research’. In: Political Analysis, 14:3, p. 242. 
168 Yanow, D., Schwartz-Shea, P., Freitas, M. (2009), ‘Case Study Research in Political Science’. In: A. 
Mills, G. Durepos, E. Wiebke (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Case Study Research. London: Sage 
Publications. 
169 Mahoney, Goertz 2006. 
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qualitative methods are a promising approach. A mixed-methods approach as an 
extension of the undertaken qualitative analysis, on the other hand, would have 
exhausted the time and space for the production of this thesis. 
Furthermore, the numerical data on recent and current economic transactions 
between the relevant actors, are often incomplete, and even contradictory, depending 
on sources and their access to primary data and their definitions and categorizations. 
This is why this thesis treats the recorded and published secondary numerical data 
with caution, and merely presents them as indicative, but loose estimations.  
Most importantly, the author is not trained in advanced statistics and econometrics, 
which would be necessary for a quantitative analysis of the topic. More is said about 
non-used methods and entire academic disciplines for capturing the wider subject 
matter at the end of this chapter. 
The following section briefly discusses the qualitative approach, the research 
methods, and sources according to their relevance for this thesis’ respective chapters. 
 
2.2.2 Historical Contextualization and Analogies 
‘For the qualitative researcher, explanation and understanding of human social and 
political behaviour cannot be independent of context. Therefore, the qualitative 
researcher tries to convey the full picture, and this is often referred to as ‘thick’ 
description’.170 This view is critical for providing a historical context of outside 
powers in the Persian Gulf region. Though the author is not conducting a behavioural 
analysis, his examination of historical and contemporary developments, situations 
and their underlying structures necessarily involves describing certain actions of the 
actors. These relate directly to the structures which the theoretical framework is 
centred on and should not be confused with, for instance, an IR foreign policy 
analysis. 
Pierce has listed several typical attributes of qualitative analysis, two of which are 
highly relevant to this thesis.171 First, the inductive analysis is wide and selectively 
deep, especially in the historical context chapter, but also beyond. This approach goes 
beyond mere deductive hypothesis testing. The latter, connected to the theoretical 
                                                          
170 Vromen 2010: p. 257. 
171 Pierce, R. (2008), Research Methods in Political Science. London: Sage Publications, p. 43. 
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framework, is only one of several ways to derive meaning from the specific content of 
the context chapters and from the recent and contemporary (and very briefly, future) 
China-Gulf relations. Second, a holistic perspective acknowledges the complexity of 
issues involved. Rather than reducing the analysis to very few exact variables, the 
thesis is sensitive to the historical and temporal contexts. 
China-Gulf relations in their current form are a very recent phenomenon. Hence, 
there is not much modern history to explore in them. Historically more relevant 
towards an assessment of China’s impact on the Gulf, not only in an economic, but 
geo-political sense, is to examine the structures and situations that brought in, 
maintained, and expulsed former outside powers in and from the region. Together 
with the theoretical framework, this thesis’ chapter on historic Gulf outside powers 
seeks to identify patterns, similarities, and differences in the respective structural 
conditions and developments for the outside powers involved. These can then be 
applied to China’s and the Gulf’s current situation and briefly its possible future 
developments. An application of historical analogies can imply both an endorsement 
of relative similarity of the compared cases, but also a rejection of dissimilar cases. 
The author has chosen to cover the most important cases of the modern era, meaning 
a selection of the relatively dominating Gulf outside powers at the time. Both in the 
interest of necessary brevity, and in the belief that pre-modern history differs too 
much from modern and hence current circumstances, he does not extensively cover 
the cases of Gulf outside powers before the 1500s, even though there would have been 
plenty of opportunities. Consequently, after providing a brief pre-modern “prologue” 
that demonstrates the Gulf’s long-term centrality to the old Silk Roads, the history 
chapter discusses the cases of the Portuguese Empire in the 16th century Gulf, the 
Dutch East India Company in the 17th century Gulf, and the British Empire in the 19th 
and 20th century Gulf. The 18th century is also covered precisely because it saw no 
dominating outside power in the region – a condition potentially imaginable 21st 
scenario for the Gulf, as the conclusion briefly shows. The history chapter 
chronologically ends at the time of the British withdrawal from the region in the 
1970s. 
A second context chapter was deemed necessary in order to simply summarize the 
nature and scope of the current Gulf outside power’s role there, the United States. 
The slightly more extensive and separated coverage of this recent history and ongoing 
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situation is not solely explained by the motivation to provide the most recent possible 
historical analogy for China’s role in the Gulf. Since the US is still the dominating 
outside power there, it directly influences China’s and the Gulf’s current situation and 
prospects. Hence, the US-Gulf chapter extends the historical context and provides a 
vital contemporary one on top. 
At the ends of both these context chapters, a theoretical assessment of their subject 
matter is undertaken, interpreting its content through the lenses of neo-liberal 
institutionalism and neo-realism. 
 
2.2.3 Inter-Regional Contextualization 
Vromen’s and Pierce’s notes on qualitative research are also relevant for this thesis’ 
other context chapters. Since the US is not the only contemporary outside power in 
the Gulf, at least in an economic and diplomatic sense, which China and the Gulf 
states have to reckon with, a further contemporary contextualization is necessary.  
In an economic and diplomatic sense, there are indeed countless states and their 
companies that are or would be interesting to consider. The limited space in this 
thesis unfortunately requires an exclusion of several of those candidates from all over 
the world. The author has chosen Asia’s three largest economies alongside China. 
Japan, South Korea, and India are all closely connected to the Gulf states via growing 
economic transactions and diplomatic cooperation. Hence, in any case, their state-
owned and private firms are important economic competitors of China’s and their 
diplomatic connections with the Gulf states are also important variables for China’s 
political leaders and diplomats to consider when dealing with the region. 
The choice of these three states though lies not merely in these explanations, but also 
in two others. Firstly, Japan’s, South Korea’s, and India’s economic connections to 
the Gulf are part of rapidly growing, inter-regional and indeed pan-Eurasian New Silk 
Roads of which China is an integral part. It can thus be argued, that Asia’s New Silk 
Roads to and from the Gulf thereby form one large economic sub-system of the global 
economy. Secondly, Japan, South Korea, and India find themselves more or less 
within China’s direct neighbourhood. Next to their global economic importance and 
their geographical proximity to China, their historically tense political relations with 
China represent vital geo-strategic variables which are arguably compounded by all 
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these countries having relatively equal stakes in the Gulf. The combination of all these 
factors makes the inter-regional connections between Asia and the Gulf rather 
unique. 
Other major economic and even political partners of some Gulf countries do not 
share the same factors. The European Union, as well as individual European nation-
states like Britain and France, are indeed among the most important economic 
partners of the GCC states and are for now even more crucial political partners to 
them than any of their Asian counterparts. The author has decided to discard Europe 
from the contemporary analysis because the EU so far cannot be considered a 
political and military superpower, and neither do Britain and France nowadays count 
as such. Although the latter two play a bigger role in Gulf geo-politics and security 
than any of the Asian countries, and although Japan and South Korea are much too 
small to count as actual or potential superpowers, it is the conceivable future in which 
China and India become superpowers combined with Japan’s and South Korea’s East 
Asian strategic relevance that explains first and foremost the author’s choices of 
incorporation. 
Russia could be considered a superpower, albeit a currently less powerful one than 
the US, and a less powerful one than China, at least in an economic sense. However, 
its role in the Gulf has been and still is a minor one due to the lesser economic 
significance that Russia and the Gulf states represent to each other. A more directly 
relevant peripheral power in the Gulf is Turkey. Yet, as with Europe, there was too 
limited argumentative space for the post-Ottoman Turkish case to be included. 
Since this thesis deals with the phenomenon of the New Silk Roads, of which China-
Gulf relations constitute merely one determining element, the selection of 
contemporary pertinent cases is underpinned by a thematic logic. 
Atlhoguh it structurally belongs to Part Three of the thesis, which focuses on the core 
subject matter of China-Gulf relations, it could be said that the inter-regional context 
overview which solely covers China’s relations with the Gulf region is completed in 
Chapter 6. However, it can still be regarded as a more detailed contextualization for 
the following case studies on Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Even the space of one entire 
thesis would arguably have been too limited for a comprehensive analysis of China’s 
relations with the entire Gulf region, involving all of its states. 
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The analysis of the four Asian countries’ relations with the Gulf states primarily 
covers economic relations, because business dominates them. The chapters are 
composed of sections on trade as well as investment flows. Migratory flows would 
have offered a further important theme. Yet, in the name of brevity, this aspect 
needed to be excluded. Diplomatic relations are covered loosely and analysed from a 
geo-strategic point of view where considered relevant.  
 
2.2.4 Case Study Choices 
The two case study chapters provide the thesis’ most detailed analyses of bilateral 
relations and represent the thesis’ most original contribution in terms of China-Gulf 
relations. As stated above, a case study approach is deemed necessary in order to 
analyse some crucial aspects of China-Gulf relations in greater detail. A purely 
bilateral analysis of China’s relations with one Gulf state would have been another 
option and would have provided an even larger amount of details. However, this 
would have merely covered the nature and scope of that particular bilateral 
relationship. It would not have provided for contextualization, which is essential in 
giving deeper meaning to China's recent, current, and future regional role. 
Aforementioned, the choice of case studies, especially in a qualitative analysis, is 
unavoidably biased due to its non-random nature. The author has specifically chosen 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE for several reasons. 
Saudi Arabia is the largest GCC country and China’s most important economic 
partner in the region. This is the case in both trade and investment flows, but it is 
China’s oil import volumes from Saudi Arabia which makes the country the principal 
Chinese Gulf partner. Furthermore, the Kingdom’s relative political dominance of the 
Arabian Peninsula, the GCC, and the Arab Middle East, and its religious-cultural 
centrality to the Muslim world is a further strategic variant which China needs to 
consider. 
As for the UAE, it is China’s second most significant economic and diplomatic partner 
among the GCC countries, also accounted for with trade and investment flows and 
the extent of diplomatic cooperation and state-visits. Moreover, the nature of Sino-
Emirati trade and investment is characterized by a more diverse nature. The UAE, in 
many ways is a unique case in China’s ties with the Gulf. This case study provides an 
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interesting opportunity which to test complex interdependence theory with, because 
the latter emphasizes diversity in transactions, channels, and contacts, and the UAE 
thus represents a useful case study to maximize a CIT application. 
The other Gulf countries do not reach the extent of China’s economic ties and 
diplomatic cooperation. There is only one, quite different, exception. Iran is China’s 
second largest Gulf economic partner and arguably a potentially important geo-
political partner. A comparison of China’s relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran would 
indeed have an interesting one from a regional point of view, due to the Kingdom’s 
and the Islamic Republic’s mutual enmity towards each other. This represents a 
formidable challenge for many of the Gulf’s outside partners, including China. Yet, 
from a global point of view China’s relations with the GCC states are potentially more 
meaningful, because the GCC is closely allied to the US. The research question is 
about China’s impact on the whole Gulf, but because this is also discussed within the 
context of the region’s currently dominating outside power, the US, the question of 
potential Chinese replacement of the US regional role is most relevant to where the 
latter is currently based – and this is the GCC. Additionally, there is more uncertainty 
about Iran’s immediate future given the recent lifting of sanctions. The latter had 
incidentally prohibited much of Sino-Iranian trade and investment over the last 
decade, so its recent research data is narrow.172 Nonetheless, Chapter 6 specifically 
incorporates an emphasis on Iran, especially in respect to diplomacy and strategy, 
due to its regional importance. 
These considerations entail that the case study choices are reasoned by their most 
vital overall relevance in terms of the research question. Hence, they are not 
randomly, but deliberately chosen. Both case studies cover the same categories – 
trade, investment, and political relations – as the two preceding chapters, but in 
greater detail. All chapters’ data collection methods and their challenges are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
2.2.5 Data Collection Methods 
In view of the diverse nature of the thesis’ chapters, the research relies on a variety of 
secondary and partly primary sources. 
                                                          
172 Last but not least, the author conducted field research in the UAE which was considerably more 
conclusive and easier in terms of his university Ethics endorsement and insurance. 
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For the historical context chapters, purely secondary data was used. Despite the 
relevance of historical contextualization, it needs to be re-affirmed that this is an IR-, 
and not a History-thesis. Thus, both historical context chapters did not require 
archival work to support the arguments with first-hand documents. The author 
scarcely makes use of primary sources, and almost entirely relies on secondary 
literature – partly provided by historians’ primary literature analysis. The historical 
context chapters’ noteworthy originality lies in their theoretical analysis and their 
later application to the research question. The latter’s contemporary nature does not 
allow for more space which would have been required for an original primary-source-
based History analysis. For the objective of historical contextualization, this limited 
approach was deemed sufficient by the author. 
The inter-regional context chapters shift towards a greater economic focus due to the 
dominating commercial nature of Asia-Gulf relations. The author especially drew on 
the very recent academic publications by Gerlach Press, in the wake of the annual 
conferences at the Gulf Research Centre in Cambridge, authored and edited by 
contributors such as Tim Niblock, Monica Malik, Yang Guang, Talmiz Ahmad, N. 
Janardhan, and Ranjit Gupta. These experts on Asia-Gulf relations provided general 
overviews of the topic as well as very specific chapters on particular bilateral relations 
or inter-regional transactions of a particular product or investment. As already shown 
in the literature review above, this highly specialized literature has been greatly 
contributed towards by cooperative book publications by collaborating scholars from 
Durham University and Nottingham University. Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Niv 
Horesh have edited a growing number of volumes on East Asia-Middle East relations, 
focusing markedly on China and the Gulf. Profiting from these, the academic book 
publications integrate various research threads and analysed primary and secondary 
data – relevant directly for this thesis’ inter-regional context chapters. 
Besides academic publications, the author also consults substantially open-source 
online publications from specialized think tanks and specialized news-websites. Two 
largely stand out. First, the Washington-based Middle East Institute’s Middle East-
Asia Project is a large online pool of yet more specialized reports and articles within 
the wider subject matter. Second, the also-Washington-based online magazine The 
Diplomat provides an even larger sample of daily-published articles on Asian issues, 
encompassing diplomacy, politics, security, strategy, trade, investment, and culture, 
with reports and blogs on East Asia, South-East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, the 
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Middle East and pan-Asian New Silk Roads. Both sources are extremely helpful, 
because their contributors integrate the most recent news into the wider context of 
much of this thesis’ subject matter. 
Further secondary data comes from a wide and random range of online sources, 
including specialized reports by other think tanks, consultancies, and private 
companies, including major banks, as well as online news-articles from the media. 
When relying on the latter, the author seeks to maximize the utilization of large 
internationally-renowned and respected brands, such as the BBC, Bloomberg, CNN, 
the Economist, the Financial Times, the New York Times, the South China Morning 
Post, or the Washington Post – in other words, media not subject to censorship in 
their home countries. Wherever news is not covered by such providers, because it is 
either not considered relevant enough for a generalist global audience, or because it is 
very industry-specific, the author makes exploits into local media online or 
specialized media. The latter two categories include local Gulf or Chinese media such 
as Al-Jazeera English, Arabian Business, China Daily, Gulf News, Khaleej Times, The 
National, or Xinghua, or specialized business news such as Construction Intelligence 
Center, Construction Week Online, Cemnet, or Rigzone. 
In terms of numerical data, a number of secondary sources is utilized. For the world 
of energy trade, among the most detailed and informative providers of primary and 
secondary data, as well as tailored analysis, the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration’s (EIA) or BP’s annual reports and country profiles are highly useful. 
The author has employed data from both sources and has also pasted some of their 
charts into his thesis for visualization purposes.  
For general trade statistics, the International Trade Centre (ITC) provides data 
collected from a wide range of other secondary and primary sources, including 
UNCTAD, the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics, as well as the reported data from all 
involved governments’ ministries of commerce and suchlike. The ITC website is very 
valuable, because it not only presents data from the year 2000 onwards – which, 
coincidentally, is also the time when China-Gulf trade began to skyrocket. It breaks 
down the trade statistics into many general and specific product categories. 
Furthermore, ITC provides easily accessible related datasets of the respective trade 
values and product categories, which enables the user to directly compare various 
cases. The author has collected all relevant datasets and, in the interest of 
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visualization, has created several charts in MS Excel, partly using the programme to 
calculate further figures. Just as with the numerical investment data, discussed 
beyond the next paragraph, he has included charts and tables in the chapters 
concerning China-Gulf relations – the thesis’ core subject matter. 
Yet, it is important to stress that the ITC’s data is secondary data. Since it is drawn 
from other secondary and primary data, the website stresses caution when viewing 
the statistics. Many governments have different definitions or categorizations for 
distinctive aspects, and numerous ministries do not report all trade data. 
Consequently, when using a dataset for a bilateral trade relationship, it often depends 
one which frame of reference the user selects, because the other country’s mirror data 
can be different. Thus, it is crucial to emphasize that trade data presented in this 
thesis should be understood as estimations rather than wholly accurate values, which 
the author highlights in the manuscript when considered necessary. 
The same counts for investment data, which is even more complicated for any 
institution to calculate. The first problem revolves around the definition of the word 
investment. It ranges from foreign direct investment (FDI) to foreign portfolio 
investment (FPI) but could also include mere project contracting. Loosely 
formulated, FDI is usually understood as a company from one country opening a 
branch in another country or acquiring shares in a joint venture in another country.173 
This can take place via a greenfield investment, meaning a new start-up, or comes in 
the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A).174 FPI concerns the purchase of a 
foreign company’s stock in one country by a private person, or a private or state-
owned firm from another country, but does not involve any physical presence 
abroad.175  Investment statistics usually are confined to FDI, because the information 
on FPI is mostly not open-source. These definitions from the IMF are very loosely 
adopted by the author. However, it is not the task of this thesis to measure or classify 
investment types when analysing the subject matter. The IMF definitions here merely 
serve as a broad orientation. 
                                                          
173 Patterson, N., Montangees, M., Motala, J., Cadillo, C. (2004), ‘Foreign Direct Investment. Trends, 
Data Availability, Concepts, and Recording Practices’. International Monetary Fund 
[https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fdi/2004/fditda.pdf], whole report, but especially pp. 1-3. 
174 Ibid.: p. 19. 
175 International Monetary Fund (2009), ‘Balance of Payments and International Investment Position 
Manual’ [https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2007/pdf/bpm6.pdf], p. 110. 
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With regard to project contracting, the investments can cover several industries. For 
this thesis, the only relevant type of project contracting revolves around what is often 
stamped as ‘engineering, procurement, construction’ (EPC).176 Most of China’s 
investment into the Gulf states comes in this form. However, it is important to 
underline that sometimes the capital investment per se is not at all undertaken by the 
Chinese firm, but is provided by funds from local entities, like banks or other 
companies. 
Thus, in a strict sense, investment data should always be considered as incomplete. 
For the sake of simplicity, the author uses the term investment in a very general 
manner – encompassing all legal capital flows minus trade payments and 
remittances. This is considered advisable because media reports in particular handle 
the term in the same way. The author employs a small number of secondary data 
sources, including UNCTAD’s FDI database and data published in reports by the Arab 
Investment & Export Credit Guarantee Corporation (Dhaman). The latter relies on 
UNCTAD, but also on the IMF’s and Financial Times’ FDI databases. The author did 
not have access to the latter two. 
A further useful source of secondary data for this thesis is drawn from the China 
Global Investment Tracker (CGIT), a database set up by a joint project between the 
American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation, two major US think 
tanks. The CGIT covers a comprehensive range of Chinese FDI into other countries 
and is a very helpful source of orientation as well as of specific information about 
individual investments. The author has obtained the dataset and has set up tables and 
charts in MS Excel with data on Chinese investment into Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 
Each row in the tables covers an individual investment, with the columns providing 
information on the companies or entities involved, the investment value, the sector, 
etc. The respective data from the CGIT on the individual investments are then used 
by the author for more extensive research about them in online media sources, and 
the associated companies’ press releases and reports on their websites. The latter 
therefore supply numerical and non-numerical primary data. Hence, when an 
involved company elaborates on its investments, the information needs to be treated 
with caution due to its PR nature and the business-interest-related bias. 
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Before turning to the last type of primary sources, it again needs to be stressed that 
the CGIT’s data requires serious caution, too. First, some of its content could not be 
verified by the author. Second, the database lacks a noteworthy amount of Chinese 
investment contracts in both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Hence, it can only offer a 
rough estimation. Most of the database’s information on both case study countries 
covers EPC-contracts, but lacks a documentation of other FDI flows, including M&As 
and some greenfield investments. The author has chosen to incorporate investment 
projects not covered in the CGIT where he deems it supportive to portray the nature 
and diversity of China’s investment into Saudi Arabia and the UAE. However, it has 
to be emphasized that the manuscript’s investment sections cannot be considered 
complete, due to the lack of comprehensive information from a larger number of 
secondary and primary sources. These sections should be treated as worthwhile 
estimations. Fortunately, this limited approach suffices to analyse the subject matter 
in the interest of answering the broad research question. 
A further source of primary data for this thesis derives from field interviews 
conducted by the author during his research. These took on the type of what Pierce 
and Burnham et al. define as ‘elite interviews’ – individuals from business, public 
services, or academia.177 For the interviewee selection process, as Vromen points out, 
a qualitative analysis involves ‘an emphasis on the distinctive nature of the sample 
populations and a detailed criteria-based explanation of purposive (rather than 
random) sampling used to select interviewees’.178  
The author has followed these ideas and interview-characterizations. Interviews were 
conducted on two field research trips to the UAE, and during conferences attended 
and presented at by the author.  
These conferences, during which the author conducted field interviews, include the 
February 2015 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association in New 
Orleans, where the author also presented a paper on elements derived from his first 
case study; and a joint conference on the Silk Roads and China-Middle East subject 
matter, between the China Policy Institute (Nottingham University) and the School of 
Government and International Affairs (Durham University) in May 2015 in  
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Nottingham, where the author presented a paper on elements from his Gulf outside 
power history chapter. These conferences brought together academics specialized in 
the specific and wider subject matter, including the thesis’ theoretical framework. 
They thus offered a useful pool of primary data in the form of expert opinion. 
The field research trips took place between June and August 2015 and in November 
2016. The UAE was chosen as a location for four reasons. Firstly, the second case 
study concerns China-UAE relations. Secondly, even for research on the Gulf as a 
whole, the UAE’s regional business hub status entails that most regionally relevant 
business and research entities have branches, if not even their main Gulf 
headquarters in that country. Thirdly, most of the author’s contacts in the Gulf are 
located in the UAE, thereby providing a small network of individuals with further 
contacts in a whole range of industries. Receiving access to potential interviewees 
located in the Gulf was therefore easiest in the UAE. Fourthly, visa regulation in the 
UAE is amongst the most open in the Gulf, especially when compared to the second 
case study country, Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the ethics board’s consent of the 
author’s university as well as insurance provision for field research was also far easier 
to obtain for the UAE. Due to several barriers towards entry into Saudi Arabia and 
potential risks requiring a higher insurance costs, convinced the author to refrain 
from traveling to the KSA. 
However, firstly, given the UAE’s hub status, many of the interviews conducted there 
by the author had a regionally relevant and insightful character. Secondly, it needs to 
be emphasized that almost all of the author’s interviews produced information or 
viewpoints that can be verified or obtained through secondary literature or online 
open-source primary data, too. The likely reasons for this are discussed in the next 
paragraph. Due to the relatively limited value of primary data from the interviews, 
the author has decided to only include interview-data that highlight particular 
arguments in an original sense. Most of the overall primary data from the interviews 
have therefore been kept aside by the author, because they would not have 
unilaterally influenced the thesis’ discussion, but merely would have bloated it. 
The author’s interviews were informal or semi-structured. No surveys or comparably 
structured methods were used. Types of questions varied according to the 
interviewees’ profession but were drawn from a long list which is attached in this 
manuscript’s appendix and sanctioned prior to the interviews by Durham University’s 
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ethics board. In qualitative research this loose form of interview is commonly used, as 
Vromen points out. ‘It is necessary to keep in mind that qualitative interview-based 
researchers do not attempt to make generalization to a broader population based on 
the small sub-section they study. Instead, there is an emphasis on the distinctive 
nature of their sample populations’.179  
The interviews conducted during the conferences had the rationale of sampling 
academic expert opinion on the subject matter. The interviews conducted during the 
field research trips also included academics for the same reasoning, but especially 
sought to gain inside perspectives from individuals within the direct or indirect 
professional environment of the subject matter. Interviewees included professionals 
from the energy industry, finance, insurance, market research and consulting, the 
shipping industry, but from diplomatic circles as well. Most of the interviewees in 
these areas were not Chinese or worked for Chinese entities. This undoubtedly 
reduces the potential scope of inside perspectives. The author sought to interview as 
many as Chinese businessmen- and women as possible within his limited network of 
contacts or when contacting individuals outside his network. However, this proved a 
difficult undertaking, since many Chinese businessmen- and women, in the name of 
confidentiality, showed reluctance to risk a misunderstanding by their superiors.  
This problem occurred despite the author’s offer for unconditional confidentiality and 
despite his official documents stating his university’s ethics approval. It occurred that 
most candidates agreeing to be interviewed were Westerners. Most of the author’s 
interview partners though wished to remain unnamed or at least not quoted, despite 
the subject matter’s relative non-controversial nature. Consequently, the thesis does 
not include any transcripts. References to the used interview data merely contain 
footnotes with the amount of details agreed to by the interviewee’s signature on the 
provided Written Consent Form – based on a template from the author’s university 
department. The interviews took place in conference venues, offices, hotel lobbies, 
restaurants, and cafes, during which the author fully informed the interviewees of his 
research, the nature and purpose of the interviews, and provided the interviewees 
with ethics approval proof and required their signature on the Written Consent Form. 
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2.3 Alternative Methodologies and Methods for Future Research 
Different ontologies, epistemologies, and methodologies are highly encouraged by the 
author in order to deepen and diversify the subject matter’s and the research 
question’s analysis. Positivist methodologies for instance could make use of 
quantitative methods, especially since the subject matter is heavily dominated by 
economic transactions and offers much room for advanced statistical analysis. Post-
positivist methodologies on the other hand could tap into areas which this thesis has 
not covered, for example cultural relations between China and the Gulf states or at 
least the cultural underpinnings which might be influencing the relations. 
Within the IR discipline, different IR theories would therefore offer themselves, such 
as constructivism which includes questions of identity of the actors. This also 
incorporates the philosophical roots of strategy, foreign policy making, business 
mentality, and general interpretations of world affairs, foreign interests and their 
realization. 
For such methodologies, theories, and methods a different skills-set than the author’s 
is required. The author also chose his approach due to his type of background in 
positivist IR and History. For a post-positivist methodology, which could include an 
analysis of cultural relations, constructivist theory, and the necessary amount of 
discourse analysis, for instance, the researcher would have to either specialize in 
Chinese or Middle Eastern culture or ideally be a Chinese or Middle Eastern national 
in order to comprehend the vast complexity. This includes Chinese, Arabic, and 
Persian language skills which the author of this thesis cannot offer to the necessary 
extent and because of which he is not in a position to provide more than a top-down 
analysis of structural and largely materialistic factors. 
These structural and material factors are highly important though and form the 
crucial background for any further diverse take on the topic. In IR, this would include 
a foreign policy analysis approach, which examines the units from inside. Indeed, 
there is room for further materialistic analysis also beyond the IR discipline. The 
subject matter’s characteristics merit also a purely macro-economic analysis within 
the Economics discipline, which could cover trade and investment in all their forms 
and with multiple theories and methods. This could even entail a cross-disciplinary 
analysis including geology – focusing on global energy technology and its impact on 
the Gulf and China. 
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Another angle and another discipline with potential to tackle the wider subject matter 
would be Anthropology, because the old and new Silk Roads are not only about goods 
and capital, but also people. The migratory and travel patterns along them, especially 
in the multi-cultural demography of the smaller Gulf states should offer fascinating 
topics which would have to bring culture, mentality, and civilization into the 
equation.  
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PART TWO: 
Historical and Inter-Regional Context 
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3. The Persian Gulf in the Modern History of Empires 
The Persian Gulf region, for most of its history, has not spawned an empire of its 
own. Except for Sumer and Dilmun, among the world’s first proven civilizations, the 
Gulf was either subjugated by other near and distant empires or has found itself on 
their peripheries. Over the millennia-long period of human civilization various 
empires have ruled the Gulf or incorporated it into their informal spheres of influence 
and traded with and through it. These include the Bronze Age civilizations of ancient 
Mesopotamia, ancient Egypt and the Indus Valley civilization, as well as the great 
powers of classical antiquity, such as the regional Persian empires of various 
dynasties – the Achaemenids, the Seleucids, the Parthians, and the Sassanids. The 
Greek Macedon Empire also touched the Gulf. The Romans praised Arabia Felix.180 
Alongside ancient and early-modern Persia, Arab-Islamic civilization birthed the only 
truly regional empires that ruled the Gulf. Yet, their cores also were never located 
there, but rather in Mecca, Medina, Damascus, Baghdad or Cairo.181 After the Mongol 
invasion of the Fertile Crescent, as well as the Mongol Empire’s subsequent collapse, 
Arab civilization remained fragmented and has never since managed to build another 
empire, despite many attempts.182 Islam by that time had been exported to other 
ethnicities and cultures which in turn achieved imperial greatness and influence in 
the Gulf. In early modernity, the Islamic Mughal Empire ruling the Indian 
subcontinent and Persia’s Islamic Empire of the Safavids were thriving regional and 
peripheral powers, but soon declined relatively to their Ottoman rivals.183 The latter 
sought and partly achieved expansion in all directions, including the Red Sea and 
Gulf littorals. Persia’s Qajar Empire on the other hand was only one in name.184 
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By the time both the Ottoman and Qajar Empires, in the early 1900s, followed the 
fate of Mughal India’s earlier collapse, the Gulf had already come under mostly 
indirect control by a series of Western empires. The latter encompassed the 
Portuguese Empire in the 16th century, the Dutch and English East India Companies 
in the 17th, and finally the British Empire in the 19th and 20th, as this chapter shows. 
An important part to this 500-year-long story of Western Gulf involvement is a 
striking feature of Gulf geo-politics: for most of this time, the smaller Gulf sheikdoms 
and tribes managed to assert their relative independence from the hinterlands’ 
regional powers. Rarely were they subjugated by the latter. As this chapter shows, 
there are largely two reasons. Firstly, the populations dwelling on the Gulf coastline 
have often differed culturally, economically, and politically from the various regional 
powers neighbouring them. They have often been mixed, and mobile, exogenous, and 
therefore, more than the hinterland, focused on overseas maritime trade with other 
civilizations outside the region. Consequently, the second reason for Gulf autonomy 
from regional powers has been that very contact with outside powers. The latter often 
served as outside allies shoring up Gulf “independence” politically and militarily. 
Thus, it is important to underline that despite often being an imperial periphery and 
subject to outside power influence, this has never meant the smaller Gulf entities 
were or are without agency. As this chapter also shows, they have often played off 
their powerful regional or outside counterparts against each other. At times, 
especially in the 18th century, these geo-political dynamics caused war and instability 
– which then also deterred outside power presence. These periods are here referred 
to as interregna. 
Before starting to cover the Gulf’s modern outside-power history it also needs to be 
emphasized, that this 500-year long Western age was not the Gulf’s first globalization 
experience. For instance, before, there were several periods in which regular and 
direct interconnectedness between the Gulf and China existed. Hence, the new 
subject matter of current Sino-Gulf relations also has many historic prologues, which 
were merely interrupted by the Western age and the great global divergence in 
modernity. Before that, the Gulf was in contact with many other civilizations across 
Asia.  
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3.1 Prologue: The Pre-Modern Gulf and the Old Silk Roads 
Commercial networks connected the Gulf to the East by land and sea. The Indian 
Ocean economy was driven by China’s silk and ceramics, ‘South-East Asia’s Spice 
Islands, India’s rich textile, spice and pepper supplies, Persian silk, and East African 
ivory and slaves’.185 
It was in classical antiquity that the Silk Road, the Eurasian trade-based economy, 
reached its first peak. It connected to what Christopher Beckwith calls the ‘peripheral 
civilizations’, such as Imperial Rome and Han China, via Parthian and Sassanid 
Persia and Central Asian nomadic merchant cultures ‘to such an extent that Roman 
and Chinese writers, who normally disdain to mention commerce, actually discuss 
it’.186 China’s trade and diplomatic contacts with Persia were so extensive that 
emissaries ‘were sent several times a year’.187 Similar to today’s world, these political 
state visits were accompanied by large trade delegations, selling silks and foodstuffs. 
‘Diplomatic envoys typically accompanied large caravans bringing goods for trading, 
which then returned home with products that were sought after at home – including 
Red Sea pearls, jade, lapis lazuli, and consumables such as onions, cucumbers, 
coriander, pomegranates, pistachios and apricots’, as well as frankincense and 
myrrh.188 
After the Sassanid Persian Empire’s collapse and the rise of Arab-Islamic civilization, 
the region experienced another high point in economic mobility, science, and art, 
especially under the Abbasid Caliphate. Trade, knowledge- and technology transfer 
between the Middle East and India and China flourished.189 With a wide reach across 
the entire Middle East, most of North Africa, and deep into Central Asia the empire 
lay centralized at the heart of three continents. Baghdad foremost profited from this 
geographical position and became one of the largest, most prosperous, enlightened, 
and advanced cities in the world.190 A prominent example for an important 
technology transfer was the city’s ‘introduction of paper manufacture from China’.191 
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The result was that ‘the production of books became easier and cheaper, and 
[therefore] libraries multiplied’.192 It is therefore possible to note that “China” and the 
“Silk Road” supercharged the Arab-Islamic civilization’s most enlightened and 
prosperous period with fundamental long-term effects on the world.  
On the Gulf coast, the town of Siraf is said to have been one of the Abbasids’ most 
significant maritime trading hubs ‘feeding on the appetite of […] Baghdad for goods 
from China, India, and East Africa’.193 These included Chinese stone works and 
porcelain in such quantities that Sino-Middle Eastern maritime trade to the Gulf at 
the time has been described as then constituting ‘the world’s biggest maritime trading 
system’.194 This was because under China’s Tang Dynasty, the country experienced 
one of its most economically productive eras of all time, only surpassing it over a 
millennium later, towards the end of the 20th century.195  Simultaneously, the Abbasid 
Empire became the world’s largest market for almost anything. Hence, the immense 
trade between the two should then come as no surprise. A Chinese prisoner of war, 
Du Huang, living through the construction of Baghdad – and thus only witnessing the 
mere beginning of this prosperity –, later documented his amazement: ‘Every thing 
[sic.] produced from the earth is there. Carts carry countless goods to markets, where 
every thing [sic.] is available and cheap: brocade, embroidered silks, pearls and other 
gems are displayed all over markets and street shops’.196 
Admittedly, it is believed that the first direct contacts between China’s Tang Dynasty 
and the Abbasids were not exactly of the strictest commercial nature. They were 
violent. In the mid-8th century, Tang forces repeatedly invaded parts of Central Asia, 
which in 751 brought them into a direct clash with Abbasids in the Battle of Talas – 
‘the first and the last meeting of Arab and Chinese armies’.197 In the immediate 
aftermath, several captured Chinese mercenaries, Du Huang allegedly among them, 
incidentally became the Abbasids’ teachers in paper production. Furthermore, after 
Sogdian-dominated Central Eurasia had seen a Tang retreat and a major rebellion 
threatened Tang China shortly after, the Arabs and Chinese empires switched from 
confrontation to cooperation. Sending Uighur Muslim allies to assist the besieged 
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Tang, the Abbasids and Tang Chinese formed a military alliance that defeated the 
Sogdian rebels. 198 
Though Eurasia’s early medieval period saw a cultural, scientific, and commercial 
flourishing, it also witnessed constant warfare along the Silk Road. In the high Middle 
Ages then, violence reached its peak in the form of the Mongol invasions of much of 
Eurasia. These also brought down the Seljuks who had controlled the largest Islamic 
empire at the time. Baghdad, still run by Abbasid remnants, also fell in 1258. 
However, further south, the Persian Gulf, protected by mountains to its north-east, 
was spared the carnage, because the Mongols focused on the political centres of 
power along the Silk Road’s commercial land arteries, including the Middle East’s 
northern tier. ‘Consequently, they showed no interest in mastering maritime routes 
running through the Gulf’.199 
From there, ships continued to sail as far as Guangzhou, one of China’s most 
significant ports, carrying Egyptian, Arabian, and Indian goods like ambergris, 
cotton, frankincense, glass, pepper, and other spices.200 The Gulf also continued to be 
an obvious transit station for travellers, missionaries, and merchants between West 
and East. In the Mediterranean, Venice became Europe’s most globalized seafaring 
entrepot, eager to bring such goods also to an increasingly curious Occident. The city 
state’s most eminent merchant family, the Polos, are said to have made use of 
Hormuz Island – by then the Gulf’s main trade hub – on several occasions on their 
journeys to and from Mongolia and China.201 Besides Marco Polo, another famous 
travelling author from the high medieval period, who also sailed through the Gulf on 
his extensive travels, was the Moroccan scholar Ibn Battutah. Between various 
pilgrimages to Mecca, he travelled extensively around Eurasia and the Arabian 
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Peninsula, stopping over in places like Jeddah, Aden, Dhofar, Shiraz, Tabriz, 
Baghdad, and, in the Gulf, Basra.202 
Basra always had the geographic advantage of prospering not only from long-distance 
trade, but additionally from higher local productivity. This was due to its location at 
the fertile crescent’s southern end. Yet, that also made it more vulnerable to 
unwanted influences from the more populated hinterland, be it foreign aggression or 
disease. Hence, on the Gulf coast, it was Basra which was hit hardest when the land-
based Silk Road from Central Asia in the mid-1400s transported the plague. 
Decimating the populations of Central Asia, Europe and the Middle East, the 
bacterium Yersinia pestis ultimately also affected Persia and the entire Arabian 
Peninsula203 Though it was one of the darkest periods in all history and set back 
Eurasia’s health and wealth on a massive scale, the Black Death subsequently had the 
long-term consequences of boosting wages amid labour shortages, elevating the 
purchasing power of entire economies.204 Despite large parts of the Middle East and 
even Norther India coming to suffer again severely under the invasions of Timurid-
Mongol Tamerlane in the late 1300s,205 economically better times lay ahead again. In 
the following two centuries, several parts of Eurasia ‘saw a similar surge in growth 
and ambition’. ‘Business boomed in southern India as trade with China built up 
along-side that from the Persian Gulf and further afield’.206 
This accelerated trans-regional interactions. A glamourous Gulf encounter with China 
took place in the early 15th century, when the famous explorer Zheng He, a Muslim 
admiral in the service of China’s thriving Ming dynasty was sent on several missions 
abroad by the Yongle Emperor. He was assigned to sail along the Indian Ocean 
littoral to exchange goods with distant “barbarian” kingdoms. Far from constituting a 
profit-making rationale, his mission was meant to showcase China’s civilizational 
superiority and extend the Middle Kingdom’s periphery of tributary states. His 
voyages between 1405 and 1424 included Hormuz Island in the Gulf, to where the 
admiral sailed with a fleet of 61 of the world’s largest ships. The missions marked the 
peak of historic Chinese maritime exploration. Successful though Zheng He’s 
                                                          
202 See: Ibn Battutah (2003), The Travels of Ibn Battutah. Abridged, Introduced, and Annotated by T. 
Mackintosh-Smith. London/Basingstoke/Oxford: Picador. 
203 Frankopan 2015: pp. 187-195.  
204 Ibid. Even the birth of the Italian Renaissance – and thus modernity – is said to have been 
indirectly facilitated by the apocalyptic pandemic in the mid-1300s. 
205 Beckwith 2011: pp. 183-201. 
206 Frankopan 2015: p. 195. 
115 
 
individual missions appear to have been, they did not build a legacy. After the Yongle 
Emperor’s death, his Ming successors, under fiscal strain and commercial and 
cultural indifference, legally suspended the voyages and decided it was best to turn 
inward, away from the world.207 
Hence, it was ironic, that just half a century after Zheng He’s explorations and 
displays of China’s prowess, a handful of other famous sailors from the other end of 
the Eurasian landmass embarked on a similar mission – and found a wide-open door. 
With Portugal leading the way to linking the world’s sea lanes, it would re-start 
globalization to unprecedented extents in the long run. The Gulf lay at the centre of 
this. However, with maritime trade – a ‘Littoral System’ – becoming the future, 
Portugal and its successors rang the death knell of the old Silk Road.208 
 
3.2 Persian Gulf Outside Powers in Early Modernity 
In the 1500s, two regional powers, Safavid Persia plus the rapidly expanding 
Ottoman Empire, and one European power, Portugal, became major players in and 
around the Gulf. Mughal India was a dazzling empire as well and a large economic 
power, though its role outside the subcontinent, including in the Gulf, was almost 
entirely commercial and cultural.209 
The Safavids took over Persia to embark on a near 200-year reign from 1501 to 1722. 
For the entirety of Portugal’s Gulf involvement, the Safavids were the dominating 
regional power which by and large exceeded that of distant Portugal.210 The Safavids 
controlled the Gulf economically, especially in regard to the silk trade. Shah Abbas 
managed to divert these goods away from Ottoman control in order to deal directly 
with the growing European market.211  
The Ottoman Empire was turning into Persia’s close neighbour and growing rival 
when it defeated Egypt’s Mamluk dynasty in 1517, invaded Basra in 1546, and 
occasionally managed to take several other major port-cities around the Arabian 
Peninsula in the following decades. Though causing alarm in Persia and among local 
Arab tribes, the Ottoman conquest of Basra and several subsequent, though only 
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short-term victories, did not suffice to impose direct Turkish rule in the entire Gulf. 
Yet, this Ottoman emergence was enough to incentivize the Safavid Shah to leverage 
the new Portuguese presence in the region to counterbalance the Turks.212 
 
3.2.1 The Portuguese Empire and the Gulf 
1510 marks the most important date in the beginning of Portugal’s imperial history in 
Asia, when Goa in India, became a Portuguese vice-regal seat. From there, Portugal 
would launch its maritime trading enterprise in the East. This novel development of 
European seafaring in the Indian Ocean had been first enabled by Vasco da Gama’s 
pioneering circumvention of Africa’s Cape of Good Hope in 1498. It opened up a 
maritime trade route between Europe and Asia despite entailing countless months of 
hazardous travel. Tellingly, the latter burden was considered less risky than the land 
route through the Middle East. Nevertheless, plenty of maritime risks were reason 
enough for the Portuguese to try and police these sea lanes by force. Their theatre of 
operations included the Gulf, where Hormuz and Muscat, both controlled by them 
through an allied local dynasty, became their central outposts for over a century, 
notwithstanding some crucial interruptions.213 
Three years before they conquered Goa, 1507 saw their first arrival in today’s Oman, 
in the form of Admiral Afonso de Albuquerque with his men.214 Sailing up the Gulf, 
they violently intimidated locals, ransacking those local settlements and ports which 
refused to pay tribute to Portugal.215 They occupied Muscat and conquered Hormuz 
Island. Albuquerque’s motivations for establishing an outpost in the Gulf were closely 
aligned with the proclaimed goals of Portugal’s King Manuel I. Expanding his 
country’s role in the world, especially in the Indian Ocean, was the King’s signature 
policy. It covered three spheres – commerce, ideology, and geo-politics – all of which 
can explain both Portugal’s rise and demise in the East.216 
The first can be explained by the growing appetite in Europe for exotic Asian goods in 
the late medieval and early-modern period. Portugal, at the time, lead the European 
efforts to explore the unknown world and import spices from Asia in larger quantities 
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and to establish a trade monopoly.217 Albuquerque’s entry into the Gulf was intended 
to cut off the Egyptian or Ottoman middlemen and buy directly from the Persians 
instead.218 The trade supply chains required logistical centres; monopolization 
required armed policing and deterrence. For these matters, commercial hubs and 
military forts were set up along the Indian Ocean littoral. Hormuz came to host one 
such hub, and one such fort, with neighbouring Qeshm Island and the Persian port 
city of Gamrun (now Bandar Abbas) hosting support bases.219 From there, as well as 
Aden, the Portuguese then soon after aggressively sought to enforce their trade 
monopoly interests by blocking maritime traffic through the Gulf and the Arabian 
and Red Seas, northwards to Mesopotamia and Egypt.220  
On top of that, religious ideology added an influential missionary dimension to the 
Portuguese Empire. The early 1500s saw a heated clash-of-civilizations-mentality 
between Christianity and Islam in the Mediterranean and beyond.221 As Rudi Matthee 
underlines, ‘the desire to convert the peoples of the East and to fulfil a long-cherished 
dream of Christianity by “liberating” Jerusalem from Muslim overlordship’ played a 
central part also in Lisbon’s Gulf role, especially during the reign of King Manuel I.222 
However, Portugal’s strategic rationale was geo-political too, as it sought to contain 
Middle Eastern regional powers in the Arabian Sea and the Mediterranean. Security 
concerns were important incentives. Still, Portugal, as Matthee observes, ‘never 
controlled the Gulf, certainly not territorially – aside from holding Hormuz and 
monitoring access to the entrance of the waterway’ for roughly a century.223 On the 
one hand, this was down to Portugal’s relative indifference to a region that, compared 
to “Asia proper” and except for Persian silk had little business to offer.224 On the 
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other hand, Portugal’s relative overall power was modest. Apart from the forts which 
had limited land-power projection capabilities, Portugal’s military power on Indian 
Ocean shores stemmed almost entirely from its naval reach. The latter seems to have 
been one in only two reasons for the Safavids’ partnership: firstly, they themselves 
possessed no navy. Thus, alliances with admirals like Albuquerque and his successors 
offered the Persians a back-up against Ottoman naval forces. Secondly, at the time, 
Portuguese silk importers simply happened to be the most numerous from the 
European market. Hence, though Lisbon’s military and economic relevance in 16th 
century West Asia cannot be disputed, it never went as far as that of later outside 
powers.225 The Ottomans, for instance, inflicted two major defeats on Portugal’s Gulf 
position, when they captured Muscat in 1552 and again in 1581, before the Portuguese 
took it back in 1588.226  
The Portuguese Empire’s decline in much of Asia, including the Gulf, became visible 
in the earlier 1600s. Ultimately, seeking a trading monopoly proved an impossible 
goal, as Asian and Middle Eastern merchants simply located to other ports where 
Portugal had no military presence.227 The Portuguese anti-free-trade policy made few 
friends and invited local and regional opposition right from the onset.228 With the 
collapse of Mamluk Egypt, the Ottoman Empire had already proven a far more 
formidable obstacle. Consequently, the Portuguese then limited their strategy to one 
of regulated commerce that entailed the introduction of customs-duties.229 They 
ended up sharing the bulk of Indian Ocean trade to Europe with the Ottomans and 
Persians whilst simultaneously engaging in quite constant battles with the former.230 
Even this more constrained trade policy proved unpopular and gave way to new 
alternatives beyond Portugal’s power.231 In Oman, where in 1624 a tribal alliance was 
mobilized by Nasir ibn Murshid of the Yariba clan, local merchants began to move 
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towards an overthrow of the dysfunctional Portuguese trading system.232 Omani 
commerce with India (for rice, lumber, and cotton) and East Africa (for slaves used 
for agricultural labour), soon prospered, also thanks to taxes imposed on foreign 
merchants in the Gulf.233 Under the eyes of the increasingly overwhelmed 
Portuguese, the Persians meanwhile turned to new European alternatives in the 
shape of the Dutch and English East India Companies, both of which offered larger 
trade deals.234 
Along with the economic alienation of locals came their ideologic alienation, in the 
form of Portugal’s religious agenda. King Manuel I’s dreams of destroying Islam and 
his imperial agents’ determination of sometimes violently enforcing missionaries’ 
conversion attempts only reinforced the determination of regional powers and their 
local allies to oust the Portuguese once this became doable.235  
Fateful geo-political challenges to the Portuguese Empire came in the form of 
regional and outside re-alignments.236 Following a Safavid-Ottoman peace treaty in 
1613, the situation had changed. Now less threatened by Istanbul, and thus less 
dependent on the formerly protective alliance with Lisbon, Persia’s Shah Abbas I 
began to move against the Portuguese regional presence. In 1615, Persian troops re-
conquered Gamrun and re-named it after its new ruler – Bandar Abbas.237 This 
coincided with the Shah’s first important outreach to the English East India Company 
(EIC) to which he granted commercial rights in Persia. This paved the way for an 
alliance, that, in 1622, would oust the Portuguese from Hormuz militarily and would 
mark a decisive strategic and financial loss to Portugal’s position in the Gulf.238 The 
Portuguese Empire tried to militarily fight the decline aggressively – which only 
perpetuated its reputation as an unwelcome spoiler. It first re-located its main Gulf 
base to Muscat, which it managed to hold onto until 1650.239 Yet, by that time, 
Oman’s new Yariba Imamate had turned into a self-sufficient economic and political 
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player in the Gulf and the wider Indian Ocean. It was only a matter of time, that it 
would also enlist English and Dutch help to throw the Portuguese out of Muscat.240 
This opened a new chapter in the history of European outside power involvement in 
the Persian Gulf. 
 
3.2.2 The Dutch East India Company and the Gulf 
In the early 1600s, the Dutch and English East India Companies were issued charters 
by their governments in Amsterdam and London to pursue business in Asia. The 
liberty to conduct trade and invest into foreign markets additionally incorporated a 
free hand to ‘wage war and negotiate treaties’ with Asian polities.241 In spite of the 
fact that they were private companies, solely responsible to their shareholders, these 
charters turned them into state-like entities with considerable financial and military 
capabilities. Though the English East India Company (EIC) provided the bulk of 
naval assistance to the Safavids in Portugal’s 1622 expulsion from Hormuz, and 
though the EIC had acquired commercial rights in Persia, it would not enjoy the 
dominant Gulf market share for over another century.242 It was the Dutch East India 
Company (VOC) which mastered Indian Ocean trade in the 1600s and dominated the 
seas militarily. Among the VOC’s achievements was ‘the integration of the Persian 
Gulf region into the new, emerging capitalist world system over which the Dutch 
exerted hegemonic supremacy’.243 Where the Portuguese and Spanish discovered and 
connected new worlds, the VOC truly piloted economic globalization.244  
Next to the VOC’s business objectives in Asia, fighting the Portuguese there had a 
geo-political dimension, because Spain’s brief annexation of Portugal turned the 
latter into a Dutch enemy. Spain and Holland were engaged in an 80-year-long war at 
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the time. And so the Dutch began to launch a series of attacks on the Iberian Union’s 
Portuguese possessions in Asia and on any Portuguese ship they encountered.245 The 
Iberians, furthermore, held a competitive advantage over the VOC in Asia. Unlike 
Spain and Portugal, who owned large silver mines in their South American colonies, 
the Dutch could not satisfy Asia’s demand for precious metals. The VOC then 
overcame this challenge by identifying another market, namely that of intra-Asia 
trade. The investment into the latter’s facilitation ultimately opened up the VOC’s 
opportunity for domination. Japanese consumers wanted Chinese silk, and Indian 
warlords bought Arabian horses. ‘By the mid-seventeenth century, nearly half of the 
company’s ships that left Europe remained in Asia for regional use’.246 
By and large, the Indian Ocean, naturally incorporating the Arabian Sea and the 
Persian Gulf, became a Dutch lake. The VOC’s more specific reasons for establishing a 
Gulf presence was Persian silk. And as part of its wider intra-Asian trade strategy, it 
intended to profit from also expanding Persian and Omani trade with India.247 With 
its main Gulf headquarters in Bandar Abbas until 1765, the VOC built factories and 
trading bases in Persia’s capital Isfahan (1623-1745) in order to consult closely with 
Shah Abbas and his successors, and running the regional trade network bypassing the 
Ottoman middleman.248 As a result of trade agreements in 1623 and 1652, Persia 
hosted the VOC’s most profitable establishments in the entire Orient throughout the 
17th century.249 Notwithstanding European competition, the VOC became the 
Persians’ number one overseas trading partner.250 The company’s numerous trading 
stations manifested this. Inside the Safavid Empire’s territory, apart from Bandar 
Abbas and Isfahan, Dutch bases could be found in Kirman, Bushire, Shiraz, Lar, and 
on Kharg Island by the mid-1600s. On the Arabian Peninsula too, VOC bases were set 
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up in Muscat and Basra, even though the former was to be firmly controlled by the 
Omanis, and the latter remained an Ottoman outpost.251 
Yet, despite the VOC’s financial and naval capabilities, it made no bid for empire in 
the Gulf. The company managed to keep out the Portuguese, it made itself the shahs’ 
preferred trading partner, it consequently snatched away market share from the 
comparably modest EIC business in the Gulf, and at least in the region, it prevailed in 
the mid-17th century Anglo-Dutch Wars.252 However, since the profit-motive lay at the 
centre of VOC strategy, too much involvement in regional politics was considered a 
threat to the company’s business interests.253 Even with their limited strategic 
objectives and their relative indifference towards domestic Gulf affairs, the VOC (and 
EIC) seemed to have faced quite enough political risks already. As Lunsford writes, 
despite cooperative deal-making and mutual gains-seeking, the European-Asian 
interactions were far from harmonious, especially in Persia: 
‘The profitability and vibrancy of the VOC-Iran trade belied its erratic history, the source of which was 
the haphazard implementation of the contracts the VOC had forged with the Iranians. These trade 
agreements were a frequent source of frustration to the Dutch. […] No less vexing to company 
leadership was the rampant corruption that afflicted VOC Gulf personnel.’254 
Moreover, unlike in other Asian theatres such as the Spice Islands, which came under 
the VOC’s direct control, in Persia, the Dutch were in no position to do anything 
against their risk-exposure. If they wanted to maintain their trading dominance, they 
simply had to accept these conditions, because not only was Persia a serious regional 
power, it could additionally simply switch to alternative overland trade routes to 
India, or to alternative European trading companies.255 Although there were 
occasional military clashes after some Persian treaty violations, and although in those 
escalations the VOC always re-enforced its maritime power and domination against 
the largely navy-less Safavids, these Dutch military victories on the Gulf coast never 
shifted the overall balance of power between them and never transformed into a 
Dutch political say in Persia’s domestic affairs.256 On the other hand, such occasional 
conflicts, as in 1645, 1685, and 1712, hardly seemed to have disrupted Dutch-Persian 
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business. Trade continued to flourish, and both saw the advantages of continuing 
their commercial relationship.257  
Nonetheless, all this changed dramatically in the 18th century. When disorder and 
conflict came to the Persian Gulf amid the Yariba and Safavid dynasties’ respective 
collapses in 1720 and 1722, the VOC’s limited influence in the hinterlands left it with 
little assets to prevent a spill-over into its business interests. Persian and Omani trade 
with India and Europe grounded to a halt.258 This ultimately paved the way for the 
VOC’s exit from the Gulf in the 18th century. It abandoned its bases in Basra, Bushire, 
Bandar Abbas, and on Kharg Island by 1765. The company now classified the Gulf as 
‘too unstable, risky, and thus unprofitable’ and decided to break off relations with 
Persia, focusing on less volatile regions in Asia instead.259 
Still, the VOC’s 18th century Gulf misfortune, should not be regarded as a completely 
isolated case. The overall prospect of intra-Asian commerce, which had once been the 
company’s successful formula, declined in the changing economic landscape of the 
time. The value of silk for instance had fallen dramatically and conflict was harming 
most Asian business.260 Given the VOC’s always limited political influence inside the 
lands of Asia, it had no chances to even try to reverse that trend.  
 
3.2.3 The 18th Century Interregnum 
When Afghan tribes invaded Persian territory, and raided its capital Isfahan in 1722, 
the Safavid dynasty ended. This spark lit up not only Persia itself, which plunged into 
a series of civil wars, but also its periphery, parts of which were immediately, though 
only briefly, invaded by the Ottoman and southward expanding Russian empires.261 
The 18th century’s first Persian civil war was won by Nadir Khan in 1736, who 
crowned himself Shah, but ruled Persia for a mere decade. Nevertheless, that decade 
was marked by numerous and colourful military campaigns which reconquered the 
Ottoman and Russian-captured territories and included brief invasions of peripheral 
territories, including parts of the Arabian coast, and even as far a place as Mughal 
India. He intervened in Oman’s civil war in 1737 and again in 1741 but withdrew most 
                                                          
257 Floor 2009: p. 244. 
258 Lunsford 2012: chapter 2, section 4, para. 1. 
259 Ibid.: chapter 2, section 4, para. 2-3.  
260 Ibid.: chapter 2, section 4, para. 4; Commins 2012: chapter 3, section 5, para. 5. 
261 Ibid.: chapter 4, section 2, para. 2. 
124 
 
of his forces relatively fast.262 This pattern of his behaviour can be observed in most 
of his campaigns, including his invasion of India in 1739. Despite extraordinary 
military success, Nadir Shah did not channel his growing tax revenue, his looted 
wealth, and his considerable power into a wider long-term political and economic 
strategy that might not only have re-stabilized Persia itself, but also the entire Gulf 
region.263 
When Nadir Shah died violently in 1747, Persia immediately plunged back into civil 
war. In 1750, a member of the Zand tribe, Karim Khan, managed to gain an upper 
hand, before in 1763, he ushered in a short period of stability. Karim Khan’s final 
years in power (and life) saw some economic growth and some modest military 
successes outside Persia, when his troops briefly took Basra from the Ottomans in 
1776.264 Still, his death in 1779 sparked the next violent succession crisis. Mass tribal 
warfare ensued and only ended in 1796, when the Turkic Qajar tribe, led by Agha 
Muhammad Khan, fought itself to victory. Having already moved the capital to 
Tehran 1785, Agha Muhammad Shah managed to rebuild Persia’s state institutions, 
which finally ended a near-century of war. Even though he died only a year after his 
coronation, the Qajar dynasty was established and would go on to rule until the early 
20th century.265  
Meanwhile, the Arabian side of the Gulf had faired equally badly throughout the 
1700s. The Yariba Imamate of Oman collapsed between 1719 and 1720. The reasons 
for this as well as the 30-year civil war that followed, also lay in a succession crisis. 
When Sultan Saif ibn Saif died between 1718 and 1719 and was replaced by his 12-
year old son, this was immediately challenged by several tribal factions and 
ideological opponents composed of the Yariba elite and more orthodox Ibadis. 
Intensified by rivalries between the Ghafiri and Hinawi tribes, ultimately two 
dominant antagonists emerged from a decade of violent anarchy. Whereas Saif ibn 
Sultan II, now a grown man, established a realm on the coast and, for a short while, 
successfully summoned substantial military assistance from Persia’s Nadir Shah, the 
Ibadi ulama nevertheless managed to control and dominate the tribes of the Omani 
hinterland. Although Nadir Shah and Saif ibn Sultan II managed to conquer Muscat, 
the city would eventually fall again to the Ibadi coalition shortly after Nadir Shah’s 
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death in 1747, by which time most of his Persian forces had withdrawn from Oman – 
ending in the Ibadis’ candidate, Sayyid Ahmad ibn Said’s elevation as the new 
Imam.266 Thus was created Oman’s Al Bu Said dynasty, which is still reigning to date. 
Although incessant civil war ended with Ahmad ibn Said’s election by the ulama, this 
did not entail a complete end to conflict in and around Oman. Even though the new 
dynasty enjoyed increasing support and brightening economic prospects, with 
Oman’s maritime trading network with India and Africa revitalized, tribes on the 
fringes of the Omani realm also became more independent, which would result in a 
violent tumult especially at sea.267 Most prominently, the Qasimi tribe (plural: 
Qawasim) of today’s UAE were Muscat’s fierce economic and military rivals. ‘Having 
a much narrower economic base than their Omani enemies, [the Qawasim] relied 
more and more on the [trade] supplies which they captured from Omani trading 
vessels passing through the Gulf to and from Basra’.268 Piracy’s impact was all the 
more severe, because the Qawasim had at that time found a new backer from inside 
the shifting sands of the Arabian desert. 
Amidst a regional power vacuum that had come about through Persian, Omani, and 
Ottoman weakness and a continued absence of outside powers a new ideological 
entity emerged that would, despite setbacks, ultimately change the region until the 
time of writing. When in 1744, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a preacher from 
Najd, who was calling for Islam’s “purification”, entered an alliance with Muhammad 
ibn Saud, leader of a tribe in the town of Dir’iyya, it would mark the birth of the first 
Saudi-Wahhabi state. Even though it took three decades to indoctrinate and finally 
take over, one-by-one, the various autonomous tribes of Najd, to contemporaries it 
seemed that the new Saudi emirate had the wind behind its back. After the fall of 
Riyadh to Saudi forces in 1773, next was al-Hasa, on the Gulf coast. Despite fierce 
resistance from the local tribes and sheikdoms, ‘Eastern Arabia’s richest agricultural 
zone’ and most ‘strategic position’ was finally conquered in 1795.269 Now, the Saudis 
were on the brink of turning into the Gulf’s new potential regional power. Ottoman 
weakness on Mesopotamia’s immediate periphery was further demonstrated by its 
Mamluk governors’ failure to defend al-Hasa, and then by being driven out of the 
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Shia’s holy city of Kerbala in an overwhelming Saudi attack in 1802. This invasion 
was accompanied by a sectarian-motivated massacre of 5,000 Shiites.270 In 1806, 
even Islam’s holy cities, Mecca and Medina, fell to the Saudis – ‘a huge blow to 
Ottoman prestige’.271 
For the smaller Gulf sheikdoms and for the Omanis, more than prestige was at stake 
after the Saudis had conquered the Buraimi Oasis in 1800 and now dominated not 
only the Arabian Peninsula. They also menaced Gulf waters and the Straits of 
Hormuz through an alliance with Oman’s Qasimi enemies.272 Relief to the besieged 
Omanis finally came from outside. Various, previously independent threads of global 
and regional affairs were now being woven together. 
 
3.3 Pax Britannica and the Trucial Coast 
3.3.1 The British Empire’s Gulf Emergence  
When in 1793 war broke out between Britain, the rising superpower, and its 
challenger, Revolutionary France, this conflict would not be limited to Europe. In this 
first era of globalization and Western imperial expansion into far flung lands and 
seas, war between the rivals entailed that the theatre of conflict would also be world-
wide. Just as the Seven Years War had done half a century before, the Napoleonic 
Wars turned the Indian Ocean into an intra-European combat zone, with France and 
Britain once more being the principal antagonists.273 The Persian Gulf therefore 
never really had a chance to entirely escape this conflict. Yet, there were three specific 
reasons why the region would pose a vital strategic battleground.  
Britain’s position in India had, during the later 1700s, turned into direct colonial rule 
over vast swathes of the subcontinent. Thus, it was in London’s and Calcutta’s crucial 
interest to safeguard the sea-lines of communication (SLOCs), trade routes, and geo-
strategic bottlenecks between Britain and India. The Middle East lay right between 
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the two, and the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea had to be shielded 
from a hostile takeover by any imperial rival.274 
The dominant one at the time happened to be France, Britain’s old, but now 
revitalized European foe. In that respect, London’s alarm bells began to ring loudly, 
when Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798.275 His immediate intentions were to control 
France’s maritime strategic backyard, the Mediterranean, and to open up new 
markets for French trade in North Africa and the Levant. However, in France’s 
continuous military conflict with Britain, Napoleon had to try to identify his enemy’s 
vulnerabilities. Thus, his strategy included economic warfare against Britain, the 
pioneering industrial power: just like his later Continental Blockade sought to harm 
the British economy, Napoleon’s intervention in Egypt and the Levant sought to 
disrupt the stability on British trade routes to and from India.276  
A French diplomatic mission to Persia in 1796 had already been seen by London as a 
disturbingly close geo-political threat which sparked a major British effort to lure the 
Persians into an alliance.277 
Ergo, it should come as no surprise that 1798 saw the first bilateral treaty between a 
Gulf sheikdom and Great Britain. The Sultan of Muscat and Oman and an emissary 
from the British Government signed an agreement for political and economic 
cooperation.278 This now placed Oman firmly within the British Empire’s sphere of 
influence. Though a considerable portion of its rationale seems to have been a 
counter-piracy alliance, it was far from a coincidence that it was forged the same year 
as Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt. 
As mentioned above, the growing influx of Qasimi pirate-attacks that hit Omani and 
British-Indian trading vessels presented a dramatic local problem in its own right.279 
The Qasimi alliance with the expanding Saudi-Wahhabi menace clearly added a 
regional dimension to this security escalation that would have probably caused a 
heightened British involvement in the Gulf anyway. Incidentally, the 1798 British-
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Omani treaty is seen by Commins as the turning point that ‘would tip the balance 
against the Qasimi sheikhs’.280 But he nonetheless acknowledges French regional 
influence as the primary British motivation to sign it. 
This was also locally relevant, because the East India Company had suspected the 
French themselves of seeking the establishment of a trading station in Muscat. As a 
result, it was the EIC who “motivated” the Sultan into choosing the British by offering 
naval cooperation, but also by threatening to blockade Omani merchants’ entry to 
their vital markets in Surat and Bombay. This carrot-and-stick-approach worked in 
the EIC’s, i.e. in Britain’s, favour when the Sultan agreed to the treaty. It included a 
clause directly ‘pledging [him] to bar French ships from Muscat’. It was also followed 
by a second treaty in 1800, which ‘granted the Company permission to post [its own] 
agent’ there.281 
Britain’s closer engagement with Oman was not an isolated Gulf case though. As 
mentioned above, the 1796 French mission to Persia was met with substantial British 
counter-offers. In 1801, Persia’s new Qajar ruler, Fath Ali Shah signed a treaty with 
Britain that sought to build a full-blown alliance. Besides a trade deal, the treaty 
included an obligation of the Shah to exclude the French from Persia and to militarily 
assist the British in India in case of Afghan incursions over the North-Western 
Frontier. In exchange, Britain promised to deliver arms and heavy military 
equipment in the instance of an Afghan or French attack on Persia.282 
The treaty failed immediately though, because by the time Fath Ali Shah invoked it 
against the Russians, who continued to eat away Persian territory in the Caucasus, 
the Tsar had just joined Britain’s anti-Napoleon coalition. London therefore broke the 
treaty by ignoring the Shah’s request. Consequently, this sparked the next round of 
diplomatic pivots. The French spotted the opportunity and made a successful 
counter-offer, persuaded the Persians to sign a new treaty in 1807 – the exact ‘mirror 
image of the previous treaty with the British’.283 
It was not to be. That same year, Napoleon defeated the Tsar and forced him into a 
peace agreement signed in Tilsit. Freshly discredited, the new French mission to 
Persia had failed from the outset, prompting the Shah to again give an audience to the 
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British who were, by then, urgently pushing for a renewal of their previous deal. The 
story repeated itself, as both signed a treaty which again was broken at the height of 
Napoleon’s invasion of Russia. The British did help broker an agreement between 
Russia and Persia in the Caucasus, but one with clear Persian concessions, ceding 
further territory to Russia, forcing them to give up military presence in the Caspian 
Sea, and giving Russia an indirect say in Persia’s governance.284 Even though the 
post-Napoleonic world would again turn Britain more anti-Russian, Qajar Persia and 
its cautious British ally would ultimately fail to prevent further Russian incursions 
into Persia and its considerable influence there throughout the 19th and even 20th 
century. 
The most immediate great power rival to Britain until 1815 was Napoleonic France. In 
that conflict, the British Empire emerged victorious and, in the process, had also 
managed to shift Middle Eastern and Gulf matters to London’s (and India’s) favour. 
This incorporated a victory against the Arabian Peninsula’s principle revisionist 
entity – the first Saudi-Wahhabi emirate. Despite the treaties between London and 
Muscat, Oman’s Al Bu Said dynasty found itself on the brink of a Qawasim-assisted 
Saudi overthrow after 1804. The Qawasim had managed to seize Omani territory in 
the Gulf, including Hormuz and Bandar Abbas whilst the Saudis continued to strike 
inner Oman from their new Buraimi stronghold.285 In a classic example of strategic 
buck-passing, the British entered an implicit alliance with the humiliated Ottoman 
Empire which was eager to re-establish its old control of Egypt and parts of the 
Arabian Peninsula, most importantly, Mecca and Medina. It was an anti-Napoleon 
alliance that had succeeded in ejecting his forces from Egypt in 1801.286 Later it also 
implied a de facto alliance against the Saudi-Wahhabi emirate in Arabia. Thus, in 
1811, when Mehmet Ali Pasha of Egypt, the largely autonomous Ottoman governor 
and founder of modern Egypt, assembled his forces and intervened in the Hijaz and 
beyond, the Omanis were finally relieved from their Saudi suffocation. Saudi jihadists 
were drawn back westwards, now fighting – in vain – for their own emirate’s survival. 
They were finally defeated in 1818. Egyptian and Ottoman prestige had been restored 
– for a few decades.287 
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Though Mehmet Ali’s victory against the Saudis ‘altered the balance of power in the 
Gulf’, the region was not pacified yet.288 For the Qawasim were continuing their 
stinging attacks against their Omani enemies, and also pursuing their piracy against 
Gulf traders. In 1808, Qasimi pirates sacked several British merchant vessels. In 
response, the EIC’s naval force, the Bombay Marine, in alliance with Omani land 
forces, executed a row of pincer-like surgical strikes against the Qasimi-controlled 
ports on both sides of the Gulf and bombarded the Qasimi stronghold at Ras-al-
Khaimah, destroying numerous pirate ships in the process.289  
Though causing severe damage to the Ras-al-Khaimah sheikdom and the Qawasims’ 
maritime capabilities, it was not the final blow. Before the Saudis were defeated in 
1818, they imposed a Qasimi leadership change and helped to rebuild Ras-al-
Khaimah and boosted ongoing piracy expeditions that indiscriminately attacked 
merchant vessels across the entire Arabian Sea. By the late 1810s, the EIC had had 
enough, and, making use of Mehmet Ali’s fresh victory against the Saudis by land, 
and local Omani advances across the Musandam Peninsula, sent an eleven-warship-
strong Bombay Marine Force against the Qawasim and Ras-al-Khaimah in December 
1819. This successful intervention marked the end to the excessive Qasimi piracy and 
its Gulf destabilization and ‘was the beginning of Britain’s definite ascent in Gulf 
affairs’.290 The 18th century interregnum had come to an end. 
 
3.4.2 The 19th Century’s Trucial-States-System 
‘We were here before any other Power, in modern times, had shown its face in these waters. We found 
strife and we have created order. It was our commerce as well as your security that was threatened and 
called for protection. At every port along these coasts, the subjects of the King of England still reside 
and trade…. We saved you from extinction at the hands of your neighbours. We opened these seas to 
the ships of all nations, and enabled their flags to fly in peace. We have not seized or held your 
territory. We have not destroyed your independence but have preserved it… The peace of these waters 
must still be maintained; your independence will continue to be upheld; and the influence of the 
British Government must remain supreme.’291 
When just under a century later, Lord George Nathaniel Curzon, Viceroy of India, 
spoke these words in 1904, he was summarizing what he saw as Britain’s role in the 
Persian Gulf in the preceding period. Leaving the self-congratulating and 
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propagandistic tone aside, they nonetheless capture the British Empire’s effect on the 
region relatively accurately. 
In January 1820, following the Bombay Marine’s defeat of Qawasim piracy and jihad 
in Gulf waters, London and the EIC’s governing body in India saw a more permanent 
and institutionalized involvement in Gulf affairs as vital to a regional stability that 
would shield British India and augment maritime trade. The same month, Britain 
brokered bilateral (and in effect multilateral) truces between the sheiks of Ras-al-
Khaimah, Abu Dhabi, Ajman, and Umm al-Quwain, who all signed the General 
Treaty of Peace with the Arab Tribes. These treaties enshrined the illegality of piracy 
in the region and completed Britain’s already active treaty with Muscat and Oman. 
The individual treaties were constantly renewed and from 1853 onwards formed a 
network of Trucial States.292 
This system guaranteed the small sheikdoms relative independence from the three 
regional powers, Qajar Iran, the Second Saudi Emirate, which was reborn mid-
century, and the Ottoman Empire. The interests of all signees were upheld with the 
permanent diplomatic presence of British political residents in all of the Gulf 
sheikdoms. These agents answered to the EIC Governor of Bombay, who again 
answered to the Viceroy in Calcutta. A political resident was no colonial ruler, but 
rather carried out the role of ambassador with privileged access and informal 
influence over the sovereign sheik.293 Yet, in the anarchic regional environment that 
in the preceding century had produced constant enmity and warfare, political 
agreements alone did not suffice to pacify the region. When severe conflicts erupted, 
and violence threatened to spread, the treaties were enforced by the Bombay Marine 
patrolling Gulf waters. Usually, stability and relative peace was quickly re-
established. There was no British military presence on the Arabian Peninsula, save 
for the moments it needed to intervene and go after treaty violators. To pacify the 
regional waters and coastlines, political/diplomatic presence, naval patrols and only 
very occasional military interventions, but usually a policy of strict non-interference 
in hinterland disputes, sufficed. What had once been dubbed the Pirate Coast, was 
now called the Trucial Coast.294 
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This system did not only protect British and Indian merchants and the wider Indian 
Ocean economy, but, as had been intended, became an integral part to a much wider 
buffer zone shielding British India from the rival European powers France, Russia, 
and later Germany. It was a peripheral strategy circling all of the subcontinent and 
ranged from the greater Middle East and Persia over to Afghanistan and Tibet, all the 
way to South East Asia. In all these areas, the British sought to run an informal 
empire guarding the central pillar of their superpower status.295 
Despite this motivation, the system could only function though if the overwhelming 
majority of peoples in this British sphere of influence gained from it as well. Britain’s 
network of treaties along the Gulf’s Arabian shores did not completely eradicate local 
skirmishes but compared to the 18th century greatly stabilized the Gulf region. This 
success convinced the Gulf’s sheikdoms to constantly renew the treaties. Indeed, their 
very own economies bounced back as a result, especially due to one old but now 
globally booming commodity – pearls. Gulf sea beds were inhabited by large pearl 
banks. ‘The pearl merchants plugged into perennial trade to India, where Bombay 
emerged as the global distribution centre, re-exporting the Gulf’s gems to Europe and 
North America’.296 Even though Britain’s more liberal 19th century empire enforced 
its humanitarian mission also on the Gulf, by abolishing the slave trade – after all 
another thriving Omani “business” with East Africa – Pax Britannica’s overall 
economic effect on the Trucial Coast was relatively profitable for local merchants.297 
The system was considered stable, because even though the British had no permanent 
military presence on Gulf terra firma, their diplomatic presence and their over-the-
horizon-capability in the form of the Bombay Marine provided incentives for local 
and mostly also regional powers to adhere to it. This was the case because on the 
occasions a regional power did seek to upset the system, the British intervened and 
ensured no red lines were enduringly crossed. Several examples illustrate this British 
strategy. 
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3.4.3 Great Games in the Persian Gulf 
When Mehmet Ali made his bid for Egyptian independence from the Ottoman 
Empire by also re-invading Syria and parts of Arabia in 1838/39, the British backed 
the Sultan in Istanbul, and, in agreement with Austria-Hungary, Prussia, and Russia, 
militarily forced Mehmet Ali to back down. Though the British had indirectly used the 
Mehmet Ali army two decades earlier as an ally to counter the first and most 
aggressive expansion of the Saudi state, they could not allow him to threaten the very 
existence of the Ottoman Empire.298 The “sick man of Europe’s” utter disintegration 
was not in the British interest, because it would have created a wider regional vacuum 
vulnerable to Russian southward expansion. London’s desired answer to the Eastern 
Question from this time onwards, and for the remainder of the 19th century was to 
prop up the Sublime Porte’s weak, but enduring control of the Levant, Asia Minor, 
and the Bosporus. The decision to fight on the side of the Ottomans (as well as France 
and Piedmont-Sardinia) against Russia in the Crimean War in the 1850s can be read 
in this light.299 In the pre-Suez-Canal-age, the Dardanelles had been of even greater 
importance in terms of sea-and-land-connectivity to the Gulf and India. 
The Great Game, as it was called, had become Britain’s primary motivation for 
influence over Gulf geo-politics.300 The 19th century had started with France being 
British India’s primary outside threat that needed to be contained, and the century 
ended with Germany taking over that role. Yet, at the height of Pax Britannica, Anglo-
Russian rivalry in Eurasia, and especially in Afghanistan and Persia, amounted to 
what was essentially the 19th century’s Cold War. The primary Russian motivation for 
enhanced influence towards the Gulf did not merely have a defensive anti-British 
element to it, but incorporated the long-held desire to acquire a warm-water port.301 
To meet these objectives, Russia had previously, as mentioned above, militarily 
expanded through the Caucasus far into Persian territory, and, due to Britain’s rather 
moderate support for the Shah, had managed to gain greater influence in Tehran.302 
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Now, the Russians backed Persia’s new ruler, Mohammad Shah in his domestic 
standing and his neighbourhood policies, especially regarding Afghanistan. There, 
the Russians encouraged the Persians to invade in order to “compensate” them for 
their territorial losses in the Caucasus. Mohammad Shah complied and sent forces to 
besiege Herat and Kandahar in 1837. This immediately provoked British ire, who 
responded in the Gulf theatre by occupying Persia’s Kharg Island and forced the Shah 
to withdraw from Afghanistan. The concluding Anglo-Persian treaty in 1841 – by 
which time the British had (fatefully) occupied parts of Afghanistan themselves – 
forced new and more asymmetrical trading concessions to Britain.303 Similar 
procedures were repeated when Persia successfully re-attempted to conquer Herat in 
1856, which was followed by a British military intervention in Bushire, a strategic 
port city in the Gulf, forcing another Persian withdrawal from Afghanistan. The 
Crimean War-concluding Peace of Paris in 1856 then also incorporated stipulations 
against Persian invasions of Afghan territory.304 
Generally, the British Empire’s Persia strategy did not reflect its relative hands-off 
policy on the Arabian side of the Gulf, as mentioned above. Whilst the (admittedly 
scarcely populated) Trucial Coast was thriving on top of pearl-exports, the Persian 
economy, though clearly larger than in the violent previous century, seems to have 
suffered considerably due to informal, but substantial foreign imperial 
encroachment. The asymmetric and monopolistic trading concessions to Britain not 
only greatly harmed domestic entrepreneurs, but even caused famines. Furthermore, 
other than in many of its formal colonies, Britain made no attempt to develop Persia. 
The lack of infrastructure-investment, for example into railway construction, was 
deliberate in order to prevent a rapid spread of political unrest or even fast troop 
mobilizations by either Persian forces or by potentially invading Russians.305  
Instead, whilst Persia was suffering economic stagnation, at times outright famine, 
and political humiliation, the Great Game consumed more and more of the Shah’s 
sovereignty. Whilst Britain established largely economic control, for example by 
being granted rights to found and run the Imperial Bank of Persia, the Russians 
exercised more political and military influence, by setting up the Iranian Cossack 
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Brigade, which partially modernised the Persian military, but was run by Russian 
officers.306 
When resistance finally gained track and Persia plunged into domestic riots that 
mushroomed into the constitutional revolution of 1906-1911 Russia and Britain had 
formed an alliance against Imperial Germany. This made them sort out their 
differences regarding Persia and agree on their respective spheres of influence in a 
treaty in 1907.  Russia received northern Persia, Britain took control of the south, and 
both abandoned the mere indirectness of their imperial influence there – wholly 
disregarding the ‘new conditions of popular sovereignty in the country’.307 Following 
the Persian imposition of customs duties onto Russian goods as a reaction to 
deteriorating economic conditions, and political unrest raising the spectre of civil 
war, Britain and Russia finally invaded Persia.308 
This direct British presence and everyday political influence was, in all of the 19th 
century, found to a much lesser degree on the Arabian side of the Gulf. In the 
Peninsula’s hinterland, it was hardly to be found at all. The second Saudi Emirate, 
due to its reduced territorial aggression and reduced religious zeal compared to its 
predecessor, now enjoyed a relative toleration by the British, at least in the first 
decades of its existence. Though it incorporated much of the Arabian coastline in the 
Gulf, it first timidly acknowledged Britain’s treaty commitments with the Trucial 
States and Oman. Yet, in 1845, the Saudis sought to test their boundaries by re-
occupying Buraimi. After two decades of skirmishes and political manoeuvring, 
Britain finally got involved and shelled several Saudi ports, forcing Riyadh to 
abandon its further conquests. As Commins writes, the British ‘demonstrated that 
even though treaties limited their political and military commitments at sea and 
shore, they sufficed to influence inland political dynamics’ when they deemed it 
necessary.309 
Britain threatened similar measures against its Omani ally later in the 19th century, 
when the Sultan began to ignore his commercial treaty obligations. He was setting up 
diplomatic ties with the French, granting them rights to build a coaling station near 
Muscat and allowing Omani slave ships to sail under French flags. In response, Lord 
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Curzon, the above-mentioned Viceroy of India, ordered naval forces to threaten 
bombardment of the port. In the end, the mere threat availed, and Britain and France 
diplomatically reached a compromise that permitted both to use the coaling 
station.310 
A comparable case illustrating geo-strategic rivalry between superpowers in the Gulf 
is Kuwait, which became integrated into Britain’s informal empire, after following the 
Trucial States’ example by signing a bilateral treaty in 1899. Though its ruling sheik, 
Mubarak Al Sabah, who had requested the Anglo-Kuwaiti treaty, was motivated by 
fear of Ottoman designs on the sheikdom, the British wanted to contain what they 
perceived as an even different threat. London had found out about a Russian 
initiative to build a railroad from Syria to Kuwait. Great Game-logic could not allow 
this to happen, and so the British lobbied the sheikdom into an agreement, which 
prohibited the Russian enterprise.311 This Anglo-Kuwaiti treaty proved strategically 
vital just over a decade later, when Germany emerged as the new challenger to 
Britain’s Middle Eastern sphere of influence. German plans for the now famous 
Berlin-Baghdad railway project intended the construction of a branch to Basra, 
Kuwait’s close neighbour.312 The treaty prevented the Sabah ruler from having a say 
in this. The British and the Germans meanwhile cut a deal: in exchange for Baghdad, 
and not Basra, being the Express’ final destination, banks from the City of London 
agreed to co-finance German explorations for natural resources along the new 
route.313 The Persian Gulf though was to be shielded from all foreign strategic 
incursions. In words similar to Lord Curzon’s, British foreign secretary Lord 
Lansdowne’s statement in 1903 was still mainly directed at the Russians and French 
but would soon after also apply to the Germans. 
‘The British Government should regard the establishment of a naval base, or of a fortified port, in the 
Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly 
resist it with all the means at our disposal.’ 314 
Up to this moment, the strategic rationale behind this policy was the protection of 
India, and, since 1882 it should be added, the new British Protectorate of Egypt and 
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the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in the Sudan.315 The Suez Canal – the British 
Empire’s vital artery – connected the motherland with India, bypassing the Persian 
Gulf. Yet, the years between 1908 and 1914 saw a regionally crucial watershed, that 
would add an equally important reason for the geo-strategic centrality of the region. 
In 1908, British prospectors led by William Knox D’Arcy made the first oil strike in 
the Middle East, in south-western Persia.316 Apart from the long term 
transformational nature of the discovery, which would completely alter the region’s 
socio-economic structures, one of the first strategically significant consequences for 
the British Empire was the opportunity to switch the Royal Navy’s energy source from 
coal to oil. This made ships faster and less labour-dependent and would prove to be a 
decisive advantage in Britain’s naval rivalry – and then World War – with 
Wilhelmine Germany.317 British soil held plenty of coal, but hardly any extractable oil. 
So, when Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, took this decision a 
few years after the Knox D’Arcy breakthrough, and the British Government 
subsequently purchased a 51 % share of the new Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), 
this put ‘Persian Gulf security on a higher plane than ever before’.318 It happened in 
May 1914, a month before the fateful assassination of Austria-Hungary’s Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand and his wife and the resulting outbreak of World War One. This 
development ended the 19th century era of global Pax Britannica, would change the 
course of the 20th century, and with it the Persian Gulf region’s very nature of 
existence. 
 
3.5 World War and the Persian Gulf 
The period between 1914 and 1945 would transform the greater Middle East’s entire 
political and economic landscape. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire would end a 
regional order which had lasted for almost half a millennium, and, for better or 
worse, brought modernity to the Middle East. On its ruins, not only a wholly 
sovereign Turkish nation-state was built. A whole range of Arab nation-states with 
somewhat artificial borders was created by the period’s usual suspects: The victorious 
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British and French Empires drew ‘lines in the sand’ according to their interests.319 
Post-World-War-One, they rather non-altruistically took upon themselves the burden 
of running new “mandates”, the League of Nations’ terminology for colonies that 
would gradually be turned into self-governing, sovereign, and modern polities. 
Besides Palestine and Transjordan, the British stuck to their Middle Eastern priority 
zone, the Persian Gulf, where Iraq came under British control. Whilst dramatic and 
not wholly peaceful change swept the region in the interwar period, World War Two 
would gradually exhaust not only the British Empire’s finances, but also its stamina 
to carry on, as the very legitimacy of the imperial project came under heavy fire from 
everywhere, including public opinion at home. It certainly came not only from a 
Soviet phoenix rising from the ashes of a collapsed Tsarist Russian Empire, but also 
from the new Anglophone superpower that was gradually replacing Britain as the 
world’s hegemon. The United States’ abandonment of isolationism, its decisive role in 
both World Wars, and its newly acquired relative power and resulting global 
interests, naturally also brought it to the oil-rich Persian Gulf – the Middle East’s 
only sub-region that by 1945 still looked fairly similar to what it had looked like back 
on the eve of World War One. 
 
3.5.1 World War One and Its Aftermath  
At the dawn of the 20th century, the Trucial States system seemed relatively stable 
and tranquil. But in the Arabian Peninsula’s hinterland, trouble was brewing, and 
change lay in the air. The second Saudi Emirate had collapsed in 1891 over inner-
dynastic rivalries.320 Yet, in 1902, Abdulaziz ibn Saud came to power in Riyadh, 
establishing the third Saudi Emirate and also re-conquering al-Hasa in the process. 
Despite Ibn Saud’s lukewarm relations to the British, he seemed to accept the Trucial 
States system or at least focused on other theatres.321 By the time World War One was 
raging in the Middle East, the British had entered into something of an alliance with 
him, supplying him with weapons and funds in order to now fight Germany’s Middle 
Eastern ally, the Ottoman Empire.322 World War with Germany had caused a 180-
degree switch of Britain’s global and regional alliances. Whereas much of the 19th 
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century had seen British support for the Ottoman Empire against both Russian as 
well as Saudi bids for regional domination, London had now turned against Istanbul 
and instead allied with its former primary Eurasian rival, as well as with the principal 
regional disrupter.323 
Britain’s fight against the Ottoman Empire was undertaken via both conventional 
warfare, taking on Ottoman forces directly on the battlefield, as well as indirectly via 
irregular guerrilla warfare on the Arabian Peninsula. The former tactic included vast 
setbacks, such as the one over Gallipoli, but in the end resulted in decisive victories 
when General Allenby took Jerusalem and Damascus, and General Maude took Basra 
and Baghdad.324  Most well-known, and probably crucial to the generals’ successes, 
was Arab asymmetric warfare against the Ottoman presence on the Arabian 
Peninsula. Especially the operations against the important Ottoman supply line, the 
German-built Hejaz railway, carried out by pan-Arab guerrillas led by Faisal ibn 
Hussein and the famous Thomas Edward Lawrence, paved the way to end Ottoman 
rule in Arabia.325 Though this campaign was largely run under Hashemite leadership 
from the Hejaz, the Saudis enduring rival, Ibn Saud contributed to it under an 
implicit alliance with the British Empire. Prince Faisal’s dream of a united pan-Arab 
polity of course did not materialize, and he and his brother Abdullah were merely 
compensated after war with ruling the new states of Transjordan and Iraq, both 
under de facto British control, but the Saudi-Wahhabi state, tolerated by Britain, was 
gradually carved out by Ibn Saud. His modern state, Saudi Arabia was founded in 
1932, the same year Iraq was granted at least formal independence.326 
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3.5.2 The Interwar Period 
British troops and administrators though remained in Iraq – a state of affairs 
originally brought about by the World War One occupation – which ended Britain’s 
19th century strategy of offshore balancing in the Gulf. More direct colonial rule and 
resulting military presence was also now increasing on the Trucial Coast. In the 
interwar period, which saw considerable unrest in Britain’s and France’s Middle 
Eastern mandates, including major uprisings in Iraq, the Trucial States remained 
relatively calm. Though the Great Depression caused the collapse of the once thriving 
Gulf pearling industry, the region’s future economic lifeline would lie with the 
hydrocarbon sector. British and American oil explorations began in the interwar 
period but were interrupted by the outbreak of World War Two.327 
Until then, British oil explorations prioritized not only Iraq, but especially Persia, 
which had been carved up by Russia and Britain and also saw their initial and later 
returning military presence. After the Russian Revolution in 1917, Russian troops for 
the time being withdrew from the northern Persian provinces, leaving behind a weak 
administration, which, for the sake of survival sought British protection, even though 
its new national assembly did not ratify the proposed treaty.328. When in 1921, Reza 
Khan swept to power in Tehran, subsequently crowned himself Shah and founded the 
Pahlavi dynasty, Persia – or rather Iran, as it was now predominantly called – 
embarked on a similar secularization- and modernization process that aimed at 
copying Mustafa Kemal’s Turkey. It moderately succeeded, but, despite this, by the 
time of the 1930s, the highly authoritarian and repressively brutal nature of the 
regime had alienated much of the country’s population.329 Even though the Russians 
had withdrawn and even though the British enjoyed less influence than before, the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) still controlled the country’s hydrocarbon 
industry. Even though the 1908 Knox D’Arcy oil concession was renegotiated, the 
new agreement still merely gave the Iranian state a 20% share of AIOC’s output 
revenue.330 The Abadan complex, near the Gulf coast, then one of the largest oil 
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refineries in the world, continued to be run solely by AIOC and functioned as an 
economic, bureaucratic and cultural unit entirely independent from Iran.331 
 
3.5.3 World War Two 
Even though it impacted the livelihoods and existence of nearly all states, World War 
Two was less transformational for the Middle Eastern political order than World War 
One. The war’s “only” game-changing consequence on the east-Mediterranean shores 
was the creation of Israel in 1948. In the Gulf though, borders and regimes did not 
change as a result of the war. 
The Allies prevailed and hence, the designs Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy had on 
the wider region were defeated also, including their North African campaign. The 
outcome was not a forgone conclusion though. Together with clandestine operations 
by German intelligence officials in Palestine and Iraq, a victorious Afrika Korps had 
plans to take over Egypt, the Suez Canal and push far into the Levant in order to link 
up northwards with the Wehrmacht’s Eastern Front divisions, which had invaded 
Russia in 1941 and where advancing south-eastwards. Yet, Hitler’s Operation 
Barbarossa and his intended push for the Caucasus and the Caspian oil fields – 
essential for the German war machine’s energy demand – ultimately failed also.332 
Nevertheless, Iran’s situation especially was still somewhat affected by the 
developments. Reza Shah’s early sympathy with Nazi Germany, and the simultaneous 
German support for the neighbouring Iraqi coup d’état against the pro-British 
Hashemite monarchy there, prompted the Allies, Britain and the USSR, and later also 
the USA, to (re-)invade Iran.333 Reza Shah had to make way for his son, Mohammad 
Reza Shah, and for the remainder of the war, Iran’s sovereignty was essentially 
nullified. The British, and also the Americans, required the route through the Persian 
Gulf and through Iran, to supply their Soviet ally with arms, munitions, machinery, 
and equipment, as an alternative to the highly hazardous Artic convoys to Murmansk. 
Churchill’s, Roosevelt’s, and Stalin’s famous war- and post-war-planning conference 
in Tehran in 1943 then promised the Iranians an Allied withdrawal after the war. This 
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was executed instantly by the Americans and British according to the agreement, yet 
the Soviets dragged their feet – thereby paving the way for the start of the Cold War – 
and only pulled out reluctantly from Northern Iran in 1946.334  
By that time the international system had finally changed into a bi-polar one. This 
would affect the question of Gulf outside powers in the long run, though not as 
immediately as might have been suspected. 
 
3.6 The Cold War Gulf and Britannia’s Indian Summer 
The start of the Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union coincided with 
another major development in world politics – decolonization. Not only did public 
opinion and the spread of national independence movements in much of what would 
then be called the Third World delegitimize the entire idea of colonialism. The World 
Wars had furthermore completely exhausted the Europeans’ capacity to finance and 
run their empires, let alone fully develop their colonies. This included France’s and 
Britain’s former Middle Eastern mandates, but in Britain’s case, and most 
importantly for this subject matter, also the Raj.335 The hasty and messy partition of 
the subcontinent into India and Pakistan not only resulted in a British exodus from 
South Asia. Indian and Pakistani independence in 1947 additionally took away 
Britain’s geo-economic and manpower-capacity that had been crucial to its 
superpower status. It also took away what had been the primary reason for 
controlling the Persian Gulf – the shielding of British India.336 
Yet, by that time, another reason for British military and political presence in the Gulf 
had become even more important – petroleum. This was significant firstly in terms of 
British economic interests, because in the three decades after World War Two, the 
Gulf provided around half of all UK oil consumption.337 Secondly, it was also 
significant in terms of wider Western strategic energy interests. Even though the new 
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superpower, the United States, was still largely energy-self-sufficient in those days, 
most of the First World’s industrial economies, i.e. Europe’s, but also Japan’s, were 
not, and increasingly matched Britain’s Gulf oil dependence.338 With the Cold War 
burgeoning into a global enmity between the two blocs, this became a crucial geo-
strategic variable. The principal global energy artery, the Persian Gulf and the Strait 
of Hormuz, had to be guarded from potential instability, especially in the form of 
Soviet influence. Though this was a new development, it did mirror elements of the 
19th century Great Game. 
Consequently, this explains an anomaly in Britain’s post-war foreign policy. In the 
midst of decolonization and greatly diminished British geo-political clout, the small 
Gulf sheikdoms, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the Trucial States, for 
almost three decades, continued to rely on British military protection. For this period, 
they even came to look like something they had specifically never been – de facto 
colonies. Following the 1947 extinction of the Indian Civil Service, the British Foreign 
Office became responsible for the Trucial States’ administration and modern 
development.339 In an era in which the United States would maintain its primary 
strategic focus on Western Europe and East Asia, the British Gulf presence served as 
a vital component in a wider Western economic framework and security architecture. 
Thus, in the Gulf, Britain enjoyed a temporary extension of its former global power 
status – an “imperial Indian summer” as might be formulated – at the same time as it 
not only had to grant independence to colonies all over the world, but also faced an 
especially hostile backlash against its influence in much of the rest of the Middle East, 
as the next sections will briefly show. 
 
3.6.1 Britain’s Demise as a Middle Eastern Outside Power 
As a result of Britain’s post-World War Two weakness, and as an effect of regional 
movements against its imperial influence, London faced a series of dramatic losses, 
setbacks, and outright foreign policy failures in the greater Middle East of the 1950s 
and 1960s. The 1952 coup d’état in Egypt by the Free Officers Movement ended the 
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rule of King Farouk and ended the British Protectorate.340 The same fate befell the 
pro-British Hashemite monarchy in Iraq in the revolution of 1958.341 
In neighbouring Iran, the Pahlavi dynasty’s pro-Western stance came under severe 
stress when Mohammed Mossadeq was democratically elected Prime Minister in 
1951. Following his nationalization of Iran’s oil industry, Mossadeq was subsequently 
toppled in 1953 by a CIA/SIS-sponsored coup and replaced by the former monarch, 
the autocratic Mohammad Reza Shah who did keep Iran in the Western camp, but 
nonetheless inflicted another setback on British Middle Eastern interests. Firmly 
resisting a return to the pre-1951 oil concessions, the now newly named British 
Petroleum Company (BP) had to make do with the creation of a consortium of 
multiple companies, and a mere 50% share of its Iranian oil production.342 
The two most dramatic setbacks, both in terms of their symbolism, but also in terms 
of raw political and military power and logistical capabilities, were, first, the outcome 
of the 1956 Suez Crisis and second, the outcome of the Aden Emergency in 1967.  
The nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt’s new President Gamal Abdel Nasser 
prompted a (successful) military intervention by Britain, France, and Israel which 
nevertheless was rendered futile by the US’s and USSR’s cooperative resistance to it. 
Britain’s subsequent withdrawal, forced by Washington’s financial blackmail, firmly 
left London not only without its hitherto regionally important military access and free 
shipping rights to the Suez Canal, but also with a fateful wound to its perception as a 
superpower. Now, it was Nasser’s anti-Western pan-Arabism which had politically 
triumphed instead.343 
A second major blow to Britain’s regional credibility was the failure to prevent its 
Aden Protectorate, the Federation of South Arabia, from ultimately falling to the 
Marxist National Liberation Front, while the Imam of North Yemen fell to the pro-
Nasser insurgency.344 Britain’s withdrawal from Aden, which, after all, hosted its 
largest overseas military base in the Orient at the time, but now, instead, became the 
                                                          
340 See: Gordon, J. (2016), Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt’s Free Officers and the July Revolution. 
Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. 
341 Tripp 2007: pp. 139-142. 
342 Axworthy 2007: pp.239-245; Yergin 1991: pp. 243-260; Kinzer, S. (2008), All the Shah's Men: An 
American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons. 
343 Kyle, K. (2011), Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris; Lucas, W.S. 
(1996), Divided We Stand: Britain, the United States and the Suez Crisis. London: Sceptre. 
344 See: Hinchcliffe, P., Ducker, J.T., Holt, M. (2012), Without Glory in Arabia: The British Retreat 
from Aden. London: I.B. Tauris; Walker, J. (2014), Aden Insurgency: The Savage War in Yemen 
1962-67. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military. 
145 
 
capital of the People’s Democratic Republic of South Yemen, also negatively impacted 
London’s ability to guarantee Gulf security.345 
This series of British failures to unilaterally realize its interests and uphold its duties 
towards its Middle Eastern protectorates underlined the sheer relative lack of 
Britain’s military power. It showcased therefore also the generally hollow nature of 
the wider Western regional strategy which had been contractually assured by the 1955 
Baghdad Pact. An alliance between Britain and the Middle Eastern Northern Tier 
countries of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, as the region’s anti-Soviet shield, seems 
to have been doomed to fail from the start due to Britain’s disability to hypothetically 
defend those countries militarily from a Soviet invasion, and Britain’s inability to 
actually defend those countries politically from socialist or nationalist revolutions – 
whether inspired by Nasser or the USSR.346 
 
3.6.2 Britain’s Gulf Fanfare 
Despite these decisive setbacks though, the core theatre on the Persian Gulf’s Arabian 
coast experienced relatively little anti-British resistance. The most important sub-
region in terms of oil was spared British foreign policy failures. On the contrary, the 
1950s and 1960s saw relatively successful British nation-state-building on the Trucial 
Coast, and a successful political and military defence of these sheikdoms’ 
independence against possible threats and ideological influence from regional 
powers’.347 Britain also committed itself to domestic pacification measures in the 
Trucial States. 
Following World War Two, a border dispute between Abu Dhabi and Dubai escalated 
into open tribal warfare in 1948. Only a British intervention and unilateral definition 
of the future border between the two sheikdoms ended the conflict.348 Yet more 
dramatically, a major dispute over the Buraimi Oasis between Saudi Arabia, Oman, 
and Abu Dhabi heated up again in the 1950s. Although a 1935 treaty had placed 
Buraimi inside the borders of the Trucial States, Saudi Arabia had historically 
collected zakat from its inhabitants, and claimed it as its own territory. More 
importantly, the alleged oil reserves in that area gave the dispute a geo-economic 
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connotation. This was also relevant for the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), 
which was now heavily involved in developing Saudi Arabia’s vast hydrocarbon 
resources. As protector of the Trucial States, this placed Britain not only against 
Saudi Arabia, but also against American oil interests. When arbitration efforts 
between the parties failed and Saudi Arabia sought to gain control unilaterally, the 
British Royal Air Force and the British-led Trucial Oman Levies took the Buraimi 
Oasis in a bloodless fait accompli and sent the captured Saudi troops back home.349 
A larger Gulf crisis erupted in 1961, when Britain granted full independence to 
Kuwait. This immediately aroused old Iraqi territorial claims. In the post-1958 
revolutionary Republic of Iraq, it only took a week of Kuwaiti independence for Iraqi 
Prime Minister Abdul Karim Qassim to ‘demand every inch of its territory’.350 The 
threat to invade militarily then prompted Kuwait to reluctantly seek British help. As a 
result, previous British scenario-planning was set in motion and Operation Vantage, 
composed of a giant airlift and amphibious landing, was successfully launched. 
Consequently, Iraq was deterred and backed down. Subsequently, British forces were 
replaced by an Arab League contingent.351 
The rest of the Trucial Coast experienced no noteworthy challenges to the British-led 
system, as Nasser’s pan-Arabism mostly failed to catch on there. On the contrary, the 
Trucial States were now benefiting from British efforts to build modern state-
institutions and the rule of law. This brought about relative political stability. In 
socio-economic terms too, the British invested into infrastructure and especially into 
the development of the oil industry. All these efforts coincided with an influx of 
foreign companies and workers, which also raised productivity.352 Benefiting also 
from the Gulf Arabs hostility to the atheist Communism and thus to Soviet influence, 
it can therefore be stated that the British Trucial System and the enhanced 
development and administrative assistance functioned relatively well and therefore 
caused no substantial indigenous resistance to this order. 
Hence, it came as a shock, especially to the region’s ruling sheiks, who were also 
benefiting economically and politically from British support, when in 1968 the 
Labour Government of Harold Wilson announced the UK’s withdrawal from East of 
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Suez by 1971. This decision was not only taken out of fiscal pressures, but especially 
for ideological reasons. Though the British Conservative Party lead by Edward Heath, 
who came to power a year before the deadline, was unhappy with this decision and 
initiated an enquiry into reversing Wilson’s decision, and even though various ruling 
sheiks offered to bare the entire financial cost of maintaining the UK’s military 
presence, these initiatives proved to be too late to halt events.353 
The year of 1971 saw the successful founding of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the 
State of Qatar, and the Kingdom of Bahrain. A Gulf state where the British remained 
directly involved militarily until 1975, was Oman, which was caught up in the Dhofar 
insurgency that had begun in the mid-1960s. Oman’s new Sultan Qaboos, who is still 
head of state at the time of writing, was fighting China-backed Marxist rebels from 
South Yemen streaming into western Oman. Qaboos, himself educated at Sandhurst, 
with substantial British and Iranian help, finally defeated the insurgency, which in 
the Cold War was of vital Western interest.354 
Despite major setbacks and a largely negatively perceived legacy of Britain in the 
Middle East, the Gulf’s Arab sub-region, which had for one and a half centuries been 
called the Trucial Coast, marks something of a largely positive exception. It had seen 
a relatively stable and prosperous period and now Britain had helped build a new 
regional order composed of independent and rapidly modernizing emirates. 
Nevertheless, the era in which Britannia had ruled Gulf waves had now come to an 
end. Yet, this greatly reduced British political and military role proved not to be 
enough to guarantee local, regional, Western, and indeed global interests, as the 
world’s new American hegemon would find out only a few years later. 
 
3.7 Chapter Conclusion and Theoretical Assessment 
Each of the historic cases of outside power involvement in (and absence from) the 
Gulf provides insights from a theoretical point of view. Although some minor 
elements from neo-liberal institutionalism are detectable, it is especially neo-realism 
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that offers greater utility in this chapter. Neo-liberal institutionalism is a child of late-
20th century globalization and thus cannot hope for much usefulness when analysing 
older history. 
Given the limits of regular seafaring distances, neither theory is fit for purpose to 
interpret pre-modern geo-politics. Nevertheless, it can be deduced that the Persian 
Gulf has been central to global flows of goods, culture, ideas, and warfare across the 
ages. The very birth of civilization occurred in that wider region and came to connect 
the likes of Rome and China via Persia, or Europe and India via the Arabs. Trade and 
diplomacy was conducted via the Old Silk Roads on land and at sea. The Gulf lay at 
the centre of both routes. The thriving Abbasid and Tang Dynasties in the Middle 
East and China were closely connected via these networks, and saw the exchanges of 
goods, technology, conflict and cooperation. Though China’s late medieval Ming 
Dynasty sent entire fleets across the Indian Ocean and on to the Gulf, these were 
“merely” tribute-seeking marketing stunts, rather than geo-political manoeuvres 
guided by an offensive grand strategy. It was only at the dawn of modernity that far-
flung outside actors began to play a direct and geo-political role in the region, 
enabling an IR-theoretical analysis. 
Both Portugal’s entry into and exit from the Gulf resembles neo-realism in its 
assumptions that relative gains, overall power and security matter most. Via its 
military commanders, Lisbon sought to dominate this geo-strategically important 
region, as offensive realist logic would predict, in both economic and military matters 
– showing no interest in potential cooperation with regional powers like Egypt’s 
Mamluks or the Ottomans. On the contrary, the Portuguese Empire constantly fought 
the Ottoman Empire with the motivation of excluding it from the Gulf and the Red 
Sea and pragmatically allied with the Safavids. The Portuguese sought this alliance, 
because they were not generally powerful enough to control the Gulf without Safavid 
toleration, but also because the Safavids – who had no navy – were not powerful 
enough to prohibit Portugal’s presence without outside help. The Safavids’ more 
immediate economic and security concerns were the (more powerful and numerous) 
Ottomans who threatened Persia by land and sea. Yet, when two new outside powers, 
the English and Dutch East India Companies, joined the theatre, the balance of power 
was upset – enabling the Safavids to form a new alliance with them in order to eject 
the Portuguese. This is closely in line with defensive realism’s balance of threat 
notion: the more geographically proximate the threat, the greater the incentive to 
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balance against it, even via an alliance with outsider actors with considerable 
aggregate power. Only when the proximate Ottoman threat had been dealt with in a 
treaty, did the Safavids (and Omanis) view overstretched and aggressive Portugal as 
their most immediate threat.  
Portugal’s relative, but always shaky and contested dominance of Gulf waters in the 
16th century especially offers one crucial insight. The Portuguese found out the hard 
way that establishing a commercial monopoly and complete geo-political control in 
the region proved ultimately impossible, when both market forces and regional and 
global military alliance structures worked against them. 
The same can be said about the Dutch East India Company, although for different 
reasons. Before the VOC’s Gulf exit, it enjoyed a century of profitable trade with 
Persia and Oman. Contrary to the Portuguese, the VOC adopted an approach that in 
economic matters included an absolute-gains-rationale and in political matters 
refrained from getting regionally involved in more than commerce. Profitable for its 
own business interests, the VOC promoted growth in intra-regional trade along the 
Indian Ocean littoral, including the Gulf. The Dutch indeed took control of it, but 
their intra-Asian trade network offered more than simple bi-directional commerce 
between Asia and Europe. It thus also proved profitable enough for regional 
merchants and their political masters, who made use of the greater opportunities the 
Dutch provided. 
The Dutch did not seek political involvement or military hegemony on land, but 
merely secured regional waters with their navy. Neither did they pursue indirect 
political influence in Persia or the Gulf sheikdoms and therefore did not even exercise 
what offensive realists would call an offshore balancing strategy. The focus on 
business and maritime security alone proved popular and therefore highly successful 
in the 17th century Gulf. However, this only worked as long as the region was stable. 
Once Persia and Arabia economically stagnated and politically disintegrated into 
violent anarchy in the 18th century, the VOC did not have the capability or the will to 
protect its interests and thus decided to exit the region. 
These developments created quite different conditions in the Gulf and brought about 
an interregnum for the entire century, again showcasing the ultimate regional 
prerogative of geo-political trajectories. The regional imbalance of power and no 
domestic stability in Persia, where the Safavid dynasty had collapsed, or in Oman, 
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where the Yariba dynasty had simultaneously experienced the same fate, 
characterized the region in the 1700s. These necessarily supercharged “realist” 
conditions, in which numerous civil war parties fought for survival and dominance, 
first deterred potential outside powers from entering the Gulf, which in turn did not 
help in ending the regional anarchy either. Around 1800 then, the return to relative 
political certainty in Oman and Persia and the still gaping security vacuum made it 
easy for a new outside power, the British Empire, to finally intervene in the region, 
when London’s strategic perceptions made it necessary. 
The English, or rather by then British, East India Company’s colonization of the 
Indian subcontinent brought the Gulf into its imperial neighbourhood. Hence, when 
both local Gulf developments – Qasimi piracy and Saudi-Wahhabi jihad – as well as 
global ones – Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt and diplomatic overtures in Persia – 
made a securitization of the region necessary, the British government and the EIC 
became heavily involved. After helping to expulse the French from the Middle East 
via an Anglo-Ottoman alliance, after gaining diplomatic influence in Persia, and after 
militarily defeating the pirates and jihadists, the 18th century interregnum came to an 
end.  
The Gulf era of Pax Britannica re-stabilized most of the region via the Trucial States 
system. Its legal and “institutional” dimension brought with it increased cooperation 
among Gulf sheikdoms and with British political residents, as did the Bombay 
Marine’s deterrence, legal enforcement, and security assurances. Furthermore, the 
resulting economic opening re-energized Gulf business, especially the pearl trade, 
contributing to Gulf prosperity, at least when compared to the 18th century. These 
developments could be interpreted as an albeit highly miniaturized precursor of 
conditions described by neo-liberal institutionalism. Certainly, hegemonic stability 
theory’s explanatory power is particularly evident. 
Yet, by and large, the geo-political dynamics of the 19th century Gulf still resemble 
realism far more closely. This includes local actors with their constant rivalry and 
occasional skirmishes, as well as outside actors. The British Empire clearly followed 
offensive realist behaviour. It often engaged in buck-passing tactics, as long as they 
were conceived sufficient and was engaged in offshore balancing, unless it saw the 
necessity for rapid deployment strikes. But not only did it militarily intervene when 
some of the local conflicts threatened to de-stabilize the region. London and Calcutta 
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were also determined to shield off British India, and later also the Suez Canal, with a 
buffer zone from which other potential outside powers were to be excluded. The Gulf 
clearly fell into this zone, both on the Trucial Coast, as well as inside Persia (and 
Afghanistan). Rivals comprised the French, especially during the Napoleonic Wars, 
the Russian Empire, especially during the Great Game, and, around the fin de siècle, 
the German Empire. Pax Britannica in the Gulf was realism to the core. 
Furthermore, it was firmly influenced by strategic thinking that found its intellectual 
outlets in Mahan’s, Mackinder’s, and Spykman’s writings. Sea power had enabled the 
emergence and global dominance of the British Empire in the first place, as Mahan 
was well aware. The Indian subcontinent – Britain’s land- and manpower asset on 
which the Empire equally depended – also lay at the actual centre of what Spykman 
later called the Eurasian rimland. Its periphery, including the Persian buffer zone 
that the Russians increasingly sought to dominate led straight into Mackinder’s 
heartland.  
The entire situation was transformed dramatically with the Gulf oil-discoveries, the 
world wars, and the British colonization of Iraq, de facto parts of Iran, and 
increasingly the Trucial States. The world war and interwar periods find no examples 
for any actor resembling neo-liberal institutionalist characteristics. Local, regional, 
and outside actors again behaved in highly realist manners, in order to ensure 
survival and/or maximize power. Just as defensive realism would predict, regional 
powers like Reza Shah's Iran sought to play the major powers off against each other, 
first balancing and then bandwagoning in the face of necessity. In two world wars, 
Britain successfully managed to prevent its enemies, the Ottoman Empire, 
Wilhelmine Germany, and later Nazi Germany from gaining (deliberate) control of 
the heartland and of what by then, in terms of oil resources as well, had become the 
most important region in the world. 
However, heavily indebted and decolonizing Britain was in no position to prevent the 
world’s new superpower, the United States, from gradually taking control of the 
region. The distribution of capabilities across the world’s major units had 
fundamentally changed – now, in the Cold War, forming a bipolar international 
system. After a few – failed – unilateral British attempts at reasserting its standing in 
the Middle East, Britain finally had to bandwagon itself and subsequently maintained 
a successful Cold War alliance with the US in the region. Britannia’s three-decade-
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long Indian Summer in the Gulf was by and large successful but proved too heavy a 
burden for a country that was no longer a superpower. The UK’s military priorities 
shifted to Europe, its own backyard, which was more directly threatened by the 
Soviets, and because of which the British military was not free to roam. It was aware 
of its limitations and hence exercised the newly necessary restraint. This line of 
behaviour can also be characterized as realist. 
To conclude in one sentence, neo-realism has proved the far more accurate theory 
when assessing the modern history of Persian Gulf outside powers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
153 
 
4. The United States’ Persian Gulf Hegemony 
After shining light on the modern history of Gulf outside powers in the previous 
chapter, this one seeks to complete the story by briefly focusing on the present 
situation and its recent history. Since the mid-20th century especially, the United 
States has gradually taken over the role of Gulf security underwriter. This role has 
experienced varying degrees and changing strategies since Britain’s final moments in 
playing it. 
 
4.1 The Two-Decade Interregnum 
4.1.1 America’s Gulf Emergence 
The United States’ quiet emergence in Gulf affairs goes back to the beginnings of the 
20th century, when a handful of Americans became involved in the Persian 
administration and civil service. At the time, and probably up to the eve of the 1953 
coup against Mossadeq, they had indeed been largely welcomed. Compared to British 
and Russian imperialists with their modest track record in the country, Persians 
seemed to perceive American advice and assistance as benevolent, constructive, and 
even inspirational.355 This only changed in the 20th century’s second half.  
On the other side of the Gulf, in Saudi Arabia, Americans were also quick to spot an 
opening in Britain’s sphere of influence, which had always been concentrated more 
on the Arabian Peninsula’s coastlines and not so much the hinterland. From the 
1930s onwards, the California Arabian Standard Oil Company (later Aramco) became 
involved in explorations in Saudi Arabia, alleged to hold massive oil reserves. It was 
only the Second World War that put these surveys and investments on hold until the 
War’s conclusion.356 
Regarding US political involvement in the Gulf region, two dates are of significance. 
The year of 1945 saw President Franklin D Roosevelt’s famous meeting with King 
Abdulaziz ibn Saud on board the USS Quincy in the Red Sea, where both heads of 
state cut their famous oil-for-security deal which has been lasting until the time of 
writing. Tellingly, Roosevelt had not informed his ally and friend, Winston Churchill, 
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on their prior meeting at Yalta, knowing fully well how he would have reacted.357 The 
signal was clear: America was beginning to edge the British out of the Middle East.  
Though this was less true for the Trucial Coast, where a buck-passing, pragmatic 
Washington appreciated the British presence, but certainly true regarding Iran. In 
1953, the CIA’s involvement in the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadeq and the re-
installation of Mohammed Reza Shah marked the beginning of a strategic bilateral 
alliance that lasted until 1979. Though the coup was sponsored in alliance with 
Britain, the Americans became the Shah’s primary ally and BP had to accept less 
favourable oil concessions, as mentioned in the previous chapter.358 
 
4.1.2 The Twin Pillars and their Collapse 
Both incidents, in 1945 and 1953, marked the foundations of the American Twin 
Pillar strategy in the Gulf in the 1970s. What was also named the Nixon Doctrine 
sought to rely on the Gulf’s two regional powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, instead of on 
American military presence that might have followed the 1971 British exodus. In the 
interest of protecting its access to cheap oil, in order to stabilize the region, and in 
order to keep the USSR out of the Gulf, this strategy closely resembled earlier 
empires offshore balancing and buck-passing, especially in consideration of the 
excessive American arms sales to Iran that started around 1970. US military presence 
was still very marginal. In Iran it grew, though not in the form of bases and 
contingents, but of military advisers, weapons systems operators, and a vast signals 
intelligence infrastructure. With the exception of a small naval presence in Bahrain 
after the UK withdrawal, the US, distracted also by the Vietnam War, still had no role 
in the newly established small Arab Gulf monarchies.359 
This strategy, relying on Gulf regional powers rather than direct support for the small 
coastal states, differed from the previous British one. The secret and unrestricted 
arms sales to the Shah was not the only US instrument with which to prop him up 
and turn him into the ‘Guardian of the Gulf’.360 President Nixon and his National 
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Security Advisor and later State Secretary Henry Kissinger – going against US 
economic interests – even encouraged the Shah to raise oil prices, in order to prevent 
Iran’s potential economic implosion. They wanted to turn Iran into the regional 
powerhouse that would stabilize the region and to deter the Soviets.361 
Yet, this hardly assured the Arab Gulf States, who were constantly distrustful of their 
ambitious Persian neighbour. Despite their hypothetical support by the Twin Pillars, 
the small Arab Gulf States, fearing greater Iranian designs in the line of the Shah’s 
unilateral seizure of three contested Gulf Islands after the British Gulf withdrawal, 
showed, apart from Oman in Dhofar, little interest in cooperating militarily with 
Iran.362 
Economically, the situation, at least for the Western oil consumers, was starting to be 
no less volatile. At the same time, the Saudis renegotiated the terms on oil 
concessions, gradually taking over the previously Western oil production. Nixon 
scrapped the US’s oil import quota out of raw necessity which caused American 
reliance on Gulf oil to skyrocket simultaneous to a global surge in demand. The 
recklessly overspending Shah now seized control of the oil consortium out of both 
pride as well as fiscal necessity. As various regional crises amalgamated, the situation 
reached boiling point in October 1973. The Yom Kippur War was accompanied by the 
Arab-led OPEC oil embargo, which would contribute to recession across the Western 
world, especially in Europe.363  
Bahrain also gave the US Navy an ultimatum to leave its small base at the same time 
as Iraq happened to grant the Soviet Navy docking rights.364 An alarmed Kissinger is 
said to have been prepared to activate some of the Pentagon’s contingency plans: 
Orders by his ally, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, were given to the US Navy 
and the US Marines, who were simultaneously conducting regional military exercises, 
to prepare for an amphibious invasion of oil-rich Abu Dhabi in late November to 
reinstate credibility.365 The mere threat, beside Kissinger’s diplomacy, proved 
successful and the embargo was lifted, although admittedly the Gulf’s ultimate 
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economic interests also incentivized OPEC to get back to business.366 However, the 
incident, which had also threatened the US Navy’s fuel supply, awakened the US 
desire to establish a military presence in the Gulf in the long run. 
Yet, the oil price rises driven by the Shah, who had nevertheless not joined the oil 
embargo, continued, and with Kissinger’s consent, – partly out of the necessity to pay 
back the Iranian state’s huge piles of debt, but, imprudently also, in order to purchase 
ever more American weapons. Washington’s motivation was two-fold: firstly, 
Kissinger emphasized Pahlavi Iran’s centrality in America’s Cold War strategy in 
West Asia, and secondly, America’s huge foreign oil expenditure needed to be 
recycled to the maximum.367 However, Kissinger’s endorsement of Iranian oil price 
rises contributed to the worsening of the global energy crisis and skyrocketing 
inflation inside Iran. Furthermore, the Shah’s overly ambitious domestic 
development plans could not work in the inflationary environment and his over-
extended military spending is said to have damaged Iran’s hitherto positive economic 
trajectory, certainly its domestic legitimacy and thus its political stability.368 In 
Washington, it also stirred the first opposition to the unchecked and unbalanced 
American support for the Shah. He showed little sign of moderation and cooperation 
though, prompting the mood to finally swing against him. Kissinger’s opponents won 
the argument and brought about a full American switch to Saudi Arabia as the US’s 
main regional strategic ally and oil provider.369  
The resulting loss of flowing US dollars into Iran damaged the Iranian economy even 
more, which after all had been rapidly modernizing following the Shah’s White 
Revolution. Yet, this sudden dip may have had an impact on the course of 
developments leading up to the 1979 Islamist Revolution. 370 Inspired by the 
religiously fundamentalist preaching and political opposition of the exiled cleric 
Ruhollah Khomeini, the Pahlavi dynasty fell and with it one of the most important 
American allies between Europe and Japan.371 This marked the breakdown of 
America’s Twin Pillar Gulf strategy and changed the Middle East’s political and 
ideological landscape until the time of writing. 
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4.1.3 The Carter Doctrine 
The Carter Presidency and the Iranian Revolution coincided with a perceived as well 
as actual increase in Soviet assertiveness, including in the greater Middle Eastern 
region. Though the 1973 OPEC oil embargo and resulting 1974 global energy crisis 
caused the first American doubts over the sufficiency of their Twin Pillar strategy, it 
was only the 1979 fall of the Shah that incentivized American strategists to prepare a 
new potential approach to the region. 
One of the principal architects of what would come to be known as the Carter 
Doctrine, was the President’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. The 
collapse of one Gulf pillar convinced him of three things. Firstly, the offshore 
balancing and buck-passing approach to the Gulf had already failed; secondly, 
especially in a time of growing Soviet global and regional assertiveness it would 
therefore be even more inadequate to carry on as before; and thirdly, the complete 
centrality of the Persian Gulf region for Western energy interests had reached a new 
quality, necessitating a new equivalence in the Gulf’s regional importance, beside the 
dominating Western Europe and East Asia in American prioritization. ‘America’s 
security had become interdependent with the security of three central and inter-
related strategic zones consisting of Western Europe, the Far East, and the Middle 
East-Persian Gulf area’.372 
His new concept ‘was first broached in the spring of 1979’, but notwithstanding the 
preparation of memos, only found growing support in the wider US national security 
and foreign policy establishment by the time the USSR invaded Afghanistan at the 
end of the year.373 This Soviet incursion overtly confirmed the new Soviet 
assertiveness in the wider region and together with the influx of recent regional crises 
and even an apparent new jihadist threat to Saudi Arabia – the second pillar – 
convinced Jimmy Carter of introducing a new regional strategy.374 
Consequently, Brzezinski advised Carter to not only give full public American political 
backing to the Persian Gulf’s Arab monarchies, especially Saudi Arabia, but to 
underwrite that backing with teeth. Ergo, he was calling for enhanced military 
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presence at least around the Arabian Sea’s coastlines. This over-the-horizon-
capability would be enabled via a new rapid deployment force which had the sole 
purpose of militarily protection the Strait of Hormuz and if need be the Gulf States’ 
oil fields onshore. 
In his January 1980 State of the Union Address, Carter announced his new doctrine – 
and sounded strikingly similar to Lord Curzon less than a century earlier: 
‘Let our position be absolutely clear. Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian 
Gulf region will regarded as an assault on the vital interest of the United States of America, and such 
an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force’.375 
Yet, it would take the US another decade to fully implement the Carter Doctrine and 
step into Britain’s Gulf footprints. Though already March 1980 saw the creation of the 
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), which would, in 1983, following the 
restructuring of the US Armed Forces, turn into US Central Command (CENTCOM), 
Washington would not station vast numbers of troops in the Gulf until 1990/91.376 
Two Gulf Wars caused this further American switch from on over-the-horizon-
capability, to a direct military presence inside Gulf states. The Iran-Iraq War from 
1980 to 1988 – by far the Middle East’s most violent conflict since World War Two, 
even until the time of writing – already brought in the US Navy on a greater scale. 
President Ronald Reagan’s approach to the war was a literal balancing act – since his 
administration provided arms and support, as well as opposition to both antagonists, 
depending on who threatened to dominate at different times.377 It proved not to be 
enough to stabilize the Gulf and to then deter Iraq’s dictator Saddam Hussain shortly 
after. When he invaded Kuwait (and also crossed the Saudi border) in the summer of 
1990, this put in motion a US-led and UN-endorsed grand coalition. Operation 
Desert Storm militarily ousted Hussain from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 1991, and, 
though regime change was not yet on the agenda, left behind US troops on bases in all 
GCC states until the time of writing.378 
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4.2 Pax Americana in a Globalized Gulf 
4.2.1 From Dual Containment to War on Terror to Arab Winter 
The US military presence in all Arab Gulf states including Saudi Arabia essentially 
put America in charge of Gulf security. As Macris highlights, since 1991 the US has 
been the ‘arbiter of war and peace in the region’.379 This trend reached its peak 
especially with the post-9/11 invasion of Iraq when American grand strategy 
completed the shift to prioritize the Middle East over all other regions.380 Arguably it 
has come under stress ever since. 
In the 1990s, Washington pursued a Gulf strategy of ‘dual containment’ – with both 
Iran and Iraq, despite their mutual contemporary enmity, being the West’s and the 
GCC’s regional antagonists.381 America’s military presence in the Gulf served as a 
buffer zone between the three regional powers and protected the independence of the 
small Gulf monarchies.  
Post-9/11, the George W Bush administration’s war on terror directly affected the 
Gulf’s security environment. This coincided with the small monarchies’ ongoing, 
rapid modernization and integration into the global economy, not merely in the form 
of oil and gas exports, but also in the form of regional business- and tourism hubs.382 
On the Gulf’s immediate periphery meanwhile, conflict and disorder escalated. With 
the ill-fated US-led invasion of Iraq, Washington abandoned its decade-long status 
quo management, and adopted an active quasi-imperial role with the intention of 
changing the status quo and spreading representative government institutions. 
Regime change in Iraq and the following civil war also changed the regional 
distribution of power, essentially taking Iraq out of a previously triangular order.383 
Iran was the only conventional American enemy left. Its nuclear programme now 
posed one of the biggest Western- and Gulf Arab security concerns. Given the poor 
American track record in its Afghanistan- and Iraq reconstructions though, this crisis 
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was not met with another military intervention. In the end, at least a temporary 
diplomatic solution was achieved between the Obama- and Rouhani administrations 
and the multilateral treaty, the JCPOA, has allegedly halted Iran’s nuclear 
programme in exchange for the lifting of UN-sanctions.384 
This relative success has not resulted in an American military withdrawal from the 
Gulf, given that general regional insecurity has increased, not decreased. Much of this 
is down to what in 2011 was still optimistically called the Arab Spring, but which has 
since mutated into an Arab Winter. The popular uprisings which toppled the 
autocratic regimes of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, firstly, have only produced 
modest results at best (in Tunisia’s case), and civil wars and fragmentation (in Libya 
and Yemen) at worst.385 Moreover, simultaneous to the US’s withdrawal from Iraq in 
2012, the revolutions’ internet-assisted message spilled over into other Middle 
Eastern countries. Most prominently, this happened in Syria and Iraq, which, for all 
intents and purposes, have ceased to exist as nation-states. The subsequent rise of 
Islamic State has only seen a half-hearted US-led intervention, with few boots on the 
ground.386  
West Asia’s 21st century version of the Thirty Years War has created fragmentation 
and unleashed sectarianism, creating a political and security vacuum, that the US has 
shied away from filling the way it might have tried under the Bush administration. 
Instead this power vacuum across much of the Fertile Crescent, bordering the Gulf 
sub-region, is being filled by the geo-political rivalries between the two regional 
powers and primary antagonists – Iran and Saudi Arabia – and their proxies.387 
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Hence, following the Obama administration’s unwillingness to directly engage in 
most of these conflicts, and given the current Trump administration’s semi-
isolationist impulses, there is an ongoing regional and global perception of gradual 
American retreat from the Middle East. Yet, at least until the time of writing, Pax 
Americana endures – if not in various Middle Eastern hinterlands – then at least in 
and between the economically globalized GCC-member-states and the waters of the 
Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean. In order to assess if this is to remain so 
in the short-to-mid-term future, it is necessary to understand the essentials of 
America’s Gulf Role. 
 
4.2.2 The Nature of America’s Gulf Role 
Notwithstanding the souring of US-Russia relations and the fears of China’s rise, 
since 9/11, the greatest threat to US national security is perceived to originate in the 
Middle East. Saudi Arabia, the biggest, richest, and most influential GCC member is 
America’s key regional ally. Although most US military personal is based in the small 
coastal monarchies, the US-Saudi “special relationship” is a central pillar to the entire 
Gulf security system. Due to its relative size, resources, political, and ideological 
influence in the Arab and (Sunni-)Islamic world, the Kingdom’s role in the US’s 
regional strategy is a unique element.388 
Yet, it has always been a double-edged sword, especially since 9/11. On the one hand, 
the KSA not only seemed to be the most important regional ally in a war on terrorists, 
but, on the other hand, also the latter’s’ home. 15 of Osama bin Laden’s 19 suicide 
bombers on 9/11 were Saudis, considerable portions of the KSA’s population anti-
Western, some wealthy individuals of those portions direct and indirect financiers of 
several Islamist militant groups, and one of their recipients al-Qaeda on the Arabian 
Peninsula – the Kingdom’s very own domestic terrorist problem in the earlier 
2000s.389 
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The second grave US and Saudi security concern in the Gulf since that time has been 
the Iranian nuclear programme, which was, like 9/11, ironically sparked off by the 
very regional presence of the US military itself.390 Apart from Israel, the principal 
actor feeling endangered by Iran’s uranium enrichment though has been Saudi 
Arabia. On several occasions Riyadh has threatened to join the nuclear arms race 
were its regional nemesis in Tehran to achieve a breakthrough.391 As a result, the US 
– more than reluctant to forcefully intervene against Iran – has significantly 
upgraded its conventional arms exports to Saudi Arabia, in order to tilt the regional 
military balance decisively against Iran.392 
Iran’s nuclear programme, as well as terrorism and Islamist violence, most 
dramatically in the form of the so-called Islamic State (IS), represent potentially 
grave security threats in their own right to both the US as well as its Arab Gulf allies. 
The situation’s volatility was and is still enhanced further though, through the Gulf’s 
geo-economic importance in energy matters. Middle Eastern terrorism and regional 
rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran present the entire world economy with 
potentially grave challenges. A disruption of energy flows out of the Persian Gulf 
through a security breakdown or even an international, negative market perception 
alone could cause oil prices to skyrocket, as they have partly done during historic 
regional crises.393 The dynamics of supply and demand dictate that this would be 
ultimately bad for everyone – consumers and producers alike. Even if America does 
achieve so-called energy independence in the near future due to its shale revolution, 
many of its allies and trade partners around the world will not. Moreover, the entire 
global economy is and will stay dependent on stable oil prices, as long as no 
alternative energy has fully replaced oil (which according to experts is still presumed 
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to be at least two decades away).394 The oil price, and thus global energy security, is 
and will be highly dependent on relative Gulf stability for some time to come. 
Up to now, this has been largely maintained via the US military presence in the Gulf, 
both on land and especially at sea. It is impossible to know what current security 
escalations in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, or even the Saudi-Iranian enmity would entail 
for the small Gulf oil monarchies in the absence of American military presence there. 
A spill over of these regional conflicts, first into the GCC states, and then into oil price 
dynamics does not seem fanciful. Explaining the enduring low oil price prevalent at 
the time of writing needs to include such a counterfactual scenario: regardless of the 
post-2014 global oil glut – would prices really have had a chance to be as low in an 
absence of American bases and of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf? 395 
The American-Saudi relationship has long been a core ingredient of this security 
system. If Washington or Riyadh were to break up their ‘arranged marriage’ without 
Saudi Arabia having a new robust regional system in place, it is hardly likely Gulf 
security would improve, especially in the long run.396 History has shown that great 
power retreat from the region can create a security vacuum that is relatively quickly 
filled by intra-regional rivalries. After Britain’s exodus from east of Suez in 1971, these 
unleashed rivalries that had previously been mostly contained, escalated with 
politically-driven oil price rises, arms races, the Iranian Revolution and thus 
indirectly resulted in Iraq and Iran to launch the biggest and longest Middle Eastern 
war of the 20th century’s second half.397 
History never repeats itself, but it often rhymes, and the structures and imbalances of 
power in the Gulf are not too different from previous periods and various 
“interregna” which often saw similar developments. The prospect of non-state actor 
violence and the extent of globalization though have dramatically intensified. Hence, 
ending the special relationship without any functioning alternative in place could be 
synonymous with allowing insecurity to spread in the Gulf and beyond. This could 
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have dramatic costly effects for and inside Saudi Arabia as well as for the United 
States and its interests. Reciprocal costly effects could be felt in terms of terrorist 
violence and its impact on humans as well as infrastructure, but also in terms of 
regional conflict and its own impact on energy trade, on global financial markets, and 
on entire economies – impacting large numbers of individuals detrimentally in 
multiple ways. 
This is why the US-Saudi relationship can be characterized as highly interdependent 
in the security issue area and beyond. The more interesting question might be 
whether it is also symmetrically interdependent. In the security issue area, the 
alliance is one of mutual benefits and mutual costs. Both indeed face a popular 
domestic backlash against the close relationship. American suspicions and antipathy 
run deep about a religiously ultra-conservative Wahhabi Saudi society, its harsh 
Sharia law enforcement, and human rights abuses.398 As mentioned above, a 
considerable number of Saudis are equally resentful towards the West and view the 
special relationship as nothing but colonialism. The extreme elements of these voices 
indeed joined Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda in the 1990s in order to end this 
undesired status quo.399 Hence, both governments face negative backlash of 
interdependence in popular perceptions. 
Both, however, at least for the moment, have bolstered their alliance and continue to 
cooperate closely in intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism. Both have an 
entrenched military-to-military dialogue, US arms sales to Saudi Arabia recently 
represented the largest military technology transfer the US has ever conducted, as 
mentioned above, and US military advisers play a vital role in the Kingdom’s national 
security structures.400 These measures, characteristic for an interdependent network 
of transgovernmental channels, have further improved the high level of 
interoperability of both militaries.  
In terms of infrastructure, as well as national elites, a cooperative Saudi Arabia 
provides the US with a higher degree of access to the region than Washington would 
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otherwise enjoy. Both those assets were recognized early on and aspired towards by 
the architects of the Carter Doctrine, who emphasised the need for an infrastructure 
and a cooperative transgovernmental network, essential for any future US rapid 
reaction force.401 Yet, it needs to be noted that relying entirely on the smaller Gulf 
monarchies and even merely West Asia’s periphery hosting US military bases would 
hypothetically still enable the US to secure the Strait of Hormuz, similar indeed to the 
UK’s former approach. This indeed seems to have been noticed by then national 
security advisor Brzezinski, one of the principal strategists in charge of planning the 
Carter Doctrine, when he first proposed Somalia, Oman, and Kenia as candidates for 
essential strategic bases on the shores of the Arabian Sea.402 Furthermore, ever since 
the US military’s large-scale exodus from Saudi Arabia in 2003, the bulk of American 
forces in West Asia are stationed in some of the smaller Gulf monarchies like 
Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar.403  Thus, Saudi Arabia’s undeniable importance to 
America’s regional security interests might be overstated. In this case, speaking of 
complete US vulnerability to an imaginary end of the special relationship might 
indeed take the interdependence argument too far.  
Barack Obama’s statements in an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg, published by The 
Atlantic magazine, revealed the former President’s long-held opinions towards the 
KSA – a country he labelled America’s ‘so-called ally’ – add fire to this.404 Admittedly, 
the US would be highly sensitive to the possible political consequences and 
conceivable security breakdowns a bilateral breakup could spark. A Saudi Arabia left 
to its own devices could result in unwelcome Saudi policies or Saudi inaction on 
sensitive matters. Some even would predict the collapse of the Saudi regime at least 
in the long run when combined with the threats posed by sustained low oil prices and 
lack of diversification of the Saudi economy. Such a scenario could diminish greater 
American regional influence and threaten the entire Arabian Peninsula. 
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From the Saudi perspective, a breakup could have two effects. On the one hand, 
Islamists sympathetic to or even actively supportive of jihadism against the West may 
become further marginalized in wider popular Saudi opinion. The “Great Satan’s” 
complete withdrawal from the land of the two sanctuaries would certainly deny 
radicals the necessary oxygen for their argument’s perceived legitimacy. Ironically, 
this could have a positive effect on Saudi national security from domestic threats. 
Nevertheless, on the other hand, regarding actual and perceived outside threats, the 
Kingdom would feel considerably exposed to potential foreign aggression, be it from 
state or non-state actors in the region. The KSA’s relatively small population vis-à-vis 
rivals like Iran would leave Saudi Arabia’s defences at a numerous disadvantage. 
Furthermore, the Kingdom’s most sophisticated US weapons technology that 
currently still places Riyadh in a stronger position than Tehran would be left to its 
own devices in the long run, as arms transfers require more than merely a one-time 
delivery. Constant technological upgrades, replacement equipment, and expert 
training personnel are part of the transfer and entail the arms importer’s significant 
dependence on the exporter.405 
Therefore, despite all kinds of ideological and political challenges to the US-Saudi 
security relationship, the Saudis, despite their growing friendliness to China, Russia, 
Turkey, and Israel, are likely to remain favourable to American protection, because of 
‘TINA’ – there is no alternative.406 None of these countries have the capabilities to 
take over the US role, alone or in an unlikely full-blown alliance, and neither is a 
fully-integrated GCC security structure, let alone cooperation with Iran in sight. Yet, 
there are more variables to consider than the current distribution of military 
capabilities. 
  
4.3 Energy, Monetary, and Political Variables in America’s Gulf Role 
4.3.1 The Petrodollar 
Next to America’s strategic priority to keep the Persian Gulf open to global trade and 
maintain access to it firmly under the military control of the US Navy, ‘the other geo-
economic mainstay of American supremacy has been the dollar’s standing as the 
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world’s leading transactional and reserve currency’.407 Not only has the dollar’s 
standing enabled the US ‘to extract seigniorage from other countries’ and reduced 
exchange rate risk for the US.408 Global transactions in dollars that do not even 
involve the US, have kept dollar demand high. Moreover, Flynt Leverett and Hillary 
Mann Leverett highlight ‘the dollar’s role as the overwhelmingly dominant currency 
in which oil and gas volumes are priced on international markets’ and have been for 
the last forty years.409 This has led to an ‘accumulation of large dollar surpluses by 
major energy producers’, which subsequently has led to a more or less constant 
“recycling” of those surpluses ‘back into the US economy to cover America’s never-
ending current account and fiscal deficits’.410 
Where did this system originate? In the post-Bretton Woods world, the foundation of 
dollar-underpinned American grand strategy, the US needed to incentivize foreigners 
to hold ever larger surpluses of dollars. Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan sought to 
plan and implement this by ending the old Bretton Woods-era barriers to cross-
border portfolio investment and by pushing for the liberalization of international 
finance. 411 
As the Leveretts point out, the petrodollar is a fruit of this policy. However, it is not 
merely a symptom of wider dollar hegemony, but the result of a carefully planned and 
absolutely central component of American grand strategy after the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods monetary order in the early 1970s.  
‘As the United States worked to reconstitute dollar primacy, its strategic ties to Gulf Arab hydrocarbon 
producers proved central to forging the contemporary oil-dollar nexus; these ties have remained 
critical to maintaining this nexus. […] Washington’s ability to leverage […] [Gulf Arab, and especially 
Saudi Arabian security] concerns through its security partnerships with Gulf Arab states has been vital 
to the recasting and perpetuation of post-Bretton Woods dollar hegemony’.412 
This active US policy seems to have been essential. Throughout the 1970s, the OPEC 
countries were pushing for oil trade conducted ‘in a basket of currencies […] pricing 
oil in IMF-administered Special Drawing Rights’ (SDRs).413 Hence, it is credible when 
Jonathan Kirshner underlines that monetary matters are always high politics, and 
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not merely determined by market forces.414 The Leveretts state that there is nothing 
“natural” about the petrodollar. It is the outcome of ‘strategic bargains’ between the 
US and the Gulf Arab states.415 
These included secret deals with Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 1974, when those 
countries’ central banks agreed to purchase ‘substantial volumes of US Treasury 
securities outside the normal auction process’, buttressing the ‘international image of 
US treasury bills as the world’s safest investment instrument’.416 This was 
perpetuated by another comparable US-Saudi deal in 1978. 
How did this course of events come about? The US seems to have played on three 
Saudi and Emirati incentives: firstly, Washington began to offer preferential terms to 
the Gulf Arabs; secondly, it supported an enhancement of Saudi voting power in the 
IMF; and thirdly, ‘US officials did not hesitate to link Gulf Arab states’ willingness to 
help the United States financially with American willingness to guarantee their 
security against threats perceived by Gulf Arab elites’.417 Despite Cold War America’s 
focus on its Soviet rival, Saudi Arabia’s primary threat perception then already 
revolved around Iran, which at the time was still ruled by Shah Mohammed Reza 
Pahlavi, Washington’s central ally and arms customer in West Asia. ‘These conditions 
both enabled and incentivized Washington to leverage Gulf Arab states’ concerns 
about Iranian power to influence their financial and monetary decision-making’.418 
This threat perception has risen to entirely new proportions over the decades since. 
The Islamist Revolution in 1979, the Iran-Iraq War, Iranian efforts to export both its 
Islamist ideology to the “Arab Street”, as well as to bolster the “Shia Crescent” in the 
Middle East and Sunna-dominated conservative Gulf, Iran’s independent and anti-
Western foreign policy, and, most dramatically, its recent nuclear programme, as well 
as its temporary conclusion through the lifting of UN-sanctions, have perpetuated 
this Saudi and Gulf Arab fear.419 The US has been able to play on that and extend its 
political and military influence in the region over the same time period. The origins of 
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this well-known development though, as the Leveretts demonstrate, lie in 
Washington’s Gulf oil-dollar diplomacy of the 1970s.  
Despite the post-“Arab Spring” world seeing American reluctance to engage in 
regional military adventures and actively idealistic and transformative policies, and 
despite Saudi Arabia’s suspicions about a perceived American disengagement from 
the region, the post-Bretton Woods system and the Gulf security order remain firmly 
in place for now. As a IISS-publication, led by Alan Wheatley emphasizes, the US’s 
overwhelming dominance in defence, technology, and finance makes a sudden shift 
to a new monetary system unlikely in the short-term, and even in the mid-term, an 
increasingly possible shift together with the global economic re-convergence, would 
be gradual and multipolar, rather than characterized by any new non-dollar unipolar 
order.420 For the Gulf, defence matters most. ‘US security commitments to its Persian 
Gulf allies, especially vis-à-vis the perceived threat of Islamist Iran, have elicited 
sustained Gulf Arab support for the oil-dollar nexus’.421   
However, this does not mean that the Gulf and its new primary energy importers are 
wholly without alternatives should stronger incentives arise to build new monetary 
orders and oil-trade regimes, as portfolio manager and DoD-advisor James Rickards 
points out. Since the GCC economies are still so dependent on oil exports, they 
continuously require the best-suited monetary and oil-trade regimes. He pictures 
two: 
‘A logical extension, then, of the SDR basket approach would be to include the dollar price of oil in the 
basket. By doing so, the exchange value of the GCC currency would move in tandem with the dollar 
price of oil. If the Fed pursued a cheap-dollar policy and the dollar price of oil increased due to the 
resulting inflation, the GCC currency would appreciate automatically, mitigating inflation in the 
GCC.’422 
However, Rickards also imagines an even more disruptive alternative monetary 
regime change. Although long-held ideas on an integrated GCC-currency for now 
seem to have lost appeal following the Eurozone crisis, this could change again in the 
future. A potential GCC-currency would offer itself as a viable one for pricing oil- 
(and natural gas-) trade – ‘thereby allowing the GCC currency to float relative to 
other currencies’. Rickards concludes stating that such a development ‘could truly 
mark the beginning of the dollar’s demise as the bench-mark currency for oil prices, 
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and it would create immediate global demand for the GCC currency’.423 He credibly 
evaluates the likelihood of such revolutionary developments relative to the state of 
US-GCC relations. Yet, there is even another potential alternative, centred on the 
Gulf’s primary oil customer, China, as the Leveretts point out and as is discussed in 
the final chapter of this thesis. 
Furthermore, there are signs that shifting market forces in the world of energy itself 
are beginning to influence and even change the status-quo rationale. 
 
4.3.2 The Shifting American Energy Landscape  
Since the dawn of American presence in the Persian Gulf, the US economy has been 
significantly dependent on oil imports from that region, albeit always to a lesser 
extent than for example Europe. The height of American oil dependence on the Gulf, 
was in the mid-1970s and again in the early 2000s, although by then, the US energy 
import and consumption mix was already relatively less dependent on the Gulf. In 
1977 it imported 2.4 mbd and in 2001, 2.7 mbd.424 By 2011, the US share of Gulf oil 
exports had decreased below 10%. By contrast, Asia’s share of Gulf exports, having 
skyrocketed especially since the millennium, was 43%.425 In 2013, the US barely 
imported more than a fifth of its oil consumption from the Gulf.426 
This reduction of US imports from the Gulf has come about due to an increased 
global oil and gas supply, due to newly reachable reserves especially in North 
America. The most important explanation is the so-called shale gas, tight oil, and oil 
sands revolution.427 US imports of Canadian oil sands, for instance, have risen.428 
Incremental technology breakthroughs in recent years have substantially cheapened 
the upstream production of these unconventionals – unlocking gigantic reserves in 
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North America, including the US, which has enormous reserves of shale gas. Hence, 
domestic production there has become profitable.429 
The immediate effect of this development has been its contribution to a global oil 
glut. Despite constantly rising global demand, global over-supply has therefore 
resulted in a dramatic fall of the oil price since 2014, when it plunged from $96 a 
barrel to $41 in 2016.430 Since then it has not surpassed $50 – causing sudden dents 
in Gulf economic growth and directly threatening even its richest members with 
budget challenges.431 A Saudi Arabia-led OPEC first reacted by maintaining its 
production levels, presumably in its member countries’ race for market share as well 
as their desire to slow the profitability and supply of their North American 
unconventional competitors.432 In late 2016, Saudi Arabia finally gave way and 
returned to its classic role as swing producer – although this has only very 
moderately increased the oil price. Despite the serious challenge of low prices, the 
unconventionals’ production has not been dramatically hurt.433  
As Yang observes, the simultaneous developments of growing oil and gas supply, is 
beginning to have quite opposite effects in the oil and gas markets. Whereas the 
previously highly internationalized oil trade is increasingly regionalizing – with 
sellers and buyers now being able to trade with regional partners, the previously more 
regionalized gas market is gradually internationalizing, because the world’s largest 
gas consumers and their regions also happen to still have lower gas production 
levels.434 
The overall emerging picture is that the US consumption mix will become even less 
dependent on oil imports, especially from the Gulf. As US gas consumption is 
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growing and its oil and gas supplies are both mainly met by domestic production and 
imports from within the Americas, its current energy mix is already very different 
from the past. In the near future, the BP predicts ‘US […] energy-self-sufficiency by 
2021 and oil self-sufficiency by 2030’.435 Moreover, also by 2021, BP predicts North 
America to become a net oil exporter and, due to shale gas, the US to become a net 
exporter of liquified natural gas (LNG) in 2017. Already, the US is one of the world’s 
major exporters of refined oil products, rivalling even the established giants Saudi 
Arabia and Russia.436 
This game-changing development has the potential to fundamentally reshape the US-
Saudi and wider US-GCC alliance – and with it the very nature of America’s regional 
role. What was once called the “oil-for-security”-relationship is likely to at least 
undergo a review, even though the US still imports large amounts especially of Saudi 
oil and will continue to have an interest in stable oil prices – which prolongs energy 
interdependence with the Gulf, even though not as much as before. How far it will 
influence the monetary underpinnings – the Petrodollar – is one further open 
question in this equation. Its possible answers will be mainly addressed in this 
manuscript’s final chapter. There, it will be merged with an assessment on what the 
Gulf states increasing energy interdependence with Asia could simultaneously entail. 
 
4.3.3 The Future of the US-GCC Alliance 
Gulf history has been moving fast in the recent decade and some of its developments 
have called into question the future endurance of Pax Americana in the Gulf. Not 
merely is the Gulf’s periphery in violent turmoil, parts of which can be firmly laid at 
the door of the US’s failures in its regional foreign and security policies, the situation 
in Iraq being the most important example. What matters here is how America’s 
regional power, performance, and prospects are perceived. Both the Bush and Obama 
administrations have faced significant hostility, not only by America’s regional 
enemies, but also by its allies – albeit for diametrically opposed reasons. Where Bush 
was seen as doing too much (and failing in his objectives), Obama was seen as doing 
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too little (and also failing to uphold his allies’ interests).437 In the Gulf, it is especially 
Saudi Arabia which has lamented Obama’s off-hands approach, his lukewarm 
support for the Kingdom’s interests and legitimacy, and his outreach to Iran which 
concluded with the nuclear agreement. It is too early to judge which path the Trump 
administration will follow. 
America’s Middle Eastern misadventures and perceived retreats have also been 
coincided by other global and regional developments, which are likely to have an 
impact on the question of future US strategy in the Gulf. The 2008 global, but largely 
Western, financial crisis and credit crunch resulted in the biggest Western economic 
recession since 1929. This has not only undermined Americans’ economic self-
confidence, but also their domestic economic prospects, and the US’ global economic 
power. With a gigantic budget deficit, a heavily indebted US superpower has already 
felt the need to cut some of the Pentagon’s budget.438 In the future, it might be forced 
to take an even harder look at its priorities. Simultaneously to the sequestration, the 
Obama administration announced a rebalancing to Asia as its future regional priority 
– thereby allowing a withdrawal of more troops from Europe sooner, even though the 
likelihood of the pivot is now questionable.439 Whether the Trump administration will 
follow this course and might even herald an American drawdown from the Persian 
Gulf, seems highly unlikely for now, for all the reasons shown above, but it is not 
inconceivable. Indeed, an increasing number of commentators are already calling for 
this.440 How this may interact with China’s and Asia’s Gulf emergence, and how far 
history and theory can inform the issue, is addressed in this thesis’ conclusion. 
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4.4 Chapter Conclusion and Theoretical Assessment 
As globalization and interdependence have greatly increased since the 1970s, this 
chapter’s subject matter sees a more diverse picture in theoretical interpretations. 
Neo-realism’s explanatory power clearly endures, but neo-liberal institutionalism has 
become more relevant than in the previous chapter. 
By the mid-20th century, American oil interests in the Persian Gulf were in 
competition with British ones. This had political implications insofar as the American 
companies gradually undermined the British position in Saudi Arabia and Iran. The 
leaders of both those major Gulf countries favoured American involvement. As 
defensive realism would predict, Saudi Arabia and Iran made use of Anglo-American 
competition and at least softly balanced against the British, by giving favourable 
concessions to the Americans. On the Trucial Coast this did not happen, due to the 
presence of British personnel from the foreign office and the military. Local and 
British joint efforts to create a modern state bureaucracy and infrastructure went by 
relatively smoothly. Hence, whereas the Americans were seeking to edge the British 
out of Saudi Arabia and Iran, or at least reduce their role in those countries, in the 
small Gulf states the Americans came to adopt the opposite tactics. Indeed, as already 
seen in the previous chapter, in the first three decades of the Cold War, Washington 
appreciated the British military presence, buck-passing to London the burden of 
securing Gulf waters. Thus, both strategies can be interpreted through offensive 
realism – seeking to gain the perceived necessary control of the region through its 
largest and most powerful states, but staying largely offshore, because it was deemed 
sufficient. 
Realism again offers similar insights into the Nixon Doctrine, which was created after 
the British Gulf withdrawal. The twin pillar strategy was another example of 
American offshore balancing by the act of buck-passing. Though the British 
abandoned their historic role, the US was able to stay offshore, because the Shah of 
Iran especially more than willingly caught the buck. As a result, Washington sold him 
massive amounts of high-tech military equipment and even seemed to have 
sanctioned the Shah’s part in the oil price rise policies in the 1970s in order to 
stabilize Iran’s economy (and polity). His overspending and unilateral actions though 
then incentivized Washington to switch to Saudi Arabia, the second (and minor) 
pillar, as the US primary foreign oil source. Offensive realism would see the Iranian 
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ally becoming too powerful, independent, and unpredictable, and would try to 
prevent Iran from becoming a regional hegemon. Saudi Arabia was also an important 
US ally but committed much less to the Gulf security architecture. Hence, the US 
indirectly pursued soft balancing against the Shah. The Nixon Doctrine was not only 
there to protect the flow of oil, but also to keep the Soviets out of the region – again 
highly realist motivations. 
Neo-liberal institutionalism though, and specifically complex interdependence theory 
(CIT), also has a case in this point too. The power-shift from the oil consumers to the 
producers had serious geo-economic and geo-political implications. OPEC's re-
negotiations on concessions, its oil embargo, and the resulting dramatic price rises 
made the Gulf states richer than ever before and gave them an influential voice in 
global diplomacy. Rather than, as in realism, merely measuring overall power 
distribution, it is the distribution of power among different issue areas that is 
increasingly relevant under interdependence conditions. CIT stresses that destructive 
issue-area linkage can be harmful to a state's diverse interests and that this is why the 
US was incapable of using its overall power to prevent the oil embargo. Furthermore, 
as the author of this thesis has highlighted, this Gulf power resource stems from 
region-specific geographical properties: the hosting of critical raw materials that can 
be translated into power dividends that can bring about beneficial outcomes to its 
holders. Yet, it needs to be highlighted, that in this case, CIT’s assumptions probably 
underestimate the relevance of military asymmetry once a crisis was in danger of 
escalating. CIT cannot account for the historic fact of how very close the US came in 
linking the issues and breaking the oil embargo militarily. 
Nevertheless, neo-liberal institutionalism is additionally helpful to explain the 
formation of oil trade regimes and their connection to monetary regimes. As CIT 
would predict, the US became dependent on the Petrodollar. This required the Gulf 
states to constantly buy US Treasury bonds in order to sustain the dollar as the 
world’s reserve and transaction currency, including in oil trade. Such a unipolar 
monetary order is closely described by elements from both hegemonic stability theory 
and regime theory.  
On the other hand, it is vital to stress realism’s looming shadow over these global 
monetary structures. From the late 1970s onwards, the US linked not only the energy, 
but also the monetary issue area to the security issue area, by providing much needed 
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military protection to the Gulf states. This underlines a dominance of the overall 
power structure shaping a specific trading regime. It additionally underlines a 
hierarchy of issue areas governing bilateral relationships, with military security 
ultimately dominating. The high politics of the oil-dollar nexus and the connected 
Gulf security arrangements, point towards realist, rather than liberalist dynamics. A 
differentiation of power distribution among different kinds of issue areas has proven 
to be a necessary theoretical contribution, as this chapter has demonstrated. 
However, CIT highlights the necessity to measure power not only as power over 
resources, but also as power over the control of outcomes. And here, the outcomes in 
the monetary and oil-trade regimes since the 1970s have been relatively favourable to 
the overall hegemon, the United States. The Petrodollar is an American success story, 
and, despite clear vulnerability interdependence at play, reinforces the explanatory 
power of realism to a greater extent than CIT acknowledges. 
The present Gulf security order was created with the Carter Doctrine. Following the 
Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US became 
increasingly involved in ensuring Gulf security with its own military. Just as the 
British Empire before, the US sought to stabilize the region with its presence and to 
exclude its Soviet enemy from the region, in a highly realist behaviour. America’s 
motivations thereby followed Britain’s former ones when it comes to the control, not 
only of the sea, but also the rimland, particularly its central bridgehead, the Persian 
Gulf region, and part of the contested heartland, where, in Afghanistan, the US 
entered a clandestine alliance with Pakistan and the Mujahideen against the USSR 
simultaneously. This grand strategy was at the time heavily influenced by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski who himself had been greatly influenced by the intellectual tradition of 
Spykman and Mackinder. 
Before the Carter Doctrine’s implementation though, for another decade Washington 
continued to rely on offshore balancing, arming the Gulf’s then warring parties Iran 
and Iraq and balancing them against each other. The Carter Doctrine was finally 
implemented with the US’s 1991 ousting of Iraq’s invading forces from Kuwait. 
Though offensive realism would have predicted this American move, there can also be 
neo-liberal institutionalist interpretations. With his invasion, Saddam Hussein 
violated several internationally and regionally endorsed regimes and, consequently, a 
multilateral coalition under US leadership came together to restore order.  
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The subsequent Pax Americana has involved large numbers of American troops 
stationed in the GCC-states, creating a security buffer between the GCC and its 
remaining conventional antagonist, Iran. This order can also be interpreted with both 
theories. On the one hand, it falls within a security framework accepted by units of 
the regional and global economic system, with the exception of Iran, which has been 
treated as a rogue. Neo-liberal institutionalism allows for such cooperative security 
measures based on diffuse reciprocity. Hegemonic stability theory also clearly points 
towards the benefits of a leader guarding his own and the system’s interests. As these 
liberalist notions however also correctly claim, such a system can bring about free-
riding by non-contributing members. This is what has happened in the Gulf since 
1991. 
On the other hand, America's military dominance in the most pivotal of the world’s 
three strategically most relevant regions clearly reinforces realism’s utility. High 
levels of interdependence in the security issue area between the US, the Gulf states 
and all the Gulf’s free-riding trading partners buttresses Washington’s huge amounts 
of relative overall power. The heavy militarization of Gulf security and thus of global 
energy security in the form of US regional presence and arms sales, especially when 
considering the post-Arab Spring’s turmoil all around, makes it difficult to not see 
neo-realism dominating the picture: first, Mearsheimer’s offensive realism in regards 
to America’s role, and second, Walt’s defensive realism in regards to both the GCC’s 
bandwagoning to the US and the GCC’s balancing against the greater proximate 
threat posed by Iran. 
This interpretation is now being further strengthened by North America’s shale gas 
and tight oil revolution, which has turned the US into a major energy producer and 
which will potentially turn it into the world’s largest LNG exporter. Hence, from a CIT 
viewpoint, a shift in the distribution of power within the energy issue area is likely to 
be taking place, with Saudi Arabia having to make room for its American ally in 
matters where the KSA used to dominate. This makes the US-Saudi relationship even 
more asymmetrical than it was before. Ironically, it will strengthen America's overall 
power, thereby giving it more flexibility to act in purely realist manners vis-a-vis its 
Saudi partner and in its wider Gulf role.  
However, when matched with its post-9/11 regional military blunders and reduced 
American appetite for military intervention post-Iraq, it also hands the US a potential 
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incentive to one day withdraw from the Gulf, leaving regional security to countries in 
greater dependence on Gulf oil. Offensive realism could incorporate a return to 
offshore balancing. Yet, unless American overall power is dramatically reduced, it 
would struggle to predict such a move, because now, in the 21st century, Eurasia’s 
rimland and heartland are seemingly up for grabs again, as new regional powers and 
great powers are entering the race. The Persian Gulf, the strategically most important 
region of the world lies at the centre of this more than ever and can again be the 
ultimate harbinger of the superpowers’ command of the global commons. 
Neo-liberal institutionalism on the other hand would point towards the opportunity 
of burden-sharing. This, a fiscally-challenged Washington has also long demanded, 
although it is still unclear, which candidates it would be willing or unwilling to accept 
for such a sensitive role. 
A discussion on future developments will be addressed in the conclusion of this 
thesis. 
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5. China’s Asian Competitors on the Persian Gulf’s New Silk Roads 
In the 20th century’s second half, the Gulf’s rapid modernization coincided with a 
global modernization and economic growth that, especially from the 1970s onwards, 
gradually narrowed the great divergence between the developed Western world and 
the developing world.441 Since then globalization has increasingly entailed 
“Asianization”.442 This process was first importantly contributed towards by Japan 
and the Asian Tigers – Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea.443 China 
under Deng Xiaoping followed in their path from the 1978/79 onwards, and so did 
India from the 1990s onwards.444 Consequently, whereas the Japan and the Asian 
Tigers enjoyed a head start vis-à-vis China, the latter enjoyed a head start vis-à-vis 
India. The different levels of these countries’ development still reflect this, and 
therefore, so do their economic characteristics in their interactions with the Gulf 
states, as this chapter shows. All of the countries covered in this chapter have mutual 
interests in regard to the Gulf, especially in terms of oil imports. Yet, each have their 
own comparative advantages, which entails that they have a particular economic role 
in the Gulf. Nevertheless, Japan, South Korea, and India, to various extents all find 
themselves in commercial competition with each other, as well as with China. 
 
5.1 Japan and the Gulf 
Japan was the first modern non-Western country which built a fully-industrialized, 
globalized economy. This process, which had started with the 1870s’ Meji 
Restoration, was dramatically, but briefly interrupted by the events of World War 
Two.445 Following its reconstruction to a capitalist and democratic state, with a 
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pacifist constitution and under a de-facto American military protectorate and Cold 
War alliance, Japan rapidly recovered and developed into the world’s second-largest 
economy for half a century, before China overtook it in 2010.446 Given this condition 
and given its own energy-resource scarcity, it also quickly became one of the world’s 
most energy-import-dependent powers. Consequently, in modernity, at least among 
the major powers, Japan is the oldest East Asian economic and political partner of 
the Gulf countries, with which it developed ties already in the 1950s – importing oil 
from them before most of their resources had even been tapped.447 
 
5.1.1 Japanese-Gulf Trade 
In the two decades since the Cold War’s end, the value of Japan’s trade with the Gulf 
rose almost by a factor of five, from $38 billion in 1990 to $180.3 billion in 2011. By 
comparison, Japan’s global trade merely grew by a factor of three over the same 
period.448 Japan-Gulf trade is heavily dominated by energy, which explains these 
diverging ratios.  
The Gulf approximately supplies a staggering average of 90% of Japan’s oil 
consumption.449 The country’s total energy consumption peaked in the mid-2000s.450 
In 2004, a mere 4% of its energy consumption came from domestic non-nuclear 
sources, complemented by 18% provided by its then growing nuclear industry. Total 
oil dependency constituted around 26% a year later – but already nearly 90% of that 
oil came from the Gulf.451 This regional dependency has remained the case and has 
even intensified in relative terms. Though Japan’s total energy consumption, 
including its oil consumption have been declining since 2005 in absolute terms, its 
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relative oil-dependency has increased due to its termination of nuclear energy 
production, following the 2011 Fukushima disaster.452 In 2015, 42% of Japan’s energy 
consumption was covered by ‘petroleum and other liquids’. Coal was at 27%, natural 
gas at 23%.453 
The rankings for oil imports by Gulf country have mostly remained relatively similar, 
with only Iran and Iraq constituting differences over certain times for largely geo-
political reasons. Iran’s political risk has often caused dents in Japanese oil imports, 
starting from the Islamic Revolution in 1979, throughout the Iran-Iraq War and then, 
up to more recently, due to international sanctions by reason of Iran’s covert nuclear 
programme, following which the US exerted high pressure on Japan to reduce its 
imports from Iran. In 2011, Iran still supplied roughly 9% of Japan’s crude oil 
imports, 2015 saw a decreased ratio of 5%.454 Though blessed with a huge amount of 
resources, Iraq’s almost four-decade-lasting insecurity, sanctions, war and 
underdevelopment meant it has still not realized its oil production and export 
potential. In 2011, Japan could still merely import 2.3% of its oil from Iraq.455 Yet, 
despite this long-lasting reduction of Japanese oil imports from Iran and Iraq, 
prospects for future growth are significant, given the 2016-lifting of UN-sanctions on 
Iran, and taking into account an optimistic scenario of long-term Iraqi stabilization 
following the suffocation of IS.456 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have constantly dominated the stage since the 1990s.457 In 
recent times Japan’s crude oil import from the Gulf peaked in 2008 by value, though 
this was due to the high oil price at the time. The fact that the years since, up until 
2015, saw a lower value is due to the low oil price, especially since 2014.458 In 2015, 
Saudi Arabia supplied 34% of Japan’s oil imports, followed by the UAE’s 25%. With 
the exception of Russia, which supplied 8% the same year, other Gulf countries 
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followed among Japan’s top suppliers, with Kuwait and Qatar both supplying 8% 
each.459 
In terms of Japan’s natural gas imports – a resource covering 23% of Japan’s energy 
consumption in 2015 – the country’s general import-origins are geographically more 
diversified than with oil, although most imports are shipped in by sea in the form of 
liquified natural gas (LNG). Despite import diversification, the Gulf region still 
constitutes roughly a quarter of Japan’s natural gas imports. Its most important 
partners in 2016 were Australia (27%) and Malaysia (18%). Russia provided 9% and 
Indonesia 8%, but Qatar, now Japan’s most important gas provider from the Gulf 
covered 15% (i.e. the third in total), the UAE 6% and Oman 3%.460 
In spite of more diversification in gas imports, all these figures underline how central 
the Persian Gulf is to Japan’s energy security and will remain so, especially post-
Fukushima. This is also underlined by the constant trade deficit Japan has run with 
its Gulf partners. From the post-World War Two period until Fukushima Japan 
enjoyed a global trade surplus.461 The Gulf always marked an exception in this, 
demonstrating the uniqueness of the ties due to energy.462 
Gulf exports to Japan are nearly fully composed of energy products.463 Nevertheless, 
already since the 1970s, the region has also been importing a large amount of 
Japanese manufactured goods, including electronics, automobiles, and heavy 
machinery.464 However, these have been declining relatively throughout the last 
twenty years in the face of intra-Asian competition, especially from South Korea and 
China. As Minagi underlines, ‘[i]t became difficult for ‘Made in Japan’ products to 
compete in terms of price with the products of emerging Asian countries’.465 
Around half of Japan’s exports to the Gulf are categorised as ‘transport equipment’.466 
This includes passenger- and large automobiles, motorcycles, and construction 
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machinery. Trade in this category has sometimes fluctuated due to oil-price dynamics 
or geo-political supply-chain disruptions.467 
A curious phenomenon can be observed in the product category of electrical 
machinery, including tech-goods from established world-class companies such as 
Panasonic, Sharp, Sony, and Toshiba. Logistical networks, outsourcing, and re-export 
business have watered down the Gulf impact of ‘Made in Japan’ products, because 
‘more than 90% of those companies’ products in the Gulf come from Asian countries 
other than Japan’.468 
The types of Japanese products to the Gulf do not significantly vary by country. In 
addition to the above-mentioned categories, Japan also exports metal products, 
chemicals, and textiles to all Gulf states.469 
Given the intra-Asian competition and Japan’s demographic challenge the country is 
set to restructure its economic model – with the aim of maintaining its current 
account surplus, but not to return to its trade surplus. Instead, economists are 
recommending Japan to reinvent itself as a big outward investing country.470 The 
Gulf has so far been a relatively moderate Japanese FDI destination, but has 
significant growth potential, despite increased competition in that area also. 
 
5.1.2 Japanese-Gulf Investment and Project Contracting 
For Japanese investment to have a highly noticeable impact in the Gulf, the country’s 
large enterprises would need to step up their direct investment there. Japanese 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and Engineering/Procurement/Construction 
contracts (EPC) have vacillated since 1975. From then until 2011, with only a few 
exceptions, its average portion has merely represented less than 1% of its global 
outward investment. It reached more than $1.2 billion in 2008, its peak so far, along 
with its trade.471 
Historically, Japanese FDI into the Gulf has mainly been in the petrochemical and 
steel industries. A well-known example from Saudi Arabia is the Petro Rabigh project 
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of 2005, a $10 billion joint venture between Japan’s Sumitomo Chemical and Saudi 
Aramco.472 Other Japanese companies such as Marubeni, Mitsui, and Sojitz are also 
conducting business in various Gulf countries. Most Japanese companies are located 
in the UAE, especially in Dubai’s free zones, where 100% foreign ownership is 
permitted. Saudi Arabia hosts the second largest number of Japanese firms in the 
Gulf, followed by Qatar and Iran.473 Especially the latter, after the lifting of UN-
sanctions, is a potentially big market for Japan to invest in, as it has already sought in 
the past, before UN-sanctions and before US pressure forced divestment.474 Japan’s 
high prospects in Iran post-sanctions were also confirmed by Jonathan Siklos, 
Associate Director of Control Risks’ Dubai branch. He emphasizes the large number 
of Japanese clients of the risk consultancy recently seeking to enter the Iranian 
market.475 
In terms of contracting, the Gulf absorbed a larger share of Japanese investment, 
especially in the 1970s and 1980s in the petrochemical industry. It rose again in the 
early 2000s, peaking in 2005 with a total value of $13.4 billion – representing a 
staggering share of more than 50% in global Japanese contracting. Minagi lists 12 
contracts signed in 2005: two LNG plants in Qatar; a refinery plant, an LNG plant, a 
methanol plant and two petrochemical plants in Saudi Arabia; a chemical textile 
plant and petrochemical plant in Iran; and, most famously, a hyper-modern light rail 
transit system in the UAE – the Dubai Metro.476 
In terms of banking, Japanese finance houses constitute the longest-present from 
Asia in the Gulf, with China catching up only after the financial crisis. Most Japanese 
banks in the Gulf have branches in the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Minagi 
highlights an important competitive advantage that Japanese banks have over their 
intra-Asian rivals, for now: ‘Japan has the financial capability to support the Gulf 
economies, not only for Japanese related projects in the Gulf but also for local 
projects/entities, whereas other Asian countries have only supported their own 
country-related business in the Gulf’.477 
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Indeed, this he highlights as potentially crucial for Japan, if the Gulf is to help 
alleviate Japan’s overall and especially its Gulf trade deficit, because other Asian 
countries, especially South Korean companies, have recently won more and often 
prestigious contracts.478 Tokyo has been alarmed by this and as a result, in addition 
to its highly increased incentive to contribute where it can towards its energy security, 
has recently pushed for closer diplomatic relations with the Gulf states. 
 
5.1.3 Japanese-Gulf Diplomacy and Strategy 
Given Japan’s Peace Constitution, the country has essentially acted as a demilitarized 
trading-state for a long time.479 Although it has recently seen a push for amendment 
in 2016, it remains to be seen how far this translates into a different strategy for 
Japan’s armed forces abroad.480 Since Japan relies on US-military protection at home 
and in East Asia, as well as in the Persian Gulf, on which it is heavily resource-
dependent, its strategic ties with the Gulf states have been largely apolitical and 
firmly entrenched inside its alliance with the US. Though Japan pursued an 
independent economic policy with countries like Iran and Iraq at certain times, it has 
ultimately been forced to bow to American pressure whenever that policy breached 
US geo-political interests in the Gulf.481 Replacing the hitherto relatively significant 
amount of oil imported from Iran until 2012 has not been as easy as the currently 
large global supply might suggest. This is to be recalled when discussing Asian 
countries’ dependence levels and symmetries. 
Furthermore, the Gulf’s political and security risks, have on numerous occasions 
threatened and harmed its trade and investment flows – and, given its energy 
dependence on the Gulf – its economic growth at home. The 1973 OPEC oil embargo 
against the developed world, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, the 
1990/91 Gulf War, and the 2003 Iraq War are the most dramatic examples of the 
kind of consequences oil-import-dependent countries can face. Ehteshami utilizes 
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these recent historic analogies to convincingly demonstrate the risk-dimensions that 
now all major Asian oil importers face, including, more than ever, Japan: 
‘So, while ‘Asianization’ of the Middle East may be taking root, it also exposes West Asia and East Asia 
to each other’s considerable geopolitical tensions. Thus, the strategic vulnerability of the relationship 
should not be overlooked. A preview of the impact of the inter-Asian interdependencies which could be 
replicated in later decades occurred in 1973/74, during which Japan’s impressive GDP growth rate of 
5.1 per cent a year was reduced to just 0.5 per cent as a direct consequence of the oil supply disruptions 
and subsequent price rises of that period. Japan’s vulnerability then was compounded by the fall of its 
trusted energy ally, Pahlavi Iran, in 1979 and the energy crisis which followed the eruption of open 
conflict between the two neighbouring oil states of Iran and Iraq. Japan arguably did not recover from 
this crisis’.482 
In order to prevent such crises from impacting its economy, Japan, just as all other 
Gulf-energy-importing countries, for now, rely on the US military’s Gulf security 
umbrella and that of its closest allies. Though Japan, under American pressure, 
deployed a small number of non-combat-engaged troops to the Gulf in both the 1991 
and 2003 wars to complement its financial assistance, these deployments can be 
regarded as mostly cosmetic in nature without a game-changing impact on security 
provision.483 
Nevertheless, in recent years, following numerous simultaneous developments, such 
as American encouragement for more burden-sharing, even higher Japanese oil-
import-dependency, and the growing role of Asian rivals, especially China, in the 
Gulf, Japan has cautiously been upgrading its regional engagement. It has facilitated 
a more regular, in-depth, multi-dimensional dialogue, especially with its most 
important GCC partners, setting up several bilateral fora contributing to a growing 
institutionalization of Japan-GCC ties. These serve largely economic cooperation, 
educational exchange and tourism promotions, but also political and security 
consulting in order to address the region’s risks to energy supply-and-demand-
security. As Miyagi underlines, both Japan and the GCC countries, recognize a 
‘mutual dependency’ towards each other, and are therefore deliberately expanding 
this dependency in order to firmly entrench the bilateral ties.484 
Diplomatic and other institutional and cultural ties with Iran are far less established 
due to American pressure. With Iraq on the other hand, Japan has sought to diversify 
and intensify its political relations creating multiple cooperative economic fora in 
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order to promote Japanese investment into the development of Iraq’s hydrocarbon 
industry and beyond.485 
All GCC countries, but especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, enjoy a higher degree of 
Japanese attention though, and, due to their combined relative stability and diverse 
importance, will continue to do so, unless US-Iran relations are fully rehabilitated. 
After a period of relative neglect, Japanese state visits to GCC countries have 
increased in recent years, especially under the second Shinzo Abe-administration – 
placing it into a more pro-active foreign (and potentially security) policy in general 
but highlighting the growing priority it places on the Gulf in that respect.486 
Last but not least, the Japanese Navy’s participation in the US-led international 
counter-piracy operations around the Horn of Africa, even though relatively low-key 
so far, underline Tokyo’s growing determination to abandon its complete hands-off 
approach to global security matters. Along with naval operations in the Gulf of Aden 
and the Indian Ocean, the Japanese Navy is setting up closer ties with the GCC and 
has recently stationed liaison personnel at America’s naval base in Bahrain and is 
increasingly interested in military exchanges and joint exercises.487 It seems likely 
that these will be expanded and further integrated into the exercises it already 
undertakes regularly with the US, India and Australia.488 Most tellingly, Japan has 
recently announced to further expand its military base in Djibouti, as part of its 
counter-piracy operations, but also with the intention of matching China’s new 
military base there.489 This simultaneous and sudden choice speaks volumes for Sino-
Japanese rivalry overseas. It is even being joined by a third important East-Asian 
actor. 
 
5.2 South Korea and the Gulf 
Apart from Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, South Korea was one of the Four 
Asian Tigers which first started to roar audibly in the 1980s. Despite its geographical 
surroundings being made up by great powers like China, Japan, and Russia, and 
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despite the North Korean threat beyond the Demilitarized Zone, South Korea has 
developed into a fully modernized, industrialized, high-tech, free-trading, capitalist, 
liberal democracy. Notwithstanding its relatively small population of just over 50 
million, at the time of writing, it is the eleventh largest economy in the world and 
enjoys the highest standard of living at home, and a large degree of cultural 
attractiveness and soft power abroad.490 
Yet, both its economy and its security depend on the same two things that Japan 
depends on, because of two also similar geological and geo-political realities: South 
Korea requires uninterrupted access to foreign energy resources due to its lack of 
domestic ones, and a military alliance with the US due to Cold War-inherited regional 
enmities and rivalries. Thus, just like Japan, South Korea’s industrial development 
and growth almost automatically needed and needs to rely on oil (and gas) imports 
from the Persian Gulf, and, just like Japan, South Korea is not only dependent on the 
American security umbrella at home, but also on the one in the Gulf to protect its 
energy supply-lines and trade routes, as this section shows.491 
 
5.2.1 South Korean-Gulf Trade 
After lagging far behind Japan, and even the lesser developed China and India prior 
to the Cold War’s end, South-Korea’s trade with the Gulf states has grown rapidly 
since 1990, and, with the exception of financial crisis-hit 2009, also consistently. 
Whereas 1990 merely saw a trade value of $6.1 billion, by 2011, it had reached $134.1 
billion.492 For 2011, trade with South Korea constituted 8% of the GCC’s global.493 
Similar to other Gulf trading partners, the bulk of goods flowing between Gulf 
countries and South Korea has been oil and to a lesser extent gas. Consequently, 
South Korea also runs a heavy trade deficit with the Gulf.494 
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Following its consistent economic growth in the last few decades, South Korea’s 
energy demand has naturally followed, even though it is noteworthy that the 
country’s efforts for energy efficiency are among the highest in Asia and indeed the 
world. In 2015, South Korea was the ninth largest energy consumer in the world. Its 
energy consumption was to 41% dependent on petroleum and other liquids, 31% on 
coal, 14% on natural gas, 13% on nuclear energy, and 1% on renewables.495 Though 
the relative oil-dependency in its energy consumption is high and has steadily 
increased in absolute terms, petroleum and other liquids have reduced their share in 
South Korea’s energy consumption. These peaked in the mid-1990s, reaching around 
66% of the country’s total. South Korea has increasingly and successfully sought to 
balance its consumption mix, leading to coal’s, gas’s and nuclear energy’s slight 
growth. Shifts in the fuel portfolio seem destined to continue as the country 
additionally seeks to expand its use of renewables for environmental concerns.496 
Despite oil consumption moderation over the years, it will continue to dominate in 
the short-to-mid-term future. It has grown consistently in absolute terms from the 
1990s onwards, with 1998 and 2008, during the Asian and Global financial crises, 
being the only exceptions. Petroleum and other liquid’s 41% dominance in 2015 
equated a consumption of 2.4 million barrels per day (b/d). This entailed an 
overwhelming reliance on the Persian Gulf as South Korea’s main source of oil. In 
that year, more than 80% of South Koreas’ crude oil imports came from Gulf 
countries. Saudi Arabia provided 30% of that, Kuwait 14%, Iraq 13%, Qatar 11%, the 
UAE 10%, and Iran 4%.497 
A major difference to Japan’s Gulf import patterns is Iraq, where South Korean oil 
companies have won more contracts.498 With regards to Iran, Seoul faced the same 
American pressure that forced Tokyo to reduce its imports. In 2011, Iran’s share in 
South Korea’s crude oil imports still stood at 10%. After the following international 
sanctions package, this had to be drastically reduced even though ‘South Korean 
officials […] expressed their concerns over the de-stabilizing effect of sanctions 
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against Iran on international oil markets, which can impose adverse effects on the 
South Korean economy’.499 Similar to Japan’s import pivot, South Korea turned to 
the Arab Gulf states and found willing replacers for Iranian oil in Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. Since the lifting of the UN-sanctions, South Korea is 
well-placed to revive its oil imports from Iran, especially because the two countries 
had already improvised their trade mechanisms in the face of the pre-oil-industry-
sanctions-regime. As Bazoobandi writes, ‘from October 1, 2010, to compensate for the 
negative impact of sanctions, South Korea started using won instead of dollars to 
clear the payments to Iran’.500 This might be of continued importance given the 
enduring American refusal to lift its unilateral sanctions on Iran, which prohibit 
dollar-denominated trade and investment.501 
If Iran, in the future, manages to heavily diversify its own energy consumption – one 
of the goals of its nuclear programme – it could also expand its exports of natural gas, 
which, up to now, has barely happened. South Korea’s own established consumption 
diversification has consistently seen an increase of natural gas imports until 2013 and 
would thus be an interested partner. So far, all of its natural gas imports come in the 
form of LNG, and, again similar to Japan, those LNG import-origins are more 
diversified than with oil. Yet, the Gulf again provides the lion’s share, accounting for 
roughly half of South Korea’s LNG imports in 2015. Qatar heavily dominated the 
South Korean gas market with 37%, followed by Oman, which covered 12%. The 
country’s other major LNG providers were Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia and 
Australia.502 
Until recently, the non-hydrocarbon trade between South Korea and the Gulf was 
relatively marginal compared to oil and gas, and indeed marginal compared to 
Japan’s, India’s, and China’s relative trade diversification with the Gulf. This has 
changed though, with South Korea’s strong reputation as a developed country 
producing world-class goods. South Korea has been exporting a growing number of 
manufactured products – both high tech, where it primarily competes with Japan – 
as well as historically more low-tech, where China is now heavily dominant though. 
Some of South Korea’s exports to the GCC states have been followed by FDI of several 
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established South Korean consumer brands, especially in automobiles and 
electronics.503 
Despite the trade deficit, South Korea’s exports to the GCC as a collective destination 
have been growing, with the bloc recently becoming ‘South Korea’s second greatest 
export destination after China’.504 Davidson recounts the most prominent 
developments in recent decades. In 1982, for instance, Hyundai started to supply 
parts worth $700 million for the development of a Saudi Arabian offshore oilfield, 
with Daewoo following the year after to supply gas compression platforms worth $110 
million to the Kingdom. He also highlights the prominence of barter deals in the 
relationships, in which South Korean companies export technological products in 
return for oil imports to the country – thereby saving all parties some considerable 
currency exchange costs.505 Thus, the above-mentioned barter system that South 
Korea has also used in trade with sanctioned Iran does not appear to be an isolated 
case. 
South Korea’s exports to the GCC states are now increasingly diversified, hitherto 
being dominated by textiles and rubber parts, and especially automobiles. Yet, in 
recent years, the latter accounted for merely around 20% of the country’s total 
exports to the Gulf. Now, electronic equipment and high-tech gadgets, such as mobile 
phones, smart phones, and computers are the most quantitatively and qualitatively 
prominent products. Big brands like Samsung and LG are highly popular among the 
GCC’s diverse national and international consumers.506 
Per head, the UAE was until recently clearly the largest destination for South Korean 
goods. Saudi Arabia is number one in absolute and relative terms – importing 39% of 
South Korean exports to the GCC in 2009. Yet, that year, the UAE followed closely 
with 37%. Given Saudi Arabia’s much larger population, there should be a much 
larger market for South Korean merchants to tap into. Qatar followed third, with 
10%, Kuwait 9%, Oman 4%, and Bahrain 1%.507 A South Korea-GCC free trade deal 
would likely see a growth and balancing effect on the bulk and destination of South 
Korean exports to the GCC countries. Negotiations were launched in 2007 and 
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several rounds have followed, though up to the time of writing, have not yet come to 
fruition. As Al-Sudairi writes, ‘progress in the talks has stalled as a result of 
differences over tariff concessions for high-priority products like electronics, 
automobiles, and petrochemicals’.508 
Despite Iran’s near four-decade-long post-revolutionary pariah status, South Korean 
goods have enjoyed a considerable market share in Iran. Similar to the GCC, South 
Korea’s main exports to Iran have been cars, mobile phones, computers, and other 
electronic high-tech gadgets.509 
In a post-sanctions world, these Korean exports to Iran are destined to increase, 
alongside FDI and EPC-contracts, which could quickly mirror the already substantial 
investment and contracting that South Korean companies have so far undertaken in 
GCC countries. 
 
5.2.2 South Korean-Gulf Investment and Project Contracting 
Admittedly, despite being major corporations, the South Korean firms investing 
directly into the Gulf countries are still relatively few in number. However, in the area 
of construction contracting the country’s companies have become Asia’s and indeed 
the world’s most successful players in the Gulf market, winning competitive bids for 
prestigious contracts in a multitude of areas. Though catching up fast, as the second 
part of this manuscript shows, China’s reputation as a merchant, investor, 
construction contractor still seems to be influenced by the stereotypical, though 
comparably correct notion of providing more cheaply-manufactured technology, 
goods, and know-how. For the moment, at least in construction, South Korea is ahead 
and has even overtaken Japan. It is quality over quantity now, because the amount of 
South Korean EPC-contracts was larger in the 1970s and 1980s, than until very 
recently.510 
South Korean construction companies like Hyundai, and large numbers of 
construction workers arrived in Gulf countries already in the 1960s and had a huge 
impact on the first Gulf construction boom. Yet, when ‘living standards in South 
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Korea rose, these companies increasingly priced themselves out of the market’ in the 
late 1980s, though only for the time being.511 
As they developed higher standards, they won more prestigious contracts from the 
1990s and throughout the 2000s. Tellingly, despite the relative quantitative decline 
of South Korean construction activity in the Gulf, ‘it was estimated that over 90 per 
cent of South Korean construction work was [nevertheless] originating in the Persian 
Gulf with South Korean companies sometimes even acquiring market shares in 
Persian Gulf monarchies that were in excess of South Korea’s total value of oil 
imports from those countries’.512 Noteworthy projects included the building of the 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority’s grand headquarters in 2003 and Dubai’s Burj 
Khalifa in 2004, both by Samsung Engineering and Construction.513 Such projects re-
started an increase in South Korean EPC-contracts in the Gulf. In 2008, when the 
financial crisis started, but before it had its biggest impact in the 2009 global credit 
crunch and Dubai’s real-estate crash, South Korea’s impact on Gulf construction 
seems to have been huge again. Davidson breaks the story down into the numbers: 
‘In total, it is [sic.] has been estimated that South Korean companies won […] just over $27 billion 
[worth of EPC-projects] in 2008. With total Gulf construction contracts in 2008 being worth $47.6 
billion, […] this means that South Korea had secured an impressive 57 per cent of the region’s 
business’.514 
Former South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, who had formerly chaired and 
transformed Hyundai Corporation into a global construction giant in the 1980s, 
initiated another South Korean construction pivot to the Gulf during his 2007 
presidential election campaign.515 Combining South Korea’s earlier as well as recently 
revived infrastructure investment into the Gulf, Davidson observes, that over time, ‘of 
the three principal Pacific Asian states, it has been South Korea that has made the 
greatest inroads into the Persian Gulf construction and labour sector’.516 
A key moment in the new South Korean Gulf construction landscape came in 
December 2009, when Lee, then as newly-elected President on a state visit to the 
UAE, helped his country win a highly prestigious and attention-grapping bid to create 
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an Emirati nuclear industry. A consortium composed of Korea Electric Power 
(KEPCO), Hyundai, Samsung, and Doosan Heavy Industries won a contract to build 
four nuclear power plants in the UAE, stunning the hitherto favourite competitors 
from Japan, the US, France, and the UK.517 In 2011, South Korea also signed a 
cooperative nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia.518 
Other noteworthy South Korean construction projects in Saudi Arabia include 
Hyundai Engineering and Construction’s investment into the Kingdom’s natural gas 
infrastructure in the Khurais and Karan fields. Dealim, SK, and Samsung moreover 
won contracts in the Saudi refinery and petrochemical industries.519 Although there is 
more information available on South Korean-UAE construction projects, Saudi 
Arabia has been the largest recipient of South Korean EPC involvement – absorbing a 
fifth of the GCC’s total – and mostly in energy and also petrochemical infrastructure. 
‘Aramco alone has already signed deals with over 89 Korean construction companies 
to carry out some 39 contracts valued at $11.5 billion’.520 
President Lee’s initiative was a key moment and helped to lead to a new growth in 
South Korean EPC-contracts in the Gulf despite the global credit crunch at the time. 
General South Korean FDI into the Gulf states did not follow the respective trade and 
EPC patterns though, especially prior to Lee’s initiative. It needs to be said that data 
on FDI-flows between South Korea and Gulf countries is even less available than data 
on EPC-contracts, especially when it comes to GCC-members’ outward investment, 
with the slight exception to the UAE. On average, over the last two decades, the 
investment recipient countries which have so far seen the highest portion of South 
Korean FDI seem to have been Oman and the UAE. In the year 2010, according to the 
OECD, they yielded approximate FDI stock values of $762 million and $564 million 
respectively. Though slowly catching up again, Saudi Arabia ($221 million), the 
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largest Arab Gulf country and importer of South Korean goods and EPC, as seen 
above, still paled in comparison with these two countries, and was even behind Iraq 
($327 million), and barely ahead of tiny Bahrain ($190 million). Iran, already under 
tight sanctions, received $34 million that year, Qatar a mere $17 million, and Kuwait 
a modest $4.8 million.521 
The trend is going in the direction of the UAE, which overtook Oman a year later, 
with Saudi Arabia in hot pursuit. According to the Korea EXIM Bank in 2011, there 
were 187 active joint ventures between South Korean and Emirati enterprises, and a 
166 between South Korean and Saudi ones.522 
In the entire GCC, the number of South Korean firms stood at 448, and, when 
including joint ventures which incorporated other non-GCC and non-Korean 
multinational companies, at 990.523 Observing the same dataset, Al-Sudairi 
underlines that ‘most of these JVs are industrial SME projects focusing on 
telecommunications, petrochemicals, IT, and even automobile manufacturing’. He 
goes on to highlight growing ‘Korean investments in service, finance and real estate 
ventures’, which are largely UAE-based.524 In Oman, most of the more than 100 
South Korean companies that have so far directly invested there, are involved in EPC-
contracts in the energy sector and port infrastructure, such as in Duqm, and are also 
building Omani ships.525 
In Qatar, South Korean distribution companies have formed a joint venture with the 
Ras Laffan natural gas project (RASGAS) and have been awarded with long-term 
LNG purchasing concessions since 1995. Ten years later, the involved Korean 
consortium purchased a 5% equity stake in RASGAS.526 In April 2012, a joint 
investment memorandum was signed between South Korea’s Ministry of Land, 
Transport and Maritime Affairs and the Qatar Investment Authority to co-finance 
EPC-projects in third party countries.527 
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South Korea’s investments in Iran have suffered the same fate as their bilateral trade, 
due to the sanctions regime. Yet, South Korea is keeping its options open despite US 
pressure and is set to exploit the recent lifting of UN-sanctions. In 2010, South 
Korea’s GS Engineering and Construction $1.2 billion natural gas investment project 
in Iran’s South Pars field was annulled.528 The fate of an agreement signed between 
the countries in 2012, to invest jointly into a 1,680km pipeline construction between 
the Caspian Sea and the Gulf of Oman is still unclear but could soon see a new 
initiative.529 
Regarding the GCC members FDI into South Korea, little information is publicly 
available. The total amount of global FDI inflows into both South Korea and Japan is 
marginal anyway, compared to other Asian countries. Most of the GCC’s, i.e. 
predominantly the UAE’s, FDI and FPI into South Korea flows into the 
manufacturing sector and into industrial services, and almost exclusively stems from 
sovereign wealth funds and national energy companies.530 A rather lonely but more 
prominent Saudi investment into South Korea saw Saudi Aramco’s purchase of a 35% 
equity stake in South Korea’s S-Oil Refining Company in 1991, providing several of S-
Oil’s subsequent CEOs.531 All in all, there is definitely room for FDI and FPI 
expansion between South Korea and the Gulf. 
 
5.2.3 South Korean-Gulf Diplomacy and Strategy 
Especially due to their energy trade, the diplomatic and strategic relationships 
between South Korea and the Gulf states have intensified. The upgraded diplomatic 
exchanges, institutionalization, and bilateral cooperation have also helped to, by now, 
greatly diversify trade and investment flows – resulting in deeper relations and a 
growing interdependence.532 
Kolb lists and compares South Korea’s as well as the GCC’s respective interests in 
regard to the bilateral relationships, demonstrating their basic compatibility. They 
largely revolve around ongoing energy trade, but also around the diversification of 
non-energy trade, investment, knowledge transfer and cultural relations. In the 
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strategic arena, both the GCC and South Korea want to strengthen their institutional 
diplomatic dialogue and military cooperation.533 
These dynamics are reflected by the growing number and level of bilateral state visits, 
for which Kolb offers a database covering the years from 2000 to 2012.534 
Furthermore, the Gulf regional importance for South Korea is also reflected in its 
government’s endorsement for a 2010 proposal titled ‘Building a Partnership with the 
Middle East in the Post-Oil Era’ and the 2011 establishment of a Middle East 
Infrastructure Order Support Center in the UAE.535 
South Korea’s diplomatic relations with Iran are of very low scale, but both countries, 
as stated above, have mutual interests to expand at least their trade and investment 
connections, which will become increasingly viable, though not yet without barriers, 
in a post-UN-sanctions world. Iraq has seen a slightly greater effort on the part of 
South Korea to moderately deepen diplomatic relations following the 2003 US 
invasion. This has also been enabled, because South Korea deployed troops to Iraq 
between 2003 and 2008, when it, at least moderately, assisted US-led peace-keeping 
efforts.536 The enduring political and security risks in the country though have 
prohibited greater South Korean involvement. 
Oman and South Korea have had diplomatic relations since 1974 and given Oman’s 
geo-strategic position at the Strait of Hormuz, and given South Korea’s FDI into the 
country, both have an interest in maintaining stable and ongoing ties.537 Bahrain and 
South Korea have enjoyed ongoing diplomatic relations since 1976, but their political 
ties do not seem to be a priority for either of them. One important side note concerns 
South Korea’s increased military cooperation with some GCC members. Though very 
modest in scale, South Korea has recently become involved in the Manama-based 
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), led by the US Navy and its allies.538 
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Kuwaiti-South Korean relations, established in 1979, have also been ongoing for 
decades, and Kuwait’s importance as a major oil-provider makes the country more 
important to South Korea, than Oman or Bahrain.539 Qatar, in the last two decades, 
has acquired greater significance for South Korea, compared to the two first decades 
of diplomatic relations since 1974. In addition to Qatar’s high relevance for South 
Korea’s LNG imports, and the expanding FDI and EPC activity, both countries 
upgraded their political and institutional ties in 2010, seeking to diversify 
cooperation in a multitude of areas.540 
Such deep and varied ties have always, but especially recently, been even more 
established between Saudi Arabia and South Korean. Since the opening of diplomatic 
relations in 1962/63, the countries became connected in energy trade and 
construction and labour contracting, as shown above. An initiative to set up closer 
strategic cooperation in economic, cultural, educational, scientific, and political 
matters gained traction as a result of Saudi Arabia’s new eastward orientation, and 
then President Lee’s second Gulf construction pivot in the late 2000s. This trend 
seems likely to further intensify and increasingly mirror the deep and 
multidimensional nature of South Korea’s cooperation with the UAE.541 
The latter country has long stood out in that respect and continues to do so. The 
Emirates’ regional centrality as a business hub has spawned the most advanced South 
Korean engagement with the Gulf. Though this reflects the UAE’s general standing in 
the world, there is even a qualitatively higher level of South Korean involvement. The 
level of institutional cooperation, energy and non-energy trade, and especially in 
South Korean EPC contracts and FDI, has been further diversified and deepened by 
South Korea’s involvement in military cooperation with the UAE.542 In 2010, South 
Korea agreed to export drones, and other high-tech military equipment to the UAE. 
Furthermore, and so far, unique among Asian partners of Gulf states, South Korea 
deployed a 130-strong training unit of elite soldiers, the Akh Brigade, to the UAE in 
January 2011 and then a 140-strong unit in July 2011, in order to help train Emirati 
special forces for counter-terrorism operations.543 This marked South Korea’s first 
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military deployment in a non-conflict zone. In 2016, it was reported that some South 
Korean troops had been permanently stationed in the UAE for these purposes.544 
Combined with the South Korean military participation in the 1991 Gulf War, soft 
though it was, and its post-2003 contribution to Iraq’s (then contemporary) 
reconstruction and military security provision, and South Korea’s active involvement 
in counter-piracy operations around the Horn of Africa, an overall trend seems to be 
emerging. South Korea’s willingness to get involved militarily, even if only on a very 
low level compared to Western powers in the wider Gulf region and periphery, makes 
it stand out from its intra-Asian neighbours and potential geo-political rivals. It needs 
to be stated though that, given South Korea’s small country size, and given its 
complete prioritization of North Korea in security matters, this pro-active military 
role in the Gulf can only ever be complimentary to either the established Western-led 
security architecture, or complimentary to any other future one. Nevertheless, as Seo 
points out, South Korea, much to the UAE’s and GCC’s appreciation, seems set to 
continue and even upgrade its bold new Gulf strategy.545 For structural reasons, one 
other Asian country in particular though has a much higher likelihood to have a 
strategic impact on the Gulf. 
 
5.3 India and the Gulf 
Its geographical position at the southern end of Asia’s heartland creates an altogether 
different geo-strategic situation for India than for the East Asian powers of Japan, 
South Korea, and China. Historically, for this reason, it also marks a major difference 
to the latter three, in so far as India has experienced an ongoing and largely 
uninterrupted relationship with the peoples, polities, and markets of the Gulf. This 
encompassed more or less the total history of human civilization, from antiquity to 
the present.546 Following the collapse of the Mughal Empire, British India, as seen in 
the previous part, traded with and militarily policed the Gulf for almost two centuries 
via Indian merchants, Indian civil servants, and the Bombay Marine’s Indian 
manpower, even though the geo-strategic decision-making ultimately lay in London.  
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Following independence, the Cold War too presented a unique experience, because 
India belonged to the Non-Aligned Bloc, whereas Japan and South Korea were 
Western allies, and China pivoted away from the Soviet-led communist bloc towards 
a de-facto partnership with the US, if not in the form of a geo-political alliance, then 
nonetheless in a game-changing economic partnership.547 Over this period, Indian 
migration to the Gulf intensified, with numerous small Indian enterprises and large 
numbers of Indian workers causing a relative demographic dominance in most of the 
small Gulf states. At the time of writing, over six million Indians live and work in Gulf 
countries, a demographic dominance that dwarfs not only the Japanese, Korean, or 
Chinese expatriates there, but also the smaller GCC-states’ domestic populations by 
an order of magnitude.548 This Indian migration wave originated from deep historical 
currents, but created a rising tide especially from the 1970s onwards, when the Gulf 
states’ skyrocketing oil-revenue created millions of new jobs for unskilled and semi-
skilled contract workers.549 It has continued ever since. All in all, India’s demographic 
presence and labour-impact has been substantial and is likely to further intensify, 
even with the prospect of more advanced Gulf indigenization efforts and increased 
competition in labour services also from other Asian countries, including China.550 
This Indian labour-impact has not only been positively felt in the GCC countries, but 
also in India itself, in the form of vast remittances flows. ‘Currently, remittances 
account for about 4 per cent of India’s GDP. […] By the end of the last decade, the 
Gulf was the largest source of remittances to India – at about 40 per cent, which was 
estimated to be around $60 billion’.551 Such transactions between GCC countries and 
India, over that same period, have been increasingly complemented by an 
overwhelming growth in respective bilateral trade. 
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5.3.1 Indo-Gulf Trade 
After the fall of the Iron Curtain and India’s comparably belated embrace of economic 
liberalization in the 1990s, its resulting high GDP growth complemented this old and 
new “Indianization” of the Gulf, as diplomatic relations and business ties intensified, 
especially in the realm of Indian energy imports, but also in trade generally.  
The EU, Japan, and the US, have long dominated the GCC countries’ trade, but 
developing Asia has been catching up fast, especially since the millennium. In 2001, 
India’s trade with the GCC held a value of $5.5. billion. In 2014-2015, it had reached 
approximately $138 billion, turning India into the GCC’s second largest trade partner, 
but only because China overtook it.552 Over that period, in terms of trade growth, 
India has been the GCC’s number one partner, even ahead of China, although the 
latter country for the last two decades, mostly recorded a slightly higher value of 
goods.553 This trade growth accompanied India’s vast economic growth of 11% on 
average over the same period – turning the country into the world’s seventh largest 
economy by GDP, and third largest by PPP. A large chunk of India-Gulf trade growth 
has consisted of Indian oil, and to a lesser extent, gas imports from the Gulf states.554 
In 2013, India was the world’s third largest energy consumer:555 Its energy mix, 
relatively diversified, but potentially highly dynamic, was composed of the following 
sources, according to the EIA: 44% of India’s energy consumption came from coal, 
24% from biomass and waste, 23% from petroleum and other liquids, 6% from 
natural gas, 2% from hydroelectric power-generation, 1% from nuclear technology, 
and 1% from other renewables.556 India is seeking to balance its skyrocketing energy 
requirements with environmental concerns. As the country’s middle class grows and 
a huge number of people need to be lifted out of extreme poverty this will present a 
challenge, but also an opportunity for investment into cleaner energy. Hence, coal, 
and to an increasing degree, petroleum, will remain high and even grow substantially 
in absolute terms. In the long-run, they are set to decline in relative terms to clean 
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renewables such as wind and solar power, as well as natural gas and nuclear energy. 
‘Despite having large coal reserves and overall growth of coal over the past two 
decades, India is increasingly dependent on imported fossil fuels. India’s current 
administration under Narendra Modi has set itself the goal of reducing India’s import 
dependency on oil and natural gas to two-thirds by 2022 and to half by 2030’.557 
Nevertheless, India’s oil consumption has grown dramatically, and, as of 2015, 
marked the world’s fourth-largest. Despite substantial domestic production, India 
has been a net oil importer for many decades. Regardless of political initiatives to 
reduce domestic oil consumption, India’s further economic development makes it 
increasingly dependent on absolute growth in oil imports in the mid-term future, 
even in the face of relative reduction of oil consumption compared to other sources. 
The year 1990 already saw India’s oil import dependence at 42%. It reached 
approximately 75% in 2015, by then an amount of 3.9 million b/d. Almost 60% of 
those crude oil imports in 2015 came from the greater Middle East, predominantly 
the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia was the largest provider, reaching 20% of India’s 
global crude oil imports, with Iraq a close second at 17%, and Iran, despite sanctions, 
6%. Non-Gulf Middle East/North-African states included Libya and Sudan. The 
largest suppliers from outside the region were Nigeria and Venezuela, reaching 11% 
respectively.558 As with the other Asian oil importers, India’s reliance on the Gulf is 
likely to at least remain the same if not intensify, especially once Iranian oil, which 
India had to scale down on due to US pressure, returns to the market.559 
Unlike with oil, India’s natural gas consumption only began to grow notably from 
around 2000 onwards at an average of 6% per annum, especially as it became a 
prime candidate with which to reduce coal consumption.560 India became a net 
importer of natural gas in 2004, when it started buying from Qatar. Most of India’s 
gas imports come in the form of LNG.561 India today is the fourth largest LNG 
importer in the world, reaching 10.4 million tons in 2014. Moody’s forecasts India’s 
LNG imports to increase to 24 million tons by 2020.562 Except for Nigeria, which in 
2012-2013 supplied 10% of India’s total LNG imports, all other sources were located 
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in the greater Middle East. Egypt provided 4%, Algeria and Yemen both 3% 
respectively. Qatar enjoyed a staggering Indian LNG market share of 80%.563 In 
anticipation of the hugely growing demand, India’s LNG-import portfolio is destined 
to diversify, although Qatar’s dominance is likely to continue, due to competitive 
pricing.564 
Energy, as with almost all of the Gulf’s trading partners, dominates India-Gulf trade. 
Yet it is not confined to it, with India’s proximity and the presence of Indian 
expatriates in the Gulf states ensuring a substantial growth in the import of Indian 
goods. These include also services, which are harder to measure in their impact on 
trade figures but take up a huge portion in the Gulf. Especially India’s thriving IT and 
telecommunications industry have a strong presence in the GCC countries and are 
alleged to achieve approximate growth rates of 30% per annum there.565 
These trends are likely to intensify and have an increasing impact on India-GCC trade 
growth. Saudi Arabia is not only India’s fourth largest trading partner in total, with 
bilateral trade exceeding $26.5 billion in 2012. Saudi Arabia is India’s 11th largest 
destination of exports – accounting for more than 5% of its global share.566 
Yet, especially when considering the demographic divergence, India’s trade with the 
UAE by far exceeds that of Saudi Arabia. Accompanied also by strong historic, 
political and cultural relations and the huge dominance of Indian expatriates in the 
Emirati population, India and the UAE are each other’s largest trade partners. Given 
India’s population size of over a billion and the UAE country size of only a few 
million, this trade symmetry is extraordinary, and speaks for the Emirati 
performance. The UAE is the second largest market for Indian goods in the world. A 
significant share of these goods was re-exported to other countries in the region, such 
as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. This is due to the 
UAE’s regional centrality as a business hub. In 2011 India-UAE trade was worth more 
than $67 billion.567 
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The other Gulf states enjoy a considerably smaller share in their trade with India. 
Kuwait, due to a large amount of oil exports that supply roughly 10% of India’s total, 
saw a trade value of approximately $12 billion in 2011. Roughly a tenth of that trade 
was composed of Indian exports to Kuwait – which have seen significant growth in 
recent years.568 Qatar’s overall trade with India is much lower than might be 
expected. Though bilateral trade has grown since 2005 as a result of Qatari LNG 
exports and is beginning to diversify slightly, in 2011 its value reached a mere $7 
billion.569 Oman, with more than $5 billion, despite its economic challenges, reached 
almost the same amount that year. Given deep historic and cultural ties, and Oman’s 
efforts for economic diversification, it offers considerable potential for trade-
expansion with India.570 Bahrain is the GCC country with which India conducts least 
of its Gulf trade, reaching $1.5 billion in 2011.571 
India-Iraqi trade has witnessed many ups and downs following the numerous 
security breakdowns in the country over the last half century. Although bilateral trade 
almost reached $10 billion in 2011, and Iraq is India’s third largest oil source, the 
ongoing civil war following the establishment of IS, has disrupted business in Iraq, 
and as a result, trade with India and others. Nevertheless, if Iraq re-stabilizes, 
whether as one entity or as three or more, the entire country offers a potentially huge 
market for Indian-manufacture goods and Indian services.572 
Iran is probably the Gulf state that holds most potential in India’s future Gulf trade. 
Over the last decades, the country has already been vital for India’s oil-supply – 
representing India’s second largest oil source before the US sanctions regime of 
2011/12. Simultaneously, India was Iran’s third largest importer of oil among Asian 
countries.573 Mirroring these other customers’ behaviour, India had been especially 
keen to maximize trade with Iran – and being quite flexible in trade mechanisms in 
order to circumvent sanctions. Yet, following extensive US pressure after the 
2011/2012 sanctions against Iran’s oil industry, India saw itself forced to noticeably 
decrease its oil imports from Iran for the time being – though this is likely to change 
again swiftly following the nuclear deal in 2015/2016. During the sanctions period, 
India was Iran’s number one source of many agricultural products, especially rice, 
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wheat, and sugar. These Indian commodity exports are likely to mushroom, but more 
potential clearly lies with manufactured goods and services that, in the sanctions 
period, were more limited, such as ‘construction equipment, building material and 
hardware, pharmaceuticals, telecom products, textiles, automobiles and spare 
parts’.574 Such Indian industries are also looking into investment and contracting 
opportunities in Iran, something they have already been embracing in the GCC 
countries, albeit very moderately compared to trade. 
 
5.3.2 Indo-Gulf Investment and Project Contracting 
As India grows in GDP, PPP, and competitiveness, and the Indian migratory impact 
and geo-political orientation towards the Gulf intensifies, so is the potential huge in 
terms of bi-directional capital flows that go beyond remittances and the purchase of 
goods. This enormous potential has not yet been realized, although, especially when it 
comes to the tertiary sector, services, it is admittedly difficult to draw boundaries 
between the definitions of trade and FDI. Relatively recent research on India-GCC 
business ties highlights four characteristics of the currently untapped investment 
opportunities: according to the calculations of the South Asia/GCC-orientated 
investment bank Alpen Capital, up until the year 2012, Indo-Gulf investment 
accounted for merely 3% of bi-directional trade.575 Especially when considering the 
GCC-countries’ sovereign wealth funds and their vast amount and value of global 
assets, their capital injection into India, a geographic neighbour and one of the fastest 
growing future economic giants, has been marginal so far. The other way around, 
most Indians investing in the GCC countries are expatriates who live there. Hence, 
their entrepreneurship has no links with “motherland” companies, and therefore 
cannot be strictly counted as Indian FDI.576 Last but not least, the UAE and Oman 
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dominate an uneven GCC investment into India with more than an 85% share.577 
Despite these modest performances, it is especially Indian businesses who are 
seeking a larger footprint in the GCC in the years ahead. With incentives to diversify 
their economies and intent on building knowledge-based growth, there are many Gulf 
markets in which India will increasingly enjoy a comparative advantage. Indian 
barriers to GCC investment lie mostly in the country’s regulatory complexity and 
scale of corruption.578 If the Modi government or its successor tackles these problems 
more successfully, then GCC capital injection into India is almost sure to grow 
substantially. 
Despite the overall modest figures compared to trade, compared to FDI and EPC-
flows between Gulf states and the other major Asian countries, and compared to 
earlier decades, Indo-Gulf investment in the last decade has grown noticeably. In 
Saudi Arabia, hundreds of Indian firms have acquired licenses for numerous joint 
ventures in diverse sectors such as ‘management and consultancy services, 
construction projects, telecommunications, information technology, software 
development, pharmaceuticals etc’.579 The other way around, Saudi Arabian 
companies have formed JVs ‘in fields such as paper manufacture, chemicals, 
computer software, granite processing, industrial products and machinery, cement, 
metallurgical industries etc.’.580 As India seeks to ease its business-environment, the 
Saudis are keen to invest into other sectors, ranging from real estate, over tourism, to 
infrastructure.581 
The same goes for the UAE, the country which enjoys the closest ties with India in 
migration, trade and entrepreneurship. The Emirates and India are bound to see a 
much larger scale of JVs and M&As, in IT, agriculture, biotechnology, 
pharmaceuticals and even space projects. Such diverse investment flows and 
commercial cooperation will be accompanied by joint R&D programmes and 
technology transfer. In India too, there is much potential for Emirati investors. 
Already they have transferred capital into India’s energy infrastructure, tourism, and 
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IT. Undeterred by the comparably modest Indo-Gulf capital flows, the UAE is 
nevertheless the 10th biggest investor-country in India.582 
Oman, building on its historic ties with India, is another major attraction for Indian 
investment in the Gulf. According to India’s Ministry of External Affairs, there are 
approximately 1,500 Indo-Omani JVs, together valued at almost $8 billion, with 
Indian companies holding more than half the shares. These are involved in Oman’s 
energy sector, manufacturing, mining, railway construction, real estate, IT, and 
telecommunications.583 
Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar have experienced a significantly lower level of FDI-flows 
to and from India. Bahrain’s weaker economic capacity and trajectory is the primary 
reason for this lower level. Qatar has much underused potential and mirrors the 
UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’s intention on building a knowledge economy that Indian 
firms, entrepreneurs and investors can help build in the kind of industries listed 
above. They have so far managed to acquire a slightly greater share in the Kuwaiti 
market, but especially in its energy sector. In the other direction, Seethi highlights the 
dominance of Kuwaiti portfolio investment into Indian companies.584 
Iraq, given its heavy underdevelopment, is probably one of the Gulf countries with 
the biggest potential for Indian investment and contracting. Indian businesses 
excelling in their previously mentioned strong sectors are ready to expand their FDI 
there in many sectors, but not until Iraq stabilizes and fundamentally reduces its 
security risks. Indian companies are well-placed to provide investment in urgent 
fields, such as ‘food, medicine, and other essential commodities’.585 
Despite continuous interest by both parties, capital flows between Iran and India 
have suffered, as have equally those of the other Asian countries' exchanges with Iran.  
Until very recently, UN-backed multilateral sanctions have torpedoed eager Indian 
companies’ investment in Iran. Several projects stalled over the past decade.586 
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Other attention-grabbing projects include India’s interest in investing into Iran’s 
Chabahar port and the Mashhad-Chabahar railway, which would try to create an 
International North-South Corridor and contribute to a rail-and-road connection 
between India and Europe, crossing Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia. Investment was 
delayed for many years, due to the sanctions.587 Yet, in May 2016, only a few months 
after the lifting of UN-sanctions, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Iran, 
signalling a revival of Indo-Iranian cooperation and investment activity. The 
Chabahar port project received a political shot in the arm, but it remains to be seen 
whether it is indeed economically sensible and viable, as Sarah Watson points out: 
Both the neighbouring Chinese-sponsored Pakistani port of Gwadar and its Economic 
Corridor (CPEC) to Kashgar, as well as Iran’s biggest existing port in Bandar Abbas 
would seem to make more geographical sense for pan-Eurasian trade connections. 
Furthermore, the trade route via sea from India to Europe is highly likely to engender 
far lower costs than a potential land route.588 The reasons for India’s enthusiasm lie 
firmly in the strategic realm of pan-Asian, West Asian, and Gulf geo-politics. 
 
5.3.3 Indo-Gulf Diplomacy and Strategy 
All Gulf states, but especially Iran, are strategically central to these Indian concerns. 
As mentioned at the start of this section, in terms of Asia-Gulf relations, India 
represents a different case altogether when compared to the other observed 
countries. Like these other Asian states, India is highly dependent on strategically 
vital Gulf energy imports. But with India, additionally, because of its geographic 
proximity to the Gulf states, the latter’s overall political and socio-economic 
conditions have a direct impact on India’s security. Nowhere among the Gulf 
countries is this more the case than in Iran, which is not only considered a political 
pariah by the international community, but it also borders India’s direct neighbour 
and arch-rival Pakistan, as well as India’s main South Asian ally in this rivalry – 
Afghanistan. Moreover, since there are signs that Iran may have joined Pakistan in its 
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proxy support for the Afghani Taliban, it is highly logical that India has tried to 
exploit its relations with Iran as much as possible already in the recent sanctions era, 
but especially now.589 An overthrow of the elected Afghan government of Ashraf 
Ghani, a close Indian ally, by Pakistan-and-Iran-sponsored Taliban forces, would 
create a strategic ordeal and security nightmare for India, leaving its entire north-
western back-yard dominated by rivals which could easily – again – mutate into 
serious enemies. Pakistan’s historic support for, or at least its blind eye to Islamist 
terrorists attacking India, both countries’ rivalry over water-resources in the Indus 
valley, especially in their disputed territories in Kashmir, and their mutual nuclear- 
armed status, make this conflictual situation highly sensitive and dangerous.590 Yet, 
there is still another vital layer to this story. 
Pakistan happens to be China’s closest ally, not only in the Eurasian heartland, but 
indeed in the world.591 Given India’s own rivalry with China, which could turn from 
soft to hard as both countries grow and turn into great powers, India is faced with 
potential semi-encirclement, at least on its western and northern land boundaries, if 
all those previoulsy listed Indian neighbours see eye to eye. Consequently, India is 
trying to move strategically in almost all directions. Eastwards, India’s rapidly 
intensifying relations with Japan, China’s other major Asian rival, are meant to 
potentially help create an anti-Chinese balancing coalition to which the US would be 
the leader, and to which also several ASEAN countries like Vietnam may pivot.592 
Such a potential encirclement of China would reciprocate Chinese and Pakistani 
efforts to contain India.  
North-westwards, this geostrategic pan-Asian chessboard – quite literally a chain of 
“black-and-white” fields bordering each other – is relevant to India’s Gulf interests, 
as shown above. India’s diplomatic push for closer economic and political ties with 
Iran goes back more than a decade for precisely these and other reasons. In 2003, 
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when the US-led Iraq invasion destabilized the Gulf, Iran and India agreed to 
strengthen their future defence cooperation in the New Delhi Declaration.593 Now, 
China’s New Silk Roads to the region are perpetuating India’s simultaneous 
orientation to its north-west. As shown in the previous section, India’s investment 
into Iran’s Chabahar port, was incentivized by China’s investment into Pakistan’s 
Gwadar port and the CPEC, connecting it to Kashgar – and provocatively running 
right through disputed Kashmir. This situation is largely seen as the reason why India 
only shows lukewarm reactions to Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road initiative – even 
skipping participation in a recent summit in Beijing.594 Iran on the contrary, has 
shown great enthusiasm for its planned connection to China’s Silk Road Economic 
Belt, as explained in the next chapter. 
China is therefore one of several major economic players, alongside Japan, South 
Korea, and the EU, who are able to further outperform India’s trade and investment 
with Iran. For much of the time since Iran’s covert nuclear programme was 
discovered and met with international sanctions, India has enjoyed an asymmetric 
power relationship with Iran, as the latter became desperate for trade and investment 
partners. This ‘bargaining power for the Indian government’ resulted in Iran offering 
considerably discounted prices for Indian purchases of Iranian oil.595 For a time, 
India made use of this, though it ultimately had to yield to US pressure to reduce its 
oil imports and freeze much of its investment, as mentioned above. Consequently, 
Indo-Iranian relations soured with Iran even seizing an Indian tanker in the Gulf in 
2013 holding it for some time, allegedly to punish and pressure.596 
Although relations have recovered since the lifting of sanctions, and although there is 
enormous economic opportunity for enhanced flows of goods, capital, and labour, 
India now may have slightly less leverage over Iran, even though, in absolute terms, 
the laws of comparative advantage dictate that both countries would profit from 
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enhanced trade and investment. Despite this, it remains to be seen how Indo-Iranian 
economic, diplomatic, and strategic relations develop and how they will compare to 
Iran’s future ties with other Asian and European countries. So, this is another reason 
why India is simultaneously seeking to equally strengthen its relations with GCC 
states and building on its deep economic ties with most members.  
India and Saudi Arabia enjoy increasingly close relations in the wake of India’s huge 
oil imports. In the 2010 Riyadh Declaration, the then Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh and the late Saudi King Abdullah signed a strategic energy 
partnership. They also announced future cooperation in other issue areas, from 
science and technology to banking and investment.597 The underlying strategic 
rationale for both countries willingness to upgrade their bilateral ties are firmly 
influenced by their respective ties to each other’s main enemies: India has ongoing 
suspicions over Saudi Arabia’s historically close political and cultural relations to 
Pakistan and, consequently, is interested in upgrading its own importance relative to 
Pakistan; Saudi Arabia on the other hand is increasingly weary over India’s warmer 
relations to Iran and is thus seeking to pull India firmly over to the GCC side. This is 
one of the many reasons why Riyadh has recently reduced its support for Pakistan.598 
Yet, it would seem to be a very unrealistic Saudi dream to form an anti-Iran alliance 
with India. As shown above, India has strong interests not to cut off ties with Iran and 
is thus seeking a balanced and equally strong relationship with both antagonists, 
mirroring China’s Gulf approach. 
This entails an equal maximization and diversification of deep bilateral relations with 
all parties, not an equal downgrade. Saudi Arabia and India are therefore fully 
embracing the notion that (their) increasing interdependence will also increase their 
long-term closeness and cooperation.599 India has seemingly realized, that to gain 
influence on the Arabian Peninsula, it needs to be open to military cooperation – 
though it is careful not to appear as an anti-Iran GCC ally. Saudi Arabia though lies at 
the heart of India’s westward policy, with both countries forming a joint committee 
on defence cooperation in 2012. Beside India’s willingness to participate in more 
counter-piracy operations around the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Sea, the signed 
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MoU incorporates intended collaboration in military training programmes, joint 
military exercises, and potential joint ventures in the arms industry.600 
Given the UAE’s much smaller demographic and territorial size, its diplomatic and 
strategic relations have less of a regional geo-political impact than the foreign 
relations of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Hence, the same is true also for India’s strong 
political ties to the UAE. Besides this demographic-underpinned geo-political reality, 
India’s relations with the UAE are probably the strongest, most diversified, widest 
and deepest among all Gulf countries. Not only have there been numerous state visits 
and numerous cooperation agreements in a multitude of areas, in all economic 
sectors, science, technology, education, culture and tourism. India also enjoys a high 
degree of influence inside the UAE due to the above mentioned huge Indian 
demographic impact on the Emirati population across all sectors, industries, job-
levels and classes.601 
Also, because of these deep and diverse connections, India and the UAE’s cooperation 
additionally includes the defence and security issue areas – and has done so for 
longer than with Saudi Arabia. ‘Defense cooperation reached a new level with the first 
ever India-UAE air exercise and the India-UAE Joint Defense Cooperation 
Committee deliberations’.602 As Seethi highlights, a crucial point in India’s trust 
towards the UAE is the early Emirati willingness to assist India in intelligence 
operations against Pakistan-based terrorists, following the Mumbai attacks in 2008. 
Both countries have agreed to further strengthen their security cooperation in the co-
production of defence technology and equipment, defence training, joint naval 
exercises, and intelligence-sharing, as well as their intention of streamlining geo-
strategic doctrines.603 
Among the other GCC countries, although India has signed defence collaboration 
agreements with all of them and, as seen above, has sought to diversify political, 
economic, and cultural ties with all of them, it is merely Oman that, so far, is sticking 
out. It cannot match the level of connections India has built with the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia, due to its lesser economic importance, but it is worth stressing that Indo-
Omani relations are among the oldest India enjoys on the Arabian Peninsula.604 
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Indian expatriates are involved in all sectors of the Omani economy. Oman is also the 
country with which India first established Gulf defence cooperation. The India Oman 
Joint Military Committee meets on a consistent basis, exchanging intelligence and 
policies on regional security issues. There are regular joint naval and air force 
exercises between the two countries, and India often makes use of its military docking 
rights in Omani ports. Areas of naval cooperation predominantly involve counter-
piracy operations in the Arabian Sea.605 Another strategic dimension that strengthens 
Indo-Omani bilateral ties and constitute a unique opportunity for Indian interests in 
the Gulf, is the fact that Oman’s GCC membership has not stopped the country from 
taking an historically ongoing mediation role in the Saudi/GCC rivalry with Iran. 
Muscat’s more pragmatic relations with Tehran have often served also the 
international community in regard to Iranian issues. The recent international nuclear 
deal with Iran (JCPOA) was partly brokered by Oman’s proactive engagement.606 
Such an approach will always be one India and also China, Japan, and South Korea 
appreciate given their mutual interests in stable and equal relations with both the 
Arabs and Iranians.  
To summarize, India needs as stable a Gulf as possible and, ideally, it would continue 
to enjoy good relations with all Gulf states and expand them further. East Asia, South 
South-East Asia, and Australasia have so far taken more of India’s economic and also 
strategic political attention.607 But despite prioritizing the East in its economic and 
diplomatic relations with entire regions, India has realized that it needs to also look 
west, to Europe and Africa, but especially to what it calls West Asia, meaning 
predominantly the Gulf. Both energy security as well as raw national security dictate 
this. The combination of these two threads make the Gulf arguably even more 
important for India then for any other great power, because unlike for the others, the 
Gulf is India’s backyard. What India draws from this recognition is open to several 
possibilities. Whereas some see a future Indian version of the American “Monroe 
Doctrine” – ultimately barring any other outside power from its backyard, which in 
India’s case would see China’s String of Pearls along the Indian Ocean littoral as a 
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threat608 – others are trying to argue for a pan-Asian collaborative approach to Gulf 
security. Former Indian Ambassador Talmiz Ahmad, for instance, spoke to the author 
in Dubai, explaining not only his personal research interests in Asia-Gulf relations, 
but his active role in seeking to kick-start a track-two diplomatic dialogue between 
Chinese, Indian, and other Asian and Gulf academics with ties to their governments. 
This is meant as a foundation for future pan-Asian collaboration in the Gulf and, as 
Ahmad outlines, if possible even a new Asian multilateral institution modelled on the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.609 Whilst this would clearly be 
a benefitial model in a multilateral sense and would provide much stability to the 
Gulf and Asia as a whole, it is not yet clear how it can succeed, given the very real 
rivalry between the possible members and the even greater rivalry between some of 
the Gulf states. 
 
5.4 Chapter Conclusion and Theoretical Assessment 
Asia’s New Silk Roads to the Gulf, involving not only, China, but also Japan, South 
Korea, and India are rapidly changing the economic landscape of the Gulf. These 
intensifying “south-south” transactions are causing increased bilateral diplomatic 
cooperation between Asian states and Gulf states. 
In terms of trade, due to Japan’s energy imports from the Gulf states, there is a clear 
vulnerability interdependence between them. A slight asymmetrical interdependence 
can be observed. Although the Gulf states require maximum long-term diversification 
in oil export destinations and because a theoretical Gulf cut-off from the Japanese 
market would constitute a grave loss, the lack of Gulf oil supplies for Japan would 
entail a more dramatic challenge. In terms of non-energy trade, neither Japan nor the 
Gulf are interdependent, as the product categories are not particularly sensitive or 
competitively unique. Japan has much larger markets to sell its goods to all around 
the world, and the Gulf too, has many alternative sources for them. 
The same can be said about investment flows. Japanese FDI in the Gulf is marginal 
compared to its global activity. Long established Japanese multinationals including 
banks though have enjoyed an enduring presence and good reputation in most Gulf 
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states. In EPC contracts, the activity of Japanese companies has been much more 
extensive. However, as in trade, Japan has been losing ground to South Korea in 
high-quality products and related investments, and to China in more cheap 
manufacturing and competitive pricing, both including EPC. Hence, with the cautious 
exception of EPC contracts it would be too much to say that either Japan or the Gulf 
are dependent on each other's investments. 
Japan's political relations with most Gulf states have always been close, but low-key, 
firstly due to the relatively one-dimensional energy nature of their ties, but secondly 
due to Japan’s peace constitution, which entails a complete security reliance on its 
American ally, including for Gulf energy security. This has increased Japan’s 
vulnerability dependence on both the Gulf and the US. A dramatic indicator was the 
impact of the oil price rises from the 1970s on Japan's then still thriving economy. 
Now, this vulnerability dependence is being further intensified through Japan's Asian 
geo-strategic rivals, especially China, who are gaining footholds in the Gulf without 
being aligned to the US. Therefore, both neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-realism 
have some explanatory power for this case. Yet, it seems ironic that the very rise of 
Japan’s dependence on the Gulf states and on the US leads Japan to adopt more 
realist, rather than liberalist tactics. It is seeking to intensify political cooperation 
with the Gulf states and has recently amended its peace constitution – allowing it to 
open a military base in Djibouti, for instance. This is because China has taken similar 
initiatives, as shown in the next chapter. The result seems to be that inter-regional 
interdependence is ironically perpetuating intra-regional rivalry – undermining CIT's 
assumptions and strengthening realism’s. 
South Korea and the Gulf are highly interdependent in oil and, to a much lesser 
extent in gas trade. The level of South Korean energy dependence is not quite as high 
as Japan's though. Given South Korea’s smaller demographic size, this fact makes it 
slightly easier for South Korea to diversify its energy import sources. Simultaneously, 
from a Gulf perspective, since South Korea is “only” the world’s 11th largest economy, 
and its market size does not compare to much larger countries and economies. 
Nevertheless, a breakdown of Korean-Gulf energy trade would have highly dramatic 
consequences which is why the label vulnerability interdependence, especially from a 
South Korean point of view, can still be used. Non-energy trade was marginal for 
long, but in the last decade has heavily increased, making the GCC South Koreas 
second largest export destination of diverse high-tech goods. Therefore, the diversity 
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of interdependence and the multiple channels being created intensify Korea-Gulf 
overall interdependence. 
FDI flows and EPC contracts between South Korea and Gulf countries mostly go in 
one direction. The level of GCC investment in South Korea is hard to estimate, given 
the confidentiality of the former’s most active investors, the sovereign wealth funds. 
South Korea has experienced two construction booms by its companies in the Gulf. In 
recent years, South Korean firms have won highly prestigious EPC contracts, 
especially in the UAE, but also in Saudi Arabia. In high-tech matters, South Korea has 
recently outperformed Japan, but in lower-tech matters, China has become an 
advantaged competitor. Even in the more complex and sophisticated areas, the 
Chinese are catching up fast as well. Given the GCC's and South Korea's high level of 
development and liquidity, their markets represent enticing and lucrative 
opportunities, but, as with Japan, it would be exaggerated to claim that they are 
indeed interdependent. However, this does not mean they would not feel the 
difference, especially in EPC projects, as the GCC is South Korea’s largest capital 
destination. 
The increasing economic interdependence between South Korea and the Gulf states is 
more diverse than of the Gulf’s other Asian relationships. Their diplomatic and 
institutional ties have intensified as a result, going even as far as military corporation. 
South Korean special forces have been posted to the UAE in order to train their 
Emirati counterparts. There is no fundamental strategic impact in this though, 
because firstly South Korea is too small to have such an impact, and politically it is 
firmly allied with the United States. This alignment is or course welcomed by the 
GCC, but any South Korean contribution to Gulf security would be within the US-
built security architecture. The same junior role for South Korea would be taken 
inside any other potential Gulf security architecture in the future. These structural 
factors make neo-liberal institutionalism the more useful theory for this bilateral 
relationship, because South Korea does not have the same level of a rivalry with 
China, as have Japan or India. 
India's geographic, historic, and cultural proximity to the Gulf marks an altogether 
different structural situation for India, compare to the other major Asian countries. 
This has resulted in long ongoing and recently further intensifying Indian migration 
flows to the Gulf states, especially to the GCC. Particularly in the small Gulf 
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monarchies, where Indian expatriates and large labour forces have created a 
substantial Indian demographic dominance. This has an impact on all other issue 
areas, also because Indian expatriates in the Gulf work in all sectors across all levels 
of society, business, and government. 
India is increasingly dependent on Gulf oil and to a lesser extent gas. Vulnerability 
interdependence will grow quite symmetrically, since India is the second largest 
country in the world and its GDP growth creates a huge energy demand. India is 
therefore the Gulf's most important oil export market next to China and this seems 
destined to even intensify over the next decades. Non-energy trade has also grown 
and will continue to do so as India’s economy grows. 
When considering India's sheer size, its Gulf proximity, Gulf demographic 
domination, and the large Indo-Gulf trade values, it has to be noted that Indo-Gulf 
investment flows are still at a relatively disappointing level. Therefore, so far, they do 
not massively contribute to the growing vulnerability interdependence between India 
and the Gulf, and certainly, with the possible exception of IT and 
telecommunications, cannot yet compete with any of the aforementioned Asian 
countries. However, due to the listed structural factors, there is immense potential for 
the future. 
India's Gulf situation is structurally different from all other major powers. Though its 
energy dependence is high, it faces slightly less energy security concerns than those of 
its Asian rivals, due to its geographic proximity. However, that very proximity 
probably entails a higher national security risk for India on a general basis. Fear not 
only is limited to terrorism carried out by Pakistani groups and their traditional 
(mostly private) Gulf sponsors, but also a strategic encirclement by China and 
Pakistan. India is seeking to reciprocate the Sino-Pakistani alliance via its own 
strategic alliances eastwards, especially with Japan, but also westwards with the Gulf 
states. Iran is at least as crucial to this equation as the GCC, which is why India is 
seeking to upgrade its relations with all of these states. It has managed to do so 
mostly with the GCC where especially the UAE stands out. Rising interdependence in 
economic matters, predominantly in energy, but also notably in security matters, 
makes CIT a useful framework. Still, due to India's geo-strategic concerns, realism 
once again will probably become the more accurate theory. 
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To summarize, all these Asian and Gulf countries hold increasing stakes in each 
other’s states and markets. Although, unlike CIT’s ideal type, with energy dominating 
the transactions, and there being a clear hierarchy of issue areas, the conditions merit 
the use of the interdependence label, even to its vulnerable level. But although this 
interpretation creates less room for flexible manoeuvring by all participants, it does 
not translate into a natural harmonization in which every state involved will always 
cooperate with all others. On the contrary, there is much tension between the major 
powers in each of the two regions. The New Silk Road phenomenon, tying them all 
together economically, has not reduced, but potentially re-enforced this tension. All 
parties could benefit from deep institutional, multilateral cooperation and see their 
fundamental interests thereby secured. Nevertheless, neo-realism’s assumption that 
no actor can know the others’ current or future intentions, are casting a shadow over 
the absolute gains rationale. To put it bluntly, the growing inter-regional 
interdependence has a noteworthy potential to perpetuate the already existing intra-
regional rivalries. From a global, holistic perspective, Spykman’s heavily populated 
rimland especially is growing together into a complex web, creating a fusion of what 
Brzezinski and Mearsheimer still saw as the three separate regions of East Asia, the 
Gulf, and Europe. Now, not only outside sea powers and the heartland have a heavier 
geo-strategic stake there, but also growing powers from within the rimland. This 
rimland-fusion is facilitated by growing interdependencies between these formerly 
more separate regions, but also by middle powers between them, such as Turkey and 
India. This phenomenon is only likely to dramatically intensify the forces of historic 
tectonic plates rubbing up against each other. The Persian Gulf rimland region, where 
heartland and sea meet, will be the location where East Asia, South Asia, the Greater 
Middle East, and the West all converge. 
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6. China’s New Silk Roads and the Persian Gulf Region 
Although Japan and later the “Asian tigers” were the first non-Western countries to 
economically liberalize and modernize, as mentioned above, China’s skyrocketing 
catch-up over the last four decades marked the real turning point in the half-
millennium-long history of the great divergence. Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and 
economic opening in 1978/79 was the most important and impactful development in 
that respect. Since then, China, the largest country in the world by population, has 
pulled off the fastest industrial revolution the world has ever seen, has reached 
second position in global GDP ranking, is on course to soon overtake the first-placed 
US, and has hugely contributed to the great re-convergence – steadily closing the 
income gap between the West and the rest of the world.610 
‘In a single generation, a nation that did not appear on any of the international league tables has  
vaulted into the top spot. In 1980, China’s gross domestic product (GDP) was less than $300 billion; 
by 2015, it was $11 trillion […]. In 1980, China’s trade with the outside world amounted to less than 
$40 billion; by 2015, it had increased one hundredfold, to $4 trillion’.611 
The result of China’s growth at home, which to a great extent has been driven by its 
exports, has turned the country into a financial behemoth – increasingly investing 
abroad.612 The economic and geo-political influence that comes with it, is being 
spread through both novel and established financial institutions.  
The China Investment Corporation (CIC) is one of the world’s largest sovereign 
wealth funds. These state-owned investment vehicles are an important feature of the 
great re-convergence, because many belong to emerging market countries. Especially 
after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, those states started to horde huge amounts of 
their economies’ export revenues to then invest in diverse global assets portfolios, 
make profits and hedge against risks. The CIC is a prime example of this 
phenomenon which after the Credit Crunch of 2008 further contributed towards the 
financial world’s shifting centre of gravity towards the East.613 
After many years of Chinese diplomatic pressure and Western reluctance, in 2015 
China’s global financial power was finally acknowledged by the IMF’s decision to 
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include China’s renminbi into the A-list basket of global reserve currencies, the 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). According to the IMF, the new weight distribution in 
its basket is 41.73% for the U.S. dollar, 30.93% for the euro, 10.92% for the Chinese 
yuan, 8.33% for the Japanese yen, and 8.09% for the British pound.614 The IMF itself 
labelled this reshuffling of monetary power ‘a milestone in China’s global financial 
integration’.615 Both the (albeit slow) renminbi elevation in the IMF and also the 
AIIB’s founding are likely to take on important roles in trade and investment on the 
New Silk Roads. As Chapter 4 of this thesis showed, American global power, 
especially also in the Gulf, is closely connected to the dollar’s unipolar hegemony. 
Hence, Washington is highly uneasy about China’s and the renminbi’s rise. 
This is despite China’s and the US’s economic importance to each other. A great 
portion of Chinese trade over the past decades has been conducted with the world’s 
largest economy, the US. Capital flows between the two countries greatly increased in 
the form of FDI, and in the form of the Chinese purchase of US Treasury securities. 
China currently holds more than $3 trillion in US currency reserves – giving it 
considerable global financial clout, thus greatly contributing to a deep economic 
interdependence between the world’s two largest economies. “Chimerica”, as this 
condition was dubbed by the historian Niall Ferguson, is part of what the economist 
Ben Simpfendorfer analytically completed when he identified the ‘financial world’s 
holy trinity’ – the US, China, and the Gulf states.616 
Yet, whilst the US is geo-politically aligned with the GCC, the US finds itself 
increasingly at odds with China on the geo-political front. Despite economic and 
financial interdependence, the US is highly uneasy about the rise of China in geo-
political and overall power matters. The world is shifting back towards a more 
multipolar international system. As China seeks to re-establish its superpower status, 
especially in its region, the US is incentivized to follow previous superpower 
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behaviour and contain China.617 Former President Obama’s announcement of a ‘pivot 
to Asia’ – meant to prioritize East Asia in the US’s global military presence and 
diplomatic engagement – is meant to create a potential balancing coalition between 
the US and China’s neighbours in its Asian backyard.618 Geographically, the growing 
US-China rivalry is mostly evident in the South China- and East China Seas.619 Given 
that both areas are part of China’s backyard this is going to remain the case in the 
short-term future at the very least. However, as China’s interests and engagement go 
global, so will the US-China rivalry. It is especially Eurasia, the most strategically 
important part of Mackinder’s “world island”, where China is increasingly investing 
and where this is already beginning to show. 
 
6.1 Belt, Road, and String: China’s New Silk Roads across Eurasia 
China’s massive domestic infrastructure expansion since Deng Xiaoping’s economic 
liberalization policies has dramatically changed the country’s entire way of existence. 
Within four decades, it has created the largest urbanization and migration wave in 
history and has helped to lift half a billion of its citizens out of poverty. Yet, the heavy 
domestic infrastructure investment has had the dangerous side-effect of heating up 
the Chinese construction and real estate markets. It is unclear if or when this bubble 
will burst and what its ramifications would be. One of Beijing’s policies in order to 
cool down its domestic construction and real estate markets has been an initiative to 
intensify former Presidents Jiang Zemin’s and Hu Jintao’s “go out” strategy for 
Chinese construction firms. Investment in foreign infrastructure is meant to help 
absorb the domestic overcapacity especially of large firms.620 
Hence, current President Xi Jinping has launched a series of such initiatives 
especially in Asia and predominantly in China’s neighbouring countries. In line with 
his designs to restore China’s economic and political superpower status, Chinese 
firms investing into foreign infrastructure across the Eurasian landmass will create 
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much needed connectivity. This will generate long-term trade and investment 
dividends, which in turn will benefit China economically, and expand its geopolitical 
influence. Xi’s strategy was officially introduced in November 2014. Making use of 
Beijing’s hosting of the annual APEC conference that year, Xi announced his vision of 
building a New Silk Road, connecting economies all over Eurasia, from China to 
ASEAN, to India and Pakistan, to Russia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, right on 
to Europe. This was to be undertaken by investing a sum of $1.35 trillion overseas 
within the next decade, first and foremost in Asian infrastructure.621 Though Xi’s 
vision borrows from earlier uses of the New Silk Road terminology, and although 
such Chinese outward infrastructure investments had already been occurring over the 
previous decade, it is intended to become Xi’s signature foreign and economic 
policy.622 The chosen name for Xi’s project has come to be known as “One Belt One 
Road” (OBOR), in short, the Belt and Road initiative (BRI).  
The first component, the “Silk Road Economic Belt”, describes the expansion of 
overland trade routes. These would include infrastructure investment into the 
construction of roads, railways, pipelines, fibre-optic cables, airports, factories, and 
commercial hubs across the Eurasian landmass.623 Though it is a very broad and thus 
deliberately vague concept, common examples in the most general sense include a 
China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor, a New Eurasian Land Bridge, a China-Central Asia-
West Asia Corridor, a China-Pakistan Corridor, a China-Myanmar-Bangladesh-India 
Corridor, and the China-Indochina-Peninsula Corridor.624 
The second component, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, describes the expansion 
and facilitation of trade across sea routes. These obviously build on long-existing 
ones, which, unlike most of the ancient land routes – the old Silk Road – never went 
out of operation in the modern era. Yet, investment into ports, new and old, from the 
South China Sea through the Straits of Malacca and along the Indian Ocean littoral 
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into the Mediterranean, is intended to tap into many new opportunities in the age of 
rising Asia. Just as the Silk Road Economic Belt, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road 
has conflicting definitions, even though it has several specific current investments 
and future investment ideas for projects. Generally, it is intended to encompass port 
investments on sea routes from East and South-East Asia, via the Bay of Bengal, the 
Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, to the east-African coast, and on through the Gulf of 
Aden, the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, reconnecting with some of the Belt’s land routes, 
in South Asian or European port cities.625 
The BRI’s associated investment vehicles were created simultaneously. During the 
APEC conference, a $40 billion Silk Road Fund (SRF), ‘a private equity fund 
specifically set up to provide anchor financing for Belt and Road projects’ was 
announced.626 Two weeks prior to the APEC meeting, a separate ceremony, also in 
Beijing, saw the announcement of the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB).627 21 countries signed up from the outset. By the time the bank was opened in 
December 2015, the number of founding members was up to 57, primarily from 
across Asia and Europe – an astonishing and rapid success. With the founding 
members taking differently sized shares, this new development bank received a $100 
billion pool in authorized capital and will receive more over the years to come.628 
This success could not have been taken for granted. Miller points towards the amount 
of attention the AIIB’s creation received, which he explains with the paranoid 
reaction from the US government. Washington and also Tokyo had feared that China 
intended to supplant institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, and the Japanese-
led Asian Development Bank (ADB). The US government unsuccessfully tried to 
lobby European and Asian allies against joining the AIIB. Among the world’s major 
economies, only the US and Japan are now absent from the AIIB’s list of founding 
members.629  
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Yet, Washington’s concerns were not complete paranoia. Another reason for the 
AIIB’s founding was China’s growing impatience with its low-level representation in 
the established Bretton Woods institutions. In the World Bank, China’s share is 
merely 5% and the IMF achieved too little too late from Beijing’s viewpoint.630 Thus, 
China decided to indeed create its own multilateral financial institutions. It is still too 
early to say whether they will stand any chance in supplanting Bretton Woods. 
Furthermore, if corporate governance lives up to the AIIB’s stated intentions and 
values, its operations will function much the same way as the World Bank, the IMF 
and the ADB. China is aware of these American and Japanese fears, which is why the 
AIIB has tried to reassure its sceptics. It has promised compliance with global 
transparency and anti-corruption regimes, as well as with labour and environmental 
standards.631 It also chose to link up with established institutions, such as the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment 
Bank, the ADB, and the World Bank, in several of its first projects. Co-financing by 
the AIIB and these established institutions is hoped to contribute towards trust-
building. Approved and active infrastructure contracts so far especially have covered 
Asia’s Indian Ocean rim countries, ranging from Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and 
Burma to Indonesia.632 Two projects in Oman are of direct importance to this thesis 
and will be covered below. 
These projects are intended to emphasise benign Chinese intentions. China claims 
that the BRI is an instrument for growth and economic integration. Seeking to 
reassure its neighbouring countries, Xi even claims that it will be a ‘road for peace’.633 
Before the BRI announcement, Beijing had long championed bilateral trade and 
investment deals. Yet, when an increasing number of Chinese FDI or EPC projects 
encountered problems abroad, for example by sparking local protests against the 
projects, Chinese firms frequently found their projects reviewed and frozen by the 
countries’ governments, such as in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, or Burma.634 In such cases, 
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this has sometimes led to a souring or even deterioration of bilateral relations – 
suddenly harming China’s economic and diplomatic interests in the particular 
country. In order to prevent the BRI from being perceived as a Chinese bid for 
empire, the AIIB is a deliberately multilateral institution in which China does not 
claim ownership.635 
Asia’s increasing connectivity and investment will not be restricted to the Chinese 
anyway. One of the outcomes of the BRI has been a strong re-boot in other Asian and 
non-Asian countries’ investment surges, as the previous chapter has partly shown. 
Especially Japanese, but also European companies have again stepped up their FDI 
and EPC ventures in the region, especially in South-East Asia. Much to those 
recipients’ economic benefit, Miller describes this as a fierce Sino-Japanese 
competition, with each trying to out-perform the other.636 
How far the AIIB and the SRF will be able to fundamentally transform all of Asia into 
an interdependent, thriving trade and investment super-cluster remains to be seen. 
In fact, given the AIIB’s relatively modest capacity in authorized capital of $100 
billion and much less in paid-in working capital, it is doubtful that it will play the 
predominant role in China’s outward infrastructure investment across Asia. With $40 
billion in authorized capital and $10 billion in paid-in capital, the SRF’s capacity is 
comparably even more modest. Both China’s commercial banks, such as Bank of 
China (BOC) or the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), as well as 
particularly China’s policy banks, such as China Development Bank or the Export-
Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank), all whose capacity is much higher, will 
invest and lend substantially more than the AIIB or SRF.637 
These numerous sources of capital, as well as Asia’s huge demand for infrastructure 
investment, especially the low-income countries in South Asia, at first glance suggest 
a bright future for overall development. Yet, several commentators have criticized the 
alleged transformational nature, especially that of the Silk Road Economic Belt, 
stressing the high costs and logistical complications in long-distance trade via rail, 
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when compared to the much cheaper, usually easier, and established oceanic 
shipping. Despite the greater speed of trade on land routes via rail, these 
commentators believe the Belt to be more of a symbolic propaganda stunt.638 
However, it should be beyond doubt that Eurasia’s infrastructure integration will 
have some positive economic impact, especially when considering the often much 
more important short-distance trade, both within countries, as well as between 
neighbouring countries. This is especially true for land-locked Central Asia, but also 
for China’s still significantly poorer western provinces. Indeed, a further motivation 
for China’s BRI is the development of those provinces, investing into their 
infrastructure and connectivity with neighbouring countries.639 
Nevertheless, a great deal of caution in regard to the BRI’s impact in Asia’s 
underdeveloped countries is essential. The problem is not a general lack of funds for 
infrastructure investment, but often the high levels of risk. Many underdeveloped 
investment destinations are home to corrupt governments or – for Chinese SOEs 
especially difficult to comprehend – hostile political oppositions from within active 
civil societies. Such environments are fraught with political risk for Chinese firms 
whose projects or demeanour have often sparked local ire.640 Furthermore, unstable 
territories, such as areas in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor like Baluchistan, 
pose serious security threats to Chinese construction workers, who have been 
attacked and abducted by militants.641 Though in this example, Pakistan has 
promised a special military unit to protect Chinese workers and company employees, 
insecurity will be an enormous challenge. Miller writes that the future could present 
the Chinese government with difficult dilemmas, which one day might make a 
Chinese military involvement in insecure areas a real possibility in order to protect 
the Chinese companies’ workers and assets.642 In crises, so far, China has responded 
merely with evacuation of its workers – partly abandoning their companies’ 
investments, be it in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, or Iraq.643 In an age of China’s intended 
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return to superpower status and a growing nationalism at home, this approach will be 
increasingly untenable if Beijing is serious about protecting its economic interests 
and geo-political influence. 
This is why China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road project includes geo-political 
considerations. Beijing is keenly aware of the need for naval access to critical port 
cities – for potential evacuations at least, but possibly also for military influence and 
operational bridgeheads in the maritime security environment. It has devoted much 
attention into these efforts for over a decade now, investing into the development of 
old and new port cities along the Indian Ocean littoral. Prominent examples include 
the newly active deeps sea ports in Kyaukphyu (Burma), in Sonadia, near Chittagong 
(Bangladesh), in Colombo and Hambantota (both Sri Lanka) and in Karachi and 
Gwadar (both Pakistan).644 Whilst so far these “Chinese” proxy ports are largely of a 
commercial/logistical nature, their geo-strategic value is evident for many analysts. 
The consultancy Booz Allen Hamilton, in a report for the US Department of Defense, 
famously called this a “String of Pearls”, coining a term that has stuck ever since, 
despite China’s Silk Road narrative.645 The journalist and geo-political analyst Robert 
Kaplan also captured that dimension by characterizing some of these ports as China’s 
21st century ‘oil-age equivalent of’ the British Empire’s 19th century ‘coaling station[s]’ 
on the same coasts.646 Although he thinks that ‘full-fledged Chinese naval bases in 
places like Gwadar and Hambantota’ are less likely, because they ‘would be so 
provocative to the Indians’, and that ‘“[a]ccess” is the key word, not “bases”’, other 
observers are not so sure.647 Whereas Kaplan could rather imagine the Chinese to 
follow the approach of their historic Ming predecessors, seeking ‘access through the 
building of alliances in the form of a tribute system’,648 it is especially many Indian 
strategists who already interpret the String of Pearls as the groundwork for Chinese 
naval domination attempts in India’s backyard.649 
So far, the deep-sea port of Gwadar is a seemingly commercial endeavour, but with 
clear strategic motivations, connecting China’s western provinces with the Arabian 
Sea via the $46 billion-valued construction of the 3,000 km-long China-Pakistan 
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Economic Corridor (CPEC), a crucial branch of the Silk Road Economic Belt.650 
Although Gwadar does not feature on some of the publicly available OBOR-maps, it 
clearly lies at the centre of China’s New Silk Roads, as it connects both the Belt and 
the Road in a critical region to boost trade in all directions and gives China another 
backdoor-option to circumvent the “Malacca-dilemma”. For the CPEC plans include 
not only motor-and railways, but also an oil-and gas-pipelines. Besides dreams of 
building the next Dubai, the intention for Gwadar meanwhile is to host massive 
container berths, bulk cargo and grain terminals, and at least two oil terminals and 
an oil refinery.651 Miller observes two Chinese incentives for the CPEC and the 
Gwadar investment: ‘to open up an alternative route for oil imports from the Middle 
East, and to persuade Pakistan to do more to combat violent extremism seeping over 
its border’. Commerce is unlikely to have been the primary motivation, he concludes, 
because Chinese ‘[g]overnment officials […] privately admit they expect to lose 80% 
of their investment in Pakistan’.652 The close partnership between the two countries, 
as well as Gwadar’s geo-strategic location close to the Persian Gulf make these 
investment uniquely valuable for China, including for the Chinese navy, the PLAN. 
Though there is no proof yet, that Gwadar will host a Chinese naval base and listening 
post, Miller echoes Kaplan, highlighting naval access as most important.653 
However, in light of more recent developments, it does not seem too fanciful to 
imagine a Chinese naval base in Gwadar, because China has also invested elsewhere 
abroad in its military infrastructure. The contested artificial islands in the South 
China Sea, with their naval docking ports and military airstrips have received most 
press, because of the territorial disputes involved.654 Yet, outside China’s backyard – 
in which Beijing is acting far more assertively – the Chinese military has recently 
opened its first overseas base, in no other place than Djibouti.655 The Arab state’s 
highly strategic location on the horn of Africa and right inside the crucial Bab el-
                                                          
650 Ibid.: p. 164. 
651 Ibid.: p. 175. Although these plans were already drawn up by the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA), 
who previously owned the Gwadar port and only sold the rights in 2012, they are now being 
implemented by the new post-2013 owners: China Overseas Port Holdings Company, a subsidiary of 
China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC). Since Xi Jinping’s BRI, the giant Gwadar 
project has experienced a major boost, with at least $11 billion being kept ready by the Chinese 
investors. 
652 Ibid.: p. 176. 
653 Ibid.: p. 178. 
654 See: Ibid.: pp. 199-202; Kaplan 2015. 
655 Wood, P. (2017), ‘20,000 Li Over the Sea: China’s Sends Troops to First Permanent Base in 
Djibouti’. In: The Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief, 17:10, 21 July 2017 
[https://jamestown.org/program/20000-li-over-the-sea-chinas-sends-troops-to-first-permanent-
base-in-djibouti/]. 
230 
 
Mandab bottleneck, which connects the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea (and Suez Canal 
and Mediterranean) speaks volumes about China’s emerging willingness to wield 
global military influence where it matters to secure its core interests. Vast amounts of 
China’s trade with the EU passes through the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandab, 
where Somali piracy has long been an issue (and against which the PLAN has joint 
multilateral operations.656 When considering that Djibouti already hosts major 
military bases not only of France or the UAE, but also Japan, and, crucially, the 
United States, the argument that China would shy away from the provocation of 
setting up camp within rivals’ spheres of influence of their operative zones, seems 
unpersuasive.657 Peter Wood, Editor of the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief, 
argues along the same lines:  
‘The Djibouti support base is likely just the first of many as China improves its ability to protect the 
trade routes that form the vital arteries of its economy. This base, and those that follow should be 
viewed in the same light as the infra-structure projects China is driving across Asia, connecting it 
through an expanding web of pipelines, highways and railways to the rest of the global economy.’658 
Such a policy direction will become increasingly viable as China builds a blue water 
navy, which is the country’s mid-century goal. According to retired US-Navy Captain 
Bernard Cole, China is about half-way there.659 This estimation is of course based on 
the assumption that the country will continue to grow economically and channel 
enough funds into the PLAN. Neither of the two is a cast-iron certainty, as China’s 
economy and polity face increasing challenges next to its opportunities. 
The BRI’s overall impact on China itself is also far from a forgone conclusion. China 
still invests much more in domestic infrastructure expansion and the potential for 
absorbing the current overcapacity of Chinese construction firms abroad is believed 
to be exaggerated.660 Nevertheless, the BRI is here to stay and expand along with 
China’s military spending. The BRI will experience noteworthy successes as well as 
failures. And given the sizes of both supply and demand in Asia’s overall 
infrastructure investment, it seems unlikely that its impact will not be felt.  
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The most obvious indicator in that direction is that China’s economic rise, its trade 
and investment abroad, already has had a large economic impact on many countries 
all over Asia. Both supply and demand of goods and capital point to an 
interdependent future among many Asian countries whose relations will only 
intensify in the process. The Persian Gulf region, all of which’s states have also 
become founding members in the AIIB, may be the most important example, as the 
next section and the remaining chapters show. 
As China’s economic clout widens the country’s zone of influence in all directions, the 
US-China rivalry also may play out much further away, including in the Persian Gulf. 
Precisely due to the Gulf’s new significance for China, from an American perspective 
there is an argument for a sustained US commitment to the Gulf, if only because of 
China’s growing presence there. A US pivot to Asia and a strategy geared towards 
China’s containment could very much include the Gulf, as pointed out to the author 
by John Mearsheimer. Above all other reasons for a continued American military 
presence in the Gulf, Mearsheimer sees China’s increasing interest in the region as 
the principle future incentive for the United States.661 Admittedly, other close 
observers and practitioners do not agree with him, even though their profession 
demands more diplomatic rhetoric. Philip Parham, UK Ambassador to the UAE, in a 
further interview by the author stated he saw many important reasons for sustained 
Anglo-American engagement with the GCC, but not China’s regional emergence as a 
motivator. In light of a renewed British desire to return to a more active military 
footprint in the Gulf, Parham clearly explains this with Britain’s and the West’s 
security and economic interests there, and stressed the active though low-key 
diplomatic dialogue between the British and Chinese in the GCC.662 
The process of China’s rise has involved a great intensification of China’s ties with the 
Gulf states, especially since the 1990s.663 Before the necessity of net-oil imports from 
1993 onwards drove these relations forward, China’s contacts with the Gulf states 
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were relatively marginal, and for a brief period before that, even somewhat hostile.664 
Indeed, prior to Mao’s death, China’s sought to spread Communism around the world 
including in the Middle East.665 A fervent supporter of Marxist guerrillas in southern 
Arabia resulted in China’s support for the revolutionary People’s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen. Thus, when the insurgency, which created that regime, spilled 
over into Oman from the late 1960s onwards, Mao’s China with its support of the so-
called Dhofar Liberation Front, was actively fighting a Gulf state by proxy. Since the 
Dhofar Insurgency was ultimately defeated in 1975, and due to the subsequent and 
complete de-radicalization of China’s foreign policy, this ghost no longer seems to 
haunt the now strong relations between China and Oman and the rest of the GCC.666 
Although China sold ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, an incident 
discussed briefly in the next chapter, and although China has actively promoted 
diplomatic ties to Iran, China-Gulf relationships have remained relatively apolitical, 
as this chapter also shows. Even if diplomatic relations between China and the GCC 
members have grown closer in the wake of their hugely growing trade flows, business 
so far clearly trumps politics in these relations – which is no different than with most 
of China’s global diplomacy.667 The next sections give an overview of China’s trade, 
investment, and construction transactions, and of China’s political and strategic ties 
to the Gulf countries. A necessary regional context is thus provided for the two 
succeeding case studies and the conclusion, which all address these questions and 
their implications in more detail. For the latter reason, this section minimizes 
detailed GCC examples, and focuses more on Iran than proportionality would 
otherwise demand. 
 
6.1 Sino-Gulf Trade 
Over the last 15 years, there has been substantial trade growth between China and the 
GCC members, as Figure 1 points out, reaching its hitherto peak in 2014, with a value 
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of $175 billion. In Figure 2 it becomes evident that over the last few years, the 
dominating bulk of that trade consisted of Chinese imports from the GCC. These were 
again heavily dominated by energy exports from the GCC to China, as demonstrated 
in Figure 3.  
 
Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [MS Excel chart created by author]. 
 
Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [MS Excel chart created by author]. 
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Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [MS Excel chart created by author]. 
 
After China’s acceptance to the WTO in 2001, its GDP grew even more than it had 
done so in the preceding two decades. With this came about a growing thirst for 
energy, especially oil imports, in order to sustain and enhance the industrialization at 
home.668 Despite import diversification measures, the Gulf soon reigned supreme as 
China’s most important source region, supplying around half of its oil imports.669 
The magnitude of China’s size, rise, and energy demand becomes all the more 
impressive when realizing that in that same peak trade year of 2014, China’s energy 
consumption still saw an overwhelming dominance of coal, as Figure 4 shows. 
Following coal’s energy share of 66%, oil came a distant second with 18%.  
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FIGURE 4: Source: BP. Available at:  
http://www.euanmearns.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/chinapie2014.png. 
 
More than half of that 18% of China’s energy consumption was imported. As Figure 5 
demonstrates, China became a net oil importer in 1993. Since then those imports 
have strongly outpaced production, rising by eight million barrels per day, whereas 
production has only increased by less than two. Of China’s global crude oil imports, 
51% in 2014 were provided by the Gulf, as seen in Figure 6. Looking at individual 
countries, Saudi Arabia supplied 16%, Oman 10%, Iran and Iraq both 9% respectively, 
the UAE 4% and Kuwait 3% of China’s global oil imports. Since 2014, the value 
growth of China’s oil imports from the Gulf has moderately decreased, due to China’s 
slightly lower economic growth, but especially due to the oil price slump which has 
mostly endured since then.670 More will be said in the next two chapters about 
China’s oil trade with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 
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FIGURE 5: Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. Available at: 
http://www.marcon.com/library/country_briefs/China/pic5.png. 
 
FIGURE 6: Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. Available at: 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=CHN. 
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Iran’s share of China’s oil imports has been quite large consistently from 1997 
onwards, when China’s refining industry was made compatible with the high levels of 
sulphur content in Iranian oil.671 In late 2000s Saudi Arabia overtook Iranian oil 
exports to China. And although Iran’s share was still quite high compared to the 
amount of oil other countries imported from it following the US/EU push for 
sanctions on Iran’s energy industry, China had reluctantly conformed to the Western 
pressure for sanctions compliance as well. Since 2012, it has made significant cuts to 
its oil imports from Iran.672 Testifying before the US-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, Erica Downs highlighted how this allowed China to escape 
penalizations:  
‘The National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 prescribes penalties for foreign financial institutions 
which do business with the Central Bank of Iran, the main clearinghouse for oil payments, but also 
grants 180-day exemptions to countries that “significantly reduce” oil imports from Iran.  China’s 
imports of Iranian crude have fallen from 555,000 b/d in 2011 to 439,000 b/d in 2012 to 402,000 b/d 
during the period January-April 2013. These reductions earned China exemptions in June and 
December 2012 and June 2013’.673 
Nevertheless, China’s strong interest in maximizing oil imports from Iran even 
during the sanctions era has been partly achieved through specialized companies set 
up precisely for these special circumstances. One of China’s ways in oil trade has been 
the use of the company Zhuhai Zhen Rong which deliberately has no exposure to US-
markets, and therefore was not economically affected by Washington’s punishment 
sanctions on it in 2012.674 Similar to the other Asian importers, much is to be 
expected in terms of future Sino-Iranian oil trade, after the lifting of sanctions in 
2016, even though significant obstacles remain for investment, as will be explained in 
the next section. 
Iraq, as seen in Figure 6, provided as much of China’s oil import share as Iran in 
2014. Since 2006, China has seen a significant increase in Iraqi oil inflow, growing 
from then 1 million tons to 3.4 million tons by January 2015. This growth could have 
been even larger had it not been for Iraq’s staggering security breakdown in 2014 
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following the then rapid expansion of IS, which prevented increased Iraqi oil 
production especially in the northern Kurdish region. Yet, China’s oil imports from 
Iraq still grew because most of them came from southern Iraq, where most Chinese 
companies have invested.675 Iraq’s future is highly uncertain though, despite the 
ongoing pushback of IS and its imminent destruction as a state-like entity.676 Much of 
China’s hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon trade with Iraq depends on its future 
political stability and security. 
Such particular risks and uncertainties have not been exactly relevant in Oman, the 
Arabian Peninsula’s tranquil south-eastern end, beyond the Hormuz bottleneck, 
where Sultan Qaboos’s reign has produced relative stability.677 These two positive 
conditions, one political and one geographical, are the main reasons why China has 
increasingly cherished its bilateral economic ties with Oman. Despite the latter’s 
comparably moderate hydrocarbon resources, China has sought to maximize its 
imports from there – reflected in the fact that Oman was the first Arab country to sell 
oil to China and reflected in the still high figure above. This is also significant the 
other way around, because China for long was Oman’s largest oil customer. This 
substantial oil trade volume will likely remain the case in the short-term future due to 
the overall closer bilateral relations and bi-directional investment into upstream and 
downstream oil business.678 
Yet, Oman’s dwindling resources, its political and economic stagnation resulting from 
the Sultan’s age and poor health, and a potential return of political risk and 
uncertainty over his succession, mean that China’s oil imports from Oman are likely 
going to decrease in the mid-to-long term. This has already happened most recently, 
although that dip might be of a more short-term nature. The 30% decrease of Oman-
China oil trade in January 2017 can be explained with OPEC’s recent decision to cut 
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production.679 If this goes on for longer, it might even extend Oman’s export capacity 
further into the future. Kuwait’s oil exports to China have also been long-established, 
but, considering Kuwait’s much larger resources they seem destined to endure for 
much longer.680 
The same can be said about Qatar’s gas supply for China, although, for now, that 
energy type has only been used to a relatively moderate extent. As already seen in 
Figure 5, China’s consumption of natural gas accounted for 5% of its total energy 
consumption in 2014. It became a net importer of natural gas in 2007 and has 
increasingly relied on those imports – although its import dependency is still much 
lower than with oil, as seen in Figure 7 below. This moderate gas import dependency 
seems likely to endure and even expand, because, for environmental reasons, China is 
seeking to reduce its coal consumption, and does not seem to have immediately 
accessible domestic gas reserves to the amount that would reduce import 
dependence.681 
As evident in Figure 8, China’s imports are balanced between natural gas via 
pipelines, especially from Russia and Central Asia, and via LNG imports by sea. Of 
these LNG imports Qatar’s position is highly dominant, enjoying a third of China’s 
LNG import market share. The other LNG suppliers are located in China’s back yard 
in South East Asia – Australia, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Although Iran has enormous 
gas reserves, it does not yet have the high-technology to fully develop them. China 
could be well-placed to change that and unlock huge Iranian resources. Yet, this 
would not only be very costly, but simultaneously considered unnecessary by China, 
bearing in mind the world’s current excess gas capacity. China has multiple 
alternative sources that are comfortably sufficient and simply much cheaper to 
import. For a long time, anti-Iranian sanctions and Iran’s pariah status also 
prohibited Chinese willingness to take potentially high risks in investing into an 
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Iranian (gas) energy infrastructure. The latter might have been destroyed by a 
possible American military strike on Iran.682 
 
FIGURE 7: Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. Available at: 
http://www.marcon.com/marcon2c.cfm?SectionGroupsID=30&SectionListsID=30&PageID=2803 
 
FIGURE 8: Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. Available at: 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=17591. 
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China’s trade with the Gulf states is in no way limited to energy though. Admittedly, 
the Gulf states’ exports to China are still overwhelmingly dominated by hydrocarbons 
and at best some related petrochemical products.683 Yet, the entire region has 
imported a rapidly growing amount of Chinese manufactured goods, especially 
electronics, heavy machinery, transport equipment, metals, food, and textiles.  This 
increasingly includes more high-tech products, as stated by Shaojin Chai to the 
author, a Chinese national employed as a Senior Research Fellow of the Ministry of 
Culture, UAE and expert on China-GCC relations.684 The low-and-higher-tech 
products are in high demand in all Gulf countries and since China enjoys a 
comfortable comparative advantage in these product categories, they are likely to 
enjoy continued outlets there.685 On a side note, although China-Gulf trade is highly 
imbalanced in favour of the Gulf, this imbalance does not exist when incorporating all 
OPEC countries. For every dollar China spends on importing oil from OPEC, 64% of 
value is returned to China due to Chinese manufactured exports to these markets.686 
Iran also is a vast market for Chinese exports – and has already been for the past 
decades, although potential is much greater than the bilateral trade to date. Between 
1980 and 2010 bilateral trade rose 163-fold, from approximately $180 million to $30 
billion.687 A year later, China became Iran’s largest trading partner, whilst Iran 
became China’s second biggest Middle Eastern trading partner back in 2007. 
Although an increasing and dominating bulk of that trade was composed of Iranian 
oil exports, Chinese heavy machinery and equipment, as well as cheap-manufactured 
consumer goods found many tight-budgeted Iranian consumers in a constantly 
underperforming economy also requiring infrastructure investment and industrial 
advancement. Huang and Ji have taken a detailed look at Sino-Iranian trade patterns 
and have identified the most important Chinese products exported to Iran over the 
last decades: ‘tractors, iron and steel products, motor vehicles, power generators, 
electric motors, building equipment, mechanical equipment, drilling equipment, 
tubing, phosphate, insecticide, clocks and watches, household appliances, articles for 
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daily use, etc.’.688 Yet, they notice an overall decrease of Chinese exports to Iran in the 
2000s, when only exports of textiles grew, but exports of ‘mechanical and electrical 
products and meters’ declined. They explain this with Korean, Japanese, and 
European competition in these sectors.689 This competitive trend might be cemented 
in the new post-sanctions era. 
Furthermore, the growing Iranian imports of Chinese articles of apparel, and all 
kinds of other comparably cheaper goods, have been a double-edged sword for the 
Iranian economy. Whilst they helped the Iranian consumer, they harmed the Iranian 
producer. Domestic textile business seems to have taken a significant beating, with 
the Majlis Research Centre reporting the insolvencies of more than 2000 Iranian 
SMEs in the clothing production sector in 2012 alone.690 This is merely one recent 
example of many cases in which Chinese goods flooding the Iranian market have 
drawn much ire from Iranian business, politics, and the religious establishment.691 
On a side note, it might be interesting to mention that the last time clothes “Made in 
Persia” were domestically outperformed by Chinese competitors was in the early 18th 
century, when the influx of Chinese silks damaged Persian producers so much, that it 
helped cause economic stagnation, and indirectly, the Safavid dynasty’s collapse, as 
seen in chapter two. Sometimes Silk Roads seem to have unintended consequences. 
Yet, textiles and other essential goods have been needed in neighbouring and war-
torn Iraq, to which China currently mainly exports those goods, and heavy 
machinery, electronics, metals, chemicals, stone, glass, plastic, rubber, and food 
products.692 
Beijing has been highly proactive in facilitating the exports of such goods to all Gulf 
markets, but especially the GCC, in order to try and reduce its massive trade deficit 
with these countries, an imbalance clearly illustrated by Figure 2 above. Given 
China’s demonstrated dependency on Gulf oil and to a much lesser extent gas, there 
does not seem to be much potential for significant further trade imbalance 
reductions, unless the low oil price falls further and stays as low. All in all, Sino-GCC 
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trade growth since the millennium resulted in China becoming the GCC’s third-
largest trading partner in 2009.693 
The new Sino-Arab trading Silk Roads, and especially China-GCC trade, are as much 
a story of small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) trading in both directions as 
of large SOEs, although, again, it is mostly the Arab world and the Gulf in particular 
that imports Chinese consumer goods. The Chinese city of Yiwu in Zhejiang province 
perfectly exemplifies the micro-nature of these new commercial arteries. As Ben 
Simpfendorfer, the banker-turned-entrepreneur and CEO of the Silk Road Associates 
consulting firm, observed already in the late 2000s, Yiwu ‘claims the world’s largest 
wholesale market for consumer goods and […] is a Mecca for foreign traders’.694 Huge 
numbers of Arabs, mainly individual merchants, not large retail conglomerates, have 
littered the city market with their small consumer goods, and yet more of them travel 
there to assess what is on offer and order huge amounts of small and large consumer 
goods to be shipped to the Gulf. Yiwu has reacted to this phenomenon and built not 
only many hotels, but also mosques to make it more attractive to Muslims traders.695 
And for those who do not travel, the internet offers its own “Silk Road” connection 
portal: not the illegal dark web platform, but Jack Ma’s all-conquering e-commerce 
business-to-business company Alibaba – a telling name – now one of highest valued 
companies in the world. Sino-GCC traders have made enormous use of it.696 Besides 
Yiwu, China and Arab states, particularly from the GCC, have also set up a number of 
trade fora and expos in China’s Ningxia Province, which is home to a large 
demography of Hui Muslims. A proposed free trade zone in and around Ningxia’s 
capital, Yinchuan, is especially targeting Sino-GCC trade in halal food.697 
As a consequence of all these macro-, meso-, and micro-developments, an overall 
China-GCC free trade agreement has been under negotiation for over a decade. Its 
obstacles are primarily believed to lie in the petrochemicals sector, an industry which 
both China and the GCC-block have championed domestically and over which they 
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therefore compete.698 Although China called for a faster conclusion and 
implementation of a deal in May 2017, new dramatic political obstacles were added 
only a month later, with the outbreak of the Qatar crisis and the country’s new 
economic isolation at the time of writing.699 
However, unless the crisis mushrooms into direct conflict, even in absence of a near-
future FTA, China-GCC trade volumes are likely to endure and grow further. Besides 
the demonstrated patterns of demand and supply, the simultaneously growing 
investment flows, joint ventures, and construction contracts between China and the 
GCC are further important facilitators of trade. 
 
6.2 Sino-Gulf Investment and Project Contracting 
In the past decade, China-GCC capital flows in the form of FDI and EPC have also 
greatly soared, though on a slower and lesser scale than trade, especially up to the 
global financial crisis. A significant bulk of FDI and EPC flows between the countries 
has been conducted by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), often co-facilitated via credit-
supplies from their mother countries’ large sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), but also 
between private companies.700 
Figure 9 and 10 show the distribution of China’s outward infrastructure investment 
into GCC countries between 2005 and 2015. Due to its size and importance as a 
hydrocarbon source, Saudi Arabia clearly dominates the field, with a Chinese 
infrastructure investment inflow of approximately $26 billion – representing more 
than half of the GCC’s share. The UAE though follows as a clear second, absorbing 
approximately $11 billion over the same period, which accounts for roughly a quarter 
of all Chinese infrastructure investments in the GCC. In the other direction, from the 
Gulf to China, investment was marginal before 2008, as only around 11% of Gulf 
investment went to Asia. Yet, especially in China, this share is likely to double by 
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2020.701  As with trade, more shall be said about the nature of Chinese investments in 
the KSA and UAE and their investment in China in the two case study chapters. 
 
* excluding Bahrain (no data). 
Source: American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker  
[MS Excel chart created by author]. 
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* excluding Bahrain (no data). 
Source: American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker 
[MS Excel chart created by author]. 
 
Though the global financial crisis had an astonishingly marginal impact on China’s 
growth, Sino-GCC investment suffered for at least a year, just like trade. The GCC’s 
financial sectors were heavily hurt, most famously with the burst of Dubai’s real 
estate bubble in 2009, oil prices declined, and Gulf growth depreciated in the wake of 
several business failures – all of which negatively affected Sino-GCC capital flows. 
Yet, they rebounded very quickly and grew substantially at the start of the new 
decade.702 
Apart from China’s and the developing world’s continuously growing energy demand 
and Gulf supply, one of the reasons for their fast recovery and indeed absolute growth 
was and is the ‘complementarity of project contracting’ between China and the GCC, 
according to Chen. Between 2009 and 2013, ‘the market for project contracting […] 
[was] enlarged. GCC project contracting is currently China’s predominant market in 
foreign project contracting’.703 He observes five reasons on the GCC side: first, the 
rebounding oil price between 2010 and 2013 and subsequent rents re-booting GCC 
liquidity; second, native and expatriate population growth together with increased 
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urbanization demands. These developments entail all kinds of infrastructure and 
services expansion in communications, education, housing, hydropower, medical 
facilities, and transportation, encompassing entertainment, as well as work, leisure, 
shopping, sports, and worship. Third, the GCC-states’ new development strategies 
necessitate sweeping economic diversification which again requires the respective 
infrastructure investment for all kinds of services. The fourth factor extends this 
economic development strategy across borders, urgently connecting the GCC 
countries which, after all, formed a customs union in 2003. Finally, the GCC-
countries’ acceptance to the WTO required them to simplify their regulatory 
environment and remove barriers to inward investment.704 The combination of these 
aspects has created many and ever-expanding opportunities for Chinese companies 
involved in project contracting. 
These companies additionally have been and continue to be well-placed to harness 
that potential. Chen identifies four such factors. First, in the highly dense contract 
market, China’s companies enjoy a competitive advantage vis-à-vis the longer 
established Western firms or those of the “Asian tigers”, regarding labour provision 
which is not only skilled, but comparably low-cost.705 Second, China’s now ‘advanced 
manufacturing, design and construction technology […] coupled with lower 
production costs is advantageous for those industries with large infrastructures’. 
Thus, China can nowadays for example offer ‘technical capability and know-how in 
new energy technologies, such as nuclear power, solar and wind energy’.706 Third, 
Chinese companies have adopted EPC methods to their portfolios, which means they 
take on complete projects as general contractors, after decades of mere sub-
contracting in foreign markets. Fourth, Chinese firms now offer ‘complete sets of 
equipment manufacturing’ which enhances their EPC-capability and overall project 
efficiency.707 
Sino-GCC FDI flows, though very modest initially, and still trailing far behind trade, 
have also increased in the last decade. In 2001, global FDI into the GCC stood at $2.3 
billion, which accounted for just 0.27% of global FDI. In 2008, the value had grown 
to $63.4 billion, which represented 4.56% of global FDI. The GCC countries have had 
an enduring and constantly increasing need for technological development and FDI 
                                                          
704 Ibid.: pp. 175-177. 
705 Ibid.: p. 177. 
706 Ibid.: p. 178. 
707 Ibid. 
248 
 
inflows and outflows. The commodity boom in that decade and its resulting high oil 
price provided foreign investor assurance for capital inflows, as well as domestic 
liquidity for capital outflows. Capital inflows into GCC markets have mostly 
encompassed sectors such as ‘the service industry, finance, transport, 
communication, real-estate, hydraulic engineering, petrochemical products, and 
refining’.708 Especially the energy sector requires FDI, although it is protected by 
much stricter regulations. This means that most FDI goes into the GCC’s downstream 
industry. Nevertheless, the overall privatization policies in some GCC countries have 
opened up potential for cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A).709 
Chinese companies have increasingly tapped into these markets, although ‘initially 
the proportion of China’s investment in GCC countries was relatively small – under 
1% per year of total Chinese investment overseas’. Yet, it has notably increased since 
the GCC’s post-crisis rebound, mostly in the energy and service industries.710 
In the other direction, the FDI of GCC countries into China also intensified ever since 
both trading blocs acceded to the WTO, although to a much lesser extent. Given the 
huge divergence in country sizes and demographics, this is not surprising. In 2003, 
the GCC’s overall FDI into China stood at $790 million, and in 2010 at $7.76 billion. 
Most of these capital flows came in the form of joint ventures and were facilitated by 
the GCC’s sovereign wealth funds.711 This state-driven investment is motivated by 
their recognition not only of China’s enormous market size, but also by their 
intention to deepen China’s overall stake in the Gulf – as an instrument to lock it into 
a long-term energy trading relationship underpinned with the desired diplomatic 
cooperation. Accordingly, Davidson also attests ‘clear political goals in addition to 
[the SWFs’] stated economic objectives’ and discerns that so far disappointingly ‘few 
of the [GCC’s] investments are being made by private companies’.712 
Besides Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as seen in the next chapters, Kuwait and Qatar are 
two other significant GCC origins and destinations of FDI, FPI, and EPC-flows into 
and from China. Back in the 1980s, the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) became involved in over 175 larger and smaller infrastructure projects, 
supplying also more than 20,000 Chinese workers. CNPC was equally responsible for 
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comprehensive maintenance work on Kuwaiti oil refineries, as well as a $400 
million-strong construction of two oil storage depots in the 1990s. In the year 2009, 
Sinopec signed a deal to construct five new oil and gas stations, all of which ‘will 
boost Kuwait’s oil production by over four million barrels per day by 2020’.713 
Kuwait is China’s oldest investment partner in the Gulf, with that connection too 
reaching as far back as the 1980s. The Kuwait Pacific Finance Company and the Hong 
Kong Metropolitan Bank, as well as UBAN International were founded as bi-
directional investment facilitators. Between 1984 and 1985 the Kuwait Petroleum 
Company (KPC) acquired a 15% stake in a Chinese offshore gas field and then, 
together with the Chinese National Chemical Construction Company formed a 60%-
40% joint venture, the Sino Arab Fertilizer Company, to develop a petrochemical 
plant in Shandong Province. By the time two decades had past, Sino-Kuwaiti capital 
flows had greatly increased. In 2005, KPC’s and Sinopec’s $9 billion joint venture was 
launched to co-finance an oil refinery and ethylene plant in Guangdong Province. 
Kuwait’s primary SWF, the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), had also steadily 
grown its portfolio share in East Asia. Now, it is one of the largest foreign 
shareholders in the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). KIA also holds 
a 15% stake in the Kuwait-China Investment Company (KCIC), a joint venture to 
invest in Chinese agriculture from which import-dependent Kuwait will draw food 
products.714 
Given its overwhelming oil-dependency and need of economic diversification, Kuwait 
is, so far, heavily dependent on imports of almost everything to boot. Thus, investing 
in infrastructure which facilitates connectivity and trade is crucial to its own Vision 
2030. The plan includes ambitions to build a “Silk City”, the Madinat al-Hareer, over 
the next decade. First announced in 2008, it had initial plans to not only connect the 
Middle East to China via railway, spreading out also to Iran, Baghdad, and Damascus, 
but also to form a metropolis including a 1,001-metre skyscraper and a business-, 
home-, leisure- and tourism- hub close to the capital.715 Whilst the Silk City’s 
construction is moving forward, partly co-financed with China’s Belt and Road 
investment vehicles, the railway-plans have stalled and may have gone extinct for 
now, given GCC-Iran hostility and Syria’s and Iraq’s raging civil wars and 
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disintegration.716 Over a hundred years since the Berlin-Baghdad railway project, 
once again, direct railway connections from the Levant to the mouth of the Persian 
Gulf are failing to be built due to geo-political turmoil. Nevertheless, the Madinat al-
Hareer demonstrates Kuwait’s ambitions to compete with Dubai over 
intercontinental business hub status in the long run. It remains to be seen whether it 
can succeed and how profitable the Chinese financial support will turn out. 
In view of Qatar’s recent GCC isolation in the wake of alleged substantial support 
from government sources to jihadist groups in the Middle East, Qatar’s similar 
business hub ambitions are now far less realistic. Nevertheless, Sino-Qatari capital 
flows are not likely to be frozen. Already China has invested significantly in Qatari 
markets, just as Qatari entities have in Chinese markets. The Qatar Investment 
Authority (QIA), the country’s main SWF, has followed Kuwait’s example in buying 
stocks of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. ICBC has since also opened a 
branch in Doha, offering banking to other Chinese companies there.717 This move into 
Qatar’s financial sector was later complemented by the two states setting up a 
renminbi clearinghouse in Doha, seeking to solidify trade-and-investment-easing 
monetary ties.718 In the other direction, QIA has opened an office in China to expand 
its portfolio there. Furthermore, in 2009, Qatar Petroleum, allocating a planned $12 
billion, entered a joint venture with Petrochina in order to co-finance a 
petrochemicals plant in Zhejiang Province, as well as ‘an oil refinery, an ethylene 
plant, and a port for oil supertankers’.719 These are merely the most prominent 
examples of Sino-Qatari capital flows. 
Oman has also been both a recipient as well as a provider in its investment ties to 
China, though on a lesser scale than the larger Gulf economies. One of Oman’s most 
prominent capital provisions for China came in the form of a huge grant in the wake 
of the heavy Sichuan earthquake in 2008.720 Up until 2014, China had invested into 
Oman’s energy and petrochemical industry, and had signed agreements to form joint 
ventures between the Oman Oil Company (OOC) and the likes of CNPC and Sinopec. 
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Beyond oil, Chinese companies have also invested into other Omani energy sub-
sectors and have upgraded Oman’s water management.721 
As Oman’s much needed economic diversification has more recently seen the 
country’s focus on the expansion of logistics networks, free trade zones and port 
constructions in order to provide a modern upgrade to its anciently relevant maritime 
commerce, China has encouraged this with its most recent and possible future 
investment decisions. Oman’s new Logistics Strategy incorporates the construction of 
an advanced railway network, connecting not only major Omani cities, free trade 
zones, and ports, but also linking up with the GCC railway network, which is also 
under construction. Following the announcement of these Omani plans in 2014, the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has emerged as a major funding vehicle 
for this project, agreeing on an instant provision of a $36 million loan – representing 
a 60% share in the project, alongside the Oman Global Logistics Group’s 40% share 
($24 million). A specific section of the rail grid will be a network of ‘Mineral Lines’ – 
thus representing also an investment into Oman’s vast and untapped mineral 
resources.722 In another, even bigger, and highly complementary AIIB project, the 
Chinese-led investment bank almost simultaneously signed an agreement to develop 
the Omani port and Special Economic Zone of Duqm. 
‘The objective of the Project is to help Duqm Port capture its full economic potential through improved 
transport efficiency, strengthened logistics services, facilitated mineral exports, and reduced supply 
chain delivery time and costs for the wide spectrum of industries in the new Duqm Special Economic 
Zone and its broader port hinterland. […] The project investment will mainly include the civil works 
for the construction of port related infrastructure including port access roads, cargo storage, terminal 
buildings, and operational zone’s facilities buildings.723 
The AIIB will provide 75% of the project’s overall EPC costs, a $265 million loan to 
the Special Economic Zone Authority of Duqm. The latter will contribute with $88.33 
million, accounting for 25% of the estimated project costs.724 
These two AIIB loans to Oman certify that Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative is, at 
least currently, not bypassing the Arabian Peninsula, as had been speculated.725 
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Despite the BRI’s alleged overall vagueness, and despite specific doubts on the GCC 
as a critical and safe regional node in both the Belt and the Road, for now China 
seems to be more than open into incorporating it. Oman mostly lies outside the 
strategically sensitive Persian Gulf and, in addition, its territory on the Musandam 
Peninsula overlooks the Hormuz bottleneck jointly with Iran. Chinese investors 
appreciate this geographic, and thus geo-political and geo-economic, advantage that 
Oman enjoys over its GCC allies. This may be one of the reasons for their active 
investment in Oman and especially Duqm, which is going far beyond the AIIB loans. 
Also in 2016, Oman Wangfang, a subsidiary of China-Arab Wanfang Investment 
Management Company, founded in 2015 in Ningxia Province, signed an agreement to 
build an industrial park in Duqm. The $370 million Chinese infrastructure 
investment will flow into Duqm’s Special Economy Zone, where the industrial park 
alone plans to attract $10 billion of investment by 2022. Oman Wangfang will finance 
an ‘oil refinery, a cement plant, a factory making pipes for the petroleum industry, an 
automobile assembly plant, and a 1-gigawatt solar power generation facility’ and, 
additionally to their construction by Chinese companies, will include land leases to 
the Chinese investors.726 In spring 2017, the Omani government also turned to China 
when it requested a $3.6 billion loan to meet budget gaps in the wake of the 
enduringly low oil price. The mandated banks include the Bank of China, the China 
Development Bank, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.727 China’s 
increasing financial importance to Oman is made evident through such requests. 
Iraq is in even greater need for any FDI given its civil wars and dire existence as a de 
facto failed state. Construction opportunities are therefore manifold but involve high 
risk. Yet, China’s energy and construction companies have shown much appetite to 
take it on, at least after Iraq’s temporal stabilization following the US troop surge in 
2006. They have invested especially in Iraq’s southern region and to a lesser extent 
the northern Kurdish region, simultaneously taking the biggest share in Iraqi oil 
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exports. Alongside investments into Iraqi oil, Chinese companies also became 
involved in the Iraqi cement industry, as well as real estate.728 This has caused 
commentators to declare China the winner of the Iraq War, in which it did not 
participate, because after Iraq’s oil boom from 2013 onwards, China reaped the 
dividends and has increasingly got its money’s worth, albeit relative to low 
expectations.729 Yet, the 2014 security breakdown after the IS insurgency exemplified 
the risk Chinese investment faces in Iraq, although most of its projects were not 
directly affected at that time.730 In December 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 
state visit to Iraq, in which he and Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced a 
‘strategic partnership’, it was announced that more Chinese companies would invest 
further into ‘energy, electricity, communication and infrastructure’.731 It remains to 
be seen how lucrative they can be, given Iraq’s highly uncertain future. 
Iran’s investment risk levels have been less on the security side, but heavily impactful 
on the political and legal side. Long starved of FDI, Iran’s future seems to be brighter 
following the lifting of UN-sanctions. But even before, Iran was an eager recipient of 
Chinese investment throughout the last decades, especially prior to the advanced 
sanctions regimes of 2010 and 2012. Given Iran’s size and its relative isolation from 
impeded and reluctant Western firms, China enjoyed access to a much less 
competitive market environment there, and “merely” faced intra-Asian competition. 
As seen above, Japan and South Korea long provided a more sophisticated high-
technology transfer in their investments, when China’s were more quantitatively 
impactful rather than qualitatively from a relative point of view. 
The American Enterprise Institute has calculated that China was Iran’s number one 
foreign investor between the year 2000 and 2007, accounting for a total FDI value of 
$101.74 billion. Iran’s oil, gas, and petrochemical industry was the overwhelmingly 
dominant sector for Chinese investment – accounting for $96.7 billion over that 
period. An additional $3.38 billion flowed into EPC contracts in power, energy, and 
construction, and a further $1.08 billion into transportation. Beyond energy and 
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infrastructure, Chinese companies also invested $620 million into Iranian banking 
and trade finance.732 
Chinese EPC contracts in Iran have partly grown, partly declined, in number, value, 
and revenue over the last two decades, with the biggest fluctuations occurring since 
the mid-2000s. Bazoobandi characterizes these Sino-Iranian capital flows as taking 
‘one step forward and two steps backward’, especially due to complications over 
perpetuated UN-sanctions.733 On the one hand, in 2009, 62 Chinese engineering 
contracts in Iran were valued at approximately $11.5 billion. On the other hand, a 
year later, there were 178 contracts in number, but their value merely accounted for 
around $1.3 million. In total, revenue has mostly been growing though. In the year 
2007 alone, their turnover of Chinese engineering contracts stood at around $1 
billion, but had almost doubled by 2010.734 Admittedly, when taken as a whole, it has 
to be said that the GCC’s inflow of Chinese EPC contracts dwarfs that of Iran’s less 
business-friendly environment. Yet, the visibility of their impact seems much higher 
in Iran’s economy and infrastructure judging by Iran’s relative lack of economic 
globalization. Huang and Ji have broken down China’s engineering contracts in Iran 
into nine categories, highlighting the diversity of China’s infrastructure footprint 
inside Iran: 
First, energy, including oil, gas, thermal, and hydropower; second, transportation, 
both railway and motorway; third, the chemical and petrochemical industries; fourth, 
communications; fifth, non-ferrous metals like aluminium-, zinc-, and copper-plants; 
sixth, shipbuilding, ranging from cargo ships to oil tankers and LNG carriers; 
seventh, water conservancy in the form of dam construction; eighth, metallurgy, 
including steel factories; and ninth, the construction industry itself, involving cement 
production facilities.735 
Huang and Ji’s examples of prominent Chinese infrastructure investment in Iran are 
too detailed to discuss here at length but deserve to be listed and partly quoted or 
summarized. In Iran’s oil and petrochemical industries, Chinese companies like 
Sinopec, Sinochem, CNPC and CNOOC signed upstream and downstream deals 
throughout the 2000s for developing Iran’s Yadavaran and Azadegan oil fields. The 
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former included a 51% stake acquired by Sinopec. The latter was going to yield a 70% 
share acquired by CNPC in 2009 – controversially replacing Japan’s Inpex 
Corporation which had initially won the bid, but then showed reluctance in the face of 
US-pressure, was downsized to from 75% to 10% and finally divested completely.736 
As mentioned above, US pressure caused much frustration among Japan’s statesmen 
and oilmen, and this was compounded by the fact that a Chinese rival had 
presumably won instead. Yet, even China buckled in 2014 and CNPC had its contract 
cancelled by Iran.737 Only recently, in the post-UN-sanctions era, was the venture 
realistically open for competition again – with Iran launching a tender in Spring 
2017, and so far, receiving bids for the field’s development by France’s Total, 
Malaysia’s Petronas, and, once more, Japan’s Inpex. CNPC is said to be interested 
again, too.738 
Iran’s natural gas reserves in the Pars fields have also attracted Chinese investment, 
with SINOC inking a $16 billion deal in 2007 to develop the North Pars field and two 
years later, with CNPC and National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) entering a joint 
project to develop the South Pars field and replacing Total in the process.739 Yet, these 
ventures stalled as well due to the international sanctions against Iran. The post-
sanctions outcome points to a similar trajectory as with the Azadegan oil field, 
because Total has come out on top again winning a new tender in July 2017. It will 
invest $4.8 billion into the South Pars field and has acquired a 50.1% interest in the 
project. Although CNPC has also renewed its participation, it will now “merely” enjoy 
30%, with Iran’s Petropars holding the remaining 19.9%. The venture is said to 
produce gas for Iran’s domestic consumption by 2021.740 Though China clearly 
continues to have its foot in Iran’s energy industry, the lifting of sanctions has 
undoubtedly crowded the market with more technologically advanced competitors 
from Europe. Yet, it is too early to say what impact the lifting of UN-sanctions will 
have, because, as already pointed out, unilateral US-sanctions on Iran remain in 
place for now. These prohibit Iran from access to American finance and therefore 
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prohibit dollar-denominated transactions between Iran and any entity listed on US 
stock exchange. Since most of China’s biggest SOE’s also have their subsidiaries 
registered there, they too need to find complicated or costly ways to circumvent their 
use of US-dollars.741 
Nevertheless, Iran and its investment and trading partners have often found ways 
around these barriers via barter deals. China’s active investment into Iran, at least 
until the height of the sanctions era, had a visible impact on Iranian consumers and 
EPC clients. As mentioned above, Chinese investment went beyond oil already from 
the 1990s onwards. Back then China’s International Trust and Investment 
Corporation (CITIC) and China’s North Industries Corporation commenced 
construction of the Tehran Metro and an electricity-powered overland express train, 
launching in the year 2000 and now transporting millions of passengers every day.742 
In 2004, Sinotruk invested into the construction of the Aras Khodro Diesel 
Automobile Assembling Factory in Tabliz. Between 2002 and 2006, Sinohydro 
Corporation invested $150 million into the construction of a dam for the Taleghan 
hydropower and water conservancy project. Then there is Iran’s China Town of 
Commerce in the Anzali free zone near the Caspian Sea, where construction of a giant 
shopping centre began in December 2006. Alongside these examples, Chinese 
enterprises have also invested into Iran’s agricultural sector and have more recently 
identified Sino-Iranian tourism as the next sector for capital injection.743 The post-
sanctions future might hold much greater opportunities for Chinese investment in 
Iran, because it needs to be underlined that out of all of Chinese capital flows into the 
Iranian economy of the sanctions era, ‘only a [relatively] small fraction of those funds 
[was] invested’ in practice.744 
In the other direction, admittedly, Iranian FDI into China has in no way matched the 
amount of China’s into Iran. According to data from the Chinese government, by the 
end of 2010 there were 207 firms with Iranian capital, with a combined value of 
$731.95 million, doing business in China745. Strategically most important was the 
2009 opening of the NIOC’s branch in China and its plan to invest into oil storage 
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facilities on the mainland.746 As Sino-Iranian economic relations seem set to improve, 
more Iranian business activity could be expected to at least moderately blossom also 
in China in the near future. Much also depends on the trajectory of Sino-Iranian, and 
as a result, also Sino-GCC political relations, which have always affected bilateral 
trade and investment. 
 
6.3 Sino-Gulf Diplomacy and Strategy 
China’s diplomatic relations with the GCC states are largely shelved from this section, 
because a more extensive analysis of Sino-Saudi and Sino-Emirati relations, the most 
important ones of GCC countries, is undertaken in the next two chapters. To tackle 
the individual bilateral relations between other GCC states and China, there is not 
enough space within the confines of this manuscript. Fortunately, they do not differ 
noticeably besides their relatively lesser prominence. Hence, the focus of this section 
is on China’s political ties to Iran.  
China’s diplomatic relations with Iraq have intensified and have even been labelled 
‘strategic’ since Xi Jinping’s 2015 state visit, but despite Chinese companies’ security 
risk exposure to Iraqi turmoil in the IS insurgency, have not resulted in any kind of 
military cooperation.747 Considering Iraq’s uncertain future, which is likely to remain 
highly unstable, it is just as likely that China will not change its course in that respect 
any time soon. 
Sino-Iranian diplomatic relations on the other hand seem to have more room for real 
strategic cooperation across the board. They have experienced an increasing 
closeness over the last few decades, albeit with the same fluctuations as in their trade 
and investment ties. Before Mao’s death, before Deng’s economic opening, and before 
the Islamic Revolution, Cold War era relations until the late 1970s between China and 
the Shah’s Iran were somewhat hostile. Henry Kissinger’s first trip to China, which 
launched the later Sino-American cooperation resulted in the Shah’s Iran recognizing 
the People’s Republic of China in 1971. However, it was only after the revolutionary 
establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran that relations between Beijing and 
Tehran grew closer, despite China’s cooperation with the US by then. Echoing 
Garver’s analysis, Adibelli emphasizes ideological as well as strategic factors for the 
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Sino-Iranian convergence from the 1980s onwards. ‘The Chinese and Iranian 
revolutions demonstrated a number of parallels that potentially made for similar 
world views’ which inspired Iran’s creation of its Revolutionary Guards modelled on 
China’s Red Guards.748 Yet, because China’s revolutionary fever has completely 
cooled down since those days, ideological sympathy seems to play next to no role in 
Sino-Iranian cooperation, other than a general tendency towards their shared 
resentment of an excessive American hegemony. This is more a strategic question 
though which is why Adibelli’s second emphasis is arguably the more important one 
when identifying the origin of Sino-Iranian political cooperation. The outbreak of the 
Iran-Iraq War in 1980 incentivized Iran to seek a massive arms-transfer from China. 
Beijing agreed to this partly for the financial returns, and partly to gain influence in a 
region it was willing to help shield from the Soviet Union.  
‘China throughout this period sold thousands of tanks, armoured personnel transporters, artillery 
shells, ballistic missiles and anti-tank missiles to Iran. […] Most of the arms Iran used on the front 
were made in China. Also of importance was China’s delivery of HY-2 (Silkworm) and C-801 missiles 
usable against warships. […] Thus, a close strategic collaboration between China and Iran emerged 
during the Iran-Iraq War’.749 
The 1990s saw this collaboration reach new heights when China’s growing economy 
first became dependent on net oil imports and Iran became a major supplier. If the 
historic US-Saudi relationship is defined as “oil-for-security”, then its Sino-Iranian 
counterpart in the 1990s was a soft version of that, because China not only traded 
arms (and military technicians) for energy, but even sold nuclear technology (and 
scientists) to Iran. These deals were forged also by high-level state visits. Yet, whilst 
China continued to import increasing amounts of Iranian oil right up until the US-led 
sanctions on Iran’s energy industry in 2012, it froze not only its arms exports to Iran, 
but also its nuclear cooperation already around the year 2000. This happened due to 
both US-pressure, as well as US-concessions following the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 
1995-1996.750 
Much to Iran’s frustration, it became increasingly clear that China was not willing to 
forge an alliance, which in the recent and current situation would have necessarily 
been anti-American and anti-GCC. Beijing has mostly prioritized its largely positive 
economic ties and even mostly political cooperation with Washington over the past 
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decades. In Gulf matters, this was underlined on numerous rounds of anti-Iranian 
UN sanctions, which China joined between 2006 and 2010.751 
Yet, this Chinese preference for stable relations with America has by no means ever 
entailed a US-China alliance against the Iranian regime. On the contrary, China’s 
diplomatic relations and increasingly strategic cooperation with Iran have developed 
to a level that scholars like Robert Pape, and Flynt and Hillary Leverett brand as ‘soft 
balancing’.752 This includes the Iranian nuclear issue which Beijing never countered 
as assertively as Washington, despite signing up to UN-sanctions that did not target 
Iran’s energy industry or included a prerogative to militarily target Iran’s nuclear 
facilities. ‘As part of its soft balancing strategy, the People’s Republic judges it 
important to keep the nuclear issue in multilateral fora like the [International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA)] and the [UN] Security Council, where China’s influence and 
its options for restraining the USA – are enhanced’.753 Moreover, China, together with 
Russia, repeatedly watered down anti-Iranian sanctions that otherwise would have 
been much harsher.754 It thereby firstly protected its own oil interests. Secondly and 
crucially, it also protected Iran not only from a harsher economic strangulation, but 
possibly even from a US-led military intervention. In other words, China became 
increasingly valuable for Iran even without a full-blown alliance.  
Other UN-sanctions that China (and Russia) vetoed not only include the harsher ones 
in the nuclear dispute, but also Western-led sanction-proposals on Iran’s primary 
regional ally – Syria’s genocidal Assad regime.755 A more advanced strategic 
cooperation of Iran with China and Russia might be taking shape. Iran’s post-2005 
observes status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a potential case in 
point and has increased in importance. The SCO and China as its leading member, 
have recently supported Iran’s permanent and full membership in the near future, 
even though they did not grant it yet, possibly thereby appeasing the GCC.756 
China and Iran are cooperating politically, but despite this potential 
institutionalization of security cooperation not outright militarily. Such careful, but 
                                                          
751 Idib.: pp. 116-117. 
752 Leverett, Mann Leverett 2015b: p. 139. 
753 Ibid.: p. 143. 
754 Ibid.: p. 144. 
755 Adibelli 2015: p. 117. 
756 Fulton, J. (2017), ‘China is trying to pull Middle East countries into its version of NATO’. In: The 
Washington Post, 21 June 2017 [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2017/06/21/how-china-is-shifting-toward-the-middle-east/?utm_term=.63c30030a396]. 
260 
 
pro-Iranian ‘strategic hedging’ stems from two Chinese motivations: firstly, Iran’s 
geographic position on the Gulf’s eastern shores opens up an alternative oil-import 
route over land across Central Asia, rather than sea, which is why China is eager to 
develop its pipeline connection to Iran. Secondly, and directly linked, a potential 
future deterioration of US-China relations would not only necessitate such an energy 
corridor via land, due to the US Navy’s control of the sea lanes, but also require a 
staunch ally in the oil-rich Gulf from which to draw uninterrupted oil supplies in the 
first place.757 On a general basis, Beijing views the US’s unipolar hegemony in the 
Middle East as detrimental to China’s interests and economic and diplomatic 
freedom of action there: 
‘Iran has […] become implicated in China’s long-term aim to move from unipolarity to multipolarity. 
Beijing sees the Middle East as central to US global primacy [unrestrained since the Cold War’s end]. 
[…] To forestall [US leverage against China in the Gulf], an at least minimally balanced distribution of 
power is crucial, with a ‘resistance’ camp balancing the Middle East’s pro-US camp [the GCC]’.758 
Although the Leveretts clearly highlight China’s ‘Persian Gulf dilemma’ – a 
concurrent reliance on hydrocarbons from two fierce enemies, both Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, they ultimately observe a Chinese preference for Iran attributable to the two 
reasons mentioned above.759 This had already been concluded by sinologist and 
political scientist Martin Jacques.760 Yet, this convincing interpretation of China’s 
answer to its Persian Gulf dilemma only carries potential relevance if either US-China 
relations or Saudi-Iran relations completely deteriorate. Admittedly, since especially 
the latter relationship is currently so hostile that even a direct war – besides the 
already raging proxy wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen – cannot be ruled out, the 
interpretation might indeed become dramatically relevant any time. China would 
likely to step up its entire Gulf diplomatic engagement to prevent this from 
happening. As the energy data presented above shows, such an escalation could have 
disastrous consequences for the Chinese economy – and political stability. As the 
next chapters will demonstrate, the US and Saudi Arabia are too important for China, 
and carry too much economic potential, for it to side-line them to Iran’s benefit, 
should there be no further escalation. 
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6.4 Chapter Conclusion and Theoretical Assessment 
Since China’s economic opening in 1978/79, it has become the world’s second largest 
economy by GDP and the world’s largest by PPP. It is now the largest trading and 
investment partner for most Asian countries, contributing to New Silk Roads as a 
result, but also to a more multipolar world order – thereby gradually bringing about a 
systemic change. Although China enjoys a deep and interdependent economic 
relationship with the US, its political relations with the world’s current hegemon are 
turning increasingly icy, especially in the South China Sea. Both these new economic 
and political conditions are re-shaping Asia, the Gulf, and the world. 
One of the outcomes of China’s and much of the developing world’s economic rise has 
been a relative global rebalance in financial matters. The economic growth of 
developing markets and their accumulation of currency reserves has brought about 
the emergence of new investment vehicles in the form of the sovereign wealth fund. 
China’s and the Gulf’s SWFs are a major part of this story. On the one hand, SWFs 
operate as businesses reacting to market forces. On the other hand, they are state-
owned and therefore suspected of succumbing to their mother-countries’ geo-
political interests. 
Hence, arguments can be found for both neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism. 
Neo-realism would point towards the state’s attempt to regain the upper hand in the 
face of economic globalization and unimpeded market forces, in order to hedge what 
CIT calls vulnerability interdependence. Neo-liberal institutionalism would highlight 
not only that powerful states are becoming participants in global capitalism as 
trading states. It would also highlight the corporate management of SWFs and also 
the rise of a potential new regime in the form of the GAPP – writing the rules for 
SWFs’ legitimate conduct. 
Another regime that is being impacted upon by China’s (and also the GCC’s) 
economic rise is the global monetary order. China’s economic catch-up has been 
mirrored by the relatively recent promotion of the renminbi as a global reserve 
currency. The groundwork is being laid for a potential, though not automatic, future 
monetary regime change from a unipolar dollar-based order, to a more multipolar 
order in which the renminbi plays a greater role than it does today. Yet, it is still 
wrong to say a regime change is imminent. The dollar’s dominance is still 
overwhelming. This is why within CIT, Keohane and Nye’s third model for 
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international regime change, the issue structure explanation seems to be the most 
relevant one for now. The other three structures might gain weight in the future 
though.  
The economic process explanation does provide an analytical framework for 
measuring the necessary economic conditions for political processes that might bring 
about a regime change. These conditions are the market forces that drive Gulf oil 
exports to China and Chinese exports to the Gulf. Given the growth of trade it seems 
natural for monetary structures to react to it over time.  
The overall power structure model seems to be helpful when matching the relative 
rise of China’s total global influence with its enhanced monetary power. China’s 
efforts to step into America’s global monetary and geo-strategic footprints in the long 
run would point towards the enduring explanatory power of realism.  
Institutions such as the IMF have proven more flexible though than realism would 
suspect. They have reacted to this development and have begun a moderate policy to 
adjust the monetary regime. This highlights the explanatory merit of the 
international organization model, in which elite networks within and among 
countries and institutions launch a political process for regime adjustment. 
However, China’s total economic power – derived from being the second largest 
economy in the world at the time of writing – is arguably not symmetrically matched 
by its monetary power. The issue structure model predicts this differentiation among 
issue areas in the distribution of power resources and power as control over 
outcomes. 
Still, this does not entail a future irrelevance of the overall power structure model that 
is closer to realism, or at least to the realist-liberalist bridge branded hegemonic 
stability theory. For the moment, these theories would have predicted the US to resist 
the renminbi’s rise in importance, even if within the liberal order of which the IMF is 
a key part. This has not occurred and therefore would entail that a gradual regime 
adjustment, tolerated by the current hegemon, the US, is slowly taking place. As 
Keohane and Nye point out, a change within a regime is very different from a change 
of regimes. In the case of a more substantial growth in Chinese currency power and 
overall power, different paths than now might be chosen by both the hegemon and its 
potential challenger – leaving the door open for the overall power structure model, 
and realism, to have the “final” word. 
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An area in which the current hegemon has tried more actively to resist China’s 
growing influence is global development finance in the context of the New Silk Roads. 
The US did not welcome China’s founding of the AIIB, perceived to threaten the 
Bretton Woods institutions. Anyhow, US lobbying against its allies’ AIIB 
memberships proved futile. Infrastructure finance across the Belt and Road, both 
multilateral and bilateral, but led by China, is set to have an important impact on 
Asia’s development and, despite serious challenges and risks, is likely to strengthen 
interdependence. Yet, as China will gain influence, it seems to be doing so via an 
adherence to the basic rules of the liberal world order in economic matters. Thus, 
especially with Keohane’s regime theory in mind, the AIIB does not look like an 
institution bringing about an international regime change, but rather a regime 
adjustment – even backed up by new and complementary institutions. This 
interpretation would also strengthen neo-liberal institutionalism’s emphasis that 
China’s rise has successfully been taking place within the old order. Consequently, US 
and Japanese resistance to the AIIB, when viewed through the lens of neo-liberal 
institutionalism, would be counterproductive, especially because all other US 
partners, including the Gulf states, are supporting China’s BRI. 
Yet, although the BRI has been greeted with much enthusiasm across Eurasia, even 
some of its founding members have grave geo-political concerns about it. India 
especially sees the giant project to have non-commercial motivations. The perception 
that China is trying to encircle India by land, via the China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor, and by sea, via proxy ports in Sri Lanka and Pakistan – the so-called String 
of Pearls –, is gaining ground. The Arabian Sea port of Gwadar, via which China seeks 
to circumvent its Malacca Dilemma through an alternative energy land route, and 
where China’s naval activity has increased, has aroused particular ire in New Delhi. 
Moreover, China has recently opened its first overseas military base in the port of 
Djibouti, with the intention of guarding its critical Indian Ocean trade routes close to 
the Middle East. With Gwadar and Djibouti therefore, China is moving closer to the 
Persian Gulf in an active geo-political sense, eager to acquire more direct influence 
over much of Spykman’s rimland, especially its crucial centre. 
Over the last two decades China and the Gulf states have become increasingly 
interdependent economically. This is predominantly the case due to oil trade. 
Although less than a quarter of China's domestic energy consumption is covered by 
oil, half of that consumed oil is imported from abroad, and again half of that 
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imported oil comes from the Gulf. That is indeed not as much as Japan and South 
Korea import relative to their energy consumption, but China still remains the Gulf 
states’ largest energy export market due to China's sheer size and economic growth 
over the last decades. The Gulf’s share in China's overall energy consumption might 
seem relatively low at first glance, but again, given the size of China's economy and 
the absolute size of its imports, a cut-off from that Gulf source would have very 
serious implications for the Chinese economy. Therefore, one can already 
characterize Sino-Gulf interdependence at the vulnerable level in CIT. This is also 
true from the Gulf states’ perspective – arguably even more so. The loss of the 
Chinese oil import market would throttle the Gulf economies especially in the long 
run. Given that their economies are so dependent on oil exports, it is fair to say that 
the vulnerability interdependence between China and the Gulf states is asymmetric – 
with China being slightly less dependent than the Gulf. Yet, this difference and power 
imbalance in the energy issue area does entail a Chinese power dividend. Its 
economic prosperity and thus political stability would be under threat without Gulf 
oil.   
China is less dependent on natural gas/LNG imports even on a global basis, but that 
could change slightly in the future, as China’s energy mix diversifies towards cleaner 
energy. Qatar stands to prosper from this, but therefore would be the first to suffer in 
a hypothetical loss of China’s gas import market. The same could at some stage apply 
to Iran if the country, before, turns into a major gas exporter to China. Thus, the 
asymmetric interdependence is even more pronounced in natural gas, with China 
merely moving towards sensitivity dependence on Gulf gas, but Qatar especially being 
more vulnerably dependent on the current and especially future Chinese gas market. 
In terms of non-hydrocarbon trade the mutual dependence between China and the 
Gulf is not as high, although the region imports vast amounts of Chinese 
manufactured goods. This trade takes place between large corporations as wells as 
SMEs and seems likely to grow and diversify continuously. 
Consequently, in trade matters, China and the Gulf states are highly interdependent, 
but mainly based on the importance of energy. However, the multiple large and small 
trade channels are likely to increase the overall trade interdependence in the long run 
– lessening the hierarchy of issue areas, though not levelling them. Hence, CIT is 
already a helpful tool by which to interpret Sino-Gulf trade. 
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Compared to trade, Sino-Gulf investment flows remain relatively marginal, especially 
proportional to China's worldwide investment. Among the GCC countries, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE have enjoyed roughly three-quarters of China's overall 
investment into the GCC, between 2005 and 2015. Kuwait and Oman have also seen 
an increasing amount whilst Qatar and chiefly Bahrain have received the lowest 
levels. Most of China's investments into the GCC economies have come in the form of 
EPC contracts, especially in the downstream energy and petrochemical industries, 
but in general infrastructure too. Iraq absorbed a substantial amount of Chinese 
investment after 2006, particularly in the energy industry, but only against low 
expectations and against even less enthusiastic Western competitors. Iran has 
enjoyed the longest investment relationship with China, absorbing large amounts, 
especially in the early 2000s in the energy industry and general construction. Even 
so, many projects stalled or were cancelled due to the UN sanctions. Following the 
lifting of sanctions, there is much potential for tremendous growth in Chinese 
investment into Iran. Yet, it is noteworthy that Chinese firms now also encounter a 
more crowded market with other Asian and European competitors who can often still 
provide higher quality technology.  
Gulf companies have invested increasingly in China notably via their sovereign 
wealth funds, but many deals remain classified. Clearly, the flow of capital dominates 
in the other direction. Politically-driven investment ties are growing too, in order to 
lock in the bilateral energy trade relationships in the long term, confirming again the 
hierarchy of issue areas and the dominance of state-sponsored commercial ties. This 
will extend the diversity of multiple channels and flows of capital, goods, and people 
between China and the Gulf, thereby moving closer to CIT’s ideal type. Yet, it must be 
said that investment flows alone do not constitute interdependent relationships 
between China and individual Gulf countries, even though the GCC as a whole is now 
China's largest EPC contract market. 
Chinese diplomacy in the Gulf has so far been constrained deliberately for three 
reasons. Firstly, China has long sought to maintain largely apolitical, but cooperative 
relations with its global economic partners, including in the Gulf and the wider 
Middle East. Principally in this region, China has shown no desire to become involved 
in the many (geo-)political conflicts, which could hypothetically jeopardize its 
lucrative business relations. Secondly, the US-China relationship remains paramount 
for Beijing. For now, the Gulf firmly remains Washington’s primary region of national 
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security interest. China has no interest in upsetting its economically vital relations 
with America, provided it does not harm China’s economic interests in the Gulf. 
Finally, especially the enmity between Iran and Saudi Arabia and both countries 
economic and strategic importance for China's core interests involves the Chinese 
desire to maintain equally strong relations with both states. However, this strategy is 
only viable as long as US-China relations remain relatively stable and the Iran-Saudi 
conflict does not escalate. China’s traditionally close relations with Iran were de facto 
downgraded since the late 1990s and particularly since the most assertive UN-
sanctions era. Yet, the Chinese have a hedging strategy in anticipation of potential 
future conflict escalations, in which case Beijing would likely tilt towards Tehran. 
Given also India’s aspirations in regard to its Iranian neighbour, this intensifies Iran’s 
status as the world-island’s ultimate pivot state, because, located on the rimland’s 
centre, it is the only Eurasian country with access to the heartland and the sea. 
Nevertheless, a Chinese choice between Iran or Saudi Arabia would involve heavy 
sacrifices and costs in terms of oil imports and is thus not a desirable situation and 
outcome for Beijing. 
All in all, structurally, China’s emergence as an important actor in the Gulf is the 
most impactful story in Gulf geo-politics with regard to the emerging multipolar 
world. As already shown in the previous chapter, Asia-Gulf interdependence has the 
structural potential to enhance, not reduce, intra-regional rivalry, as Asia’s major 
countries have an increasing stake in the Gulf, but simultaneously have partly 
rivalrous relationships with each other, such as China and India, or China and Japan. 
In China’s case, the US is added to this equation. Although multilateral cooperation 
and absolute gains remains the aim for most of the actors, fear of relative losses could 
incentivize the actors to disregard absolute losses, despite the obvious dangers. 
China’s hedging strategy can be rightly labelled as soft balancing. Theoretically, this 
implies that for now neo-liberal institutionalism and CIT are helpful when seeking to 
characterize China-Gulf relations. Still, the hedging strategy points towards a 
potential future in which neo-realism becomes the dominant theory for China’s 
political engagement in the Gulf.  
In order to assess how these dynamics are playing out, a more detailed analysis of the 
relations between China and two of the most important Gulf countries is in order. 
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7. China-Saudi Arabia Relations 
Saudi Arabia is the Persian Gulf’s third largest country, after Iran and Iraq. It is the 
GCC’s largest country and, measured by GDP, it is the largest economy of the GCC, 
the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East. Furthermore, it is the de facto leader of OPEC, 
and the world’s largest hydrocarbon reserve holder and exporter.761 For long the 
world’s largest producer, it has recently fallen behind Russia and is also now hotly 
pursued in the latter category by the US.762 For much of the recent decade, as China’s 
oil imports steadily increased, it became China’s largest foreign source of crude oil. In 
the wake of Sino-Saudi hydrocarbon trade, also non-hydrocarbon trade between the 
two countries increased, resulting in Saudi Arabia becoming China’s number one 
Middle Eastern trading partner over the entire period.763 The amount of bi-
directional FDI and project contracting also increased, especially, again, in Saudi 
Arabia. Diplomatic relations between the two countries have intensified as a result 
and have been branded ‘strategic’ by both Beijing and Riyadh.764 
Together with the second case study on China-UAE relations, this chapter ultimately 
contributes to a wider assessment of China’s role in the Gulf. Yet, it must be stated, 
that the Sino-Saudi diplomatic relationship is for now fundamentally driven by 
economic interests. Given the strategic importance of the energy sector in these 
interests, market forces have admittedly not determined the exchanges on their own, 
but have been locked in by diplomatic initiatives. This has not entailed a political 
alliance though. Hence, trade and investment ties take up an overwhelming share in 
this analysis of bilateral relations.  
 
7.1 Sino-Saudi Trade 
In the year 2000, the Saudi Arabian share of China’s global trade stood at a meagre 
0.6%, whereas China’s share in Saudi Arabia’s global trade stood at 2.93%. By 2011, 
                                                          
761 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (2017), ‘Saudi Arabia facts and figures’ 
[http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/169.htm]. 
762 Carpenter, C. (2017), ‘Russia Overtakes Saudi Arabia as World's Top Crude Oil Producer’. 
Bloomberg, 20 February 2017 [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-20/russia-
overtakes-saudi-arabia-as-world-s-largest-crude-producer] 
763 Al-Tamimi 2014: p. 124. 
764 Xinhua Net (2017), ‘China, Saudi Arabia agree to boost all-round strategic partnership’. 16 March 
2017 [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/16/c_136134528.htm]. 
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the figures had increased to 1.7% and 14.08%.765 Two observations follow from these 
numbers. At first glance, especially the Saudi percentage of China’s global trade 
seems very low – and, in relative terms, it is. Yet, on the one hand, its importance for 
China’s economy is not easily quantifiable. On the other hand, that growth from 0.6% 
to 1.7% nevertheless represents a large sum in absolute terms. The second 
observation from both sets of figures is a glaring asymmetry in the importance of 
both economies to each other. China became Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner in 
2011, overtaking the United States, but Saudi Arabia is not even among China’s top 
ten trading partners.766 Yet, again, this is merely true in terms of directly measurable 
financial value. As will be seen, Saudi Arabia does not only require China’s market. 
China’s market too, increasingly requires Saudi Arabia’s primary export commodity, 
oil. 
In a first step, the meaning of Sino-Saudi trade growth becomes more evident when 
examining its actual value. As presented in Figure 11, it skyrocketed from just over $4 
billion in the year 2001 to $73 billion in 2012, interrupted only by a dip in 2009 
during the global financial crisis.767 So far, 2012 marked its peak. It has experienced a 
clearly visible decline since then, especially in 2015, a process that has not yet been 
reversed.768 This very recent trade depreciation can be explained not in terms of a 
fundamental absolute reduction of trade, but with the rapid fall of the oil price since 
2014, as explained in the previous chapter. It remains to be seen for how long this 
condition will continue. Yet, it is crucial to stress that its impact should not be 
confused with a reduced importance of Sino-Saudi trade relative to market forces. 
                                                          
765 Al-Tamimi 2014: p. 127. 
766 Ibid.: p. 126; China Daily (2014), ‘Top 10 trading partners of the Chinese mainland’. 19 February 
2014 [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2014-02/19/content_17290565.htm]. 
767 International Trade Centre, ‘Trade Map’ [http://www.trademap.org/Index.aspx]. 
768 Chen, A., Meng, M. (2016), ‘Russia beats Saudi Arabia as China's top crude oil supplier in 2016’. 
Reuters, 23 January 2017 [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-trade-crude/russia-
beats-saudi-arabia-as-chinas-top-crude-oil-supplier-in-2016-idUSKBN1570VJ]. 
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Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [MS Excel chart created by author]. 
Their trade’s immense growth since the millennium, as can be seen in Figure 12, has 
primarily been driven by Chinese imports from Saudi Arabia. Though both imports 
and exports grew mostly in a synchronised way, China’s trade deficit with Saudi 
Arabia has been constant and substantial, and only saw a significant contraction in 
2015 when the oil price had dropped below $50 per barrel. This oil price collapse had 
such an impact on the Sino-Saudi trade value, because, as shown in Figure 13, an 
overwhelming bulk of Saudi exports to China are composed of hydrocarbons. This 
commodity strikingly dominates Sino-Saudi economic relations. 
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Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [MS Excel chart created by author]. 
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7.1.1 China’s Imports from Saudi Arabia 
7.1.1.1 Hydrocarbon Imports 
China will not only contribute to shaping the future Middle East. It has already 
helped to shape the latest Gulf history. From the time when the PRC was admitted to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and the country’s oil imports surged, 
the GCC exporters witnessed a massive boost in revenue, which was further 
compounded by Saudi Arabia’s own accession to the WTO in 2005.769 
China’s energy companies simultaneously declared a “go out” policy, an economic 
and strategic policy shift that was undertaken out of raw necessity. China had already 
become a net oil importer in 1993, but it was ten years later when its consumption 
noticeably began to out-pace domestic production.770 The decade following China’s 
WTO admittance saw the country’s GDP increase from around $1.3 trillion in 2001 to 
around $9.2 trillion in 2013, turning China into the world’s largest energy 
consumer.771 China’s oil demand alone has surpassed 10 million bpd and its net 
imports have also surged accordingly, reaching the record high of 6.2 million bpd in 
2014.772 Around half of China’s oil imports come from the Middle East, 
approximately a fifth from Saudi Arabia alone in the year 2013, and falling down to 
16% in 2014.773 
Saudi Arabia has been China’s most important oil trade partner for over a decade. 
The Kingdom is the most influential and largest petroleum exporter with a capacity of 
around 12 million bpd, it is the de-facto leader of OPEC, and a member of the G20.774 
The energy issue area is one in which the Saudis can be considered a global 
superpower, even in a world of OPEC’s relative decline.775 
                                                          
769 Simpfendorfer 2011: pp. 1-30; World Trade Organization (2017), ‘Saudi Arabia’ 
[https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_arabie_saoudite_e.htm]. 
770 U.S. Energy Information Administration (2015), ‘China. International Energy Data and Analysis’. 
14 May 2015 [https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=CHN], p. 8. 
771 U.S. Energy Information Administration (2014), ‘China is now the world’s largest net importer of 
petroleum and other liquid fuels’. Today in Energy, 24 March 2014 
[http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15531]; World Bank (2015), ‘China’ 
[http://data.worldbank.org/country/china]. 
772 Facts Global Energy (2015), ‘China Oil and Gas Monthly Data Tables’. February 2015 
[https://www.fgenergy.com/services/product-types/research-and-analysis/china-oil-service/china-
oil-monthly.aspx], p. 2. 
773 EIA, May 2015, ‘China’; EIA, March 2014, ‘China’. 
774 U.S. Energy Information Administration (2014), ‘Country Analysis Brief: Saudi Arabia’. 10 
September 2014 [http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Saudi_Arabia/saudi_arabia.pdf]. 
775 BP (2017), ‘BP Energy Outlook’. 2017 Edition [https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-
economics/energy-outlook-2017/bp-energy-outlook-2017.pdf], p. 25; Meredith, S. (2019, ‘OPEC's 
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FIGURE 14: Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. Available at: 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=CHN. 
 
Oil import figures reflect China’s awareness of the Kingdom’s vital energy position.776 
This is precisely the reason why Beijing has sought to diversify its energy sources. 
Given the fact that 2014 saw China’s highest amount of total oil imports yet, the 
reduction of China’s imports from Saudi Arabia from 19% in 2013 to 16% in 2014 
reflects its risk management strategy.777 
However, whether China imports 19% or 16% from Saudi Arabia does not change the 
reality that such a high ratio of imports from one country alone can already be 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
future not looking so rosy even with extended supply cuts in the offing, says economist’. CNBC, 9 May 
2017 [https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/09/opecs-future-not-looking-so-rosy-says-
economist.html?view=story&%24DEVICE%24=native-android-mobile]. 
776 U.S. Energy Information Administration (2014) ‘China’. 4 February 2014 
[http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/china.pdf]. 
777 Furthermore, China seeks to spread risk further by extending its control via the asset acquisition in 
foreign energy companies. See: Tunsjo, O. (2010), ‘Hedging against Oil Dependency: New Perspectives 
on China’s Energy Security Policy’. In: International Relations, 24: 1, pp. 25-45); Here, it is 
noteworthy that the major acquisitions and investment overseas, worth $73 billion in total between 
2011 and 2013, obtained mainly by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), but also 
Sinopec and CNPC, have – with the exception of Iraq – largely been outside the Middle East, 
predominantly on the American and African Atlantic rim, and concentrated on natural gas, deep-water 
oil fields, and unconventionals. See: EIA, May 2015, ‘China’: p. 9. 
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identified at least as a moderate economic dependency in the long run. This 
recognition has an even greater significance when all of China’s Gulf imports are 
taken as a whole constituting around half of total imports.778 As Iranian oil returns to 
the market after the lifting of UN sanctions, the Gulf region’s importance for China 
will grow even further. Hence, it is advisable to also regard Saudi Arabia as a regional 
spearhead influencing China’s energy consumption from a much bigger regional pool.  
For the moment, China is still mainly run on coal which accounted for 66% of the 
country’s total energy consumption in 2012, down from 69% in 2011.779 Yet, despite 
the continuous rise of its domestic coal production in absolute terms, it seems 
impossible for China to resist a greater oil dependence in the future. In 2012, 
petroleum accounted for 20% in China’s energy consumption.780 Calculations by the 
US Energy Information Administration show that China overtook the US as the 
world’s number one net oil importer in 2013 and China will at some point be the 
largest oil consumer.781 China’s oil consumption could rise by 77% by 2030 according 
to BP’s 2011 estimates.782 The oil market has evolved since the days of those 
predictions, especially in the form of the ongoing oil glut since 2014 – a trend which 
BP now presumes likely to persist.783 Yet, despite this fact and China’s slightly lower 
GDP growth in recent years – a slowdown equally probable to persist – and the 
resulting lower growth in oil demand in relative terms, its absolute oil demand 
growth over the next two decades seems set in stone, at least in the absence of a 
wholly transformative energy revolution. Therefore, the somewhat small Saudi share 
in China’s global trade, clouds that small share’s importance – comparative to some 
countries with which China might trade more goods in total. The Chinese economy 
requires ongoing growth – fuelled by energy consumption – in order to escape the 
looming middle-income-trap, even as it necessarily seeks to protect its environment 
and invest in alternative, cleaner energies.784 
                                                          
778 Daojiong, Z., Meidan, M. (2015), ‘China and the Middle East in a New Energy Landscape’. Chatham 
House Research Paper, October 2015 
[https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/20151021ChinaMi
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779 EIA, May 2015, ‘China’; EIA, February 2014, ‘China’. 
780 EIA, May 2015, ‘China’: pp. 2-3. 
781 Ibid. 
782 BP (2011), ‘BP Energy Outlook 2030’. January 2011 
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783 BP 2017. 
784 OECD (2013), ‘The People’s Republic of China. Avoiding the Middle-Income Trap: Policies for 
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Beijing’s ‘active oil diplomacy of targeting large oil producers’ like Saudi Arabia and 
Iran (number one and two in Gulf sources until sanctions), rather than smaller 
countries like Oman and Yemen, was launched after 1995.785 This necessary strategic 
refocus on Saudi oil highlights how China’s dependence on the Kingdom has been 
increasing in its sensitivity level, though classifying it firmly as vulnerable would 
overstate one rather small country’s importance, especially if Iraq and Iran reach 
their full export potential.786 A more recent development has seen Russia’s increasing 
oil provision for China, overtaking Saudi Arabia, at least for the year of 2016. This 
development might last for the duration of OPEC’s recent production cuts – resulting 
in a temporary reduced market share for Saudi Arabia. Yet, the Kingdom’s supply 
contracts with China are long-term and are therefore not set to be reduced in absolute 
terms.787 
The recent historical and long-term projected figures demonstrate the importance of 
the Gulf, despite China’s diversification strategy. Admittedly, some question China’s 
dependency-level on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Christopher Lomax, sales consultant 
for the Chinese oil-equipment providing company Jereh Group, sees the Gulf 
importance for China as exaggerated and the high figures as strategically 
insignificant. The global energy supply, including conventional and unconcentional 
oil and gas, is large enough for China to diversify away from the Gulf in an 
emergency. As Lomax stated to the author in Dubai, China is merely making use of 
the cheaper Gulf production costs when importing larger quantities from there.788 On 
the other hand, given the huge amount of China’s future demand and those lower 
Gulf production costs, it is hard to see China’s economy not suffering a severe hit in 
case of an oil supply stop from the Gulf, with potentially grave economic and political 
consequences. Historical figures (and future projections) alone do not account for 
political uncertainty. Compared to some of its non-Gulf oil suppliers, China greatly 
cherishes Saudi Arabia’s historic reliability as an energy provider, its responsibility in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
September2013.pdf]; Robertson, P., Ye, L. (2016), ‘China’s greatest challenge will be escaping the 
middle income trap’. The Conversation, 28 January 2016 [http://theconversation.com/chinas-
greatest-challenge-will-be-escaping-the-middle-income-trap-53567]. 
785 Al-Tamimi 2014: p. 54. 
786 Daojiong, Meidan 2015; As already seen in the previous chapter, there are several major oil-
producing countries in other regions, ranging from Eurasia and Africa to Latin America, from which 
China purchases oil. The other major oil trade partners so far are all located in the Gulf. See: EIA, May 
2015, ‘China’: p. 11. 
787 Chen, Meng 2016. 
788 Lomax, C. (Jereh Group), interviewed by the author on 26 July 2015 in Dubai, Tecom. See Consent 
Form attached. 
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handling oil prices, and its moderating influence over OPEC and non-OPEC 
producers.789 Despite the North American shale revolution and Saudi Arabia’s limited 
ability in harming the unconventionals’ profitability, for now, Saudi Arabia remains 
the world’s only swing producer. It is certainly retaining at least parts of its long 
global domination in the energy issue area. The combination of these virtues cannot 
be taken for granted from other suppliers.790 Moreover, the Gulf, and therefore 
primarily Saudi Arabia, is not only the most important hydrocarbon source due to 
reserves which account for more than half of the world’s total proven. It is also the 
region with the lowest production costs for oil and China can save considerable sums 
by prioritizing Gulf petroleum.791 
With its vast oil reserves, energy is what Saudi Arabia is built on, has depended on 
and will depend on largely also in the years to come. The revenue the Kingdom 
collects from oil lay the foundation of its functioning as a modern state. Since the first 
successful explorations in the early 1900s, oil has funded almost everything inside the 
country. This seems destined to remain the case, unless Crown Prince Muhammad 
bin Salman’s recent ‘Vision 2030’ will manage to implement its ambitious 
diversification plans.792 
Paul Aarts identified energy as the first of the Kingdom’s ‘four pillars’ on which its 
relationship to the US is based, with the other three being security, influential 
moderation in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the country’s cultural centrality in the 
Arab-Islamic world.793 
                                                          
789 Douglas, J.K., Nelseon, M.B., Schwartz, K.L. (2007), ‘Rising in the Gulf: How China’s Energy 
Demands are Transforming the Middle East’. In: Al-Naklah, Spring 2007. 
790 Aarts, P., Rijsingen, M.V. (2007), ‘Beijing’s Rising Star in the Gulf Region: The Near and the Distant 
Future’. In: E. Woertz (ed.), Gulf Geo-Economics. Dubai: Gulf Research Centre Books, pp. 23-58; Al-
Tamimi 2014: p. 81; Kemp, J., 2017; Spindle, B. (2016), ‘Weak Oil Prices Curbing Production’. In: The 
Wall Street Journal, 12 April 2016 [http://www.wsj.com/articles/crude-rises-on-signs-of-output-cuts-
1460505118];  
791 The Chinese can contribute to this by exporting more construction and labour services especially to 
Saudi Arabia and attracting Gulf investment. See: Shichor, Y. (2006), ‘China’s Upsurge: Implications 
for the Middle East’. In: Israel Affairs, 12:4, pp. 665-683. 
792 Hutt, R. (2016), ‘Which economies are most reliant on oil?’. World Economic Forum, 10 May 2016 
[https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/which-economies-are-most-reliant-on-oil/]; Vision 
2030 (2017), ‘Our Vision: Saudi Arabia, the heart of the Arab and Islamic worlds, the investment 
powerhouse, and the hub connecting three continents’. October 2017 [http://vision2030.gov.sa/en]. 
793 Aarts, P. (2005), ‘Events versus Trends: The Role of Energy and Security in Sustaining the US-
Saudi Relationship’. In: P. Aarts, G. Nonneman (eds.), Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political 
Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs. London: Hurst and Company, pp. 399-429. 
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Whilst in the 20th century most of Saudi Arabia’s oil exports flowed chiefly to Western 
nations and Japan, this has changed since the dawn of the new century.794 Rising 
Asia, spearheaded by China, and still accompanied by Japan and South Korea, is now 
the main destination of Gulf and Saudi oil. The Saudis branded their reaction to this 
market shift the ‘Look East Policy’, which is a reflection of growing interdependence 
with Asia. Where China requires energy security, Saudi Arabia requires ‘demand 
security’.795 This vital interest is perpetuated by several simultaneous challenges and 
opportunities: The North American shale gas and tight oil revolution, a rise in 
domestic Chinese fuel consumption, as well as Iran and Iraq re-entering the market. 
As the BP Energy Outlook 2035 confirms, Saudi Arabia’s influence over OPEC will be 
challenged by the latter developments, and OPEC’s influence itself will be in relative 
decline.796 North America, including the US, is likely to sustain itself and might even 
be among the energy export giants rivalling the Gulf. To take a simultaneous look at 
market expectations, almost 90% of Middle Eastern oil exports by that time will flow 
to Asia.797 
Asia’s general growth and oil demand represents a certain leeway for Saudi Arabia to 
reduce its export dependence on China. India and the ASEAN countries are growing 
in China’s wake. The KSA has made more than use of these trade opportunities and 
has – mirroring China’s energy import risk management – diversified its export 
destinations inside Asia, with remarkable success to boot. Saudi Aramco is enjoying 
dominance in most Asian markets and is the number one oil provider, not only to 
China, but also to India, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan.798 In terms 
                                                          
794 About Oil (2014), ‘What does the Future Hold for the Gulf Countries?’. 22 August 2014 
[http://www.abo.net/oilportal/interview/view.do?contentId=2289853]. 
795 Al-Tamimi, 2014: p. 121. 
796 BP (2014), ‘BP Energy Outlook 2035’. January 2014 
[https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/energy-outlook-2016/bp-energy-
outlook-2014.pdf]. 
797 Ibid.; Daojiong, Meidan, 2015: p. 9; Other than some GCC states like the UAE, Saudi Arabia has 
long been hesitant to open its domestic upstream market to China though. See: Mills, R. (2017), 
‘China's Big Play for Middle East Oil’. Bloomberg, 20 May 2017 
[https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-05-10/china-s-big-play-for-middle-east-oil]; Saudi 
Aramco also still relies mainly on American drilling technology. See: Saudi Aramco (2017), ‘Saudi 
Aramco signs agreements with American companies to promote bilateral trade and investment 
between Saudi Arabia and United States’. 20 May 2017 
[http://www.saudiaramco.com/en/home/news-media/news/MOU-saudi-US_forum-2017.html]; Yet, 
it has recently opened R&D centres in China. See: Saudi Aramco (2017), ‘Beijing Research Center 
(BRC)’ [http://china.aramco.com/en/home/services/beijing-global-research-center.html]; Given the 
demand dynamics, more such institutional cooperation seems likely to ensue and increasing trust can 
be built, as Chinese technology and NOC performances improve. 
798 Saudi Aramco (2017), ‘Global presence’ [http://www.saudiaramco.com/en/home/about/global-
presence.html]. 
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of demographics and resulting economic opportunities, only India will be able to offer 
Saudi Arabia a comparable market size for its oil in the long run though. India is in 
fact expected to overtake China as the world’s largest energy market in about two 
decades.799 Nevertheless, in the short, and mid-term, China remains Saudi Arabia’s 
most interesting market. The Kingdom will be eager to ensure maximum access to 
China for both its oil exports and investment, as discussed below. 
These steps look especially logical as Beijing is eager to diversify its energy 
consumption as far as possible and reduce risks in energy security. China’s own 
domestic shale oil and gas reserves are a force to be reckoned with, once Chinese 
NOCs have access to fracking technology – currently still largely monopolized by 
North American companies, but increasingly acquirable for Chinese firms investing 
there.800 In the long-term, Saudi Arabia cannot be too sure about China providing it 
with high demand security it currently enjoys. Given China’s ongoing growth though 
and the time it would take for China to significantly increase production and 
consumption of renewables and unconventionals and significantly reduce oil imports, 
this prospect still seems far away. And finally, just as China is meaningfully 
dependent on Gulf energy imports as a whole, as shown above, so one can note that 
Saudi Arabia and the entire Gulf are dependent also on the Asian market as a whole. 
This is also true for the other, non-hydrocarbon exports of Saudi Arabia, of which 
there are admittedly few for now. 
 
7.1.1.2 Non-Hydrocarbon Imports 
As Figure 15 demonstrates, China’s imports from Saudi Arabia are almost completely 
dominated by hydrocarbons. The International Trade Centre’s Trade Map provides 
the data confirming this.801 Hydrocarbons are listed under a general product label 
‘Mineral Fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation [etc.]’. In Sino-Saudi 
trade’s peak year in 2012, China’s hydrocarbon-import-value of roughly $45 billion 
dwarfed other, partly even industry-related, product categories by an order of 
magnitude.  
                                                          
799 BP, January 2014: pp. 5/26. 
800 BP 2017: p. 33; EIA, May 2015, ‘China’: p. 9; Gratz, J. (2012), ‘Unconventional Resources: The 
Shifting Geographies and Geopolitics of Energy’. In: D. Mockli (ed.), Strategic Trends 2012: Key 
Developments in Global Affairs. Zurich: ETH Zurich Center for Security Studies, p. 89.  
801 ITC, ‘Trade Map’. 
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FIGURE 15: Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [Unit: US $ Thousand]. 
The next one on the list, ‘Organic chemicals’, saw a value of less than $6 billion – 
though taken on its own, this can be considered a significant sum and points towards 
Saudi Arabia’s specialization and comparative advantage in that particular 
industry.802 Indeed, it declined much less in export value in 2015 – just over one 
billion less – when the oil price collapse dramatically reduced the value of Saudi 
Arabia’s hydrocarbon exports. 
A glance at Figures 16 and 17 indicates Saudi Arabia’s booming chemicals industry, 
although again, China’s chemicals-import-dependence on Saudi Arabia is lesser than 
Saudi Arabia’s dependence on the Chinese market. Whereas China is by far Saudi 
Arabia’s largest chemicals customer, Saudi Arabia is “only” China’s fourth largest 
foreign chemicals provider, following South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. 
                                                          
802 Al-Tamimi 2014: pp. 132-133. 
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FIGURE 16: Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [Unit: US $ Thousand]. 
 
FIGURE 17: Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [Unit: US $ Thousand]. 
Among the other product categories of Saudi exports to China only ‘Plastics and 
articles thereof’ go into the billions in their annual trade. In its general peak year 
2012, Saudi companies exported $3.4 billion worth of plastics to China, rising to $4.1 
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billion in 2014 and slightly declining to $3.3 billion a year later. Figure 18 again 
shows the importance of the Chinese market to Saudi Arabia, but also that, with the 
exception of 2014, China came second behind Singapore in the destination of Saudi 
plastics. Given Singapore’s comparably tiny demographic and territorial size, the 
clear message that derives from this data is that, despite the Chinese market’s 
importance to Saudi plastics producers, it is also a highly underexploited opportunity. 
 
FIGURE 18: Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [Unit: US $ Thousand]. 
The other major product categories China imports from Saudi Arabia are listed as 
‘Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering materials, lime and cement’, ‘Copper and 
articles thereof’, ‘Ores, slag and ash’, as well as ‘Inorganic chemicals; organic or 
inorganic compounds of precious or rare-earth metals’. Though they might see a 
more significant growth in the future, their constantly fluctuating value in dollars for 
now remains in the millions or even below the hundreds of thousands. All in all, the 
lack of Saudi Arabia’s wider economic diversification is more than reflected in its 
export mix to China. However, this undiversified trade pattern is less dramatic when 
considering the other direction of trade: China’s growing exports to Saudi Arabia. 
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7.1.2 China’s Exports to Saudi Arabia 
The beginning of this chapter already pointed to the fact that China has run a 
significant trade deficit with Saudi Arabia ever since the expansion of their bilateral 
commerce. Apart from this fact, two further phenomena are observable in Figure 12 
above. China’s imports from Saudi Arabia surged much faster than its exports to it. 
However, imports began to decline again noticeably in 2014 and 2015. Yet, this did 
not happen with China’s exports to the Kingdom. Between the year 2000 and 2015, 
the only year that experienced a Chinese export decrease was 2009, the year of the 
financial crisis. Since then it has grown again, and, over the period covered in the 
given data, was at its highest in the last year of this chapter’s measurement, in 2015. 
Incidentally, this points towards the oil price collapse as the primary explanation for 
the reduced Chinese import value, rather than the simultaneously reduced Chinese 
GDP growth. 
This divergent trade pattern since 2013 has resulted in a narrowing of China’s trade 
deficit with Saudi Arabia, especially in 2015. That year, the value of Chinese exports 
to Saudi Arabia reached approximately $22 billion, as seen in Figure 19 below, 
whereas the value of Chinese imports from Saudi Arabia had declined to $30 billion, 
as seen in Figure 15 above. This mere $8 billion Chinese deficit is very different 
compared to Sino-Saudi trade value’s peak year in 2012, when that deficit stood at 
more than $36 billion.  
Nevertheless, for as long as the oil price does not rise higher than its pre-2014 level, 
Sino-Saudi trade has moved closer towards a balance. If China’s exports to Saudi 
Arabia continue to grow, this process might continue, which would further diversify 
the picture of Sino-Saudi economic relations. 
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FIGURE 19: Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [Unit: US $ Thousand]. 
China’s exports to Saudi Arabia are much more varied. As Figure 19 shows, there is 
also less of a value divergence across the dominating product categories. In 2015, the 
label ‘Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof’ saw 
a value of approximately $3.1 billion, having risen from roughly $1.5 billion during 
the financial crisis. This is just according to the data that China reported to UN 
COMTRADE and that is visible in Figure 19. Based on the mirror data from Saudi 
Arabia, the value was almost one and a half times as high, at almost $5 billion, as 
seen in Figure 20. This chart also shows China’s global competitors on the Saudi 
market for such machinery. The US has consistently been Saudi Arabia’s primary 
supplier, but China comes second, followed by Germany, South Korea, and Italy. 
China’s significant market share is even higher concerning ‘Electrical machinery and 
equipment and parts thereof’. It has been the number one supplier of these products 
for Saudi Arabia ever since bilateral trade took off. Although China again reported 
lower numbers, roughly $2.4 billion in 2015, for its electrical machinery exports to 
Saudi Arabia, the mirror data values it at roughly $6 billion for that year. Figure 21 
shows that China’s main competitors, Vietnam, the US, South Korea, and Germany 
do not even come close. 
The same picture emerges with China’s third-biggest product category in its primary 
exports to the Kingdom. Although with this example, the reported values diverge in 
the other way around, China seems to be heavily dominating the Saudi consumer 
market for furniture and related products. Whereas China reported a value of more 
than $2 billion in 2015, Saudi Arabian import data places is at about $1.1 billion for 
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that year, as seen in Figure 22. Nevertheless, even with the latter half the size of 
China’s reported furniture export value, China’s closest competitor, Italy, sold items 
worth less than $300 million, closely followed by the US, Turkey, and the UAE. 
The picture of overwhelming Chinese dominance on the Saudi market is repeated 
when it comes to ‘Articles of apparel and clothing accessories’, which, according to 
China’s reported data, doubled in 2014 and reached a value of roughly $1.2 billion in 
2015. Here, it matches Saudi Arabia’s mirror data. Figure 23 demonstrates that 
China’s number one competitor, India, “barely” sold $400 million worth of apparel 
articles to Saudi Arabia in 2015 and that the other main supply markets, Bangladesh 
and Turkey sold less than half of India’s amount, with Italy less than $100 million. 
Textiles have long represented a large chunk of China’s global exports and Saudi 
Arabia has been one of many regular customers.803 The New Silk Roads in these and 
many other cases, just like the old ones, really can be taken quite literally. 
 
FIGURE 20: Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [Unit: US $ Thousand]. 
                                                          
803 Davidson 2010: p. 40. 
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FIGURE 21: Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [Unit: US $ Thousand]. 
 
FIGURE 22: Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [Unit: US $ Thousand]. 
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FIGURE 23: Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [Unit: US $ Thousand]. 
Among China’s further product types in its exports to Saudi Arabia are vehicles and 
related parts, as well as iron and steel commodities, as seen above in Figure 19. 
Which categories of all these listed items and others will maintain competitiveness in 
the Kingdom remains to be seen, as China seeks to move up the value chain of more 
high-quality manufacturing and exports, and also compete in other categories.804 The 
country’s efforts to escape the so-called middle-income trap and the attempt to 
gradually shift to a more consumer-based economy will create new opportunities and 
open up different Saudi markets, but, as China’s labour costs rise, will inevitably 
cause a loss of market share to other developing countries for more low-tech, 
cheaply-manufactured goods.805 So far, the ongoing growth of Chinese exports to 
Saudi Arabia seem to point out that such a noticeable shift has not occurred just yet 
in this particular bilateral relationship, which may point towards the Gulf’s and Saudi 
Arabia’s relative late-coming to the “Made in China” phenomenon, because in total, 
China’s exports have declined in recent years, but continue to grow in Saudi 
Arabia.806 The decade-long, and often stalling negotiations for a China-GCC free 
trade agreement has not reached a conclusion yet, as mentioned above. Yet, its treaty 
                                                          
804 Sharma 2016: pp. 294-295. 
805 Ibid.: p. 185. 
806 Ibid.: p. 295. 
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could provide a cushion against a future depreciation of Sino-Saudi trade. It would 
further boost the bi-directional flow of capital. 
 
7.2 Sino-Saudi Investment and Project Contracting 
So far, the investment of Chinese state-owned and private companies into Saudi 
Arabia is likely to have been the dominating portion of Sino-Saudi capital flows. As 
the section will show, Saudi Arabia has also increased its investment into China, with 
various examples available to discuss. Yet, its investment activity is often classified, 
especially when its SWFs are the protagonists. 
China’s investment into Saudi Arabia is much better documented. The most useful 
database, the China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT), is provided by a joint project 
between the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation.807 It is 
important to stress that, like with any database, the CGIT is far from complete, and 
does not fully cover FDI, and especially not FPI flows – partly because the latter kind 
of information is not publicly available. The area which is strongly covered by the 
CGIT, is infrastructure investment, i.e. project contracting for construction and its 
related fields. This activity, to be grouped together under EPC-contracting, may or 
may not be accompanied by an actual FDI – the expansion of a domestic company 
into a foreign market.  
Data collected and published by Dhaman – The Arab Investment & Export Credit 
Guarantee Corporation – differs substantially from the CGIT, due to different 
definitions of investment and possibly also due to a different level of access to certain 
information. Other than the CGIT, which covers Chinese outward investment, 
Dhaman offers data on inward and outward Arab FDI flows and will thus be 
convenient for the section on Saudi investment into China. However, Dhaman merely 
offers tailored annual investment reports. It does not offer a database and thus no 
information on individual investments.808 
 
                                                          
807 American Enterprise Institute, ‘China Global Investment Tracker’ [http://www.aei.org/china-
global-investment-tracker/]. 
808 The Arab Investment & Export Credit Guarantee Corporation [http://dhaman.net/en/]. Dhaman 
uses many sources, among them the Financial Times’ FDI Intelligence database, to which the author 
did not have access. 
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7.2.1 China’s Investment into Saudi Arabia 
China’s investment into Saudi Arabia began to increase in the 2000s, following 
bilateral trade growth. According to data from the CGIT, its total value accounted for 
more than $25 billion in the decade between 2005 and 2015. Figure 24 shows Saudi 
Arabia’s clear dominance in capturing Chinese investment into the GCC over that 
period. Although the database excludes Bahrain, for which no information was 
available, but where not much Chinese investment is suspected anyway, more than 
half of Chinese investment into the GCC went to Saudi Arabia. 
 
 
* excluding Bahrain (no data) 
Source: American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker 
[MS Excel chart created by author]. 
As seen in Figure 25, the CGIT breaks down Chinese investments in Saudi Arabia 
across a quite diverse set of industries. Though the energy sector is clearly dominant, 
absorbing almost $10 billion, two other strong sectors are real estate and metals, with 
both crossing the $5 billion threshold respectively. Both transport and agriculture 
have also received billions of dollars of Chinese investment, with the chemical 
industry attracting about half a billion over this period. This section covers the main 
industries ranked in terms of value. 
3.09
1.61
4.9
25.53
10.9
Figure 24:
Chinese Infrastructure Investment
into GCC* in US $ Billion (2005-2015)
Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE
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FIGURE 25: Chinese Investment into Saudi Arabia in US $ Billion (2005-2015). 
Source: American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker. 
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FIGURE 26: Chinese Investment into Saudi Arabia in US $ Billion (2005-2015). 
Source: American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker. 
Before moving on to what are mostly construction contracts, it is necessary to briefly 
cover general FDI figures and the context of inward Saudi greenfield investments. As 
seen in Figure 26 above, the CGIT counts two Chinese greenfield investments into 
Saudi Arabia between 2005 and 2015, resulting in a total value of almost $5 billion. 
This is already one example that shows the occasional incompleteness of the CGIT, 
because, as Figure 27 below shows, Dhaman’s published data differs considerably. 
Dhaman not only lists 15 Saudi inward greenfield investments from China, but also 
GREENFIELD INVESTMENTS (IN US$ MILLION)
Year Month Investor Quantity Share Transaction Party Sector Subsector
2007 November Chinalco 1.200$            40% Binladin, MMC Metals Aluminum
2011 December Sinopec 3.710$            38% SABIC refinery Energy Oil
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS (IN US$ MILLION)
Year Month Contractor  Quantity Share Transaction Party Sector Subsector
2005 March Sinoma 170$              Riyadh Cement Real estate Construction
2005 September Sinopec 350$              Aker Kvaerner Chemicals
2005 December Sinoma 580$              Saudi Cement Real estate Construction
2007 April Sinomach / China Nonferrous 3.990$            Western Way Metals Aluminum
2007 November China Communications Construction 230$              Transport Shipping
2007 November China Communications Construction 230$              Transport Shipping
2008 February CNPC 560$              Ma'aden Agriculture
2008 July Guangdong Overseas Construction 610$              King Khalid University Real estate Construction
2009 February China Railway Construction 390$              21% Transport Rail
2009 February China Communications Construction 100$              Transport Shipping
2009 February China Railway Construction 1.160$            Transport Rail
2009 July Shandong Electric Power / Dongfang Electric 1.650$            Saudi Electricity Company Energy Oil
2009 July China Railway Construction 530$              Real estate Construction
2009 August Sinoma 400$              Yanbu Cement Real estate construction
2010 May Shandong Electric Power 1.720$            70% Al-Arrab Energy
2010 May Sinoma 200$              Hail Real estate Construction
2010 December Sinoma 140$              Real estate Construction
2011 April Sinopec 100$              Aramco Energy Oil
2011 July Sinopec 200$              Agriculture
2011 August Sinopec 130$              SABIC Chemicals
2011 November China Electronics Corporation 180$              Real estate Construction
2012 June Sinopec 150$              Aramco Energy Oil
2012 September Sinoma 190$              Southern Province Cement Real estate Construction
2012 September China Communications Construction 160$              Saudi Global Ports Transport Shipping
2012 November Shanghai Electric 990$              33% Saline Water Agriculture
2012 November China National Chemical Engineering 340$              SABIC Transport Shipping
2013 July China Communications Construction 500$              Utilities
2013 September China Communications Construction 390$              Aramco Transport Shipping
2013 November China National Building Materials 190$              Southern Province Cement Real estate Construction
2014 February China Communications Construction 200$              Transport Shipping
2014 April Sinopec 190$              Aramco Energy Oil
2014 May China Communications Construction 500$              Aramco Utilities
2014 October Power Construction Corp 1.290$            Aramco Energy Gas
2014 November China Railway Construction 1.980$            Real estate Construction
2014 November Power Construction Corp 100$              Energy Oil
2015 April Sinopec 450$              Agriculture
2015 April China National Building Materials 100$              Arabian Cement Real estate Construction
2015 June Sinopec 140$              Energy Oil
2015 October Power Construction Corp 700$              Aramco Energy Gas
TROUBLED TRANSACTIONS (IN US$ MILLION)
Year Month Chinese Entity Quantity Share Transaction Party Sector Subsector
2010 October China Railway Construction 620$              Transport Rail
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calculates their overall value to have been more than $10 billion.809 Although 
Dhaman incorporates data from 2003 to 2015, there is no open-source evidence that 
these differences in project numbers and values could be explained by a 
concentration of 13 greenfield projects in Saudi Arabia taking place in 2003 and 2004 
– before the CGIT database was started.  
 
FIGURE 27: Source: Dhaman Investment Attractiveness Index 2015, p. 133. 
In greenfield investments, Dhaman lists China as the fifth largest foreign direct 
investor into Saudi Arabia in terms of value, following the United States – the largest 
investor –, France, Japan, and the UAE. The Chinese share in Saudi Arabia’s overall 
inward greenfield investment over that twelve-year period equates to 6.8%.810 
Considering that the US share alone was 25.1%, and despite China being fifth on a 
long list, China’s performance can be evaluated as rather modest, given that it was the 
world’s fastest growing major economy over much of that period and has been the 
world’s second largest economy for several years now. However, it is crucial to stress 
that these Dhaman calculations do not seem to incorporate EPC-contracts, or at least 
not the ones where the involved Chinese companies do not provide the investment 
themselves, but are merely hired by Saudi entities who provide the finances for the 
projects. Altogether, EPC-contracts clearly take up by far the largest chunk of all 
Chinese “investments” into Saudi Arabia. 
                                                          
809 See also: Dhaman (2016), ‘Investment Climate in Arab Countries. Dhaman Index Attractiveness 
Index 2015’ [http://dhaman.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Climate-2015-English.pdf], p. 133. 
810 Ibid. 
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Among the non-EPC contracting Chinese firms that have invested directly into Saudi 
Arabia, it is information and communication technology companies (ICT) that stand 
out.  
ZTE (HK), has enjoyed a presence in Saudi Arabia since 2005 as a separate legal 
entity from its parent in Hong Kong, which at least before 2016, was required by 
Saudi law. In 2007, ZTE signed a $130 million ‘fixed-line framework agreement’ with 
Etihad Atheeb Telecommunication and further updated it in 2009.811 
In August 2016, Huawei, considered China’s most famous and successful tech brand, 
was granted a licence for 100% ownership of its Saudi branch.812 Though the 
company has been present in Saudi Arabia and several other Middle Eastern 
countries for more than a decade, it was only granted a full investment licence for its 
retail business in the Kingdom following the announcement of Vision 2030.813 Hence, 
this case is an example for the start of successful Saudi regulatory reforms which seek 
to reduce barriers to inward FDI, as proposed in Vision 2030. In fact, the licence, 
awarded by the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), marked ‘the 
first commercial licence for an IT firm awarded in the country and the first to a 
Chinese firm’.814 
Similar future breakthroughs by other Chinese ICT tech firms such as Lenovo or 
Xiaomi, both of which also have offices in Saudi Arabia, can be expected, as their 
global demand is growing and also Saudi Arabia’s tech-enthusiastic consumers 
increasingly consider Asian brands.815 Since China’s products are cheaper than their 
                                                          
811 China’s embassy in Saudi Arabia mentions on its website that ZTE’s provision of 
telecommunications equipment and entry into Saudi Arabia’s terminal market has been celebrated as 
a success. ‘The amount of sales of handsets in 2009 has reached [up] to [sic.] US$ 20 million.’ See: 
Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (2017), ‘ZTE (HK) Limited Saudi Arabia’ 
[http://sa2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/shanghui/link/201108/20110807703566.shtml]. 
812 Anderson, R. (2016), ‘China’s Huawei granted 100% ownership in Saudi Arabia’. Gulf Business, 31 
August 2016 [http://gulfbusiness.com/chinas-huawei-granted-100-ownership-saudi-arabia]; Trade 
Arabia (2016), ‘Huawei wins licence to invest in Saudi Arabia’. 31 August 2016 
[http://www.tradearabia.com/news/IT_312785.html]. 
813 Ibid.; Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of 
China in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (2012), ‘Huawei to Explore Smart Phone market in the Middle 
East’. 18 July 2012 
[http://sa2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/shanghui/link/201207/20120708238369.shtml]. 
814 Anderson 2016; This means that Huawei will now be able to sell its numerous products, especially 
smartphones, directly inside Saudi Arabia and will therefore expand its retail presence throughout the 
country, seeking to employ around 900 Saudis in the process. Before acquiring the licence, the firm 
had already employed about 1,000. It also intends to establish an IT innovation centre in the Kingdom 
before 2019 ‘with the aim of training 4,500 qualified professionals in the sector’. See: Ibid. 
815 Lenovo (2017), ‘Mailing Address’ [http://www3.lenovo.com/sa/en/contact/]. 
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American, European, Japanese, or South Korean counterparts, they should find a 
Saudi market for instance among low-income construction workers. Saudi decision 
makers seeking to implement Vision 2030-reforms are actively seeking to ease 
restrictions on FDI into the country and target diverse Chinese investors in 
particular. In August 2017, SAGIA hosted a meeting with around 50 representatives 
of Chinese businesses in Riyadh discussing new opportunities on a much wider 
spectrum.816  
Up until now, other than these examples of Chinese companies setting up shop in the 
Kingdom, most Chinese enterprises there have come in the form of EPC-contractors 
and their related investments. They will now be covered via the different relevant 
industries, as seen in the CGIT’s database. 
 
7.2.1.1 Energy and (Petro-)Chemicals 
Sino-Saudi investment ties began to blossom simultaneously with Saudi Arabia’s 
growth of oil exports to China. As evident in Figure 26, between 2005 and 2015, 
Chinese companies invested ten times into the Saudi energy industry. Most of these 
ventures were construction contracts. 
China’s first major energy investment into Saudi Arabia was launched in 2004, when 
Sinopec outbid several Western firms in regard to gas explorations in the Rub al-
Khali desert. Sinopec and Saudi Aramco signed an agreement to develop a major 
concession in Ghawar gas fields, “Block B”, under the Saudi Gas Initiative 2. A $300 
million investment by Sinopec over the course of ten years was to enhance Saudi 
Arabia’s domestic gas consumption capabilities. This contract was built upon in 2006 
and 2009 to form a consortium, called BGP Arabia, with Saudi Aramco and China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for further gas explorations in both the Rub 
al-Khali and the Red Sea, along with seismic data research in those areas, as well as in 
the Manifa oil field. In 2012, BGP Arabia was awarded another three contracts in 
order to conduct geophysical studies throughout the country.817 
                                                          
816 Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (2017), ‘Chinese Delegation in SAGIA’. 3 August 2017 
[https://sagia.gov.sa/en/mediaandEvents/News/Pages/News03082017.aspx]. 
817 Al-Tamimi 2014: pp. 152-153. 
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Since its first agreement in 2004, Sinopec has been the most active Chinese energy 
company in the Kingdom. In September 2005, Sinopec entered into a joint venture 
with SABIC, as well as the Norwegian energy firm Aker Kvaerner, in an EPC-contract 
for a major polyolefins complex in Yanbu, on the Red Sea coast. In this joint venture, 
Sinopec provided ‘detailed engineering and a significant proportion of the skilled 
labour required for the construction activities’.818 According the CGIT, Sinopec’s 
investment pledge was worth $350 million. At the time, it marked China’s first 
involvement in Saudi Arabia’s chemicals industry.819 
Sinopec’s first major investment into the Kingdom’s oil industry was only launched in 
2012, when the company signed a landmark joint venture agreement with Saudi 
Aramco to build an oil refinery, also in Yanbu.820 The contracting followed a 
respective memorandum of understanding (MoU) from spring 2011, in which both 
companies had agreed on a 37.5% share for Sinopec and a 62.5% share for Aramco.821 
This MoU is also registered in the CGIT. Covering 5.2 million square metres, the joint 
venture, called YASREF, became operational in 2014, with the capacity of refining 
400,000 bpd.822 
The refinery accomplished its first shipment, encompassing 300,000 barrels of 
refined diesel fuel, from its Marine Terminal in January 2015. It was officially 
inaugurated a year later in January 2016, on Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit 
to Saudi Arabia.823 During the ceremony Aramco Chairman Khalid al-Falih 
emphasized the importance of Sinopec and China as a whole in both his company’s 
global investment portfolio, as well as in wider and deeper Sino-Saudi cooperation: 
                                                          
818 Rigzone (2006), ‘Aker Kvaerner and Sinopec to Pursue More Mideast Opportunities’. 26 July 2006 
[http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/34542/Aker_Kvaerner_and_Sinopec_to_Pursue_More_
Mideast_Opportunities]. 
819 Ibid.; Another deal followed in August 2011, when Sinopec invested $130 million into the 
construction of a natural alcohol plant near al-Jubail Industrial City. The EPC-contract envisioned an 
output of 50,000 tonnes of alcohol per annum, in the form of detergents, in order to diversify SABIC’s 
chemicals portfolio. See: Henni, A. (2011), ‘Kayan and Sinopec to build natural alcohol plant’. 
Arabianindustry.com, 17 August 2011 [http://www.arabianindustry.com/oil-
gas/news/2011/aug/17/kayan-and-sinopec-to-build-natural-alcohol-plant-3824886/]. 
820 Sinopec (2012), ‘Sinopec, Saudi Aramco Sign YASREF Joint Venture Agreement’. 15 January 2012 
[http://www.sinopecgroup.com/group/en/Sinopecnews/20120117/news_20120117_283180000000.s
html]. 
821 Sinopec (2011), ‘Sinopec and Saudi Aramco Inked MOU on Partnership’. 18 March 2011 
[http://www.sinopecgroup.com/group/en/Sinopecnews/20110318/news_20110318_577700000000.
shtml]. 
822 Yasref (2017), ‘Yasref Overview’ [http://www.yasref.com/about/overview]. 
823 Saudi Aramco (2016), ‘King Salman and Chinese President Xi Jinping inaugurate YASREF 
Refinery’. 20 January 2016 [http://www.saudiaramco.com/en/home/news-
media/news/CooperationAgreement.html]. 
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‘Three strategic factors will help to further strengthen the relationship and transform it from 
transactional supply to a deeper, long-term partnership. First, is the doubling of Saudi Arabia’s energy 
supply to China, coupled with continued downstream investment to support economic growth, both in 
China and the Kingdom. The second, is implementing His Excellency Xi Jinping’s ‘One Belt-One Road’ 
initiative that will enable both the Kingdom to become a stronger partner to China, and also increase 
China’s investment in the Kingdom’s economic and industrial cities so that the Kingdom is a hub for 
China to access its Middle East and Africa markets. Thirdly, is the need to continually improve the 
mutual cooperation between the Kingdom and China in the areas of research, innovation, knowledge 
transfer, and culture.’824 
Saudi Arabia’s new Vision 2030 is presented as being very much complementary to 
these ambitions and their rhetoric. Diversified investment ties are the goal.825 The 
future is likely to see more greenfield investments by more Chinese companies. 
Already, it must be said, even just within the energy sector, Sinopec has by no means 
been the only Chinese company active in Saudi Arabia so far. The Shandong Electric 
Power Corporation (SEPCO) also stands out as a major Chinese investor in Saudi 
Arabia’s energy sector. According to the CGIT, in July 2009, SEPCO, alongside 
Dongfang Electric Corporation (DEC), together invested $1.65 billion into the Saudi 
oil industry, partnering with the Saudi Electricity Company. A comparison of the 
companies’ websites shows that the money went into the construction of an oil-fired 
thermal power plant in Rabigh, which was completed in 2013.826 
Further EPC-contracts seem to have been signed and partly completed by SEPCO in 
Saudi Arabia, according to both SEPCO’s website and to the CGIT, even though the 
latter afterwards lists SEPCO under a different name, ‘Power Construction Corp’, 
probably not having realized that it is the same company. In 2016, a 2400MW-strong 
Combined Cycle Gas Turbine seems to have been constructed successfully in Ras al-
Khair, having formed a consortium with Saudi Arabia’s Al-Arrab Contracting 
Company (ACC), which went on to purchase further technology from Germany’s 
Siemens. The contract had been signed in 2010, and, according to the CGIT, absorbed 
                                                          
824 Ibid. 
825 The only direct investment by a Chinese company into a greenfield energy project however, took 
place in the year 2011, when Sinopec, taking a share of 38%, injected $3.710 billion into a new refinery 
operated by Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC). Unfortunately, this information, provided in 
the CGIT’s database could not be verified. Neither Sinopec’s nor SABIC’s annual reports mention this 
particular venture, and even an advanced search did not produce any results besides other joint 
projects by the two companies, which do not match the information in the CGIT, because their 
investment flowed into China, as the next section will show. 
826 Shandong Electric Power Corporation (2016), ‘International Engineering. Major Projects and 
Awards’. 25 January 2016 [http://www.sepco3.com/ability_article.aspx?BaseInfoId=55&CateId=147]; 
Dongfang Electric Corporation (2015), ‘Project Solution’ 
[http://www.dongfang.com.cn/index.php?s=/home/article/lists/category/63.html]. 
295 
 
a $1.720 billion investment by SEPCO and gave the company a 70% share in the 
consortium.827  
In another landmark deal in October 2014, Saudi Aramco accepted a $1.3 billion 
investment bid by SEPCO to contribute towards a gas pipeline construction for Saudi 
consumers in the country’s western provinces. When completed, SEPCO will have 
built two booster gas compressor stations for the project, ensuring that Saudi Arabia’s 
Master Gas System will provide 9.6 billion cubic feet of gas a day (cfd), up from 8.4 
billion.828 
Saudi Arabia and China are interested in taking Chinese investment into the 
Kingdom’s energy business to the next level. In the wake of Crown Prince 
Muhammad bin Salman’s Vision 2030, one of the latter’s aspects is the flotation of a 
5% stake of Saudi Aramco in 2018. What could become the world’s largest ever initial 
public offering (IPO) is a novel, and for Saudi standards, relatively radical proposal in 
order to accelerate the country’s urgently needed economic diversification. Among 
many potential contenders for this portfolio investment are two Chinese state-owned 
giants, both the China Investment Corporation (CIC) – the country’s $814 billion 
strong sovereign wealth fund – and CNPC. As Bloomberg reports, ‘Hong Kong is 
among markets including London, New York, Singapore and Tokyo that have been 
identified as possible venues for the sale of 5 percent of the company, which is valued 
between $400 billion and $2 trillion’.829 For China, this could be a further way to 
help safeguard its long-term energy security, just as it is a way for Saudi Arabia to 
guarantee demand security from the world’s future number one economy. This is why 
King Salman, on his recent state-visit to China in March 2017, and members of his 
delegation, among them Aramco CEO Amin Nasser, directly encouraged Chinese 
                                                          
827 SEPCO 2016; Siemens (2011), ‘Siemens receives major order from Saudi Arabia 
Siemens to supply power plant components at a total value of over USD1 billion’. 21 February 2011 
[https://www.siemens.com/press/en/pressrelease/?press=/en/pressrelease/2011/fossil_power_gene
ration/efp201102042.htm] 
828 Reuters (2014), ‘Saudi Aramco gives pipeline contract to China's SEPCO’. 22 October 2014 
[http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL6N0SB48920141022]. According to SEPCO’s 
website, it has not been finalized yet, so the construction is at least half a year behind the intended 
schedule when the contract was signed in October 2014. See: SEPCO 2016. A year later from then, in 
November 2015, SEPCO won another bid related to the same project, providing roughly $700 million 
for its construction of another gas compressor station – which will further enhance Saudi Aramco’s 
Master Gas System to an estimated 12.5 billion cfd in the near future. See: Reuters (2015), ‘China's 
SEPCO signs gas booster deal for Saudi Aramco’. 17 November 2015 
[http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL8N1372GQ20151117].  
829 Bloomberg (2017), ‘China, Saudis to Discuss CIC, CNPC Investment in Aramco IPO’. 16 March 2017 
[https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-16/china-saudis-said-to-discuss-cic-cnpc-
investment-in-aramco-ipo-j0bynknm]. 
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state-owned giants to make bids for stakes.830 Both CIC and CNPC have expressed 
interest, although no agreement has yet been made.  
During the state visit, which several analysts believe to have had strong geo-political 
motivations, in light of a Saudi fear that the GCC, unlike Iran, might be side-lined in 
China’s Maritime Silk Road strategy, several MoUs were also signed between Chinese 
and Saudi entities.831 These are said to include pledges amounting to $65 billion, and 
involve firms like Saudi Aramco, Sinopec, SABIC, and China North Industries Group 
Corporation (Norinco).832 Sinopec and SABIC even signed a ‘strategic cooperation 
agreement’ on the occasion.833 If all these potentially big joint ventures were to 
materialize, and especially if, next year, Saudi Aramco’s IPO actually sells stakes to 
the biggest Chinese investors, then the Saudi fears regarding the BRI’s potential 
evasion of the Arabian Peninsula would seem much less reasonable. The fears are 
probably overstated already, due to China’s very real energy reliance on Saudi Arabia, 
not least the entire GCC, as shown also in the previous chapter. This reliance has so 
far been clearly reflected in Chinese investments into Saudi Arabia’s energy and 
(petro-) chemicals industry. Moreover, these two industries have by no means been 
the only targets of Chinese capital in Saudi Arabia. 
 
7.2.1.2 Real Estate and Transport 
China’s infrastructure investment in Saudi real estate and transport took up a 
significant amount in the general figures between 2005 and 2015, according to data 
from the CGIT. The combined value of real estate construction was more than $5 
billion and marked the second largest sector of Chinese investment in the Kingdom, 
after the energy sector. Transport, the fourth largest, after metals (see next section), 
absorbed a combined value of approximately $3 billion of Chinese capital. Some of 
                                                          
830 Guo, A. (2017), ‘China's Sinopec Says Saudi Aramco Invited It to Be Investor’. Reuters. 27 March 
2017 [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-27/china-s-sinopec-says-saudi-aramco-
invited-it-to-become-investor]. 
831 Niblock 2016; Fulton, J. (2017), ‘Why is Saudi Arabia’s king spending a month in Asia?’. In: The 
Washington Post, 6 March 2017 [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2017/03/06/why-is-saudi-arabias-king-spending-a-month-in-
asia/?postshare=2341488816841587&tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.301fb6126718#comments]. 
832 Blanchard, B. (2017), ‘China, Saudi Arabia eye $65 billion in deals as king visits’. Reuters, 16 March 
2017 [http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-asia-china-idUSKBN16N0G9]. 
833 Sinopec (2017), ‘Sinopec and SABIC sign a strategic cooperation agreement’. 27 March 2017 
[http://www.sinopecgroup.com/group/en/Sinopecnews/20170327/news_20170327_336026378175.s
html]. 
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these EPC ventures have attracted much attention. Before outlining the most 
important, it is again necessary to repeat that the CGIT’s data is incomplete and can 
only serve as a sometimes sketchy, but still highly informative and mostly 
representative orientation. 
In the Saudi real estate sector, the most active Chinese company since 2005 has been 
the China National Machinery Industry Corporation (Sinoma), since it has often been 
hired for the construction of cement-production plants which are obviously a vital 
material for most real estate infrastructure. That same year, the firm signed two EPC 
contracts in the Kingdom. The first, in March 2005, involved a $170 million project 
with the Riyadh Cement Company to build a cement production line in Riyadh, which 
was completed in November 2007.834 The second, in December 2005, involved a 
$580 million deal with the Saudi Cement Company for a construction of two further 
cement production lines, this time in Hofuf.835 Sinoma announced that at the time 
this deal marked ‘the largest engineering project contracted by Chinese suppliers’ 
overseas.836 
Another Chinese company with construction contracts for Saudi cement production 
is the Chinese National Building Material Company (CNBM). In November 2013, it 
signed a deal, also with SPCC, worth $190 million to build a new production line in 
Bisha’s cement plant. The project was partly self-financed, partly external, from an 
                                                          
834 Cemnet (2007), ‘Sinoma fulfills US$170m contract in Saudi Arabia’. 16 November 2007 
[https://www.cemnet.com/News/story/137716/sinoma-fulfills-us-170m-contract-in-saudi-
arabia.html]. 
835 Cemnet (2005), ‘China's Sinoma signs US$580m cement deal’. 19 December 2005 
[https://www.cemnet.com/News/story/142972/china-s-sinoma-signs-us-580m-cement-deal.html]. 
836 Sinoma (2010), ‘Key Events’ [http://www.sinoma.com.cn/en/gongsigaikuang/fazhanlicheng]. 
According to the CGIT, Sinoma signed its next contract in Saudi Arabia with the Yanbu Cement 
Company in August 2009, providing $400 million for the project. The information slightly differs in 
other sources, such as Global Investment House’s report on Yanbu Cement. This places the agreement 
a year earlier, in July 2008, and values Sinoma’s investment into the construction of a cement 
production facility at $442 million. See: Global Investment House (2009), ‘Investment Update. Yanbu 
Cement Company’. 1 July 2009 [http://up.m-e-c.biz/up/Mohcine/Report/YNCCO_07072009.pdf]. 
Further deals followed in 2010: one cement production plant in Hail, said to have been worth $200 
million, was signed in May 2010 and completed in 2013. See: Global Cement (2012), ‘Saudi Arabian 
cement focus’. 17 December 2012 [http://www.globalcement.com/magazine/articles/740-saudi-
arabian-cement-focus]. In June 2012, Sinoma also won a bid for the construction of a third production 
line for the Southern Province Cement Company’s (SPCC) Tahama plant in Mecca. Valued at 
approximately $190 million, these costs were said to have been invested directly by SPCC in exchange 
for Sinoma’s engineering, which was scheduled for completion two years later. See: Technical Review 
Middle East (2012), ‘Sinoma wins US$188 million Mecca cement project’. 5 June 2012 
[http://www.technicalreviewmiddleeast.com/construction/mining/sinoma-wins-us188-million-
cement-project-in-saudi]. 
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unnamed Saudi bank and planned for a construction duration by CNBM of less than 
two years.837 
Outside cement production investment, a major Chinese real estate project in Saudi 
Arabia has been the Guangdong Overseas Construction Group’s 2008 contract to 
contribute towards the infrastructure of the $3.4 billion-valued construction of King 
Khalid University (KKU) in the country’s Asir Province. The Chinese company’s 
investment value was reported to have been $700 million. It flowed into the 
construction of ‘16 new buildings and their annexes, consisting of engineering and 
science and administrative buildings’.838 
A further Chinese real estate investment connected to Saudi Arabia’s education sector 
was China Railway Construction Company’s (CRCC) 2009 contract to build 200 
primary and secondary schools for 140,000 pupils. With construction costs 
amounting to roughly $500 million, in relative terms the investment value and 
output is admittedly small. Yet, as Davidson points out, the project is worth 
mentioning due to the novelty of such foreign investments in Saudi Arabia. ‘Although 
this will represent only a small fraction of the 3,500 schools that are now under 
construction in Saudi Arabia, mostly by Arab companies, this Chinese involvement 
nonetheless represents a significant departure for the Saudi authorities’.839 The same 
can be said for an even more “sensitive” piece of infrastructure: in November 2014, 
CRCC also inked a contract which assigned the company to build the ‘Security 
Headquarters of Saudi Arabia[‘s] Ministry of Internal Affairs’.840 Valued at roughly 
$1.98 billion, the construction is scheduled to take ‘1440 calendar days’.841 These 
ventures point towards the growing diversity and responsibility of CRCC’s 
investments in Saudi Arabia, because, as its name would suggest, real estate does not 
mark the company’s primary line of business. 
                                                          
837 Starling, R. (2013), ‘SPCC signs contract for new clinker production line in Bisha’. World Cement, 11 
November 2013 [https://www.worldcement.com/africa-middle-
east/11112013/spcc_signs_contract_for_new_clinker_production_line_in_bisha_399/]. In 2015, the 
company also reached an agreement with Arabian Cement Company (ACC) to provide and mount two 
cement mills in ACC’s Rabigh plant, at a cost of roughly $100 million, scheduled to fulfil its contract 
just over a year later. See: Global Cement (2015), ‘Loesche supplies two vertical roller mills to Arabian 
Cement Company’. 13 November 2015 [http://www.globalcement.com/news/itemlist/tag/CNBM]. 
838 Zendera, Y. (2014), ‘$3.4bn Saudi university project hits final stages’. Constructweekonline.com, 28 
October 2014 [http://www.constructionweekonline.com/article-30895-34bn-saudi-university-
project-hits-final-stages/] 
839 Davidson 2010: p. 59. 
840 China Railway Construction Company (2014), ‘2014 Annual Report’ 
[http://english.crcc.cn/Portals/4/2015-4-16%202014%20Annual%20Report.pdf], pp. 17/78. 
841 Ibid. 
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In September 2015, it was announced that CRCC had completed one of its two Saudi 
prestige projects. It had built the Mashaer Railway in the Islamic holy city of Mecca, 
which not only expanded, upgraded and diversified the city’s public transport – used 
by millions of annual Muslim Hajj pilgrims – but also connected it to the 
neighbouring cities of Arafat, Muzdalifa, and Mina. This involved the construction of 
an 18.5 km-long railway, nine stations and a major parking area.842 
The contract had been signed in February 2009 and was valued at approximately $1.7 
billion. Due to the construction’s location in Mecca, a city from which non-Muslims 
are barred, CRCC hired Chinese Muslim workers alongside already present migrant 
workers in Saudi Arabia. However, the overall construction project and its labour 
dimension were everything but a smooth process. In fact, the project ran into some 
serious obstacles, encompassing ‘Saudi bureaucracy, diplomatic considerations 
between China and its biggest supplier of oil, Saudi Arabia, and the cultural 
sensitivities of doing business in the holiest Muslim city in the world’.843 
As the South China Morning Post reported, CRCC’s ‘operating cash flow collapsed by 
99.35 per cent to 48.2 million yuan during the first three quarters, and it flagged that 
overall losses from the Mecca project could be as high as 4.15 billion yuan’, a rough 
equivalent of $620 million.844 This projection indeed turned out to be accurate, as 
also visible in the CGIT’s dataset of ‘troubled transactions’ in Figure 26, which forced 
CRCC to be bailed out by its parent company, even though it had requested 
                                                          
842 Bhatia, N. (2015), ‘Chinese contractor completes $1.7bn Saudi railway’. 
Constructionweekonline.com, 10 September 2015 [http://www.constructionweekonline.com/article-
35354-chinese-contractor-completes-17bn-saudi-railway/]. 
843 Shih, T.H. (2010), ‘Mecca light rail construction woes leave China Railways over a Saudi barrel’. In: 
South China Morning Post, 13 November 2010 [http://www.scmp.com/article/730321/mecca-light-
rail-construction-woes-leave-china-railways-over-saudi-barrel]. According to CRCC, several Saudi 
government decisions to demand an increase in the light rail’s transportation capacity beyond initial 
specifications in the contract, to call for more stations than initially agreed, and to insist on foreign-
sourced, expensive, non-Chinese designs contributed to a net loss of 1.46 billion yuan, a rough 
equivalent of $200 million, in the third quarter of 2010. See: Ibid. Conversely, an anonymous 
European banker in Hong Kong, speaking to Arabian Business, observed a lack of decent preparation 
on CRCC’s side. Its market researchers had apparently failed to properly assess the conditions and 
requirements, and ‘did not have knowledge of the contract details’. See: Roberts, B. (2011), ‘Sino the 
times’. In: Arabian Business. 23 January 2011 [http://www.arabianbusiness.com/sino-times-
375131.html?_url=%2Fsino-times-375131.html&page=2]. Furthermore though, there were disruptive 
delays in underground pipeline works, land expropriation, and relocation, due to bureaucratic 
obstacles. See: Shih 2010. Most dramatically, the project even experienced ‘labour unrest’ when CRCC 
allegedly pressured workers to speed up their work in the face of the Saudi demands. These had 
provoked a reaction from workers, who protested against the harsh working conditions under high 
temperatures, but low wages. An unnamed analyst told the South China Morning Post that ‘managers 
at the Chinese company found it a challenge to manage non-Chinese workers due to linguistic and 
cultural differences as well as different work ethics’. See: Ibid. 
844 Ibid. 
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compensation from the Saudi government.845 In the end, just as with the project’s 
launch, the Chinese and Saudi government were determined to go through with it for 
bilateral diplomatic rather than purely business-driven reasons, a view shared by 
analysts from JP Morgan, Control Risks, and the Risk Resolution Group.846 Thus, 
even though it marked a financial loss, the Mecca light rail’s completion in September 
2015 was branded as a successful project.  
The same will likely be said about another major Saudi prestige project CRCC is 
involved in. The Haramain High Speed Rail construction (HHR) is seeking to connect 
the holy cities of Mecca and Medina via train. After approval and announcement in 
2002 that Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, a major SWF, would finance the 
project, the government finally awarded the first package of contracts in March 2009 
to a consortium, named Al-Rajhi Alliance, composed of CRCC, and two Saudi firms, 
Al-Arrab Contracting Company (ACC), and Al-Suwailem Company (MASCO).847 This 
consortium would undertake phase one of the construction plans, which ‘involves all 
civil works related to the building of the railway, including preparation of the ground, 
construction of bridges, culverts and tunnels for the laying of the track’.848 According 
to the CGIT, CRCC invested around $1.55 billion into the project, taking a 21% share 
in the consortium.849 Once completed, the high-speed rail connection will link Mecca 
and Medina and will include stops also in Jeddah and King Abdullah Economic City 
(KAEC). The system will have ‘a total daily capacity of 160,000 passengers and more 
than 50 million per year’ and will also offer a ‘special service […] during the annual 
season of Hajj in order to accommodate more than 3 million pilgrims’.850  
Yet, in 2014 it was reported that the construction had not only been delayed but 
would also require slightly higher costs than previously calculated. At the time, it was 
                                                          
845 Ibid. 
846 Ibid. 
847 McElroy, C. (2014), ‘Saudi's Haramain rail project delayed until 2016’. 
Constructionweekonline.com, 23 March 2014 [http://www.constructionweekonline.com/article-
27225-saudis-haramain-rail-project-delayed-until-2016/]; The Business Year (2016), ‘Railway to 
Heaven’. [https://www.thebusinessyear.com/saudi-arabia-2016/railway-to-heaven/focus]. 
848 McElroy 2014. 
849 Further contracts, making up phase two of the project were awarded to a Saudi-Spanish 
consortium, called Al-Shoula, for the ‘remaining infrastructure work on the line which includes 
construction of the track, signal[l]ing [sic.], power, electrification and telecommunications’, as well as 
a joint venture between two British companies for the design and construction of train-stations on 
route. See: ibid. 
850 The Business Year 2016. 
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reported that merely 50% of the project had been completed.851 After facing much 
pressure from the Saudi government, the HHR is now scheduled for official opening 
in March 2018.852  
In any case, even though the Saudis hired European companies for design and some 
high-tech aspects, CRCC’s participation has been considered an important 
development in terms of China’s economic and indeed political standing on the 
Arabian Peninsula. Indeed, placed into the pan-Asian context of the railway-focused 
Silk Road Economic Belt, and even into the entire global arena, CRCC and China 
Railway Group have celebrated numerous prestigious breakthroughs and are 
considered serious, technologically sophisticated, and especially government-
supported players, who successfully take advantage of government subsidies. To 
categorise CRCC’s economic competitiveness and, as an SOE, political clout, the term 
‘railway diplomacy’ has recently re-entered the vocabulary.853 Nevertheless, it seems 
to have its limits – augmenting a gradual awakening in China that grand connectivity 
visions face many obstacles. CRCC’s complications in Saudi Arabia are even 
negligible compared to many failed and loss-making projects all over the world, as a 
Financial Times investigation unearthed.854 
Parallel to the “Belt”, the other part of China’s trans-Asian transport-investment push 
consists of the “Road” – meaning the New Maritime Silk Road. In that respect, Saudi 
Arabia has also received substantial Chinese capital inflow over the last decade. The 
Kingdom’s shipping infrastructure has especially been an investment target by China 
Communications Construction Company (CCCC). Though the CGIT “merely” lists six 
transactions into ‘shipping’, besides two transactions into ‘utilities’ between 2005 and 
2015, amounting to roughly $1.6 billion, the company’s website mentions ‘37 
construction contracts in Saudi Arabia since late 2007, with a total contract value of 
                                                          
851 McElroy 2014. Since CRCC was only involved in phase one, it seems it has at least fulfilled most of 
its obligations. The latest news updates on the project’s delays solely concern Al-Shoula consortium. 
852 Railway Gazette (2017), ‘Haramain High Speed Rail deal ratified’. 17 January 2017 
[http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/single-view/view/haramain-high-speed-rail-deal-
ratified.html]. 
853 Reuters (2014), ‘After building China's railways, giant CRCC flexes muscles abroad’. 9 December 
2014 [https://www.reuters.com/article/china-railways/corrected-after-building-chinas-railways-
giant-crcc-flexes-muscles-abroad-idUSL6N0TM31S20141209]. 
854 Kynge, J., Peel, M., Bland, B. (2017), ‘China’s railway diplomacy hits the buffers’. In: Financial 
Times, 17 July 2017 [https://www.ft.com/content/9a4aab54-624d-11e7-8814-
0ac7eb84e5f1?mhq5j=e5]. 
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4,200 million US dollars’.855 Its website goes on to identify the most representative 
projects as ‘the dredging and reclamation project in Jazan Economic City, the Red 
Sea Gateway container terminal project in Jeddah, the flood prevention project in 
Jeddah, [and] the business port project in Jazan Economic City, etc’.856  
CCCC’s subsidiary, China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) has been 
responsible for these projects, strengthening its standing in Saudi Arabia’s most 
important ports in the Red Sea, such as Jeddah, Jazan, and Yanbu.857 The Red Sea 
Gate Terminal especially stresses its inter-continental centrality on one of the world 
economy’s most vital trade routes, especially regarding trans-Eurasian maritime 
commerce.858 
Given the number of CCCC’s/CHEC’s construction contracts in Saudi shipping, it 
necessarily exhausts the confined space of this manuscript. What is important to 
extract from these investment flows is their strategic value. Here, CCCC specifically 
links its investments to both China’s BRI, as well as to Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030.859 
China’s investment into Saudi Arabia’s shipping and port infrastructure facilitates the 
expansion and diversification not only of Sino-Saudi trade routes, but also Sino-
Middle Eastern and indeed Sino-European trade routes more generally, because 
business centres and port cities like Jeddah lie on Saudi Arabia’s western coast – 
outside the geo-politically more sensitive Persian Gulf. Thus, Jeddah and its 
neighbouring Red Sea ports in Saudi Arabia offer unique geographical advantages 
among GCC countries. They are potential long-term alternatives – though not 
replacements – to the Arabian Peninsula’s other intercontinental commercial hubs 
which are all in the Gulf, especially Dubai. These Red Sea locations are certainly 
Saudi Arabia’s best bet in that respect and offer Vision 2030’s regional hub ambitions 
a real opportunity, which is why CCCC’s complementary rhetoric carries weight. In 
terms of China’s Maritime Silk Road to Europe, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal are 
                                                          
855 China Communications Construction Company (2017), ‘CCCC signs MOU with RCJY in presence 
of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Saudi Arabian King’. 16 March 2017 
[http://en.ccccltd.cn/newscentre/companynews/201704/t20170414_52135.html] 
856 Ibid. 
857 For a collection of articles on CCCC’s projects in Arabia, see: 
http://www.dredgingtoday.com/tag/arabia/. 
858 Red Sea Gateway Terminal (2017), ‘About RSGT’ [http://rsgt.com/corporate_information]. 
859 CCCC 2017. 
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critical sea lanes through which 80% of their commerce flows and where ports like 
Jeddah offer critical transit infrastructure.860 
In short, China’s investments into Saudi real estate and transport, and in the latter 
sector, both land and sea, have not only been – mostly – lucrative business 
opportunities, but have often also carried a geo-strategic dimension. The last 
mentioned might be less the case with other sectors, like metals and agriculture. 
However, the growing diversity of Saudi sectors attracting Chinese investment 
certainly contributes to the deepening of the bilateral relationship. And this in itself 
has geo-strategic implications. 
 
7.2.1.3 Metals and Agriculture 
Apart from the major sector destinations of Chinese investment into Saudi Arabia – 
energy, chemicals, real estate and also transport – China has invested into a number 
of other sectors to varying degrees. Given Saudi Arabia’s growing metals industry, 
this is the country’s third biggest industry that has attracted Chinese capital. 
However, this is only due to the very high value of each Chinese investment, but not 
due to the number of contracts. In the decade between 2005 and 2015, China has 
merely invested twice into Saudi metals, yet on both occasions with a large sum. Both 
investments occurred in 2007. In April that year, China Nonferrous Metal Company 
and China National Machinery Industry Corporation (Sinomach) agreed to an EPC-
contract offer by Saudi-based Western Way for Industrial Development Company. 
The construction involved ‘an aluminum complex with capacity to produce 1.4MTPA 
of alumina and 660,000-700,000 tonnes of aluminum and power plant with 
generation capacity of 1,860MW’, according to the Construction Intelligence 
                                                          
860 Sellier, E. (2016), ‘China's Mediterranean Odyssey’. In: The Diplomat, 19 April 2016 
[http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/chinas-mediterranean-odyssey/]. Beyond “East-West” trade, 
European companies have also spotted the “South-South” trade facilitation opportunities. In terms of 
Saudi Arabia’s and the Middle East’s trade not only with China and South-East Asia, but also among 
Red Sea littorals, shipping services have been expanded. French container shipping major CMA CGM 
has launched a new service ‘connecting Asia and the Red Sea’. See: World Maritime News (2016), 
‘CMA CGM Strengthens Asia-Red Sea Service’. 17 November 2016 
[http://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/206765/cma-cgm-strengthens-asia-red-sea-service/]. The 
service links China, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Djibouti. The latter, as mentioned 
above, also hosts China’s first overseas military base. 
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Center.861 Valued at approximately $4 billion, it marked the so far single largest 
Chinese infrastructure deal inside the KSA. Construction was completed in 2015.862 
In November 2007, the Aluminium Corporation of China (Chinalco) formed a joint 
venture with Malaysia Mining Corporation Berhad (MMC) and Saudi Binladin Group 
(SBG) in order to construct and operate an aluminium smelting facility in Jazan 
Economic City – a low tariff special business zone. Within the project’s total cost of 
$3 billion, Chinalco’s investment was valued at $1.2 billion and was China’s first 
greenfield investment in Saudi Arabia at the time. The company acquired a 40% 
share – a leading position in the joint venture – with both MMC and SBG holding 
20% respectively, and the remaining 20% allocated to other, unnamed entities.863 
The deal attracted much enthusiastic attention when it was signed, and construction 
seemed to have progressed to an extent in the following years. However, the joint 
venture ran into some unspecified problems in 2013, which resulted in MMC being 
ejected from the project.864 Since no further Chinese investment has flowed into the 
large Saudi metals industry since 2007, the cancellation of the Jazan Aluminium 
Smelting Complex might be one of several possible deterring reasons for the lack of 
any new deals. 
A Saudi sector in which Chinese construction business has been more successful is 
agriculture. Since the late 2000s, China’s investment into Saudi agriculture saw a 
combined value of roughly $2.5 billion – forming the fifth largest Saudi industry in 
terms of Chinese ventures. In 2008, according to the CGIT, CNPC invested $560 
million into a Saudi agricultural project in which the Saudi Arabian Mining Company 
Ma’aden seems to have been the business partner.865 
                                                          
861 Construction Intelligence Center, ‘Project Details. WWIDC – Jazan Aluminum Complex – Jizan’ 
[https://www.construction-
ic.com/HomePage/Projects?ReturnUrl=%2FProjects%2FOverview%2F114838%3Futm_source%3Dw
orldconstructionnetwork%26utm_medium%3DReferral%26utm_campaign%3DWWIDC%2B%25E2%
2580%2593%2BJazan%2BAluminum%2BComplex%2B%25E2%2580%2593%2BJizan&utm_source=
worldconstructionnetwork&utm_medium=Referral&utm_campaign=WWIDC%20%E2%80%93%20J
azan%20Aluminum%20Complex%20%E2%80%93%20Jizan]. 
862 Ibid. 
863 Chen, J. (2008), ‘More Ore’. In: The Nation, 11 February 2008 
[http://www.pressreader.com/thailand/the-nation/20080211/282282430989108]. 
864 Constructionweekonline.com (2013), ‘MMC, SBG removed from Jazan Economic City project’. 9 
April 2013 [http://www.constructionweekonline.com/article-21799-mmc-sbg-removed-from-jazan-
economic-city-project/]. Since then, according to the Construction Intelligence Center, it seems as if 
the project has stalled, a development which has not, but should have been recorded in the CGIT’s 
‘Troubled Transactions’ dataset. See: Construction Intelligence Center, ‘Jazan’. 
865 This information could not be verified though. The only currently traceable connection between 
CNPC and Ma’aden involves a 2014 deal between the two companies, which conversely is not listed in 
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In November 2012, a Chinese multinational giant, Shanghai Electric, entered a 
consortium together with South Korea’s Samsung Engineering and Saudi Arabia’s Al 
Toukhi Company, which won a $3 billion bid for the construction of a water 
desalination plant. Awarded by Saudi Arabia's state-owned Saline Water Conversion 
Corporation (SWCC), the consortium signed a deal to build a plant in Yanbu.866 Saudi 
Arabia has a high demand for water desalination, so this Chinese investment could 
easily point towards further such deals in the future.867 The CGIT attributes Shanghai 
Electric’s project investment value to $990 million and its share in the consortium to 
33%. 
Such ventures point towards the growing diversity regarding China’s investment in 
Saudi Arabia. In order to ease flexibility and capability of its own businesses in Saudi 
Arabia, there will be an increasing demand also for Chinese financial services in the 
Kingdom. Indeed, the first signs of this are already appearing. 
 
7.2.1.4 Finance 
In June 2015, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the world’s 
largest bank by assets, set up shop in Riyadh. It is the first Chinese bank to establish a 
retail presence inside the Kingdom.868 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the CGIT. In this deal, CNPC’s subsidiary, China Huanqiu Contracting & Engineering Corporation’s 
Saudi Branch (HQCEC) ‘signed an EPC contract on Maaden's phosphate ore dressing project’. See: 
China National Petroleum Corporation (2014), ‘2014 Annual Report. Major Events’ 
[http://www.cnpc.com.cn//en/MajorEvents2011f/Major_Events-1.shtml]. HQCEC’s Annual Report 
from 2014 values the agreement at $600 million but does not specify HQCEC’s own contribution. The 
report describes the project as ‘the largest of its kind in the world, with an estimated capacity to handle 
up to 13.5 million tons of phosphate ore per year after its completion’. See: Ibid. Given the additional 
lack of information on the project it is perhaps not surprising that it does not feature in the CGIT. 
Sinopec’s other two investments into Saudi agriculture, one in July 2011 worth $200 million, the other 
in April 2015 worth $450 million, are listed in the CGIT, but are equally impossible to trace back. The 
most likely reason for this is that they were connected to Sinopec’s above-outlined EPC ventures in the 
Saudi petrochemical industry. Petrochemical compounds such as ethylene, produced also in Jubail, 
Yanbu, and Rabigh, are also used in agricultural applications, in which they function as plant growth 
regulators. See: Arshad, M., Frankenberger Jr., W.T. (2012), Ethylene: Agricultural Sources and 
Applications. Berlin: Springer, p. 8. Some of Sinopec’s additional capital inflows are thus likely to have 
been classified separately from their petrochemical infrastructure contracts. 
866 Reuters (2012), ‘Samsung, Shanghai Electric win $3 billion Saudi water plant deal’. 26 November 
2012 [http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-water-power/samsung-shanghai-electric-win-3-
billion-saudi-water-plant-deal-idUSBRE8AP0L620121126]. 
867 Ibid. 
868 In the region, ICBC already has a presence in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Kuwait City, making 
this its fifth overall branch in the Middle East. See: Reuters (2014), ‘China's ICBC opens first branch in 
Saudi Arabia’. 4 June 2014 [http://www.reuters.com/article/icbc-saudi-banking/chinas-icbc-opens-
first-branch-in-saudi-arabia-idUSL3N0YQ1UR20150604]. 
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The move seems to have come at the right time in terms of conditions in both China 
as well as Saudi Arabia. Firstly, in light of lower Chinese GDP growth and higher 
domestic credit risks and the country’s incentivization of its state-owned and private 
companies to boost their global investment, increasingly important economic 
partners like Saudi Arabia are an obvious target for entities like ICBC. ‘While gaining 
a global footprint, ICBC remains committed to serving Chinese companies to "go 
global" by closely following China's agenda in trades and investments with countries 
around the world’, the bank’s website explains, tagging this strategy also verbally to 
the BRI’s infrastructure investment.869 Secondly, in light of both Saudi Arabia’s 
Vision 2030 and its desired opening for more inward FDI, as well as the 
simultaneous constraints on Saudi rentier state expenditure in times of low oil prices, 
highly liquid lenders like Chinese banks should become increasingly welcome origins 
of investment in Saudi Arabia. As a joint research briefing by three consultancies 
calculates, Vision 2030 ‘aims to increase [Saudi] inward FDI’s contribution to GDP 
from 3.8% to 5.7% and this would require an inward FDI average growth of 21% per 
year (in nominal terms), resulting in cumulative inward FDI of up to $1 trillion over 
the next fifteen years’.870 The World Bank’s July 2016 Economic Brief reported that 
Saudi Arabia’s reserves were in danger of being ‘wiped out’ within half a decade and 
that therefore bond issues would have to increase significantly.871 
Consequently, by August 2016, the markets had already experienced many 
noteworthy reactions. For instance, Bloomberg reported that ICBC provided a $600 
million two-year loan to Mobile Telecommunications Company Saudi Arabia, a unit 
of Kuwait’s Zain, with the option of a one-year-extension. ICBC replaced Zain’s 
previous loan from two regional banks, thereby enabling a cost-cutting measure of 
175 million riyals, an equivalent of roughly $47 million according to the exchange rate 
                                                          
869 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (2013), ‘ICBC Escalates Services for Customers around 
the World’. 21 February 2013 [http://www.icbc-
us.com/icbcltd/about%20us/news/ICBC%20Escalates%20Services%20for%20Customers%20around
%20the%20World.htm]; Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (2016), ‘Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China Limited Announces 2016 Interim Results’. 30 August 2016 
[http://www.icbc-
us.com/ICBCLtd/About%20Us/News/IndustrialandCommercialBankofChinaLimitedAnnounces2016I
nterimResults.htm]. 
870 The report has been removed since the author accessed it. However, Group Africa Newsroom has 
summarized some of the reports key contents, including this quote. See: Group Africa Newsroom 
(2017), ‘Informed analysis will be vital to seizing the opportunities presented by Saudi Vision 2030’ 
[https://www.africa-newsroom.com/press/informed-analysis-will-be-vital-to-seizing-the-
opportunities-presented-by-saudi-vision-2030?lang=en]. 
871 World Bank (2017), ‘How is Saudi Arabia Reacting to Low Oil Prices?’ 
[http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/gcc/publication/economic-brief-july-saudi-arabia-2016]. 
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at the time of writing. The article also mentions a previous $1.5 million ICBC loan to 
Saudi Electricity Company, alongside a $950 million loan to the Saudi government. 
With the latter, ICBC thus contributed almost a tenth to Saudi Arabia’s $10 billion 
bond issue in May 2016.872 
Such ICBC loans seem destined to increase in Saudi Arabia and this will hand the 
bank a highly influential position there. Concerning its value, ICBC has already been 
labelled the ‘biggest Chinese player in the region’.873 Moreover, at least in case Saudi 
Arabia delivers on its promises to cut red tape on FDI and improve its regulatory 
environment to a more business-friendly one to foreign firms, it can be expected that 
more foreign, and thus especially Chinese banks will open Saudi branches.874 
In terms of portfolio investment, it is impossible to acquire an accurate picture of the 
situation in Chinese capital flows to Saudi Arabia, as this kind of information is rarely 
publicized when it comes from small businesses and individual stock and bond 
traders. It is hardly easier to obtain detailed information on SWF investments, which 
mostly remain classified. The CIC’s possible bid for a share in Saudi Aramco’s 
portfolio, mentioned already above, is a noteworthy exception, due to the publicity of 
Aramco’s planned IPO. In any case, it can be expected that FPI and FDI flows from 
China to Saudi Arabia will increase. This is also the case in terms of Saudi Arabian 
investment into China. 
 
7.2.2 Saudi Investment into China 
As revealed above, Saudi investment into China is less well documented. Based on 
open-source information, despite a noteworthy growth in attention, investment 
activity, and value, Saudi capital flows do not seem to have met either the extent or 
sector diversity of Chinese capital flows into the Kingdom. Reasons for this, range 
from the lack of diversification of Saudi Arabia’s domestic economy – which results in 
a general, global imbalance of Saudi inward and outward FDI – to China’s inward 
                                                          
872 Sharif, A. (2016), ‘China’s ICBC Boosts Saudi Loans With $600 Million Zain Facility’. Bloomberg, 
16 August 2016 [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-16/zain-saudi-switches-
regional-riyal-loan-for-icbc-dollar-facility]. 
873 Reuters (2015), ‘China's ICBC opens first branch in Saudi Arabia’. 4 June 2015 
[http://www.reuters.com/article/icbc-saudi-banking-idUSL3N0YQ1UR20150604]. 
874 Other Gulf states like the UAE, have already welcomed further Chinese financial services, as the 
next chapter shows. 
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FDI regulatory barriers. Finally, as also stated before, information on FPI, including 
SWF activity, is mostly classified. 
 
FIGURE 28: Source: Dhaman Investment Attractiveness Index 2015, p. 133. 
Comparing Dhaman’s Figure 27 and Figure 28 points towards an interesting fact. 
Whereas China, according to Dhaman’s data, “merely” came fifth in Saudi inward 
greenfield investment origins between 2003 and 2015, it came first in Saudi outward 
greenfield investment destinations.875 Nine Saudi companies over that period 
invested a total amount of roughly $8 billion across 24 projects and created over 
8,000 jobs in the process. Of all publicly known Saudi outward investments, this 
translates into 19.4% flowing into China.  
Two observations can be deducted from these figures. Firstly, Saudi Arabia’s $8 
billion greenfield investment value is surprisingly close to China’s $10 billion 
greenfield investment value into Saudi Arabia. Yet, as the previous section has shown, 
China also invested more than an additional $20 billion into Saudi Arabia outside the 
greenfield category, in EPC project contracting. Hence, taken together, China’s 
dominance in investment outflow into Saudi Arabia is much more evident. 
Secondly, in absolute terms, the large sum that Saudi Arabia has invested into 
greenfield projects in China is simply the result of sheer market size there. However, 
given that both China and Saudi Arabia have tough regulatory barriers to free FDI, 
                                                          
875 Dhaman (2015), ‘Investment Climate in Arab Countries. Dhaman Index Attractiveness Index 2015’ 
[http://dhaman.net/en/news/dhaman-publishes-investment-climate-report-2015/], 
309 
 
albeit Saudi Arabia at least until recently more than China, both countries’ 
investment inflow prospects almost offset each other. Whereas China’s greenfield 
investment into Saudi Arabia accounted for a 6.8% share of all Saudi inward 
greenfield investment, the US’s for example accounted for 25.1%. In other words, 
there is a much bigger market in Saudi Arabia that China has not tapped into, 
whereas Saudi Arabia in its outward greenfield investment clearly prioritizes China – 
reflected by the 19.4%. Contrarywise, as Figure 28 also shows, the US is only the 
tenth largest destination of Saudi outward investment. The most important reason 
for the US’s meagre 3.2% share of Saudi outward investment is the relatively sensitive 
political climate in America towards Middle Eastern and Saudi investment in the 
post-9/11 security environment, as briefly addressed in the next chapter. 
Generally, how are these relative investment imbalances to be explained and 
interpreted? Do they entail a greater Saudi dependence on China than the other way 
around? Or does a Chinese competitive disadvantage cause a Saudi preference for 
other foreign investment sources? These questions will be partly addressed in this 
section, and partly at the end of this chapter once the picture has been completed. 
 
7.2.2.1 Energy and (Petro-)Chemicals 
As a result of China’s hugely growing oil imports, especially from the Gulf, these 
petro-states’ accumulated another wave of skyrocketing wealth, in particular from the 
early 2000s onwards. Historically, these petro-dollars were primarily invested and 
“recycled” in the long oil-import dependent United States. Since global oil-import 
demand has shifted increasingly to the East, so have the oil rents been increasingly 
invested there too. Saudi Arabia is no exception to this.876 
The first signs for this development appeared in the late 1990s, when China had just 
become a net oil importer and signed an agreement with Saudi Arabia for a 50-year 
supply contract of ten million tonnes per annum. In 1998, Saudi Aramco, 
simultaneously, set up a subsidiary office for sales and marketing in Beijing. A year 
later, on a state visit to Saudi Arabia, acting Chinese President Jiang Zemin signed an 
                                                          
876 Simpfendorfer 2011: pp. 29-35. 
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MoU which ‘inaugurated a strategic oil partnership’ in which both countries opened 
their downstream markets for bi-directional investment.877  
The first joint venture of as Saudi company inside China took place in 2001, when 
Saudi Aramco and America’s Exxon Mobil signed an agreement with Fujian 
Petrochemical Company to jointly conduct a study to upgrade the Quanzhou refinery 
in Fujian Province to 240,000 bpd. This was based on a joint feasibility study (JFS) 
which further incorporated the development of a new ethylene production facility, 
which was approved in 2002 by the State Council of China. This also coincided with 
China granting Saudi Aramco the rights to open and run up to 700 petrol stations in 
Fujian Province.878  
These successful investments were implemented and further expanded a few years 
later. In 2004, Saudi Aramco, Exxon Mobil, and Sinopec finalized another round of 
negotiations – splitting the shares in their Fujian joint venture, the Fujian Refining 
and Petrochemical Company (FREP), among each other, with Saudi Aramco and 
Exxon Mobil both taking 25% respectively, and Sinopec holding the remaining 
50%.879 The Fujian refinery’s upgrade was completed in 2009, going into operation 
the same year and ‘thereby increasing the province’s annual refining capacity from 
four million to twelve million tonnes’.880 
One of the other proposed joint ventures discussed by the parties in 2007 concerned 
the development of another refinery in Qingdao in China’s Shandong Province. 
Sinopec and Saudi Aramco would co-invest into the rapid construction process so 
that more crude oil from Saudi Arabia could be delivered as soon as possible. Saudi 
Aramco again was granted a 25% stake in the joint venture.881 However, negotiations 
dragged on for years, so by 2009 a detailed agreement had not been reached yet. 
                                                          
877 Al-Tamimi 2014: pp. 149-150;  
878 Al-Tamimi 2014: p. 150; Ghafour, M. (2009), ‘China’s Policy in the Persian Gulf’. In: Middle East 
Policy, 16:2, pp. 82-93. 
879 Al-Tamimi 2014: p. 151; Davidson 2010: p. 50. This was again followed by several further project 
deals announced in 2007. In order to meet China’s by then fast growing crude oil imports from the 
Kingdom, the implementation process of the three companies’ previous agreement to ‘expand capacity 
of the Quanzhou refinery in Fujian province from 80,000 barrels per day to 240,000 barrels per day’ 
was started. See: Simpfendorfer 2011: p. 35. Concurrently, hosted by the Fujian provincial 
government, they held the inauguration ceremony for China’s first comprehensive refining, 
petrochemicals, and fuel marketing operation that had received FDI. Furthermore, the entities 
celebrated a newly approved contract for two further joint ventures, valued at $5 billion, between 
them. See: Al-Tamimi 2014: p. 151. 
880 Davidson 2010: p. 50. 
881 Reuters (2007), ‘Sinopec eyes second refinery deal with Saudi Aramco’. 7 March 2007 
[http://uk.reuters.com/article/china-oil-refinery-idUKPEK21329320070307]. 
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Though Sinopec started construction on its own, Saudi Aramco hesitated. Several 
explanations have been found for the delay. On the one hand, as Aramco’s CEO 
Khalid al-Falih reasoned, his company wanted to first patiently observe the 
operational performance of the Fujian refinery and ‘see if it [was] profitable […] 
before [Aramco] would move further to new investments’.882 Another important 
consideration was also the 2009 financial crisis fallout, which had forced OPEC to cut 
production in the face of shrinking demand.883 Yet, for the time before, it was also 
said that one of the obstacles revolved around Chinese policies. ‘The talks, which 
began well before the start-up of the Qingdao plant in May 2008, have not resulted in 
any solid progress, partly because of Saudi Aramco's concerns over China's fuel price 
controls’ at the time.884 In any case, the refinery had not been expanded via Saudi 
participation at the time of writing – a decade long delay since the idea was first 
discussed. The most important reason for this was an overcapacity of oil-refinery 
products, some of which, such a diesel, even had to be exported by China in recent 
years due to privately-owned “teapot” refineries flooding the market.885 
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia requires a huge amount of oil in order to transition 
towards a more diversified domestic economy. Despite the recent slowdown in oil 
revenues and refining markets, it sees plenty of opportunity in China and Asia as a 
whole, at least according to Khalid al-Falih: ‘From a demographics and economic 
standpoint, Asia [is] still below its requirement from refined product supply’.886 
Despite the company’s caution after its first joint venture in Fujian, this clearly did 
not signify a lack of ambition and long-term planning regarding the Chinese market. 
In March 2011, Saudi Aramco and PetroChina, a subsidiary of CNPC, inked a deal to 
jointly develop a further refinery, in China’s Yunnan Province.887 Once completed the 
                                                          
882 Saudi Gazette (2015), ‘Saudi Aramco sees strong potential in China market’. 10 October 2015 
[http://64.65.60.109/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=2009111454443]. 
883 Ibid. 
884 Reuters (2009), ‘Aramco, Sinopec in talks on Qingdao plant investment’. 10 November 2009 
[http://uk.reuters.com/article/china-saudi-crude-idUKPEK28208220091110]. 
885 Reuters (2014), ‘PetroChina delays operation of refineries on overcapacity’. 23 January 2014 
[http://www.reuters.com/article/china-oil-delay/petrochina-delays-operation-of-refineries-on-
overcapacity-idUSL3N0KX1IN20140123]; Raval, A. (2017), ‘China strives to reduce capacity of ‘teapot’ 
oil refineries’. In: Financial Times, 8 September 2017 [https://www.ft.com/content/2b6d92cc-946c-
11e7-bdfa-eda243196c2c?mhq5j=e5]. It seems Saudi Aramco’s early cautiousness made good sense. 
886 Tani, S. (2016), ‘Saudi energy boss says his country has big plans for Asia’. In: Nikkei Asian Review. 
8 September 2016 [https://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20160908-THE-FINTECH-EFFECT/Politics-
Economy/Saudi-energy-boss-says-his-country-has-big-plans-for-Asia?page=1]. 
887 Al-Tamimi 2014: p. 154. Though this plan, just as the Qingdao refinery, was then delayed several 
times, it was finally set to begin construction in October 2016 following China’s re-booted surge in oil 
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refinery will process 260,000 bpd. It was reported that Saudi Aramco planned to 
invest between $1 billion and $1.5 billion into the start-up.888 
There are many examples of Chinese efforts to spread oil-import-relevant risks 
geographically and through infrastructure investment, some of which are actively 
supported by Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, a further development in Saudi investment 
prospects in China’s energy industry had also come about during former Saudi King 
Abdullah’s celebrated state visit to China in 2006. One agreement reached during the 
state visit was a Saudi initiative to support China’s construction of an oil storage 
depot for strategic reserves on Hainan Island in the South China Sea. The facility, 
once completed, would hold the capacity of storing 100 million tonnes of crude oil.889 
However, the construction stage and Saudi Arabia’s investment share in it has 
seemingly remained classified. In any case, China did not appear to be too rushed 
with the depot’s rapid expansion, presumably in the fear of sparking oil price 
fluctuations. Both countries are in a position to react flexibly in this regard.890 
Saudi Arabia is seeking to maximize energy opportunities in China, exemplified by 
these deals as well as future plans. Since the breakthrough of the Yunnan refinery 
deal and the slight rise in China’s oil imports from Saudi Arabia in 2016 after the 
three-year oil-price related value decline, the two governments and their major 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
imports that year. The delays were also explained by China’s recent refining overcapacity, as well as 
‘tightening environmental regulations [which] forced PetroChina to resubmit approvals for changes to 
plant configurations’. See: Reuters (2016), ‘PetroChina to start new refinery in Oct, boost China crude 
imports’. 24 June 2016 [http://uk.reuters.com/article/petrochina-refinery-idUKL4N19F31A]. 
888 Ibid.; Interestingly, China intends to link the refinery to a new oil pipeline that will run through 
Burma. The pipeline connects China’s refining industry to the Bay of Bengal and is therefore a 
strategically vital infrastructure investment that allows China to import more of its Gulf oil 
circumventing the Straits of Malacca. Its construction by CNPC though also experienced a long delay 
due to Burma’s new government reviewing the deal. See: Ibid.; hence, China’s oil import dependence, 
already seen in Beijing as being exposed to geo-political maritime risks, was faced with more political 
risks on land, in a neighbouring country. Only in April 2017 did the two governments finally reach an 
agreement on opening the oil pipeline which incidentally runs along an already active natural gas 
pipeline. ‘Once fully operational, the pipeline from Made island in Rakhine state can supply almost 6 
per cent of China’s crude oil imports’. See: Hornby, L. (2017), ‘China and Myanmar open long-delayed 
oil pipeline’. In: Financial Times, 11 April 2017 [https://www.ft.com/content/21d5f650-1e6a-11e7-
a454-ab04428977f9]. In absolute terms, this is certainly a major achievement. In relative terms of 
course, this is still no escape from a continued Malacca dependence, at least in absence of the potential 
future Kra Canal through Thailand, a mega-project that China’s Maritime Silk Road builders are 
enthusiastically promoting in Bangkok. See: Murdoch, L. (2017), ‘Thailand's Kra canal plan would link 
Indian, Pacific oceans, benefiting China’. In: The Sydney Morning Herald, 8 August 2017 
[http://www.smh.com.au/world/thailands-kra-canal-plan-would-link-indian-pacific-oceans-
benefiting-china-20170808-gxrgz1.html]. 
889 Al-Tamimi 2014: p. 151. 
890 Kemp points out several options for Saudi Aramco’s strategy: ‘Saudi Arabia can choose either to sell 
China oil for its storage facilities or to fill the reserve with Saudi oil that still belongs to Saudi Arabia. 
The second approach would give Saudi Arabia more flexibility and a large storage facility in the second 
largest oil market in the world’. See: Kemp 2012: p. 82. 
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companies signed a further amount of deals, allegedly worth a staggering $65 billion, 
during Saudi King Salman’s state visit to Beijing in March 2017.891 Saudi Aramco is 
sensing a new opening of opportunities in China and can now benefit from its already 
established platform in the country. For that matter, in 2012, at the value peak of 
China’s oil imports from Saudi Arabia so far, the firm had upgraded its permanent 
presence in China by opening “Aramco Asia” in Beijing.892 
Moreover, Aramco has not been the only Saudi hydrocarbon firm with a presence in 
China. The Kingdom’s second biggest investor in China’s wider energy and 
petrochemicals industries is SABIC. Already in 1985, it opened a supply branch in 
then British Hong Kong, long before mainland China’s energy mix necessitated huge 
oil imports from the Gulf and long before China’s industrial revolution had reached 
the stage in which massive oil supplies required processing. Nevertheless, a year later 
another subsidiary was opened in Shenzhen. In 1996, SABIC set up an Asia Office in 
Shanghai. Since then, it has opened more than a dozen additional offices in the 
mainland, following several high-valued projects.893 
In July 2009, SABIC was awarded a contract by the Chinese government to invest 
into a $3 billion-valued petrochemical complex in Tianjin. The plant opened 
production a year later, with SABIC and Sinopec running it in a 50-50 joint venture. 
The plant’s output is said to be over 3 million annual tonnes of petrochemical 
products, such as various types of plastic.894 SABIC further expressed interest to 
                                                          
891 Blanchard, B. (2017), ‘China, Saudi Arabia eye $65 billion in deals as king visits’. Reuters, 16 March 
2017 [http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-asia-china-idUSKBN16N0G9]. The major agreements 
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expand its investment into China, eyeing in particular the transport sector, including 
automobiles and aircraft, and the construction sectors.895 
Fitting such future ambitions, it is not surprising that SABIC has started to create its 
first research and development (R&D) centre in China.896 The plan involves a facility 
to employ 400 researchers and engineers and was launched in December 2013, at an 
estimated cost of $100 million. Once completed, it will not only be one of 17 SABIC 
R&D-facilities around the world but will also pose as the company’s new China 
headquarters, located in Shanghai’s Pudong area. ‘The center will focus on developing 
material applications for consumer electronic products, construction, clean energy 
and medical equipment as well as transport’.897 
SABIC’s aggressive moves into China’s petrochemicals market reflects its long-term 
business interests as well as Riyadh’s general strategic rationale, for which the 
company also initiated the ‘China Plan’ that spawned these investments. It ‘aims to 
facilitate mutual investments between the two countries by supporting China’s 
economic development and, as its premier supplier of petrochemicals, helping to 
satisfy its ever-increasing demand’.898 
The need for Saudi investment into China’s downstream industry not only had 
lucrative financial incentives. The investments can be understood as quite strategic in 
nature, since Chinese refineries required the technological capacity to process Gulf 
sour crude oil rather than African sweet crude, the former containing higher levels of 
sulphur.899 Consequently, over the years of Saudi investment into China, companies 
like Aramco and SABIC have upgraded and shaped China’s energy infrastructure in 
order for its refineries to process Gulf sour crude. This had the strategic rationale of 
seeking to maximize and lock in China’s longer-term dependence on Gulf oil.  
 
 
 
                                                          
895 Ibid. 
896 Al-Tamimi 2014: p. 155. 
897 Shanghai Daily (2013), ‘SABIC’s R&D hub’. December 2013 
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7.2.2.2 Other Sectors 
In order to also reinforce the long-term bilateral cooperation and economic profits, 
Saudi Arabia has sought to go beyond energy and petrochemical investments. 
However, given the lack of economic diversification at home, there are limits at least 
on outward FDI diversity in the short-to-mid-term future. Furthermore, China’s 
regulatory framework is not the easiest either to navigate and, in some sectors, more 
established Chinese or foreign competitors, including those from other Gulf countries 
such as the UAE, are ahead of Saudi Arabia. Only very limited details can be 
indicated. 
In 1993, Al-Zamil Steel Building Company was awarded a contract to build an air-
conditioning plant in Shenzhen’s free economic zone, allegedly investing $2 million 
into the construction.900 Yet, since then, Saudi construction companies seem to have 
struggled to gain a foothold in China. This is despite discussions taking place in high 
diplomatic circles during state visits, during which has been suggested that Saudi 
companies should assist in China’s general infrastructure development.901 
Nevertheless, most EPC-contracts and Saudi infrastructure FDI into China took place 
in the energy and petrochemicals sector. On the other hand, it is clear that more 
private investments from Saudi Arabia into China are occurring than meets the 
outsider’s eye. A few examples have made it into the press. 
For instance, the major Saudi textile manufacturer Ajlan Brothers and Company 
seems to run a number of production subsidiaries in China.902 Al-Sudairi mentions 
the firm has invested approximately $632 million into at least 20 Chinese textile 
factories since the year 2000. ‘These factories, which are overseen by the main 
headquarters in Shanghai, are dispersed within a number of Chinese provinces such 
as Jiangsu, Shandong, Xinjiang, and others, employing altogether some 15,000 
workers’.903 
                                                          
900 Bin Huwaidin, M. (2002), China’s Relations with Arabia and the Gulf 1949-1999. Oxon: 
Routledge, p. 234; Simpfendorfer 2011: p. 36. 
901 Alterman, Garver 2008: p. 33. 
902 Arabian Business (2017), ‘Saudi Rich List. Ajlan & Bros. Group’ 
[http://www.arabianbusiness.com/saudi-rich-list-2009/list?itemid=151035]. 
903 Al-Sudairi, M. (2012), ‘Sino-Saudi Relations: An Economic History’. Gulf Research Center, August 
2012 
[https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156677/Final_Completed_Sino_Saudi_Economic_History_Report_37
78.pdf], p. 26. Expansion plans of Ajlan Brothers and Company’s factories were announced in 
September 2016, adding also to a business portfolio composed of ‘four wholly-owned companies 
operating in the fields of cotton products, clothes, Arabian-style scarfs, as well as gift, and wood boxes’. 
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Another example occurred in 2013, when Saudi Binladin Group opened a $15 million 
marble factory in China.904 Also, ACWA Power International, another Saudi global 
player, has a regional office in Beijing. Though it has not undertaken any projects 
inside China, it had formed joint ventures with Chinese firms in other countries.905  
China’s financial and wider services sector has seen slightly more Saudi activity, 
although, as stated above, portfolio capital flows are difficult and often impossible to 
trace. The prominent royal Saudi businessman and philanthropist Prince Alwaleed 
bin Talal has been an active investor on the Chinese stock markets, bringing together 
a group of Gulf investors to bid in the Bank of China IPO in 2006. Al-Aziziyah 
Investment Company was finally granted a share amounting to $390 million.906 
Finally, SAGIA, which has invested directly into setting up a branch in Hong Kong, is 
likely to have been an active portfolio-and-direct-investor in Chinese companies.907 
Other Saudi financial services are likely to follow suit, especially since Hong Kong 
and Ningxia Province have expressed interest in introducing Islamic Finance to 
China.908 
Such joint Sino-Saudi and multilateral pan-Asian investment plans could also go 
hand in hand with China’s BRI. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia is a founding member of 
the AIIB, contributing roughly $2.5 billion to its 2015 start-up portfolio, an 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
See: Argaam (2016), ‘Ajlan & Bros inks deal to expand affiliate’s plants in China’. 4 September 2016 
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905 Bloomberg (2017), ‘Company Overview of ACWA Power International’. 18 October 2017 
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906 Additionally, bin Talal’s chaired Kingdom Holdings Company ‘also has a presence in China through 
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Guandong and Pudong Banks’. See: Al-Sudairi 2012b: p. 27. Beyond financial services, he has invested 
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equivalent of about 2.7% ownership in the entity.909 One strategically important BRI-
project that Saudi Arabia seems enthusiastic to support is the China Pakistan 
Economic Corridor.910  
Hence, Sino-Saudi cooperation and joint business ventures have grown in both 
directions and in third party countries. Much of this is not only underpinned by 
market forces, but by high political interests. Both countries have eagerly deepened 
their bilateral diplomacy and cooperation. But does that entail a political alliance? 
 
7.3 Sino-Saudi Diplomacy and Strategy 
In the modern period, China’s and Saudi Arabia’s first official contact dates back to 
the year of 1946 when both states signed the Treaty of Amity.911 However, also due to 
historical developments in China shortly thereafter, no formal diplomatic relations 
were established between the countries before 1990.912 Prior to that year, China’s 
informal diplomatic contact to Saudi Arabia was mostly confined to the issue of 
facilitating the Hajj of Chinese Muslims to Mecca, at least until 1979.913 
Nevertheless, formal diplomatic ties to the GCC-organization had been launched 
from the latter ten years earlier.914 Those particular official links can be explained by 
China’s strategic pivot towards the US, which in the Middle East translated into a 
mutual interest of containing Soviet influence in that region.915 
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Trade too, including the Kingdom’s controversial purchase of Chinese CSS-2 
Interregional Ballistic Missiles, dates back to the late 1980s.916 That deal allegedly 
took place for two wholly disconnected reasons. Since the missiles’ technological 
quality was considered relatively poor and since the missiles only made operational 
sense when fitted with nuclear warheads – which Riyadh has so far not pursued – 
their strategic impact was considered negligible. Rather, the Saudis used this 
purchase as a means to pressure the Reagan administration to lift congressional 
restrictions on the American export of F-15 fighter jets to the Kingdom. The Chinese 
motivation presumably revolved around an ultimately successful effort to convince 
the Saudis to terminate their diplomatic relations with Taiwan and officially switch to 
the People’s Republic of China instead.917 The switch occurred shortly after in 1990. 
From that moment onwards, the bilateral diplomatic focus has been on establishing 
trade and investment between the countries, particularly in the late 1990s when 
China’s crude oil imports began to grow noticeably, as shown above. As oil constitutes 
a vital ingredient for both countries’ economically globalized and politically stable 
existence (and regime survival), it is not illogical for China and Saudi Arabia having 
labelled their relations ‘strategic’.918 
Consequently, China and Saudi Arabia have never directly or dramatically clashed 
politically. So far, the only issues around which both countries have found each other 
somewhat opposed, are firstly, the Syrian Civil War since 2011, in which China, 
alongside Russia, and more importantly alongside Iran, has unflinchingly backed the 
Assad regime in the UN-Security Council, whereas Saudi Arabia has not only called 
for Assad’s removal, but has actively sought to accomplish that via proxy forces, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter. 
This issue is connected to the second and third aspect. China’s relations with Saudi 
Arabia’s arch-enemy, Iran, have long been relatively warm, although China ultimately 
backed at least soft sanctions against Iran’s recent nuclear programme, as also 
discussed in the previous chapter. Yet, China has never declared a diplomatic and 
economic preference of Saudi Arabia over Iran, and therefore, Saudi Arabia 
constantly seems to be fearing even the slightest indication of the opposite.919 Finally, 
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Saudi Arabia’s active support for regional and global Wahhabi Islam has also often 
entailed a support for various Islamist groups. Though this cannot be said directly of 
China’s Uyghur separatist groups or so-called Islamic State, the former’s Islamist 
ideology and the latter’s increased terrorist threat to China has been seen in Beijing 
as an indirect result of Wahhabi Sharia’s Saudi home. On the other hand, the Chinese 
have recently come to appreciate Saudi efforts to contribute towards fighting Islamic 
State, endorsing Beijing’s repression of Xinjiang separatism, and helping to fund the 
international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan.920 
Other than these issues, the bilateral story has been one of mutual political interests 
of a stable Gulf and a stable global economy, based on the secure flow of oil, trade, 
and capital between the countries. On a secondary basis, cultural and educational 
exchanges are also increasingly encouraged and actively pursued. These interests 
have constantly characterized the two countries bilateral interactions.921 
The first noteworthy high-level meeting occurred in 1998, when then Saudi Crown 
Prince Abdullah visited China. During the visit, following long discussions on a 
multitude of issues, the friendly inclinations of both countries populations and 
governments towards each other was highlighted. Reciprocating the visit, then 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin came to Saudi Arabia a year later – announcing a 
‘strategic oil relationship’ in the process.922 
The most attention-grabbing state visits by that time took place in 2006. In January, 
Abdullah, the then new Saudi King, tellingly chose China for his first overseas state 
visit – symbolically showcasing China’s new centrality in Saudi foreign relations. 
Moreover, it was the first Saudi visit to China by a head of state. Again, a whole 
collection of agreements in energy cooperation, trade initiatives, and proposals for 
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joint-training in technological education, was signed between both governments.923 
Hu Jintao, then China’s President, visited Saudi Arabia only three months later.924  
In May 2008, when China’s Sichuan Province was hit by a major earth-quake with 
many casualties, Saudi Arabia responded by donating $60 million for disaster relief 
and reconstruction. Later that year, Xi Jinping, then still China’s Vice President, paid 
his first official visit to Riyadh, inking a declaration of ‘strategic friendly relations’.925 
President Hu Jintao, in February 2009, embarked on his second visit to Riyadh 
within three years of his first. Meeting King Abdullah, an MoU for Sino-Saudi 
strategic and friendly ties was signed, which encouraged initiative at all levels, from 
political, to economic, and cultural.926 
Since then, regular high-levels visits by various government ministers have occurred, 
all producing further agreements. These included visits, for instance, by China’s then 
Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, Chinese special envoy Sun Bigan, Saudi special envoy 
Prince Bandar bin Sultan, or Saudi Oil Minister Ali Al-Naimi.927 These missions have 
constantly been accompanied by large trade and investment delegations. 
Furthermore, countless trade and investment fora and cooperative institutions, 
ranging from Riyadh and Beijing, to Jeddah and Yanbu, to Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
and Yinchuan will likely grow in the wake of diversifying trade, investment, cultural 
and educational exchanges. None of these growing and diversifying ties in 
government, business, and education are yet as deep as they often are between Saudi 
Arabia and the US. Yet, the multiple channels that are being set up, create a 
transnational network strengthening cooperation – and the maintenance of joint 
projects that would otherwise not be there, or probably at least not on the achieved 
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scale. ‘Mechanisms such as the Entrepreneurs’ Conference and Investment Seminar 
and the conference on Energy Cooperation have provided the two sides with new 
platforms for practical cooperation’.928  
In January 2016, China’s current President Xi Jinping finally embarked on his first 
state visits to Middle Eastern countries in his role of president. His regional tour 
included Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran. The timing as well as the chronology of the 
visits was noted in the press. His visit to Iran occurred just days after the lifting of 
UN-sanctions on the country – signifying China’s determination to exploit new trade 
and investment opportunities with Iran. On the other hand, Xi picked Riyadh as his 
first regional destination, followed by his visit to Egypt and the Cairo-headquartered 
Arab League, before traveling on to Tehran. Yet, Xi and his entourage made clear, 
that China had no intention of picking sides in the region’s primary conflict between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia and therefore signalled no deeper interest in assertively 
mediating between the parties, at least not on a direct and official basis.929 
Behind closed doors, slightly more Chinese diplomatic activity seems to have been 
occurring though. Succeeding a previous Chinese effort, in Beijing, to mediate 
secretly between the Syrian government and some of its opposition forces, China sent 
its special envoy to Riyadh and Tehran prior to Xi’s state visits.930 Commenting on 
this move, which aimed to calm both antagonists in an increasingly escalating geo-
political issue, Li Shaoxian, vice president of a Chinese government think tank, 
acknowledged China would have to increase its diplomatic involvement, but stressed 
a different Chinese approach: ‘The Middle East is a touchstone for major powers […]. 
Whether it is a graveyard [of empires] depends on whether a country seeks 
hegemony’, emphasizing that China would not.931 
However, on Xi’s state visits, which apparently had been postponed by a year, 
precisely due to Saudi-Iranian conflict escalations over Yemen, nothing substantial 
was announced on the political front. In line with China’s usual stance, the focus was 
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[http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-35351391]. 
930 Martina, M. (2016), ‘China's Xi to visit Saudi, Iran in new diplomacy push’. Reuters, 15 January 
2016 [http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-middleeast-idUKKCN0UT12O]. 
931 Quoted in: Ibid. 
322 
 
very much on the bilateral economic relations and strictly bilateral and politically 
neutral cooperation in various fields.932 
In August 2016, the then Deputy Crown Prince, now Crown Prince, Muhammad bin 
Salman visited China in order to drive home the argument that Sino-Saudi relations 
needed to boost several aspects of their relationship. First and foremost, it included 
memoranda in promotion of his Vision 2030 to Chinese investors.933 Moreover, 
incorporation of the security issue area into their bilateral partnership was also on 
the Prince’s agenda. He managed to get China’s Defence Minister Chang Wanquan to 
officially confirm that China agreed to elevate military cooperation to a new level.934  
This and previous discussion on the matter seemed to have had the desired effect, at 
least to an extent. Two months after bin Salman’s visit, in a landmark occasion in 
Sino-Saudi relations, the first military exercises were held between the two countries. 
More specifically, their respective special forces units, in the city of Chengdu, 
conducted counter-terrorism drills and hostage-rescue exercises, as well as training 
under extreme weather conditions.935 The nature of the exercises points towards the 
countries’ growing type of security concern. Reuters also explained China’s 
motivation with recently elevated terrorist threats from Xinjiang, neighbouring 
Central and South Asian countries, as well as the Middle East:  
‘Chinese officials have long been concerned that instability in Afghanistan will spill over into China’s 
western region of Xinjiang, home to the Muslim Uighur people. Hundreds of people have died there in 
recent years in unrest the government blames on militant separatists. Authorities in bordering 
Kyrgyzstan said a suicide bomb attack on the Chinese embassy in the Kyrgyz capital in August was 
ordered by Uighur militants active in Syria.’936  
Since the days of the Chinese ballistic missile transfer to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, 
security cooperation and arms trade between the two countries had not seen any 
significant developments. Admittedly, between 2008 and 2011, China did export 
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military equipment to Saudi Arabia. However, compared to the sheer value and 
technological superiority of US arms sales to the Kingdom, as well as Washington’s 
deep security relationship with the Saudis, these particular Chinese exports cannot be 
placed in a strategically impactful category.937 Still, the joint military exercises are 
likely to see an increasing regularity, although they do not entail a fully-fledged 
alliance between China and Saudi Arabia. Too many variables stand in the way of the 
latter. Particularly China is not interested, for the moment, in fundamentally 
overhauling its global strategy of “business first” and its sought distance from 
political issues and security threats abroad, which Beijing does not see itself inclined 
or equipped to tackle militarily.938 Joseph Nye incidentally interprets this Chinese 
reluctance through a realist lens, stressing China’s relative lack of military capability 
vis-à-vis the US. He sees this as the most important reason for China’s free-riding 
and, in an interview with the author, stated that no immediate change in that regard 
is likely, provided the US maintains its Gulf presence. Saudi Arabia is continuously 
dependent on US strategic decisions, even when it comes to Sino-Saudi relations.939 
Although both sides celebrated their boosted security cooperation, the same Chinese 
hesitancy could be observed in the latest Sino-Saudi high-level meeting.   
King Salman’s first visit to China, as already mentioned above, occurred in March 
2017, as part of a month-long tour to six Asian countries, including also Japan, 
Indonesia, and Malaysia. On top of economic interests, the tour had a significant 
political and military dimension. Not only did Salman seek to bolster Saudi Arabia’s 
newly created Islamic Military Alliance, which includes Indonesia and Malaysia. The 
coalition had been incentivized by an increasingly perceived Saudi necessity to battle 
Islamic State’s global affiliates on a multilateral Muslim basis. The Saudi Monarch 
also sought to lure China into a deeper security relationship with upgraded military 
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Group (2017), ‘To Intervene or Not? China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan Raises 
Questions’. 2 October 2017 [https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/intervene-
or-not-chinas-foreign-policy-experiment-south-sudan-raises-questions]; Jacques 2012: pp. 526-533; 
Shambaugh 2013: p. 271; For a comprehensive analysis of Chinese geostrategic energy interests, 
especially along the SLOCS, and Chinese foreign and military policy, see: Cole, B. (2016), China's 
Quest for Great Power: Ships, Oil, and Foreign Policy. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. For a 
technical and doctrinal analysis of China’s military capabilities, see: Cliff, R. (2015), China's Military 
Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
939 Nye, J. (Harvard University), interviewed by the author on 21 February 2015 at the International 
Studies Association’s Annual Convention in New Orleans. See Consent Form attached. Despite coining 
CIT, Nye also acknowledged realism’s enduring relevance in Middle Eastern matters. 
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cooperation.940 Though Xi’s China agreed to cooperate more actively in solving 
Middle Eastern conflicts, Salman’s four-day visit again did not produce any game-
changing, publicized results in the matter. However, the South China Morning Post 
reported numerous Chinese government officials and analysts acknowledging China’s 
growing role in a region that is perceived to experience a decline of American power, 
especially in times of uncertainty over the Trump administration’s long-term regional 
strategy.941  
Again, an emphasis was laid on economic agreements and transactions though and 
substantiated by a Saudi delegation of around 1000 businessmen signing deals worth 
$65 billion with their Chinese counterparts.942 If implemented, the overall size of 
those investments would be more than double the size of all Chinese infrastructure 
investments in Saudi Arabia between 2005 and 2015, according to the CGIT’s value 
figures. Such deals, in addition to China’s pledge towards more military cooperation 
also served to calm Saudi fears over a Chinese political and economic pivot towards 
Iran, in times of sanctions relief and growing Belt and Road investments on the other 
side of the Gulf.  
All in all, Sino-Saudi diplomatic relations have intensified across various economic 
and partly also political fields. Yet, in terms of bilateral relations beyond economics, it 
is primarily Saudi Arabia, faced with future economic, political and security 
challenges, which is seeking a deeper relationship. This is primarily due to its 
incentives to hedge against a potential future American disengagement from both the 
Kingdom and its region. The possible development of these interrelated issues will be 
addressed in the conclusion of this thesis. 
 
7.4 Chapter Conclusion and Theoretical Assessment 
China and Saudi Arabia, as this chapter has shown, are increasingly interdependent 
in an economic sense. This has primarily manifested itself via their skyrocketing 
trade, especially since the millennium. Though their bi-directional trade does not 
                                                          
940 Reuters (2017), ‘King Salman ends Asia tour, returns to Saudi Arabia: agency’. 18 March 2017 
[https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-asia-idUSKBN16P051]. 
941 Shi, J. (2017), ‘Saudi king’s visit puts Beijing in Middle East spotlight’. In: South China Morning 
Post, 14 March 2017 [http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2078696/saudi-
kings-visit-puts-beijing-middle-east-spotlight]. 
942 Reuters 2017, ‘King Salman ends Asia tour’. 
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constitute a very large share of their respective global trade value, it has grown 
immensely in absolute terms. More importantly, their primary trade commodity, oil, 
constitutes a vital ingredient in both their economies. Since the year 2000, Saudi 
Arabia has been China’s most important foreign source of oil. China’s imports from 
the Kingdom are therefore heavily dominated by hydrocarbons. Yet, Saudi Arabia has 
also imported an increasing portion of Chinese manufactured goods – which 
diversifies their overall bilateral trade to an extent, although, at least until very 
recently, China has run up a large trade deficit with Saudi Arabia. 
Bilateral economic interdependence arguably only exists so far within the energy 
issue area, whereas all other product categories in Sino-Saudi trade are “merely” 
marked by what Keohane and Nye would call interconnectedness. Interdependence in 
oil trade has increased, but only on a sensitivity level. Vulnerability interdependence 
only exists between China and the Gulf as a whole, and would only be reached with 
Saudi Arabia alone, if China were to be cut off from other major foreign oil sources in 
an absence of an energy revolution at home. Yet, a small, but important asymmetry in 
Sino-Saudi energy interdependence can be detected. Although Saudi Arabia has many 
large oil customers, in particular in Asia, and is thus vulnerably dependent on Asia as 
whole, the Chinese economy is ultimately too big for Saudi Arabia to lose out on. 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is sensitively dependent on Chinese oil market share, but, 
in the long run, specifically in times of low oil prices, would become increasingly 
vulnerable.  
Bi-directional investment between China and Saudi Arabia has also increased, though 
on a lesser scale than trade. Most of Chinese investments into Saudi Arabia have 
come in the form of EPC contracts, mainly in Saudi Arabia’s energy and 
petrochemical industries, but additionally in real estate and transport. Metals, 
agriculture, and other sectors have also been the target of Chinese investment. EPC, 
FDI, and FPI flows, and the role of Chinese financial services are likely to surge as 
both countries seek a deeper and more diversified interdependence. This too 
accounts for Saudi investment into China, which has also grown, though to a lesser 
extent than capital flows in the other direction, and significantly so in China’s energy 
and petrochemicals industries, which Saudi Arabia has targeted in order to cement its 
long-term market share in oil exports. Neither of the two countries is yet heavily 
interdependent in bi-directional investment though. Nevertheless, they are 
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attempting to change that by, for instance, stressing the complementarity of China’s 
BRI and Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030. This is occurring even as both countries seek to 
maximize energy trade diversification in order to cushion against their respective 
reliance on each other in energy trade matters. Neo-liberal institutionalism would 
stress overall interdependence and the mutuality of interests in the cooperation in a 
globalized world and a resulting diversity in multiple channels connecting both 
societies. 
This has been taking place via diplomatic initiatives on both sides. The high number 
of state visits, facilitating business deals and deeper institutionalization of relations 
proves this mutual desire. Generally, the dominance of Saudi oil exports in bilateral 
trade though points towards a clear hierarchy of issue areas for now, a condition not 
matching CIT’s ideal type. Still, neither does military security nor does China’s overall 
relative power dominate Sino-Saudi relations, which is what realism would predict. 
On the contrary, the two countries’ general power asymmetry is not reflected by at 
least a similar level of asymmetry of interdependence. 
However, from a Saudi perspective this apolitical status quo is insufficient in the long 
run. Saudi Arabia has shown strong interest in China playing a more active political 
role in the region, also hinting at defensive realism driving the Kingdom to hedge 
against its total security dependence on a US which might one day downgrade its 
alliance and reduce its regional role. Although China has voiced a cautious 
willingness to step up its political footprint in the region, for instance as a mediator, 
and although China and Saudi Arabia recently conducted their first joint military 
exercises, imminent strategic change is not evident yet. China continues to resist 
more political responsibility and largely pursues its business interests. Its overall 
relative power vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia enables it to do so for now. 
Despite this caution, it needs to be underlined that China’s stake in Saudi Arabia 
could increase not only due to growing oil imports alone, but also for geo-strategic 
reasons. As the full viability of China’s BRI across Eurasia is still in question, the 
countries that China will have to rely on more than on others will only completely 
reveal themselves over time. It is especially the land route – the Silk Road Economic 
Belt – that has been viewed with scepticism due to costliness, and due to the political 
and security risks inside Central Asia, Mackinder’s heartland. If this scepticism turns 
out to be justified, then the BRI’s oceanic branches – the 21st Century Maritime Silk 
327 
 
Road and China’s String of Pearls – will rise in importance even more than they are 
doing anyway. The more China continues to rely on trade by sea, the more Saudi 
Arabia will matter, because of its geographical location not only in the Indian Ocean’s 
north-western extremity, but also because of its combined coastal position between 
both the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea bottlenecks. As this chapter has demonstrated, 
China’s investments on the Kingdom’s commercially vibrant Red Sea coast are telling 
in that respect. Saudi Arabia is the south-western edge of the centre on Spykman’s 
rimland. Furthermore, the Red Sea is geo-politically less volatile, paradoxically due to 
its more multipolar waters, which are regionally relatively uncontested, at least when 
compared to the Gulf. Already, China, alongside many others, has a military base in 
Djibouti, and a visible economic presence in Saudi port cities like Jeddah, Jazan, and 
Yanbu, which may one day look like something of a Chinese “back-door-entry” into a 
Gulf country. 
Yet, due to political sensitivity, a Chinese military base would not seem likely for now, 
nor even necessary. Furthermore, the lack of issue area-linkage so far, has less to do 
with interdependence prohibiting this, but rather with the fact that China’s energy 
security has, until now, not required China to do so. This is partly due to the ongoing 
US-Gulf security umbrella, on which China has been free-riding – a possible strategy 
incorporated by hegemonic stability theory. Such an interpretation though points 
towards hidden realist dynamics and constitute an aspect that will be addressed in 
the conclusion. 
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8. China-United Arab Emirates Relations 
The overall impression of the New Silk Roads connecting East and West Asia is that 
energy trade is the driving force. Indeed, looking at the previous chapter, the case 
study on China-Saudi relations has again demonstrated a clear dominance of energy 
trade over all other areas. The second case study, on China-UAE relations has two 
rationales: Firstly, among GCC countries, the UAE is the second most important 
Chinese economic partner, in trade and investment value, as already briefly 
demonstrated in Chapter 6. Secondly, Sino-Emirati connections are the most 
diversified among China’s Gulf partners so far. Hence, an assessment of the level of 
that diversification has important consequences for the answer of the research 
question and the validity of its theoretical framework. In other words: just how far do 
the new Sino-Gulf Silk Roads go beyond energy and how does the answer to that 
question influence China’s regional interests, strategy, risks, and opportunities? 
Sino-Emirati trade grew noticeably at about the time, around the year 2000, when 
Sino-Saudi trade also developed. Though the UAE has also exported much oil to 
China, its small territorial size has not been the only reason for a radically different 
trade pattern. Unlike the case with Saudi Arabia and all other Gulf states, China runs 
a trade surplus with the UAE. Investment flows are also more diversified than with 
Saudi Arabia, as this chapter shows. Finally, Sino-Emirati diplomatic relations have 
grown very close as a result of their booming and diverse economic interactions. 
 
8.1 Sino-Emirati Trade 
As seen in Figure 29, bilateral trade has grown significantly since China’s joining of 
the WTO in 2001. From roughly $2.8 billion total trade value that year, it reached 
approximately $55 billion – its hitherto pinnacle – in 2014. In other words, within a 
timeframe of one and a half decades, it grew by a staggering 1,840%. The story of 
consistent trade growth has merely been interrupted in two of the last 15 years. As the 
global credit crunch hit the Emirates by bursting Dubai’s real estate bubble in 2009, 
bilateral trade between China and the UAE was reversed by almost the entire 
previous year’s value.943 Yet, it recovered instantly the following year. More recently, 
in 2015, China’s slight economic slow-down, its relatively low GDP, and fall of stocks, 
                                                          
943 Reuters (2013), ‘Gulf cash replaces debt to fuel new Dubai property boom’. 9 October 2013 
[http://www.reuters.com/article/dubai-property-idUSL6N0HZ1UQ20131009]. 
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as well as the simultaneous low oil price negatively affecting the Gulf economies, 
resulted in the first dip in Sino-Emirati bilateral trade since the financial crisis, falling 
back to roughly $48 billion.944 
 
Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [MS Excel chart created by author]. 
 
Despite the recent slow-down in trade growth – which is suspected to be due to 
China’s domestic economic challenges – such fast and dramatic growth in trade value 
in a relatively short period of time highlights the extensive interconnectedness at 
least. 
 
8.1.1 China’s Exports to the UAE 
Figure 30 demonstrates a striking difference to Figure 2 towards the beginning of 
Chapter 6. Whereas overall China-GCC trade has been and continues to be greatly 
dominated by Chinese (energy) imports – translating into a 2014 Chinese trade 
deficit of nearly $38 billion with the GCC – China’s trade relations with the UAE 
show the opposite picture. In that same year, China exported goods worth nearly $40 
billion to the UAE and enjoyed a bilateral trade surplus of around $23 billion. This 
pattern has endured. Since the advent of China-UAE economic relations, China has 
                                                          
944 Tiezzi, S. (2016), ‘China’s trade slows’. In: The Gulf Time, 24 February 2016 [http://emirates-
business.ae/chinas-trade-slows/]. 
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constantly exported roughly between half to two-thirds more to the UAE than it 
imported from that country. China is now number one exporter to the UAE, having 
recently overtaken India and the United States.945 
 
Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [MS Excel chart created by author]. 
 
Before laying out and scrutinizing the nature of products imported by the Emirates 
from China, it is necessary to explain why their value is so high, given the 
comparatively small demographic and territorial size of the UAE.  
 
8.1.1.1 China’s Gulf Trade Hub 
The staggering overall numbers seen in Figure 30 are likely due to the fact that more 
than half of the UAE’s imports from China are not consumed domestically but are re-
exported to third parties. This phenomenon is mostly not recorded by customs 
officials as exports from the originating country. However, as a rough guide, it has 
been calculated that about 60% of China’s exports to the UAE are re-exported into 
                                                          
945 International Trade Centre, ‘Trade Map’ [http://www.trademap.org/Index.aspx]. 
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third countries.946 The importance of particularly Dubai as a hub for Chinese regional 
and global business and trade, not only serving the wider Gulf and Middle East, but 
also the African and European markets.947 In order to evaluate the centrality of the 
UAE for China’s Middle Eastern and trans-continental trade, it is necessary to ask 
whether the UAE is hypothetically replaceable in this role by one or more of its Gulf 
neighbours. 
Dubai is one of the world’s biggest trading hubs and the third largest re-export centre 
in the world, following Hong Kong and Singapore.948 Such hubs exist, because it is 
easier to transport massive volumes of manufactured goods there, and then re-load 
them onto smaller ships destined for numerous and specific individual locations. 
Dubai’s strategic location at the crossroads of three continents is one of the necessary 
geographical preconditions for this privileged position. It need not be exceptional in 
this case though, as all other Gulf states would fulfil this geographic criterion as well. 
Although the UAE’s Arabian Sea coast in the Fujairah Emirate gives the country the 
opportunity to circumvent the potentially vulnerable Strait of Hormuz – an 
advantage that only its neighbours Oman and Saudi Arabia (on the Red Sea coast) 
share – the reasons for the UAE’s and especially Dubai’s role as a hub are more 
institutional, rather than merely geographical. 
The emirate’s legal framework and economic policies have encouraged the city to 
become what it is today. The friendly business environment was a prerequisite for the 
city to become a global hub in business, finance, and trade. The fact that the UAE, 
especially through Dubai, has managed to escape its dependency on oil by what OPEC 
                                                          
946 Cafiero, G., Wagner, D. (2017), ‘What the Gulf States Think of 'One Belt, One Road'’. In: The 
Diplomat, 24 May 2017 [http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/what-the-gulf-states-think-of-one-belt-
one-road/; footnote]. This at least is a far more credible interpretation of this number than a whole 
chain of claims that in fact 60% of China’s entire global exports go through the UAE. See: Kamel, M., 
Quilliam, N. (2015), ‘The GCC-Asian Relationship: From Transaction to Strategy’. In: East Asia, 32:3, 
September 2015. Heidelberg: Springer, p. 325; Trenwith, C. (2013), ‘China-UAE trade: Enter the 
dragon’. In: Arabian Business, 10 March 2013 [http://www.arabianbusiness.com/china-uae-trade-
enter-dragon-492242.html]; Rakhmat 2015a. It is immediately obvious that this constitutes a 
dramatic and probably just sketchy miscalculation. China’s annual global export value is in the lower 
trillions of dollars, whereas even the highest valued year in Chinese exports to the UAE, in 2014, was 
“barely” $40 billion. This includes re-exports. See: The Observatory of Economic Complexity (2017), 
‘China’ [http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/chn/]. 
947 Cafiero, Wagner 2017; Olimat, M. (2015), China and the Middle East: From Silk Road to Arab 
Spring. Oxon: Routledge, p. 163-164. 
948 Kumar, R. (2013), ‘The UAE’s Strategic Trade Partnership with Asia: A Focus on Dubai’. Middle 
East Institute, 19 August 2013 [http://www.mei.edu/content/uae%E2%80%99s-strategic-trade-
partnership-asia-focus-dubai]. 
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has calculated as 60%, is not only due to Jebel Ali Port’s infrastructure.949 A business-
friendly and free-trade-orientated mentality merged with investment in services, 
tourism, leisure, and entertainment plays a major part. No income tax duties, no 
corporate taxation, no currency restrictions, general import duties of 5% outside free 
zones, minimum government control of the private sector, as well as competitive 
freight charges are part of an efficient regulatory framework and infrastructural 
environment. The World Bank ranked the UAE number 31 in their Ease of ‘Doing 
Business Report 2016’.950 
The establishment of over two dozen economic free zones, do not only encourage 
FDI, but also offer an exemption from customs duties for imports destined for the 
free zones, such as Jebel Ali or the Dubai Multi Commodities Center (DMCC). 
Furthermore, Dubai is a world leader when it comes to multi-modal logistics 
capabilities. Over 170 shipping lines and over 120 airlines contribute to this 
substantial trade-enabling infrastructure.951 
It is the whole “Dubai package” that is hard to copy and would be impossible to move 
quickly, i.e. in the direct short-term future, to another Gulf location. Other GCC 
members could compete and are doing so and will continue to do so, in specific issue 
areas. But since offering all conditions together would take a long time to set up, and 
since Dubai and the UAE are seen to be ‘decades ahead’ – it is difficult to imagine an 
alternative location for now.952  
                                                          
949 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (2017), ‘UAE facts and figures’ 
[http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/170.htm]. 
950 The World Bank (2017), ‘Ease of Doing Business in United Arab Emirates’. Doing Business 
[http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/united-arab-emirates/]. 
951 Kumar 2013. 
952 Qatar may be working on its attractiveness of living standards, it is a major exporter of liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) to China, may promote educational exchanges to build its diversified knowledge 
economy, and may have established a Renminbi clearing house in Doha. See: Rakhmat, M.Z. (2015), 
‘China, Qatar, and RMB Internationalization’. In: The Diplomat, 6 June 2015 
[http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/china-qatar-and-rmb-internationalization/]. Kuwait may be able 
to plan a “Silk City”, as seen in Chapter 6, or remind China of its identity as Beijing’s first official 
diplomatic relationship in the Gulf and point to close political relations and history of cooperation. 
See: Niazi, K. (2009), ‘Kuwait Looks towards the East: Relations with China’. Middle East Institute, 1 
September 2009 [http://www.mei.edu/content/kuwait-looks-towards-east-relations-china]. Oman 
may provide the politically most tranquil domestic environment for now, it may indeed be able to 
challenge Dubai at some point in offering a major free port and spacious logistics facilities outside the 
Strait of Hormuz. See: EIU 2014: pp. 5/11. Saudi Arabia may have similar geo-economically 
transformative visions for 2030, which would greatly promote trade and investment connections to 
China, as seen in the previous chapter. Iran at some point might experience a successful integration 
into the global and regional economy after the lifting of UN-sanctions – and China would be the first to 
have its foot in the door and build on its historically close ties to Tehran, as described in Chapter 6. 
Finally, Bahrain might have just seen the opening of Chinamex’s second Middle Eastern megamall – 
the Dragon City in Muharraq – seeking to rival Dragon Mart in Dubai (see below). See: Birkenthal, S. 
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Rajesh Kumar, Associate Professor at Dubai’s Institute of Management Technology, 
points to the duration and pioneering capacity of Dubai’s development and 
reputation. The relative backlog of the other Gulf states in providing the same 
framework and services, as well as the higher risks in some of these countries would 
additionally make China reluctant to switch away from the UAE as its central export 
hub. He observes that ‘Dubai is today and is poised to remain the linchpin of Middle 
East-Asia economic interaction’.953 
One of the most potent infrastructural investments and symbols demonstrating the 
UAE’s value for Chinese exports to the country, the Middle East, and Africa is Dragon 
Mart, a giant Chinese shopping mall in Dubai’s International City. In terms of retail 
business, China has had a significant impact not only on the UAE’s consumers, but 
also on regional shopping-tourism and indeed transcontinental wholesaling. Dragon 
Mart Dubai is China’s largest mall outside the mainland and is also a wholesale hub 
for the wider Middle Eastern and African market. It hosts hundreds of Chinese SMEs 
and also larger corporations stacking their goods in countless warehouses and selling 
them in shops and on order to re-export to other countries. Goods include 
electronics, furniture, art, textiles, and food products. Initiated by China’s Ministry of 
Commerce, financed by the Chinamex Middle East Investment and Trade Promotion 
Centre, and built by Nakheel, it has recently seen an expansion – demonstrating the 
huge demand. Many of the products are competitively priced. Together with the 
lesser distance to Middle Eastern and African countries which brings China closer to 
its millions of customers, it has thereby also enabled SMEs and individuals in those 
markets to afford certain purchases that would otherwise be more expensive.954 
It seems highly unlikely for China to ship the bulk of its Middle Eastern, African, and 
even European exports to any other Gulf state any time soon. The advantages are too 
substantial, the backlog and diverse risks in most of the other candidate countries 
only too visible to not threaten the status quo hub-preferences. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(2016), ‘Bahrain's Dragon City. China's Megamall Ambitions in the Middle East’. In: Foreign Affairs, 5 
May 2016 [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-05-05/bahrains-dragon-city]. 
However, Dubai and the UAE’s package seems impossible to match any time soon. 
953 Kumar 2013. 
954 Chinamex (2015), ‘Dragon Mart Dubai’ 
[http://www.chinamex.com.cn/english/show2.asp?id=479]; Molavi, A. (2015), ‘The United Arab 
Emirates, China, and the new “Triple-South”’. SAIS Foreign Policy Institute, 22 December 2015; 
Olimat 2013: p. 167. 
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8.1.1.2 Sectors and Products 
As evident from the data illustrated in Figure 31 below, provided by the International 
Trade Centre, the bulk of goods so far shipped from China to the UAE have been from 
three product areas: electrical and electronic equipment, heavy machinery, articles of 
apparel (i.e. textiles), and generally, much in line with the older stereotype of the 
nature of Chinese exports, cheaply-manufactured consumer goods.  Further products 
include motor parts, chemicals, foodstuffs, but also increasingly high-tech equipment 
such as solar technology.955 
Product label 
China's exports to United Arab Emirates 
Value in 2011 Value in 2012 Value in 2013 Value in 2014 Value in 2015 
All products 26812848 29568343 33411295 39034356 37069274 
Electrical, electronic equipment 4573556 4977314 5455125 7385974 7247414 
Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers, etc 5112592 5495118 5669303 6778213 5677881 
Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet 2166843 2782931 3038621 2875055 3404919 
Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet 1121757 1329264 1549601 2092921 2291272 
Furniture, lighting, signs, prefabricated buildings 1027884 1706699 2278478 2316972 1954989 
Footwear, gaiters and the like, parts thereof 678885 842036 1122518 1198617 1395433 
Articles of iron or steel 1125779 1066805 1136763 1316692 1266469 
FIGURE 31: Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [Unit: US $ Thousand]. 
 
As mentioned above, China has now overtaken India and the United States as the 
number one source of total UAE imports. China’s share in the UAE’s overall imports 
now lies at 12%.956 Given China’s status as the likely number one economy in the 
world in a few years to come, the country’s position in trade is substantial. In terms of 
imports, the UAE would be at least as sensitive to a potential bilateral trade breakup 
as China would. If the dominating sectors and product labels are viewed individually, 
as shown below in Figures 32 to 35, China’s dominance, and hence the UAE’s import 
dependence, becomes even more obvious. The UAE’s import values in these figures 
differ from the values in Figure 31, because the ITC’s data is based on several sources 
that often do not match. Just as in the preceding chapter on Saudi Arabia, China’s 
mirror data differs. Thus, it must be emphasized again that all the data should be 
                                                          
955 Olimat 2013: p, 165. 
956 The Observatory of Economic Complexity (2016), ‘Where does the United Arab Emirates import 
from?’ [http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/are/show/all/2016/]. 
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viewed with a healthy dose of scepticism towards their accuracy. It is best to 
acknowledge them as a rough guide. 
 
FIGURE 32: Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [Unit: US $ Thousand]. 
 
 
FIGURE 33: Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [Unit: US $ Thousand]. 
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FIGURE 34: Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [Unit: US $ Thousand]. 
 
 
FIGURE 35: Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [Unit: US $ Thousand]. 
 
With the exception of the ITC’s ‘Product Label 84’ classified as ‘Machinery, Nuclear 
Reactors, Boilers, etc.’, where the US’s export value’s second place “merely” falls short 
of China’s by roughly a quarter, China’s export dominance in these high valued 
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sectors is considerable.  Germany, Japan, and the UK, are not within striking distance 
of the US and China in this sector. 
‘Electrical and electronic equipment’ sees China in a clear first position, with Vietnam 
coming a distant second. Since Vietnam, an important frontier market, is increasingly 
becoming one of Asia’s key powerhouses of cheap-manufactured goods, as China’s 
living standards and labour costs rise, it could be possible that the gap between China 
and Vietnam in the UAE’s imports of electrical and electronical equipment will 
narrow over time.957 South Korea, the US, and Malaysia are, placed third, fourth, and 
fifth, are far behind Vietnam and are seeing little indication of growth, relative to 
China and Vietnam. 
Asia’s overall dominance is evident in Product Label 61, ‘Articles of apparel, 
accessories, knit or crochet’. China again plainly leads the race for Emirati imports, 
India reaches second position, Bangladesh, Turkey, and Vietnam follow far away 
given their much smaller country size. The picture is similar in Product Label 62 
which also covers textiles. ‘Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet’ sees 
Italy in the mix, reaching third place. Bangladesh and Turkey come fourth and fifth. 
Thus, it is no understatement to observe that the UAE is visibly meeting its consumer 
needs by importing various goods from China primarily. Though it would be wrong to 
talk of dependence in the light of products that are being manufactured all over the 
world, the sheer amount is also guaranteed by China’s huge size. At least in the short 
run, the UAE would arguably lose large amounts of manufactured goods for its own 
consumption and large amounts of cash yields in re-exports. To assess the bilateral 
asymmetry, the next section will now briefly focus on the other side of the 
relationship: China’s imports from the UAE. 
 
8.1.2 China’s Imports from the UAE 
As already seen in Figure 30, UAE exports to China mirror Chinese exports to the 
UAE in terms of growth. Regarding value though, it is evident Emirati exports trail 
far behind. While the latter’s growth rate between 2001 and 2014 lies at a stunning 
                                                          
957 Zhen, S. (2016), ‘Manufacturers step up search for low cost alternative to China’. In: South China 
Morning Post, 11 May 2016 
[http://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/1863709/manufacturers-step-search-low-cost-
alternative-china]. 
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3,422%, its total value at the pinnacle in 2014 lies at approximately $16 billion, 
compared to China’s $39 billion.958 This equates to an Emirati trade deficit with 
China of roughly $23 billion. This can be firstly explained by the UAE’s small country 
size. Secondly, it does not export many non-hydrocarbon products. 
 
 
Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [MS Excel chart created by author]. 
 
Indeed, a brief glance at Figure 36 instantly gives the clearest of answers. Rather 
unsurprisingly, given China’s energy demand, its fuel imports from the UAE 
overwhelmingly drown all the others. Nearly 80% of the UAE’s exports to China are 
hydrocarbons.  
 
6.1.2.1 Hydrocarbon Imports 
As seen again in Figure 37 below and in the two preceding chapters, in bilateral 
terms, China has managed to significantly diversify its oil import sources by country. 
In 2014, China drew 4% of its total oil imports from the UAE, which has been a 
relatively constant share over the recent years. Compared to a 16% share of Saudi 
                                                          
958 The author’s calculations (data derived from ITC, Trade Map). 
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Arabia, a 13% share of Angola, an 11% of Russia, a 10% of Oman, and a 9% of both 
Iraq and Iran, the UAE’s importance in this field is relatively modest.959 
 
 
FIGURE 37: Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. Available at: 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=CHN. 
 
Given the UAE’s limited size of (resource holding) territory compared to these other 
countries, 4% nevertheless constitutes a noteworthy Emirati share. Since the fall of 
the oil price towards the end of that year, the value of China’s oil imports from the 
UAE has declined considerably, albeit so has that of all other suppliers. In 2016, 
Russia became China’s largest provider of foreign oil, with the UAE coming tenth, 
supplying oil worth $3.9 billion.960 To talk of a Chinese energy dependence on the 
UAE, incidentally, would take the argument too far in any of the last two decades. As 
                                                          
959 EIA, May 2015, ‘China’: p. 11. 
960 Workman, D. (2017), ‘Crude Oil Imports by Country’. World’s Top Exports, 29 May 2017 
[http://www.worldstopexports.com/crude-oil-imports-by-country/]. This is merely down to the low 
oil price, not a fall in import quantities. On the contrary, China’s oil imports have steadily grown until 
the time of writing, primarily due to Chinese “teapot” refineries faced with no import quotas, and 
China’s strategic decision to make use of the low oil price in order to stock up its oil storage tanks for a 
rainy day. See: Sheppard, D., Raval, A., Liu, X. (2017), ‘Traders nervously eye China’s strategic oil 
imports’. In: Financial Times, 18 August 2017 [https://www.ft.com/content/608fb1ce-83fa-11e7-
94e2-c5b903247afd]. 
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even evident with the oil export giant Saudi Arabia, described in the previous chapter, 
Chinese oil import dependence on Gulf states is strategically more significant at the 
regional level. Despite Russia’s recent first place, the Gulf as a whole is the most 
important source of Chinese oil imports. It would be wrong to get distracted by the 
low price – which merely effects the reduced profits for Gulf states like the UAE, but 
saved costs for China. On its own, the UAE’s significance to Chinese energy 
consumption and short-term demand is inevitably marginal in relative terms. 
However, the other way around, it is important to ask how dependent the UAE is on 
the Chinese energy market share? It is unfortunately impossible to answer this 
question satisfactorily since the UAE does not de-classify its exact hydrocarbon 
export data by individual destination. Merely regional export flows are published. 
And here, once again, the interdependence at the regional level becomes apparent. An 
overwhelming 96% of UAE crude oil exports went to Asia in 2014.961 Owing to the 
fact that China is the largest market and, according to BP, seems destined to remain 
so for the next two decades, it should not be too adventurous to assume a reasonable 
Chinese share of Emirati oil exports.962 Thus, the UAE is likely to be more dependent 
on the Chinese energy market than China is on UAE energy supplies. A similar 
picture becomes evident when observing the UAE’s non-hydrocarbon exports to 
China. 
 
8.1.2.2 Non-Hydrocarbon Imports 
Figure 38 demonstrates again that China’s non-hydrocarbon imports from the UAE 
are negligible relative to its hydrocarbon imports. This hydrocarbon dominance is 
even compounded by the fact that most of the UAE’s produced and exported goods 
directly derive from the hydrocarbon industry. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
961 U.S. Energy Information Administration (2015), ‘United Arab Emirates. International energy data 
and analysis’. 18 May 2015 [http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=ARE], p. 5. 
962 BP, January 2014. 
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Product 
code 
Product label 
China's imports from United Arab Emirates 
Value in 
2011 
Value in 
2012 
Value in 
2013 
Value in 
2014 
Value in 
2015 
TOTAL All products 8306606 10851924 12823526 15762863 11531801 
'27 Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc 6592189 8773877 10295027 12931229 8552789 
'39 Plastics and articles thereof 1062070 1212498 1245622 1500026 1680760 
'29 Organic chemicals 121208 49274 180594 412641 344316 
'99 Commodities not elsewhere specified 282 212 66549 205983 242258 
'25 
Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, plaster, lime and 
cement 84588 219896 153833 74299 228937 
'74 Copper and articles thereof 124093 150981 248840 180980 165875 
'76 Aluminium and articles thereof 46381 67188 64887 66393 53446 
FIGURE 38: Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [Unit: US $ Thousand]. 
 
In terms of value, only one of the ITC’s product labels stands out compared to the 
following five. ‘Plastics and articles thereof’ have been the only products above the 
one-billion-dollar mark in recent years. They even grew modestly in 2015, despite the 
overall trade value’s downturn – spearheaded by a slump in UAE oil export values – 
in the pinnacle year of Sino-Emirati trade in 2014. The UAE export sectors producing 
products for the Chinese market are ‘Organic chemicals’, other natural commodities, 
and aluminium and related articles. 
 
FIGURE 39: Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [Unit: US $ Thousand]. 
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Even though the UAE’s non-hydrocarbon exports are relatively marginal, it is still 
necessary to look at which are the UAE’ major export destinations in the relevant 
product categories. Again, a significant bulk of data is classified, as Figure 39, above, 
demonstrates. Following the ‘Areas Not Elsewhere Specified’, Taiwan interestingly 
features as a major Emirati non-fuel export destination. It is followed by 
neighbouring Gulf countries primarily. The picture is clearer in the destinations of 
the product label ‘Plastics and articles thereof’, evident in Figure 40. Here, China’s 
staggering market is highly visible. 
 
FIGURE 40: Source: International Trade Centre, Trade Map [Unit: US $ Thousand]. 
 
Hence, whilst the UAE seems to be significantly dependent on the Chinese market 
also for its marginal amount of “non-hydrocarbon” exports, this entails that the 
overall Emirati GDP dependence on them is not very high either. It goes without 
saying that China, the world’s second largest economy, would notice a hypothetical 
absence of these Emirati products even less.  
To summarize, China-UAE trade is significantly imbalanced in China’s favour for 
three reasons. Firstly, the UAE’s small size necessarily places it at a structural 
disadvantage. Secondly, the UAE’s role as a regional and trans-continental trade hub 
draws in large amounts of Chinese goods which are then re-exported to other 
countries. The absence of this hub status would greatly reduce the trade value even 
further. This would have the effect of balancing Sino-Emirati bilateral trade, but it 
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would also strip the UAE from its re-export revenues. Finally, the UAE economy is 
not a major goods producer except for hydrocarbons. Besides oil, it is largely an 
exporter of capital, even as it absorbs ever more amounts of foreign direct investment 
– including China’s. 
 
8.2 Sino-Emirati Investment and Project Contracting 
In the past decade, China-GCC and China-UAE capital flows in the form of FDI and 
EPC have also greatly increased, though, especially in terms of value, on a much 
slower and lesser scale than trade. A significant bulk of FDI and EPC flows between 
the countries has been conducted by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), sometimes co-
facilitated via credit-supplies from their mother countries’ large sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs), but also, though to a lesser value, between private companies.963 
Accurate data on FDI flows is usually much harder to find, than on trade. Often the 
information is not publicly available, and databases often contradict each other due 
to different definitions and categorizations. Though the Sino-Saudi FDI values are 
higher than Sino-Emirati ones, it seems the latter are composed of smaller, but more 
numerous projects. There are more Chinese companies in the UAE than in Saudi 
Arabia, and more Emirati businesses in China than Saudi ones. The investment 
balance in the China-UAE case seems to be narrower. According to Dhaman, as this 
chapter shows below, there seems to be a higher value of Emirati greenfield 
investment in China than Chinese greenfield investment in the UAE. In EPC 
contracts, Chinese companies are much more active in the UAE though, even if their 
number and total value is lower than in Saudi Arabia, as the CGIT shows. 
 
8.2.1 China’s Investment into the UAE  
Figure 41 again shows the distribution of China’s outward infrastructure investment 
in the form of EPC contracts into GCC countries between 2005 and 2015, according 
to the Heritage Foundation’s and American Enterprise Institute’s China Global 
Investment Tracker (CGIT).964 Due to its size and importance as a hydrocarbon 
                                                          
963 Bazoobandi 2015; Davidson 2010: p. 45. 
964 American Enterprise Institute, ‘China Global Investment Tracker’ [http://www.aei.org/china-
global-investment-tracker/]. 
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source, Saudi Arabia clearly dominates the field, with more than half of the GCC’s 
share, as seen in the previous chapter. The UAE follows as a clear second, absorbing 
approximately $11 billion over the same period, which accounts for roughly a quarter 
of all Chinese infrastructure investments in the GCC. 
 
 
* excluding Bahrain (no data) 
Source: American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker 
[MS Excel chart created by author]. 
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* excluding Bahrain (no data) 
Source: American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker 
[MS Excel chart created by author]. 
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FIGURE 43: Chinese Investment into UAE in US $ Billion (2005-2015). 
Source: American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker. 
 
Figures 42 and 43 break down those Chinese infrastructure investments into six 
Emirati sectors, encompassing agriculture, energy, real estate, technology, tourism 
and transport, with energy and real estate seeing a strong dominance. Compared to 
Saudi Arabia, there is slightly less sector diversity in Chinese EPC-contracts, but more 
compared to other Gulf states. As seen in Figure 43 above and Figure 45, further 
below, total proven investment value for construction contracts in the decade 
between 2005 and 2015 in the Emirati energy sector reached $3.82 billion, trailing 
just behind the real estate sector, which saw a value of $4.49 billion.  
The following sections will address the major EPC projects. Before turning to them, it 
has to be noted again that, as with Saudi Arabia in the previous chapter, the CGIT 
does not cover the bulk of Chinese FDI flows into the UAE. Yet, there have been 
thousands of cases, often relatively small and therefore possibly disregarded in the 
CGIT. Yet, China’s investment into the UAE also incorporates a presence of several 
large and established Chinese commercial tech-brands such as China Mobile, China 
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Telecom, Huawei, and Lenovo which the CGIT also does not incorporate.965 Another 
major example is the above-mentioned Chinamex investment to establish Dragon 
Mart, which hosts thousands of Chinese SMEs. Other than China’s large companies 
which are mostly state-owned, Dragon Mart incorporates the highest amount of 
private Chinese businesses. Tong Wu, who runs the China Desk at Citibank’s branch 
in Dubai, explained this to the author with Dubai’s hub status which also attracts 
SMEs from China.966 
More than 4,000 Chinese enterprises are said to be listed in the UAE.967 By the end of 
2016, 230 of them had been registered in Jebel Ali Free Zone (JAFZA). China 
maintained its top position there the following year as well.968 With its companies 
being relative newcomers to the country and the region, more can be expected soon. 
 
FIGURE 44: Source: Dhaman Investment Attractiveness Index 2015, p. 113. 
                                                          
965 China Mobile (2016), ‘Contact Us’ 
[https://www.cmi.chinamobile.com/index.php?lang=en&Itemid=216]; China Telecom (2017), ‘About 
China Telecom Middle East FZ-LLC’ 
[http://www.chinatelecomglobal.com/subsite/arab_Introduction.html]; Huawei (2017), ‘Branch 
Office’ [http://e.huawei.com/ae/branch-office]; Lenovo (2017), ‘Contact Lenovo. General Information’ 
[https://www3.lenovo.com/ae/en/contact/]. 
966 Wu, T. (Citibank), interviewed by the author on 17 August 2015 in Dubai, DIFC. See Consent Form 
attached. 
967 Rakhmat 2015a. 
968 Gulf News (2013), ‘Jebel Ali Free Zone trade hit $80.2b in 2016’. 13 August 2013 
[http://gulfnews.com/business/economy/jebel-ali-free-zone-trade-hit-80-2b-in-2016-1.2073414]. 
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In terms of greenfield investments, Dhaman offers a slightly bigger picture than the 
CGIT. Yet, although more than 4,000 Chinese companies are present in the UAE, 
Dhaman was merely able to account for 47 conducted Chinese greenfield investments 
in the country between January 2003 and May 2015, which nevertheless is much 
more than the CGIT suggests. As Figure 44 shows, these were conducted by 37 
companies, created 2,354 jobs, and generated roughly $1,448 million. Crucially, this 
meant that China was merely ranked the 18th largest foreign greenfield investor in the 
UAE. Given China’s global economic importance and especially its high liquidity, this 
is an underwhelming performance. Though Hong Kong is listed separately, and also 
conducted 39 greenfield investments by 31 companies in the UAE, worth $1,078 
million, and thereby coming 22nd, counted together, China would still be only ranked 
15th, below Canada. Conversely, around 40% of foreign greenfield investment into the 
UAE was undertaken by Dhaman’s top three countries, the UK, ranked third, the US, 
second, and, interestingly, India, first.969 Hence, most of Chinese FDI into the UAE 
lies in the realm of joint venture projects classified as acquisitions. Furthermore, even 
in M&A, China’s priorities are Europe and North America, where it seeks to gain 
access to high technology via FDI.970 Last but not least, it is important to highlight 
again, that China, despite its four-decade long industrial revolution, has only very 
recently become a net capital exporter and a major force in outward FDI and still 
needs to catch up, whereas the US and UK have long been established investors 
abroad.971 It was especially during and after the financial crisis that China’s newly 
encouraged “go out” policy was made visible by the retreat of suddenly cash-strapped 
Western firms.972 In the coming years, a bigger Chinese FDI impact, motivated 
further by the BRI, can be expected. Despite the modest relative value so far, Chinese 
EPC contracts in the UAE have been growing and diversifying over the years. 
 
                                                          
969 Dhamam 2016: p. 112. As mentioned in Chapter 5, this is almost certainly due to a looser definition 
of what constitutes FDI, with Dhaman incorporating businesses set up by independent Indian 
expatriates in the UAE. 
970 Alon, T., Hale, G., Santos, J. (2010), ‘What Is China’s Capital Seeking in a Global Environment?’. 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 22 March 2010 [http://www.frbsf.org/economic-
research/publications/economic-letter/2010/march/china-capital-seeking-global-environment/]. 
971 Hellström, J. (2016), ‘China’s Acquisitions in Europe. European Perceptions of Chinese Investments 
and their Strategic Implications’. FOI, December 2016 
[file:///C:/Users/Philip%20GS/Downloads/http___webbrapp.ptn.foi.se_pdf_39d4c651-1562-4864-
8554-7d7310408250.pdf], pp. 11-19. 
972 Ma, D. (2017), ‘How will countries respond to China’s shift from global exporter to investor?’. In: 
World Politics Review, 19 January 2017 [https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/20945/how-
will-countries-respond-to-china-s-shift-from-global-exporter-to-investor]. 
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8.2.1.1 Energy 
Figure 45 shows that China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has invested 
large amounts into two UAE energy projects between 2005 and 2015. In 2008, it 
signed an EPC contract worth $3.29 billion to construct the Habshan-Fujairah oil 
pipeline. This single 380 km long piece of energy infrastructure, initiated by Abu 
Dhabi’s International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC), and installed jointly by 
CNPC and the China Petroleum Bureau, would ensure that the UAE could export 
more than half of its oil exports circumventing the Persian Gulf. The UAE’s 
constituent emirate of Fujairah lies on the shores of the Arabian Sea, beyond the 
strategically sensitive Strait of Hormuz – an advantage the UAE had long sought to 
utilize and which the energy security-dependent China had also quickly recognized. 
Now pumping 1.5 million metric barrels per day, it has the capacity for 1.8 million in 
the future. Although completion of the pipeline was delayed briefly due to technical 
problems and late payments, it was finally completed in March 2011, reaching its full 
capacity by June 2012. It is operated by the Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore 
Operations (ADCO).973 
                                                          
973 China National Petroleum Corporation (2008), ‘CNPC and IPIC sign EPC contract of crude 
pipeline project’. 12 January 2008 
[http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/nr2008/201211/2f05be63d3e14b8188531efa383bb4b9.shtml]; China 
National Petroleum Corporation (2012), ‘Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline becomes operational’. 17 July 
2012 [http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/nr2012/201211/6a40a138c83d45138dc2af66cf4ac9ee.shtml]; 
Pamuk, H. (2012), ‘UAE ships first oil via Fujairah as Iran threats escalate’. Reuters, 15 July 2012 
[https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uae-fujairah-pipeline/uae-ships-first-oil-via-fujairah-as-iran-
threats-escalate-idUSBRE86E07N20120715]; Sharma, G. (2016), ‘UAE's Oil Storage Hub Of Fujairah 
Taking On Established Ports’. In: Forbes, 6 October 2015 
[https://www.forbes.com/sites/gauravsharma/2015/10/06/uaes-oil-storage-hub-of-fujairah-taking-
on-established-ports/#697c6cb76e3f]. 
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FIGURE 45: Chinese Investment into UAE in US $ Billion (2005-2015). 
Source: American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker. 
 
In April 2014, CNPC, encouraged by the successful finalization of its Fujairah pipeline 
project and determined to build a reputation beyond “easier” downstream projects, 
wrote a new chapter in its relations with Abu Dhabi by acquiring a share of 40% in a 
joint venture with the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). Under the name 
of Al Yasat Company for Petroleum Operations, both NOCs sought to boost Abu 
Dhabi’s output further to the reach the goal of 3.4 mb/d by 2017.974 It is understood 
that Al Yasat was assigned to riskier and underdeveloped oil fields in the Emirate, 
rather than participating in already highly productive ones.975  
The joint venture is part of a wider Chinese strategy to secure upstream production 
rights abroad. A year later, CNPC won a $330 million bid to secure a contract with 
ADCO to develop Abu Dhabi’s Mender oil field. Current projections estimate a daily 
output of 20,000 barrels once fully developed.976 
                                                          
974 Kerr, S. (2014), ‘China’s CNPC signs UAE oil deal’. In: Financial Times, 29 April 2014: 
[http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cefe2f3e-cfb0-11e3-9b2b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz48Bgv9dEp]. 
975 Yee, A. (2014), ‘China strikes deal with Adnoc on Abu Dhabi oil exploration’. In: The National, 29 
April 2014 [https://www.thenational.ae/business/china-strikes-deal-with-adnoc-on-abu-dhabi-oil-
exploration-1.598245]. 
976 McAuley, A. (2015), ‘China state oil company wins Abu Dhabi oilfield contract’. In: The National, 18 
May 2015 [http://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/china-state-oil-company-wins-abu-dhabi-
oilfield-contract]. 
Year Month Contractor
Quantity 
in 
Millions Transaction Party Sector Subsector
2006 January State Construction Engineering $300 Dubai Properties Real estate Construction
2007 January State Construction Engineering $350 Real estate Construction
2007 January State Construction Engineering $160 Transport Autos
2007 December Sinohydro $140 Tourism
2008 December CNPC $3.290 International Petroleum Investment Energy Oil
2008 December State Construction Engineering $260 Transport Autos
2009 January State Construction Engineering $440 Al Tamouh Investment Real estate construction
2009 January State Construction Engineering $230 Technology Medical
2010 January China Communications Construction $130 Agriculture
2011 January State Construction Engineering $450 Abu Dhabi Services Real estate Construction
2012 May China National Chemical Engineering $2.950 Real estate Construction
2012 October Shanghai Electric $200 Utico Energy Coal
2013 January State Construction Engineering $160 Transport Aviation
2013 March State Construction Engineering $120 Technology Medical
2014 April State Construction Engineering $110 Transport Autos
2014 April State Construction Engineering $100 Transport Aviation
2014 May State Construction Engineering $100 Transport Shipping
2014 August State Construction Engineering $330 Skai Tourism
2015 February State Construction Engineering $170 Arenco Tourism
2015 May CNPC $330 ADCO Energy Oil
2015 July State Construction Engineering $130 Damac Crescent Tourism
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CNPC’s first success stories in Abu Dhabi quickly raised speculation that it might 
acquire a stake in ADCO itself, after the latter’s previous 40-yearlong concessions 
expired in January 2014, having had solely included established Western companies. 
France’s Total was the first to win a new stake, acquiring 10% in January 2015, with 
Japan’s Inpex taking 5%, and South Korea’s GS Energy winning 3%. BP followed in 
December 2016, also taking 10%. Given that ADNOC holds 60% stakes of ADCO, 
there were 22% left and open for biddings for an entire year. In February 2017 it was 
finally announced that two Chinese oil companies would take the remaining 12% - 
making China the biggest foreign shareholder in ADCO. CNPC was awarded with 8%, 
whilst Shanghai-based CEFC China Energy Company acquired 4%.977 Sultan al-Jaber, 
the UAE’s Minister of State, had claimed before that ADNOC and ADCO were ‘keen to 
work with all those who appreciate the value of long-term collaboration aimed at 
delivering benefits for both partners’.978 The fact that two Chinese companies were 
then awarded with the final shares points towards how much trust in long-term 
commitment and technological know-how in upstream engineering Chinese firms 
already have earned themselves in the Emirates. Furthermore, the fact that China is 
now ADCO’s largest foreign shareholder, ahead Japan and South Korea, and, more 
crucially, ahead of the historic Western Emirati partners, underlines China’s new 
centrality in the UAE’s energy interests.  
Outside oil, further Emirati energy infrastructure projects have received Chinese 
investment. In October 2012, Shanghai Electric, the world’s largest coal power 
company, signed a contract with Utico Middle East, the Gulf’s major private full-
service utility provider, for a joint project to build ‘the world's greenest coal-fired 
power plant’ in the Emirate of Ras Al-Khaimah. Seeking to meet Ras Al Khaimah’s 
growing energy demand to power its marine and port industry, the Global CCS 
Institute reports that the ‘facility will be located in the RAK Maritime City, Khor 
Khowir, which is growing fast as a major industrial hub with marine facilities and Al-
Saqr Port, the Middle East's largest dry bulk port’.979 Hence, Chinese investment into 
Emirati energy is going beyond oil. As the UAE at least officially seeks to champion 
                                                          
977 Dipaola, A., Habboush, M. (2017), ‘China Wins Big With Stakes in $22 Billion Abu Dhabi Oil Deal’. 
Bloomberg, 19 February 2017 [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-19/abu-dhabi-
awards-china-s-cnpc-stake-in-main-onshore-oil-deposits]. 
978 Reuters (2016), ‘ADNOC says "door is still open" for UAE oil concession talks’. 4 April 2016 
[http://www.reuters.com/article/emirates-oil-concessions-idUSL5N1770HB]. 
979 Global CCS Institute (2012), ‘Utico and Shanghai Electric launch Dhs1.5bn clean coal power plant 
in RAK’. 4 October 2012 [http://www.globalccsinstitute.com/institute/news/utico-and-shanghai-
electric-launch-dhs15bn-clean-coal-power-plant-rak]. 
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green technology and China’s companies are busily establishing R&D on that front, it 
seems reasonable to suspect that both will form further such joint ventures in the 
UAE in the years to come. Outside the energy sector, Chinese construction companies 
have run numerous UAE real estate projects. 
 
8.2.1.2 Real Estate and Other Sectors 
As shown in Figure 45, one company – State Construction Engineering (CSCEC) – is 
clearly dominating in terms of quantity of projects, especially in the Emirati real 
estate sector. Between 2005 and 2015, according to the CGIT, CSCEC invested a total 
value of $3.41 billion into the UAE. As in the preceding chapter, it needs to be 
emphasized that the CGIT again is not entirely complete. However, this section will 
largely utilize the CGIT’s data as a means to give a relatively representative overview 
of Chinese investment and project contracting in Emirati real estate and other 
sectors. 
In January 2006, CSCEC signed a contract with Dubai Properties to build 275 villas 
and 42 apartments in Dubai’s Mirdif area, and finished the project, worth $300 
million, within 19 months.980 A year later, the company was hired by National Bonds 
Corporation to build the Skycourts Towers, a luxurious apartment complex on the 
Dubai-Al-Ain Road. Under a contract value of approximately $350 million, 
construction was completed 27 months later.981 Simultaneously, CSCEC began work 
on the comprehensive improvement of the two Parallel Roads, for a distance of 33 
km, worth around $160 million.982 
In 2009, the company secured its next two UAE projects, worth $440 million for the 
construction of a complex of towers and $230 million for a hospital. Hired by Al 
Tamouh Investment LLC, CSCEC launched construction of one office tower and four 
residential towers named the City of Lights. It will soon reach completion. Sheikh 
Khalifa Specialist Hospital has already been finalized.983 In 2011, CSCEC won a 
further bid for participation in a 39 km² mega size housing project operated by Abu 
                                                          
980 China State Construction Engineering Corporation (2017), ‘China State Construction Projects’ 
[http://www.chinaconstruction.ae/all-projects/] 
981 Ibid. 
982 Ibid. 
983 Ibid. 
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Dhabi General Services Company PJSC. The construction, valued at approximately 
$450 million, is scheduled to end within a 48-month period.984 
In February 2015, the company was awarded a $170 million contract by Arenco Real 
Estate to complete the Five Star Resort Hotel on the Crescent of Palm Jumeirah.985 
The same year in July, DAMAC Properties hired CSCEC for a third time. The creation 
of a four-tower block hotel is valued at $130 million.986 
These are just some examples taken from CSCEC’s website of the kind of construction 
contracts undertaken by the company in the UAE. Being China’s largest construction 
company and included in the Global Top 500 of Fortune Magazine in 2012 and 
keeping in mind China’s increasing focus on the UAE and the GCC, it seems more 
than likely that CSCEC will extend its investment activity there even further in the 
coming years.987 In June 2013, the company announced its first ever acquisition of 
shares in an Emirati business. In addition to a 45% ownership, CSCEC set up the 
joint venture, Assas, with SKAI Holdings, a Dubai-based real estate investment firm, 
in order to undertake construction of the Viceroy Palm Jumeirah hotel resort, worth 
$1 billion, in one of Dubai’s most prestigious locations for tourism and leisure.988 In 
January 2014, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) unlocked a further 
$203 million funds to SKAI. By September 2015, SKAI had secured investment from 
                                                          
984 Ibid. 
985 China State Construction Engineering Corporation (2015), ‘Five-Star Crescent Resort Hotel on the 
Crescent of Palm Jumeirah’ [http://www.chinaconstruction.ae/cscec-middle-east-l-l-c-awarded-5-
crescentresort-hotel-on-the-crescent-of-palm-jumeirah/]. 
986 China State Construction Engineering Corporation (2015), ‘CSCEC awarded new contract by 
DAMAC’. [http://www.chinaconstruction.ae/cscec-middle-east-l-l-c-awarded-artesia-at-akoya-by-
damac/]. 
987 Maceda, C. (2013), ‘China ramps up investment in the Middle East’. In: Gulf News, 25 June 2013 
[http://gulfnews.com/business/sectors/general/china-ramps-up-investment-in-the-middle-east-
1.1201837]. 
988 SKAI Holdings (2013), ‘China State Construction Engineering Corporation to invest in SKAI 
Holdings AED3.67bn (US$1bn) Viceroy Dubai Palm Jumeirah’. 26 June 2013 
[https://static1.squarespace.com/static/592be69e59cc6892f6090e01/t/593328acb8a79b65b0ae799e
/1496524973459/0613+China+State+to+invest+in+Viceroy+Dubai+Palm+Jumeirah.pdf]. Comments 
by Yu Tao, President and CEO of CSCEC Middle East, highlight the magnitude of his company’s deal, 
which he sees as representative of both CSCEC’s and China’s growing appetite for investment into the 
UAE and the wider region: ‘We are thrilled to be partnering with SKAI Holdings to develop this 
exciting new project, which we believe will become one of the region’s most sought-after resorts. This 
is CSCEC’s first investment in a development project in the Middle East and marks a significant 
milestone in our growth in the region. […] Dubai’s strategic location between Asia, Europe and Africa 
together with its burgeoning real estate sector is set to become a vital area of growth for Chinese 
investment’. See: Ibid.; His counterpart, Kabir Mulchandani, CEO of SKAI Holdings, echoed these 
sentiments: ‘We are extremely pleased to be partnering with the world’s largest contracting firm for 
our Viceroy Dubai Palm Jumeirah project. CSCEC’s investment not only confirms its commitment to 
the region but also ensures that we are able to work in synergy to complete what is set to become one 
of Dubai’s most prestigious hotel projects on time and to the highest possible standard’. See: Ibid. 
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seven banks in total, four of them Chinese: the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China 
Minsheng Banking Corporation, Invest Bank and Arab African International Bank.989  
Though this specific project stands out in terms of direct investment alongside the 
construction contract, as well as in terms of the attention it has attracted in the 
Emirati media, other Chinese companies have signed EPC contracts in Emirati real 
estate. Based on information from the CGIT, in December 2007, Sinohydro agreed to 
invest $140 million into the Emirati tourism sector. This seems to have flowed into 
the building of the Novotel and Ibis Hotel in Abu Dhabi, although this information 
could not be fully verified.990 In May 2012, China National Chemical Engineering 
announced it had signed a contract with the Dubai Government’s Construction 
Department, the Engineer’s Office (EO) to build a large housing complex worth $2.95 
billion over a period of 60 months. Once completed, this would be the largest non-
energy related real estate project by a Chinese company in the UAE.991 
Another Chinese infrastructure project in the UAE in 2010 is worth highlighting, as it 
was China’s first investment in Emirati agriculture. China Harbour Engineering 
Corporation (CHEC), a subsidiary of China Communications Construction 
Corporation (CCCC), signed a $130 million contract with the Abu Dhabi Investment 
Company, a SWF, to design and build a strategic grain reserve in Fujairah.992 This 
project is another example of the UAE’s position as a regional hub: ‘The purpose of 
the project [was] not only to provide sufficient grain reserves for the UAE but also to 
provide an important grain transfer hub for other countries in the Arabian Gulf’.993 
For geographical, i.e. geo-strategic advantages, the project also underlines Fujairah’s 
emerging contribution to the UAE’s global and regional hub status. Mirroring the 
above-mentioned Chinese constructions of both the Abu Dhabi-Fujairah oil pipeline, 
and the coal power station, the location of this grain storage facility was carefully 
chosen for the same reasons. Fujairah marks a strategic location inside the UAE and 
                                                          
989 Construction Intelligence Center, ‘SKAI/CSCEC – Viceroy Dubai Palm Jumeirah Mixed-Use 
Development – Dubai’ [[http://bit.ly/29sH3jF]. According to the Construction Intelligence Center, as 
of May 2016, 85% of construction has been completed. 
990 Sinohydro’s website became inaccessible at the time of thesis submission [www.sinohydro.com]. 
991 REIDIN (2012), ‘CN Chemical Engineering secures RMB 18.64-bln deal in Dubai’. 30 May 2012 
[http://www.reidin.com/News/view?ipcode=sg_ck&pubcode= sgck&date=20120530&sequence=1]. 
992 China Harbour Engineering Corporation (2015), ‘Strategic Grain Reserve in Fujairah, UAE’. 22 
January 2015 [http://www.chec.bj.cn/zg/tabid/896/InfoID/6311/Default.aspx]. 
993 Fujairah in Focus (2011), ‘Strategic Grain Terminal in Fujairah—Latest News’. 6 October 2011 
[http://fujairahinfocus.blogspot.co.uk/2011/10/strategic-grain-terminal-in.html]. 
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the wider Gulf region, as it lies outside the Strait of Hormuz. This not only enables 
the UAE to compete with Oman and Saudi Arabia, the only other GCC countries with 
that geographical advantage. It also enables China to make use of any investment 
opportunity that can help reduce its trade exposure to the bottleneck problem, as 
highlighted several times above. Other than Oman and Saudi Arabia, the UAE already 
is a well-functioning regional hub, with Fujairah now adding another competitive 
layer to it. From an investment point of view, Chinese businesses see all these layers 
as a great risk mitigation for their capital injection into the Gulf. 
 
8.2.1.3 Finance 
China’s outlook on investment in the UAE is also highlighted by the growing number 
of Chinese banks there. In October 2008, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
set up shop in its first Middle Eastern country. It chose the UAE, both Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai, in the former’s Al-Bateen Area and the latter’s Dubai International Financial 
Center (DIFC), as the location for its regional headquarters. On ICBC’s website, it 
outlines its reasoning: 
‘This enables ICBC to become the pioneer of China-owned banks in the Middle East region, and will, 
on the basis of its advanced market position, excellent client base, multiple product structure, strong 
innovative ability and prominent brand value, allows ICBC to support various infrastructure financing 
demands in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and the greater Middle East, and comprehensively 
provide various financial services including international trade, domestic guarantee and oversea[s] 
credit, project financing, to become the economic bridge and channel between China and the Middle 
East region’.994 
Seeking to focus on commercial banking, development investment, and asset 
management, ICBC acquired its operating license from the UAE’s Central Bank a year 
later.995 DIFC itself was quickly keen to stress its interest in Chinese banking 
expansion in the UAE and to promote increased investment on China’s New Silk 
Roads across Asia, adopting the OBOR buzzwords in the process and portraying the 
economic compatibility via a new abbreviation. Whereas for long the Gulf saw itself 
part of the MENA region (Middle East North Africa), it now talks about MEASA 
(Middle East Africa South Asia).996 
                                                          
994 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (2008), ‘Abu Dhabi Branch’ [http://www.icbc-
ltd.com/icbcltd/about%20us/global%20websites/abu%20dhabi%20branch.htm]; 
995 Ibid. 
996 Dubai International Financial Centre (2007), ‘DIFC Aims to Further Increase Growing 
Commercial Ties Between the Middle East and China’. 4 September 2007 
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Other Chinese banks have followed. In November 2012, Bank of China (BOC) opened 
its regional branch, and first regional entity, in Dubai, also seeking to provide trade 
finance between China and the UAE and the wider Middle East and also 
infrastructure finance on the Belt and Road, including from Dubai. The exact status 
of BOC Middle East in DIFC meanwhile is unclear. Although the author could not 
acquire any information from the media, DIFC’s website, whilst still listing BOC, also 
claims that its status has been ‘dissolved’ since 8 August 2017.997 
In 2013, the Agricultural Bank of China also opened its first regional branch, likewise 
in Dubai.998 Additionally, in November 2015, China Construction Bank (CCB) 
registered in DIFC. From the start, CCB’s Emirati investment purpose was to closely 
align itself with China’s BRI, which Xi Jinping had announced just a year before, and 
marketed itself accordingly: 
‘Following China national strategy of ‘One Belt, One Road’, combined with Dubai’s advantage as center 
of cross-border trade and finance in MENA, CCB DIFC provides comprehensive financial service to 
Chinese customer with “Go Abroad” strategy and extends CCB’s advantage to local high quality 
customers, acting as bridge connecting China, Middle East and North Africa’.999 
With its Category One DIFC authorization, CCB products and services include 
lending to corporate and other institutional customers (except local Dirham-
denominated business) in the form of deposits, trade financing, project financing, 
aircraft financing, as well as financial consulting for bigger investment deals.1000 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
[https://www.difc.ae/newsroom/press-releases/difc-aims-further-increase-growing-commercial-ties-
between-middle-east-and-china]; Dubai International Financial Centre (2015), ‘DIFC Concludes Visit 
to Shanghai and Beijing; Highlighted New Investment Opportunities to the Chinese Financial 
Community and Investors’. 12 September 2015 [https://www.difc.ae/newsroom/press-releases/difc-
concludes-visit-shanghai-and-beijing-highlighted-new-investment-opportunities-chinese-financial-
community-and-investors]. 
997 Rahman, F. (2015), ‘Bank of China to have major presence in the UAE’. Gulf News, 8 July 2015 
[http://gulfnews.com/business/sectors/banking/bank-of-china-to-have-major-presence-in-the-uae-
1.1547238]; Dubai International Financial Centre (2017), ‘Bank of China Middle East (Dubai) 
Limited’ [https://www.difc.ae/public-register/bank-china-middle-east-dubai-limited]. 
998 Agricultural Bank of China (2017), ‘Branch Profile’ [http://www.ae.abchina.com/en/about_us/]. 
Comprising seven departments, and building on a multinational network, it now delivers various 
financial services, ranging from loans, deposits, and trade finance to large and medium-sized 
enterprises – international, Chinese, and Emirati, both inside the UAE, as well as in the wider region, 
and furthermore to Emirati and Middle Eastern funded businesses in China. 
999 Similar to other Chinese companies’ websites, CCB’s also proved inaccessible at the time of 
submission, possibly due to the China Communist Party’s (CCP) simultaneously ongoing congress, 
during which internet censorship was heightened. See: Bloomberg (2017), ‘China's Internet 
Crackdown Isn't Going Away’. 19 October 2017 [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-
19/a-stronger-xi-means-no-letup-in-china-s-internet-restrictions]; The information on CCB’s 
investment in Dubai is normally found here: http://ae.ccb.com/dubai/en/gywm.html. 
1000 Ibid. 
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These examples of relatively novel Chinese financial penetration of the Emirati and 
Middle Eastern business world seem destined to be the launching pad for an even 
greater range and scope of such investment activities in the future. In an interview 
with the author, Citibank’s Tong Wu recalled that in just over two years his China 
Desk received 50 new Chinese clients, all active not only in the UAE, but the wider 
region, cash-pooling in DIFC and investing in several West Asian countries.1001 At the 
time of writing, the Emirates and the wider Gulf are feeling the impact of a dramatic 
three-year oil price plunge, whilst China’s GDP in 2015 marked its lowest growth rate 
for decades, and its wobbly stock market experienced vast capital flight, as mentioned 
in previous chapters. It is therefore remarkable how very little impact these 
simultaneous developments have had on financial transactions between Chinese 
banks and UAE-registered businesses. In fact, the opposite seems to have been 
occurring. According to an article in the UAE’s Khaleej Times in March 2016, the 
recent history of China-UAE trade growth has caused ‘Chinese banks in DIFC [to 
double] their balance sheet in the last 18 months’.1002 
‘According to [DIFC]'s 2015 full year Operating Review results, China's top four state-owned banks - 
Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, ICBC and China Construction Bank - have combined total 
assets of $21.5 billion. The four banks, representing 26 per cent of the total assets booked in DIFC, 
have additionally upgraded their licences at DIFC to Category 1, expanding their presence from 
subsidiary to branch status’.1003 
Arif Amiri, CEO of the DIFC Authority, also highlighted China’s BRI to be of 
profound importance to the Center’s global strategic outlook:  
‘Contributing to a large portion of our business activity, we envisage an increasingly significant role for 
Chinese firms as we seek to become a leading global financial hub. […] As China continues to invest in 
emerging economies across the region, DIFC's conducive and supportive framework acts as a gateway 
for companies looking to expand their business interests and investments in these markets. Linking 
Asia to Africa and Latin America, Dubai is emerging as a crucial hub along China's New Silk Road’.1004 
Once again, Dubai’s, and therefore the UAE’s, central role becomes apparent. So does 
the diversity, not only in trade, but also in construction, investment, and finance, as 
this section has shown. Particularly the latter’s fast growth in DIFC could become the 
harbinger for much more Chinese business in the UAE in the near future. Many 
industries have not been tapped yet and the Chinese do not yet enjoy the same overall 
exposure as for example Westerners or Japanese, as Mark Cooper, General 
                                                          
1001 Wu, T. (Citibank), interviewed by the author on 17 August 2015 in Dubai, DIFC. See Consent Form 
attached. 
1002 John, I. (2016), ‘Rising UAE-China trade spurs growth in DIFC’. In: Khaleej Times, 1 March 2016 
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Representative of the insurance market Lloyds of London in Dubai, stated to the 
author. Lloyds does not seem to have many Chinese clients in Dubai, but neither has 
Cooper observed an emergence of Chinese competitors in his industry.1005   
However, as this section has shown, Chinese investment into Saudi Arabia has grown 
rapidly and is likely to continue and diversify further, as the UAE’s hub status acts as 
a magnet for regional and inter-regional business. The next question addresses how 
far this importance is matched or exceeded by the UAE’s investment into China. 
 
8.2.2 The UAE’s Investment into China  
Generally, the UAE is a very active and diversified outward investor. According to 
UNCTAD, in 2014, the UAE’s FDI abroad accounted for approximately $3 billion in 
total – representing around nine percent of Arab outward FDI. In terms of outward 
FDI balances, the UAE’s were worth $66.3 billion by the end of the same year.1006 
Drawing also from the Financial Times’ FDI Intelligence database, the 2016 report 
published by the Arab Investment and Export Credit Guarantee Corporation 
(Dhaman) mentions that between January 2003 and May 2015 ‘2456 projects […] 
[abroad were and] are being implemented by Emirati companies […] [with 
e]stimations reveal[ing] that overall investment cost of those projects, which employ 
some 572.3 thousand workers, is close to 297.4 billion dollars’.1007  
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1006 Dhaman 2015: p. 112. 
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359 
 
 
FIGURE 46: Source: Dhaman Investment Attractiveness Index 2015, p.113. 
 
The data in Figure 46 shows that the UAE’s outward investment is mostly focused on 
its Arab neighbourhood despite the high level of political and security risk relative to 
other regions. Between 2003 and 2015 almost half of Emirati FDI recipients were 
Arab countries. The two largest non-Arab recipients were India (10%) and the UK 
(4.3%).1008 
China followed third in this list (3.05%), attracting approximately $9 billion from the 
UAE in terms of investment cost. Its overall place on the list is number 11. According 
to the Financial Times and Dhaman, these figures translated into 42 involved Emirati 
companies investing in China. These were again involved in 66 projects, all together 
creating 18.484 jobs, as seen in Figure 47. Given the size of China’s economy and 
inward investment potential, this must be said to be a rather modest performance. 
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FIGURE 47: Source: Dhaman Investment Attractiveness Index 2015, p.113. 
 
As stated above, investment relations between the GCC and China are still trailing 
behind the level of trade relations, especially considering GCC hydrocarbon exports, 
as well as Gulf imports/re-exports of Chinese manufactured goods. GCC and Emirati 
FDI into China has been growing, but not as much as had been expected. Especially 
in the growing Gulf petrochemical industry, the number of GCC projects in China is 
hardly overwhelming. The UAE for instance has no running project in China’s 
petrochemical industry, unlike Saudi Arabia, whose slightly greater success could be 
explained with its much greater relevance as a long-term major oil exporter to China. 
Generally, the GCC’s modest access to the Chinese petrochemicals industry is most 
likely due to the fact that the UAE and the other GCC states are China’s low-cost 
competitors in this area – believed to be one of the major obstacles in the China-GCC 
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free trade negotiations.1009 Speaking to the Economist Intelligence Unit, Silk Road 
Associates’ CEO Ben Simpfendorfer admits there has been some confusion over this, 
and adds that both China as well as the GCC have different priorities for the time 
being.1010 
Portfolio investment is also moderate, at least relative the GCC’s and the UAE’s vast 
sovereign liquidity and per capita income.1011 China’s restrictions on foreign entities 
buying stocks in the mainland seems to be the principal reason for this relatively 
moderate level of (publicly known) portfolio investment, because the picture is 
different when it comes to Hong Kong.1012 The most prominent portfolio investors 
can be found among the GCC’s and UAE’s sovereign wealth funds, which have been 
awarded “qualified investor” status, but have still found lower barriers there.1013 
A sector in which highly regarded and solvent UAE companies could have profited 
immensely would have been Chinese real estate. However, the Chinese real estate 
market is mostly closed to foreign investors. Even where companies manage to get in, 
they face numerous regulatory issues. Additionally, as China’s real estate bubble has 
greatly inflated land prices, the best times seem to belong to the past, at least for now. 
Emaar, one of Dubai’s primary real estate developers had to learn this the hard way 
and saw itself forced to close down its operations in China after just three years.1014 
Yet, opportunities remain and could increase as China gingerly reduces barriers for 
portfolio investment and FDI. Within the real estate sector, Nakheel, one of Dubai’s 
flagships in the industry, and a subsidiary of Dubai World, has recently been in talks 
to invest directly for the first time into three Asian countries – China, Pakistan, and 
Vietnam.1015 As a means to spread risk, diversify and stabilize its portfolio (and 
thereby Dubai’s economy), it is telling that China and other Asian countries are 
among Nakheel’s primary targets, despite the regulatory challenges and 
uncertainties.  
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For UAE companies, tourism and the hospitality sector in China are potentially 
lucrative ventures. Dubai-based luxury hotel-chain Jumeirah Group, for instance, has 
signed contracts to build eight new resorts in China. Beside its already existing 
Jumeirah Himalaya’s Hotel in Shanghai’s Pudong District, the new resorts are being 
built in Sanya, Guangzhou, Haikou, Hangzhou, Macau, Nanjing, Qiandaohu, and 
Wuhan.1016 
Another example for Emirati FDI into the Chinese leisure sector is Dubai’s Meydan 
Group, which announced a strategic partnership with Chengdu Municipal 
Government in 2013. This UAE luxury resort and sports developer is specialized in 
horse-racing and aims to build up and then conquer the Chinese equestrian market. 
Since the announcement, there have been a series of annual Chengdu-Dubai 
International Cups in Chengdu from 2014 onwards.1017  
In the retail and agricultural sector, Al-Futtaim Group, one of Dubai’s largest 
conglomerates run by one of the city’s most prominent merchant families, has 
considered investing into Chinese farmland. Participation in megaprojects such as 
the development of the Jilin Modern Agricultural Food Zone is thought to be planned 
via joint ventures with Singaporean companies who have more experience in the 
Chinese market.1018 
Generally, different Emirati companies are gradually investing in diverse Chinese 
sectors, although much lower than expectations might have suggested.1019 Yet, it has 
                                                          
1016 Jumairah Group (2017), ‘Hotels and Resorts in Asia Pacific’ 
[https://www.jumeirah.com/en/jumeirah-group/development/future-plans/hotels-and-resorts-in-
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1019 Furthermore, the reported numbers are conflicting. According to Rakhmat, 2013 saw UAE 
investments in China at a value of $1.5 billion, with around 650 Emirati projects contributing to this 
number. See: Rakhmat 2015a; Rakhmat’s data can be traced back to the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce. However, this contradicts the secondary data that Dhaman has published, as seen above. It 
is either incomplete, or the Chinese Ministry of Commerce is inflating the number. If neither of these 
explanations are true, then at least different definitions seem to produce quite different results. 
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enormous potential, and furthermore, this seems likely to be exploited once not only 
a China-GCC free trade pact is signed, but also once the AIIB and the SRF expand 
their projects and the UAE sponsors BRI-projects in China and also across Eurasia. 
So far though, only a few examples of prominent companies and projects, prior to the 
BRI, mostly in the transport sector and finance have attracted attention. 
 
8.2.2.1 Shipping: Maritime Silk Road Builders 
One of the most distinguished Emirati companies which has invested heavily in China 
is Dubai Ports World (DP World), with ports and logistics-centre operations in four 
Chinese cities, Hong Kong, Tianjin, Qingdao, and Yantai.1020 Three of those ports had 
already attracted investment by DP World’s predecessor, the British Peninsula and 
Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O), which Dubai Ports Authority and Dubai 
Ports International acquired in 2006 – to form DP World.1021  
As if to symbolize the shift in the world’s economic centre of gravity from West to 
East, the birth of DP World was accompanied by a headline-grabbing political 
scandal in the US that same year. Six American ports had previously been owned and 
operated by P&O. In the post-9/11 political climate, an Arabian-led company 
controlling American ports was a perceived security risk and too much for Congress 
to bear – despite President George W Bush’s and Homeland Security’s best efforts to 
support DP World. After much controversy, DP World was barred by 62-2 votes 
against.1022 
Meanwhile, DP World’s operations in China have largely been marked by success. In 
Hong Kong, DP World manages Container Terminal Three (CT3) located in the city’s 
Kwai Chung port. Highlighting its role as a key maritime and logistics hub for 
Chinese and wider Asian trade, the company’s website points to CT3’s growing 
volumes:  
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‘[T]he terminal is providing the necessary service to support its customers’ expansion needs. The 
terminal’s facilities are complimented by the ATL Logistics Center, the world’s first and largest 
intelligent multi-storey drive-in cargo logistics center’.1023 
China’s north-east hosts DP World’s three other ports in that country. Qingdao’s role 
as a hub for Chinese exports from China’s third most productive province – 
Shandong – is demonstrated by the existence of several economic free zones in and 
around it. DP World-operated Qingdao Qianwan Container Terminal (QQCT) is 
therefore strategically placed to tap into these various export markets. Having 
transformed into one of China’s main seaports, it’s infrastructural connections have 
engendered smart logistics.1024 
A similar strategic location is offered further to the north with Tianjin Port. Tianjin 
Orient Container Terminal has been run by DP World for several years now, and for 
good reasons. Located in Bohai Bay, the man-made port is mainland China’s biggest 
– with access to the Pacific Ocean and Tianjin’s river-and-canal-system. Further 
transportation links connect the port with the wider Tianjin and Hebei Province and 
with the capital Beijing 160km to the southeast.1025 
The importance of China’s north-eastern coast is exemplified by the relative 
proximity of these two ports and the third one, located in Yantai. The volume of trade 
to and mostly from these littoral provinces has created extensive demand for port-
expansion. Yantai forms Shandong Province’s second largest industrial hub. Its road 
and rail infrastructure link it with Yantai Port. Its cargoes mainly include cement, 
coal, iron ore, and fertilizer. Forming a joint venture with China Shipping and Yantai 
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Port Group, DP World (formerly P&O) has managed Yantai International Container 
Terminals – the port’s principal container terminal, since 2003.1026 
Additional to these established operations in China, DP World also announced 
further investment into China as a result of Sheik Mohammad bin Zayed’s state visit 
to China in December 2015 (see also below).  At the time, DP World confirmed it 
would invest a further $1.9 billion in Chinese port terminals by 2020.1027 These 
examples of DP World’s eastward flows of capital and expertise highlight the bi-
directional character of what is now fashionably to call the 21st century Maritime Silk 
Road.1028 
Yet, it would be wrong to see China or Asia as DP World’s main investment 
destination, especially in the near-to-midterm future. As a DP World-analyst Ali Al-
Gergawi explained to the author, his company is increasingly focusing on higher 
growth emerging markets – Africa and South America.1029 As a result of a related re-
shuffling of assets towards these markets, and due to an increasingly saturated 
environment in Hong Kong, DP World even decided to divest from there in 2013.1030  
Nevertheless, vast and untapped areas of the Eurasian landmass might do offer DP 
World such opportunities too. As mentioned above, Xi Jinping’s BRI offers numerous 
openings to co-invest into trade-enabling infrastructure. Indeed, DP World’s previous 
and future investment into Kazakhstan’s Khorgos Eastern Gate Special Economic 
Zone and into the Caspian Sea Port of Aktau should be read in this light – as also DP 
World chairman Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem’s rhetoric confirms: 
                                                          
1026 ‘DP World provides the terminal facility with operational management, global sales and marketing 
and the industry expertise […]. Complementing the port is a contiguous export processing zone for 
warehousing and a logistics park’. See: Dubai Ports World, ‘China – Yantai’ 
[http://web.dpworld.com/our-business/marine-terminals/asia-pacific-indian-subcontinent/china-
yantai/]. 
1027 Reuters (2015), ‘Dubai's DP World, partners set to invest $1.9bn in China’. In: Arabian Business, 
15 December 2015 [http://www.arabianbusiness.com/dubai-s-dp-world-partners-set-invest-1-9bn-in-
china-615459.html] 
1028 Given its similar scope of investment into other Asian countries, like South Korea, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and India, China is – as with so many Silk Road components – merely 
one part of the wider Pan-Asian story. See: Dubai Ports World, ‘Marine Terminals’ 
[http://web.dpworld.com/our-business/marine-terminals/]. 
1029 Al-Gergawi, A. (DP World), interviewed by the author on 7 June 2015 in Dubai, Jumeirah. See 
Consent Form attached; double-digit growth there ensures higher and faster returns. Hence, those two 
continents are and will be prioritized over Asia. Logistics is a big business in Africa, because of 
infrastructural underdevelopment. As Al-Gergawi explained, DP World wants to use that not only in 
terms of infrastructure, but also with regard to consulting, efficient management, and customer 
service.  
1030 Reuters (2013), ‘UPDATE 2-DP World sells Hong Kong assets for $742 mln’. 7 March 2013 
[http://www.reuters.com/article/dpworld-hk-sale-idUSL6N0BZ14B20130307].  
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‘We already have a fruitful relationship with the government of Kazakhstan that we are looking to 
build on and will work with them on projects which support the flow of goods and enable trade across 
the region […] it remains an attractive market for us with huge long term growth prospects. […] Trade 
corridors such as the New Silk Road […] connect supply chains capable of remarkable global economic 
importance and as a global trade enabler, investment in infrastructure and developing that capability 
is part of our focus. […] We look at trade and logistics solutions, transport links and connectivity to the 
hinterland and how we can help improve efficiency for the benefit of economies’.1031  
Thus, it can be observed, the UAE, in this case DP World, is not only an important 
bilateral economic partner to China. DP World seems here to endure as a player on 
the BRI’s maritime and land corridors, and in wider “South-South” trade and 
investment as such investments show and as the company is consciously pursuing.1032 
But also the third dimension in these corridors – aerospace – is being conquered by 
eminent UAE entities. 
 
8.2.2.2 Aviation: Silk Roads in the Sky 
Whilst the goods of 21st century trade are predominantly still shipped across the seas, 
people travel across the skies. Travelers on the New Silk Roads are no exception. 
Ever since the ascendancy of air travel in the mid-twentieth century, the UAE, and 
again in particular Dubai, have extended their roles as a maritime hub to 
intercontinental aviation hub.1033 Dubai International Airport (DXB) and its own 
aviation company, Emirates, have met competition also from Abu Dhabi with its own 
brand, Etihad Airways. Next to Qatar Airways, these two are building the new 
aviation empires circling the globe.1034 The Persian Gulf’s and the UAE’s geographic 
position at the crossroads of three continents and within an eight-hour flying distance 
                                                          
1031 Seatrade Maritime News (2016), ‘New Silk Road riches secures DP World an audience with 
Kazakhstan President’. 20 June 2016 [http://www.seatrade-maritime.com/news/asia/new-silk-road-
riches-secures-dp-world-an-audience-with-kazakhstan-president.html]. Bin Sulayem was stating these 
objectives following an audience with Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev in June 2016, on 
the side-lines of an economic summit in St. Petersburg. Referring to DP World’s 2013 investment into 
Kazakhstan, he announced an investment expansion there. In 2013 his firm had entered a joint 
venture with Kazakhstan’s national rail company KTZ, to offer consulting services regarding the 
Khorgos SEZ’s and its inland container port’s management. Similar advisory roles were provided to 
rejuvenate the Port of Aktau as a Caspian Sea trading hub. These projects are now set to be expanded 
to further enhance Kazakhstan’s planned multi-modal transport system. 
1032 Mayenkar, S.S. (2014), ‘UAE’s contribution to China’s new Silk Road’. In: Gulf News, 14 May 2017 
[http://gulfnews.com/business/economy/uae-s-contribution-to-china-s-new-silk-road-1.2026975]. 
1033 The groundwork was laid by Imperial Airways (later BOAC – the forerunner of British Airways) 
and the construction and decade-long centrality of Sharjah Airport as a refuelling stop in trans-Asian 
travel – before it was gradually and then overwhelmingly out-performed by Dubai. See: Ghazal, R. 
(2010), ‘When Sharjah ruled the skies’. In: The National, 25 June 2010 
[http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/when-sharjah-ruled-the-skies]. 
1034 HSBC Global Connections (2015), ‘Sky’s the limit for GCC’s aviation sector’. 22 December 2015 
[https://globalconnections.hsbc.com/uae/en/articles/skys-limit-gccs-aviation-sector]. 
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of now 80% of the world’s population are the powerful hard facts that merely needed 
to be exploited by Emirati entrepreneurship and investment, in the wake of 
independence.1035 This has happened in every sense of the word, resulting in DXB 
snatching Heathrow’s long-held crown as the world’s busiest airport in terms of 
flights.  
‘Traffic at the airport for passengers flying outside Dubai surged to 69.9m, overtaking Heathrow’s 
68.1m. […] By 2020, Dubai authorities expect its main airport to welcome 98.5m passengers. Its 
aviation industry is projected to account for 22pc of the emirate’s employment and more than a third 
of GDP’.1036  
In addition to the growth of DXB, Dubai has embarked upon building a second 
airport – Al Maktoum International – close to Jebel Ali Port, its existing maritime 
counterpart. This will bring some of Dubai’s industry and maritime trade closer to the 
whole world via air-cargo capability. It ‘will be able to accommodate 160 million 
flyers a year after it's completed in 2020’ and especially ‘find itself operating the 
world's largest air-freight facility, capable of handling 12 million tons of freight a 
year’.1037 This means it will overtake Hong Kong International Airport as the world’s 
busiest air-cargo hub. 
So far, DXB and Emirates Airline are the main protagonists in Dubai’s aviation story. 
Therefore, Emirates is also a major player in conquering Asian airspace. It’s impact 
on China-UAE and China-Gulf relations is of a direct and material nature as it carries 
people and freight between these countries. Emirates has invested heavily into the 
wider Asian and especially the Chinese aviation market for over a decade now. The 
company prides itself with being ‘the first airline to establish non-stop connectivity 
between the Middle East and mainland China, launching freighter operations to 
Shanghai in 2002, followed by passenger services to the city in 2004’.1038 Direct 
connections to Beijing were added in 2006 and Guangzhou in 2008. 
                                                          
1035 Ibid.; Robehmed, N. (2014), ‘How Dubai Became One Of The Most Important Aviation Hubs In 
The World’. In: Forbes, 4 June 2014 
[http://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/2014/06/04/how-dubai-became-one-of-the-most-
important-aviation-hubs-in-the-world/#769f9e406875]. 
1036 Anderson, E. (2015), ‘Dubai overtakes Heathrow to become world's busiest airport’. In: The 
Telegraph, 27 January 2015 
[http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/transport/11372616/Dubai-overtakes-Heathrow-
to-become-worlds-busiest-airport.html]. 
1037 Forbes 2014, ‘Dubai Aviation Hub’. 
1038 Emirates Group (2016), ‘Emirates & China. April 2016 marked the 12th Anniversary of Emirates’ 
passenger services to China’ 
[https://cdn.ek.aero/downloads/ek/pdfs/fact_sheets/Emirates_and_China_factsheet_English_versi
on_Apr16_2.pdf]. 
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Following these destination offerings Emirates announced an expansion of its direct 
connection services to Yinchuan and Zhengzhou in December 2015, on the side-lines 
of Sheik Muhammad bin Zayed’s state visit to China. The four weekly flights to these 
fast growing and self-proclaimed New Silk Road hubs were launched half a year later 
in May 2016.1039 Zhengzhou, the capital of the central Henan Province, is a major 
technology and business hub. Heavily Muslim-populated Yinchuan, the capital of 
Ningxia Province, brands itself visibly as China’s cultural, educational, and trade 
gateway to the New Silk Roads with Arabian destinations. Chairman and Chief 
Executive of Emirates Airline and Group Sheik Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum 
emphasized this in a statement after the agreement was reached: 
‘With the opening of these new strategic routes, Emirates looks forward to contributing to the 
enhancement of China’s trade links with the rest of the world, in particular with the UAE and Arab 
world. We believe the new international air links that we are launching will help create tourism and 
trade opportunities for Chinese business and leisure travellers that may not otherwise exist. […] With 
our established network across Africa, Europe and the Middle East, Emirates is a ready-made 
connector of people and trade, and we look forward to further developing aviation links with China in a 
mutually beneficial way’.1040 
The services will provide a Boeing 777-200LR aircraft, including 266 seats and an 
additional capacity of 14 tons of cargo composed of goods such as electronics from 
Zhengzhou and agricultural products from Yinchuan. These trade-enabling 
investments pay direct homage to China’s BRI-project with Emirates seeking a major 
financing and transportation role in the name of Dubai, UAE, Gulf, and pan-Asian 
interests. Emirates’ website directly emphasizes that the company currently serves 
‘54 cities in 30 of the 65 countries identified as part of the Belt and Road Initiative’, 
congratulating itself on its unique position ‘to support China in advancing its trade 
and investment links with these countries’. Further investment and expansion into 
the Chinese aviation market are already being planned in the form of daily services to 
Hangzhou and Chongqing.1041 
The frequently high number of passengers on Emirates’ existing flight connections to 
China seem to justify this optimistic planning.  ‘In 2015, Emirates carried more than 
1.3 million passengers and 106,000 tonnes of cargo on its China services.’1042 Once 
again, Dubai’s role as both a destination and a hub becomes apparent. 
                                                          
1039 Emirates Group (2015), ‘Emirates Expands Network in Mainland China’. 14 December 2015 
[https://www.emirates.com/english/about/media-centre/2850628/emirates-expands-network-in-
mainland-china]. 
1040 Ibid. 
1041 Ibid. 
1042 Emirates Group 2016. 
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‘Emirates’ passenger traffic out of China is highly diversified. Thirty four percent of Emirates’ China 
traffic travels to the UAE and Middle East. This increases to 56% when combined with Africa. But, far 
from simply being a stopover point, Dubai is an increasingly important destination for business and 
tourist passengers, with Chinese visitors to Dubai increasing by 29% in 2015 to 450,000’.1043 
These figures explain why Dubai’s Department of Tourism and Commerce Marketing 
(DTCM) has teamed up with Dubai Duty Free and Ctrip, one of China’s main online 
travel agencies, to draw even more consumption-happy Chinese tourists.1044 Abu 
Dhabi is set to compete with Dubai for attracting their growing numbers.1045 
The UAE capital is poised to do well if the success in catching up in aviation via its 
Etihad Airways is any sign. Yet, compared to Emirates Airline, Abu Dhabi’s premier 
carrier is still noticeably behind its Dubai rival when it comes to successful 
investment into the Chinese aviation market. Alongside Hong Kong, so far, at the 
time of writing, Etihad only offers direct connections to three mainland cities from 
Abu Dhabi: Beijing, Chengdu, and Shanghai.1046 In June 2016, Etihad announced 
expansion plans in China by targeting secondary cities.1047 A further contributing 
factor could be other growing Chinese markets catering for Emirati and Abu Dhabi-
based businessmen inside China. Again, Dubai companies dominate the landscape. 
This is becoming particularly evident through the growing number of Emirati banks 
in China and specifically the growing sector of Islamic Finance. 
 
8.2.2.3 Finance 
At the time of writing there are known to be three UAE banks with branches in 
mainland China. The first one to be awarded that licence by the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) to open a representative office in Shanghai, in 2008, 
was Union National Bank in 2008.1048 The contract was signed with the intention of 
supporting the growth of bilateral trade and investment. 
                                                          
1043 Ibid. 
1044 Graves, L. (2016), ‘Dubai adds partnerships to bring in more Chinese visitors’. In: The National, 29 
October 2016 [http://www.thenational.ae/business/travel-tourism/dubai-adds-partnerships-to-
bring-in-more-chinese-visitors]. 
1045 Scott, A. (2016), ‘Abu Dhabi seeks large rise in Chinese tourists’. In: The National, 7 November 
2016 [http://www.thenational.ae/business/travel-tourism/abu-dhabi-seeks-large-rise-in-chinese-
tourists]. 
1046 Etihad Airways (2017), ‘Book your flight with Etihad Airways’ [http://flights.etihad.com/en-us/]. 
1047 Al-Ghazzar, S. (2016), ‘Etihad Airways plans expansion in China and Africa’. In: The National, 1 
June 2016 [http://www.thenational.ae/business/aviation/etihad-airways-plans-expansion-in-china-
and-africa]. 
1048 Union National Bank (2017), ‘China’ [https://www.unb.com/en/information/about-
us/subsidiaries/China]. 
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The National Bank of Abu Dhabi (NBAD) had similar motives when it opened its first 
branch in Mainland China in May 2012, next to its office in Hong Kong, established 
in 2009. This came at a time when UAE-China trade had already rapidly recovered 
from the global credit crunch and was nearing its 2014 record. Its business decision 
and Chinese officials’ authorization were reached with the intention of going beyond 
mere bilateral trade and investment. Also via Shanghai, NBAD seeks to provide a 
bridge for wider China-GCC and China-Middle Eastern business ventures.1049 A third 
UAE bank, Emirates NBD, followed this path a few months later and announced its 
new international expansion plan to incorporate a branch in China. It chose Beijing 
as its first location. Hesham Abdulla Al Qassim, vice chairman of Emirates NBD, 
emphasized the bi-directional potential for the growth of China-UAE and MENA 
trade and investment as a rationale.1050 
These only very recent establishments by Emirati banks in China are reminder that at 
least this bilateral component of the New Silk Roads is a mere start of what seems 
likely to grow much further. Besides the UAE’s SWFs, it is also the Islamic Finance 
industry which has captured recent business headlines in China and beyond. 
So far, the expanding global footprint of Islamic finance has not reached mainland 
China yet. However, provinces such as Ningxia have recently launched initiatives to 
create a future Islamic finance hub in cities like the above-mentioned Yinchuan 
within the next decade. This would leverage not only the growing China-UAE trade 
and investment ties, but specifically also the already stirring networks blossoming 
between Ningxia and the Middle East.1051 
                                                          
1049 ‘The Representative Office supports NBAD group customers with their interests in China, 
providing liaison, consulting services and market insights, whilst building relationships with local 
correspondent banks. […] It also assists local Chinese companies who are interested in conducting 
business in MENA in identifying and introducing them to potential counterparties in the region’. See: 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi, ‘NBAD China’[https://www.nbad.com/en-cn/business-banking.html]; 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi, ‘About NBAD Hong Kong’ [https://www.nbad.com/en-hk/about-
nbad/overview.html]. 
1050 ‘Over the last decade, China has emerged as one of the Gulf's most important trade partners, both 
as a leading energy importer and as the world's largest exporter. […] Indeed, the Chinese business base 
in the UAE has witnessed considerable expansion, giving rise to a sizeable Chinese business and 
resident community. […] We believe this is the opportune time to expand our banking operations into 
China, and create a liaison point to support businesses operating in these two key markets’. See: 
Sambidge, A. (2012), ‘Emirates NBD opens first office in China’. In: Arabian Business, 11 September 
2012 [http://www.arabianbusiness.com/emirates-nbd-opens-first-office-in-china-472640.html]. 
1051 Alam, N., Lee, C.G. (2015), ‘How Islamic finance could be about to take off in China’. In: The 
Conversation, 5 May 2015 [http://theconversation.com/how-islamic-finance-could-be-about-to-take-
off-in-china-40785]. 
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All in all, merely about 2% of China’s population is Muslim. Though this still equates 
to roughly 23 million people, which represents a potentially significant market size in 
its own right, analysts have underlined the eventual necessity to advertise Islamic 
finance as a means for transaction going beyond Muslim participation. This message 
has not yet been successfully delivered to the wider Chinese population. 
Consequently, Islamic finance requires a decade-long time-frame as a strategy for the 
industry to ‘gain a larger foothold in the country’.1052 Therefore, economists such as 
Nafis Alam and Chew Ging Lee recommend that ‘Ningxia’s initial focus should […] be 
on developing a wholesale Islamic capital market, including Islamic bonds, equities 
and funds and making sure it is seen as a real alternative to the conventional 
market’.1053 The province should turn to expertise from neighbouring countries such 
as Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, where the industry has boomed in recent 
years, in order to receive fruitful consulting regarding the necessary Sharia-compliant 
institutional and legal reforms. 
There is plenty of interest, especially in solvent Gulf states like the UAE. The Chinese 
government is very aware of this and is keen to support initiatives by big Islamic 
banks especially into its global financial hubs, such as Hong Kong with its lauded 
regulatory framework, but also the Shanghai Free Trade Zone.1054 Once major 
Emirati banks open up branches there, they could utilize Islamic finance mechanisms 
when investing in major infrastructure projects inside China and beyond.1055 China’s 
new AIIB has been looking into such moves and has held talks with the Saudi-based 
Islamic Development Bank, which also incorporates the UAE as a member, to sell 
sukuk bonds for the BRI project.1056  
Another example involves the Shariah Advisory Group who is advising HNA Group, a 
major Chinese conglomerate, in order to finance the development of a high-speed 
railway project in Shandong Province via a sukuk bond worth 30 billion yuan ($4.7 
                                                          
1052 Ibid. 
1053 Ibid. 
1054 For Hong Kong’s current and potential future role in Islamic Finance, see again: Ho 2014. 
1055 Alam, Lee 2015. 
1056 Reuters (2015), ‘China-led AIIB studying use of Islamic financing’. In: South China Morning Post 
[http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1798725/china-led-aiib-studying-use-
islamic-financing]. 
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billion).1057 Since Islamic finance operates interest-free, the major incentive for the 
potential Chinese borrowers would be to save money.  
As a result of this growing interest, Beijing hosted a conference on Islamic finance 
with Chinese and Emirati government institutions and banks in May 2016.1058 All in 
all, it seems reasonable to assume this industry will at some point see at least a 
moderate breakthrough in China. Once that happens, UAE financial services seem 
well-placed to be among the major participants. 
 
8.3 Sino-Emirati Diplomacy and Strategy 
Mirroring most of China’s GCC relations and trade, its ties to the UAE are also a 
recent phenomenon. After China-UAE relations experienced an awkward delay in the 
1970s, comparable to most of China’s relations with GCC members, the two countries 
finally set up official diplomatic ties in 1984.1059 
Bilateral trade was soon launched with a series of agreements between the two 
governments in the following years. Cooperation in economic and scientific research, 
an air cargo agreement, an initiative against double taxation and a trade promotion 
protocol, as well as a framework for investment and technical collaboration, were part 
of these first steps, which set the stage for what is now a deep, commercial 
relationship. Since the early 2000s China and the GCC have had several rounds of 
talks on a possible FTA, as mentioned above.1060 Its successfully conclusion would 
also boost China-UAE trade, further enhancing the commercial role played by the 
UAE for China’s Gulf trade. 
In July 2011, on a visit to the UAE, then China premier Wen Jiabao and his trade 
delegation signed numerous agreements, reaching from a contract between CNPC 
and ADNOC, an energy cooperation protocol, a protocol on sports projects, as well as 
a contract removing visa-requirements for diplomatic passport holders (after general 
                                                          
1057 Bernardo, V. (2015), ‘China's is using Islamic finance to expand its new Silk Road’. In: Business 
Insider, 22 September 2015 [http://uk.businessinsider.com/r-china-turns-to-islamic-finance-to-
expand-economic-clout-2015-9]. 
1058 The Gulf Today (2016), ‘Beijing to host 1st China-UAE meet on Islamic banking’. 18 May 2016 
[http://gulftoday.ae/portal/1e5036bb-7e1b-433a-aab8-9da02207215c.aspx]. 
1059 Olimat 2013: p. 163. 
1060 Ibid.: p. 164. 
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visa policies had already been eased in 2009).1061 Furthermore, accompanied by a 
currency exchange swap, the UAE Central Bank and the People’s Bank of China 
signed a pact on financial supervision and information exchange.1062 
Half a year later, in early 2012, high-ranking officials from both states signed a joint 
communiqué for a comprehensive bilateral strategic partnership in trade, together 
with political cooperation, energy and construction, and cultural exchanges and 
tourism.1063 
In February 2015, on an official visit to the UAE, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi 
and his counterpart Sheik Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan announced an expansion of 
the bilateral partnership. Courting the UAE and its “Look East” policy for 
participating in President Xi Jinping’s BRI, the meeting helped pave the way for a 
whole series of heads-of-state visits the same year.1064 
Zhao Leji, a member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central 
Committee and Head of the CCP Organization Department, met Sheik Mohammad 
bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi in May 2015.1065 Shortly after, 
representatives from DIFC were hosted in Beijing, as part of ‘Dubai Week in China’, 
where they boldly advertised DIFC’s competitiveness and attractiveness as a place for 
Chinese banks and other firms abroad, serving the wider Middle Eastern, African and 
European markets.1066 High-level government officials and business elites of both 
countries were present. 
In December 2015, on a state visit to China by the UAE’s Sheik Mohammad bin Zayed 
and a large entourage, a substantial number of agreements was signed between the 
two countries. Dr Sultan Al-Jaber, UAE Minister of State, characterized the visit as a 
‘paradigm shift in this whole relationship’.1067 In his supplementary role as head of 
                                                          
1061 Thafer, D. (2013), ‘After the Financial Crisis: Dubai-China Economic Relations’. Middle East 
Institute, 15 September 2013 [http://www.mei.edu/content/after-financial-crisis-dubai-china-
economic-relations]. 
1062 Olimat 2013: p. 163. 
1063 Ibid. 
1064 Scott, E. (2015), ‘China’s “One Belt, One Road” Strategy Meets the UAE’s Look East Policy’. In: The 
Jamestown Foundation China Brief, 15:11, 29 May 2015 [https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-
one-belt-one-road-strategy-meets-the-uaes-look-east-policy/]. 
1065 Ibid. 
1066 Khaleej Times (2015), ‘UAE, China well poised to take relations to new level’. 16 May 2015 
[http://www.khaleejtimes.com/article/20150516/ARTICLE/305169879/1037]. 
1067 Cited in: Malek, C (2015), ‘Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed to meet Chinese president’. In: The 
National, 9 December 2015 [https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/sheikh-mohammed-bin-
zayed-to-meet-chinese-president-1.102395]. 
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Mubadala Development Company, Al-Jaber and CNPC President Wang Yilin signed a 
strategic agreement for cooperation in oil exploration and production.1068 
The most noteworthy MoU concerned a renewal of a renminbi swap agreement 
between the two countries, crucially, the establishment of a renminbi clearing house 
in the UAE, and the UAE’s inclusion in China’s RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investor scheme.1069 As stated above, China has been active in the UAE to facilitate 
the growing internationalization of its currency. The specific deal permits the UAE 
Central Bank to lend 35 billion yuan (at the time of writing an equivalent of 
approximately US $5 billion) for bilateral trading. Even though these will probably 
not be used to a significant extent, and, according to Mark Williams, senior China 
economist at London’s Capital Economics, might ‘just remain an agreement on 
paper’, this is still a necessary first step for the UAE to turn into a regional trading 
hub for yuan-denominated capital flows.1070 For Dubai’s (DIFC’s) ambitions to 
compete globally with the financial centres of London, New York, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore, it will necessarily have to lay the groundwork to accommodate the 
possible 21st century realities of a more multipolar monetary order. Given for example 
Qatar’s establishment of a renminbi clearing house earlier in 2015, Dubai also has 
regional competitors when it comes to ambitions to growing a regional financial hub 
for world trade, although DIFC’s financial status and Qatar’s recent isolation from 
most GCC countries and markets will further increase the UAE’s competitiveness. It 
can therefore be expected that the Emirates will continue to intensify their China-
friendly monetary openness, including their possible future embrace of what Flynt 
and Hillary Leverett have called the petroyuan.1071 
Even though the dollar remains the world’s leading reserve and transaction currency, 
including for energy trade, the fact that most Gulf oil exports now go to Asia, with 
                                                          
1068 Further contract highlights from the state visit included a MoU mutually recognizing national 
driving licenses in each other’s countries; memoranda for space research cooperation and for the field 
of meteorology; a protocol for diplomatic training and information exchange between diplomatic 
agencies and political science departments of key universities of both countries; an agreement on 
cooperation in higher education, as well as student exchanges; plus a cooperation protocol on 
archiving between both countries’ national archives. See: Gulf News (2015), ‘UAE and China sign 
agreements, MoUs’. 14 December 2015 [http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/uae-and-china-
sign-agreements-mous-1.1637205]. 
1069 Reuters (2015), ‘UAE to set up Chinese yuan clearing centre’. 26 December 2016 
[http://www.reuters.com/article/emirates-yuan-clearing/uae-to-set-up-chinese-yuan-clearing-centre-
idUSL8N14F0AF20151226]. 
1070 Bouyamourn, A. (2015), ‘UAE renews renminbi swap deal with China’. In: The National, 14 
December 2015 [https://www.thenational.ae/business/uae-renews-renminbi-swap-deal-with-china-
1.104179]. 
1071 Leverett, Mann Leverett 2015a. 
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China taking the largest share, and that most of China’s foreign oil sources lie in the 
Persian Gulf, creates increasing incentives to conduct this trade in renminbi (yuan). 
China’s strategy is to internationalize its money also via currency-swap agreements 
with Gulf states and to facilitate RMB-denominated transactions. These have been 
growing in recent years, driving competition with the US and the dollar.1072 This 
means that the renminbi ‘for all intents and purposes [is] functioning more widely as 
a reserve currency’, implying a long term policy orchestrated by Beijing to ‘lay[…] the 
ground for a multipolar international monetary order’.1073 For emerging markets, this 
new order would provide flexibility and choice, making them less dependent on 
developed-market currencies. Given that trade in commodities and manufactured 
goods is still a major driving force for economic growth in emerging market 
countries, this will strengthen their geo-economic clout and their voice in the global 
monetary institutions by simultaneously saving dollar-convertibility costs. The 
renminbi’s sudden rise to global significance in the last half-decade represents the 
flagship of this change.  
It is therefore only logical that Chinese-funded development and infrastructure 
projects across Asia, boosted by Xi Jinping’s BRI, will also increasingly utilize the 
renminbi.1074 As the Leveretts highlight, a wider Chinese monetary strategy goes 
beyond mere economic advantages and is fundamentally strategic in its nature.  
‘Chinese policymakers have watched Washington’s increased propensity to cut off countries from the 
American financial system as a foreign policy tool. […] Chinese officials calculate that the renminbi 
internationalization helps mitigate China’s potential vulnerability to such pressure. More broadly, 
Chinese policymakers understand the importance of dollar hegemony to America’s capacity for 
unilateral global power projection. By chipping away at the dollar’s relative standing as the world’s 
premier transactional and reserve currency, Beijing can constrain what it sees as excessive US 
unilateralism in international affairs’.1075 
In the Persian Gulf, China has been promoting its currency and is increasingly aiming 
at using it when exporting to trading partners such as the UAE, but also to purchase 
Gulf oil with renminbi. Gulf central banks stockpiling renminbi will give these the 
option to increasingly invest those reserves directly back into China. ‘Promotion of 
[this emerging] petroyuan lets China expand the financial, monetary, and strategic 
                                                          
1072 Ibid.: p. 125. 
1073 Ibid. 
1074 Howell, M. (2016), ‘How China is taking the Silk Road to financial dominance’. CapX 
[https://capx.co/the-financial-silk-road/]. 
1075 Leverett, Mann Leverett 2015a: p. 126. 
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options available to major energy producers’.1076 These have several incentives to 
intensify the use of the petroyuan, including monetary, economic, and political ones. 
The latter especially involves the potentially uncertain future of US security provision 
to the Gulf states. The Gulf Arab states see the necessity to diversify their global 
political partners, diplomatic allies, and ultimately their security guarantors. Turning 
themselves into trustable and reliable partners for China by acting within Beijing’s 
core interests, could not only help ensure Chinese political neutrality between the 
Iranians and the Arabs. It could also lay the groundwork for a much deeper kind of 
partnership, possibly even an alliance in the future, if the circumstances allow it.1077 
This is also what Wheatley and his co-authors speculate, pointing towards enduring 
historic linkage-incentives of monetary and military power. China, they say, is likely 
to go down the same route.1078 
None of these developments are likely to create a watershed in the region any time 
soon. The change is more gradual and subtle, but potentially dramatic, as the 
Leveretts emphasize. 
‘Of course, these are just opening skirmishes in the battle between the petrodollar and the petroyuan. 
[…] But just as surely, China will continue working to expand its influence in the region. And by 
promoting the petroyuan, Chinese policymakers calculate that they can slowly erode America’s 
longstanding hegemonic dominance in the Gulf without firing a shot’.1079 
It remains to be seen when and how these highly political monetary issues will 
develop. Sino-Emirati monetary cooperation though was also complemented by 
financial cooperation only a month after bin Zayed’s December 2015 state visit. It was 
followed by the attendance of Mohammad Saif Al-Suwaidi, Director General of Abu 
Dhabi Fund for Development, in the opening ceremony of China’s AIIB in Beijing, in 
January 2016. Having declared UAE participation already in April 2015, the UAE will 
contribute to the AIIB, funding construction projects across Asia, with a value of $237 
million to be transacted over the next five years.1080 Given the UAE’s simultaneous 
embrace of the renminbi, the country has declared itself an important financial and 
monetary contributor to China’s Gulf role, China’s Belt and Road and China’s rise. 
                                                          
1076 Ibid. 
1077 Yet, it is important to stress differences between GCC members. Other than the UAE and Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia is not yet willing to promote the petroyuan, although this could quickly change with 
shifting monetary, economic, and political developments that affect Saudi Arabia. See: Ibid. 
1078 Wheatley 2013: pp. 152-155. 
1079 Leverett, Mann Leverett 2015a: p. 127. 
1080 Gulf News (2016), ‘Uae participates in the opening of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 
China’. 16 January 2016 [http://gulfnews.com/business/sectors/banking/uae-participates-in-the-
opening-of-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-in-china-1.1654671]. 
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As the examples of high-level institutionalization of bilateral diplomatic relations 
demonstrate, China-UAE trade and investment connections are already wide and 
deep and seem set to intensify over the coming years. If current mutual objectives 
and estimations prove accurate, the UAE, at least in terms of business diversity and 
relative diplomatic harmony, could become the most important Gulf state in China’s 
regional interests and in its wider New Silk Roads. Alongside energy interests, these 
diverse New Silk Roads will themselves help determine how far the 21st century will 
be China’s. 
 
8.4 Chapter Conclusion and Theoretical Assessment 
The substantial growth of Sino-Emirati trade just over just over the past 15 years has 
been fast and large enough to go beyond CIT’s label of interconnectedness, and the 
use of the word interdependence. 
The fact that the UAE represents a regional trade hub for many of China’s exports to 
the GCC, the wider Middle East, and to Africa, leads to the exact opposite balance of 
trade China conducts with the GCC. Contrary to the hydrocarbon-based Chinese 
trade deficit with the GCC, China enjoys a substantial trade surplus with the UAE – 
exporting for example cheaply-manufactured goods, electronic and electrical 
equipment, heavy machinery, textiles and food products. China would therefore be 
sensitive to a hypothetical trade cessation with the Emirates. It is primarily Dubai’s 
identity as a regional and trans-continental trade hub – the “geographic sweet spot” – 
which is so far relatively unique in the Gulf, making the UAE not only more 
important to China than the rest of the smaller Gulf monarchies, but making it 
China’s most important strategic business location in the centre of Spykman’s 
rimland. 
The UAE would surely feel an impact of a hypothetical suspension of its imports from 
China – both in terms of its own consumption, and of its re-export revenue from 
Chinese products. Its globally integrated economy would be sensitive, although not 
vulnerable to a loss of this. 
In consideration of the Emirates’ exports to China, its dependence on hydrocarbons is 
nearly total, even though the UAE’s economic growth is not export-driven. Yet, 
China’s market is the second biggest in the world, and in with regard to oil imports 
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and consumption has recently caught up, if not overtaken the developed world’s. 
Here, the UAE would not only be sensitive to a hypothetical stop to Chinese fuel 
imports, it would be vulnerable towards loosing that market at least in the mid-term 
future, despite its far more successful economic diversification vis-à-vis other Gulf 
states. Yet, the other way around, the UAE’s small size entails that China cannot be 
called dependent on Emirati fuel imports. An asymmetry of interdependence is 
visible in this issue area. 
All in all, though, these two asymmetries in trade relations – China’s use of the UAE 
as a trading hub, and the UAE’s dependence on the Chinese oil market – reduces 
what would otherwise be a highly asymmetrical interdependence between two 
overwhelmingly different-sized countries in their overall trade relations.  
Investment flows in the form of FDI and EPC have been following the growing trade 
flows, however on a much lesser level so far. In CIT categorization, Sino-Emirati bi-
directional investment does not go far enough to talk of recent or current 
interdependence, but rather, of mere interconnectedness. Moreover, much of the 
investment has come from SOEs, partly underwritten by SWFs. Such conditions are 
far away from CIT’s ideal type. 
Nevertheless, there are now thousands of small, medium, and large Chinese 
enterprises in the UAE, and markedly more than in any other Gulf country, which 
again demonstrates the UAE’s relative competitiveness, and diversification and 
business hub status. Furthermore, the overall value of Chinese project contracting in 
UAE construction is the second highest in the Gulf after Saudi Arabia. Sectors include 
real estate and the energy industry. Remarkably, unlike in Saudi Arabia, Chinese oil 
firms have recently won several upstream development contracts in the UAE, 
including a major concession and the construction of an oil pipeline between Abu 
Dhabi and Fujairah. The latter location has also received several further Chinese 
investments, because it lies outside the Strait of Hormuz – connecting the UAE to the 
Indian Ocean and to China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, whilst circumventing 
the most sensitive strategic bottleneck in the world. Dubai’s hub status, and all these 
further considerations have also resulted in the expansion of China’s largest banks 
into the UAE, having an immediate financial impact in DIFC.  
The other way around, some Emirati banks have established branches in China and 
many are eager to promote the expansion of Islamic Finance, first in Hong Kong, but 
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also in Muslim-populated Ningxia Province. SWFs are thought to be active portfolio 
investors, particularly in Hong Kong. Prominent Emirati investments in China lie in 
the transport sector, both shipping and aviation – literally helping to build New Silk 
Roads. On the other hand, the investment that has not happened is at least as 
obvious. Chinese real estate has been invested into by some of Dubai’s companies, 
though on a relatively low scale due to Chinese barriers. Neither have Emirati 
petrochemical producers found footholds in China so far.  
All in all, FDI between the two countries, when incorporating EPC contracts, is 
mostly flowing in the other direction – creating an investment asymmetry. Generally, 
the scope of capital flows between China and the GCC and thus the UAE is still 
proportionally marginal compared to their investments elsewhere. Therefore, a 
hypothetical freeze would not have the highest of costly effects for the time being. 
This could change in the near future though from the UAE’s point of view. Whilst a 
halt to Emirati investment in China would seemingly have next to no impact there, a 
stop of Chinese companies’ expansion into Emirati free zones would be felt. So would 
Chinese banking in the UAE have a noticeable, and increasingly painful impact, given 
DIFC’s recent, rapid and vast absorption of Chinese capital. If these developments 
intensify, which seems likely, the UAE will be not only be connected to China via 
multiple channels but will be increasingly dependent on what seems destined to 
become the world’s largest economy. CIT would thereby become more helpful to 
Sino-Emirati investment matters than it is at the time of writing. 
Ergo, it will become helpful to interpret Sino-Emirati monetary ties. As already 
pointed out in Chapter 6, there are signs that change in international monetary 
affairs is slowly occurring. China’s economic rise has been mirrored by the relatively 
recent promotion of the renminbi as a future global reserve and transaction currency. 
The Sino-UAE relationship is beginning to have a potential influence on these wider 
matters. The UAE and some other Gulf states are contributing to the adjustment of 
the international monetary regime (as well as the closely connected producers’ and 
consumers’ oil-trade regimes) to mirror the gradual change in the distribution of 
power in the international political economy. China’s establishment of a renminbi 
clearing house in the UAE and a bilateral currency-swap agreement might be 
cosmetic for now but could theoretically help prepare a future in which Sino-Emirati 
trade, even their oil trade, could be conducted with the renminbi. Unlike Saudi 
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Arabia, the UAE seems to be showing more pragmatism in these matters, at least for 
now.  
The birth of a petroyuan would fundamentally re-distribute power towards China in 
the global monetary order and therefore also in geo-political matters. It would 
significantly elevate China’s overall power in the Gulf. Still, a transformative level of 
issue area-linkage, in which China underpins Gulf and Emirati security in exchange 
for petroyuan-recycling in China is highly improbable in the near future, meaning 
also that a regime change is not (yet) taking place. Hence, neo-liberal 
institutionalism’s assumptions of flexible regimes guaranteeing mutual gains remains 
the most accurate theoretical interpretation. Realism would only gain the upper hand 
in Sino-Emirati monetary relations if the two states formed an alliance against the 
dollar and against US Gulf military presence. Under which conditions this could or 
could not occur will briefly be touched upon in the conclusion. 
In any case, China-UAE diplomatic relations have grown much closer over the years 
as a result of the advanced economic ties. China sees its most important Gulf partner 
in the UAE in a multitude of areas, if not in oil. Though the relations remain largely 
apolitical for now, both have a certain stake in each other’s success and are 
enthusiastically cooperating and conducting state visits accordingly. The UAE is fully 
embracing China’s rise, even as Abu Dhabi remains firmly allied to the US. This has 
not stopped it from joining China’s AIIB and from supporting the BRI. Both therefore 
place great value on the creation of wider New Silk Roads.  
The diversity in Sino-Emirati relations has spawned various fora and institutions for 
numerous areas of bilateral cooperation, creating multiple channels that connect both 
societies in government, business and beyond. The UAE is clearly the GCC state with 
the weakest hierarchy of issue areas in relations to China, making it also the closest 
Gulf case to CIT’s ideal type, next to the structurally more weighted Saudi Arabia. Yet, 
as stated before, China-Gulf interdependence lies at the regional level rather than 
vulnerably on a bilateral level. Despite this argument, realism is even less equipped to 
describe the current state of Sino-Emirati relations, but could find much greater 
relevance also when viewing the region and China’s role in it as a whole. 
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Conclusion and Outlook 
The research question of this manuscript centred on the economic and geo-political 
impact of China’s growing commercial ties to and diplomatic relations with the 
Persian Gulf states, illustrated especially by a focus on Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 
More broadly, it considered whether China is going to be the next dominating outside 
power in the Gulf region. Recent history and the present situation have seen the US 
fulfilling the role of Gulf hegemon. Given that China and the Gulf States are becoming 
more economically important to each other, at the same time as the Gulf states are 
becoming relatively less important economically to the US, it is necessary to ask 
whether the actors involved will facilitate or prohibit a changing of the guard. If the 
US followed incentives to withdraw militarily from the Gulf, would China fill the 
likely ensuing power vacuum there? This question is future-orientated, but 
nevertheless underpinned the motivation for this thesis. Its main body of work was 
not composed of future speculations, but presented an assessment of historic, recent, 
and current structures, situations, and developments that are relevant for an 
evaluation of China’s and the Gulf states’ recent and current impact on each other. 
Only when this information is provided, is it possible to engage in some informed 
speculation about the future. 
In order to answer the research question, several methods and steps were utilized. 
The underlying task was not merely to give an overview and analysis of the nature 
and scope of China-Gulf relations, but also their contextualization – without which 
there would be little substance for an assessment of their impact.  
The conclusion now seeks to bring the manuscript’s various threads together to reply 
to the research question. The author starts by summarizing his basic findings on the 
nature and scope of China-Gulf relations, including the two case studies. This is 
undertaken via an evaluation of the problem which of the two theories, neo-liberal 
institutionalism or neo-realism, best captures the subject matter more accurately, or 
rather, which of the three hypotheses, two based on the two theories and one based 
on their synthesis, falls closest to reality. This is complemented by the same 
evaluation regarding the Gulf region’s economic ties and diplomatic relations with 
Asia’s other three major economies, Japan, South Korea, and India, to bring the 
inter-regional context back into play. 
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In the next step, the author taps into the historical context chapters’ empirical 
insights and their theoretical interpretations and demonstrates their relevance or 
otherwise in assessing China’s recent and current role in the Gulf. Finally, in two 
wider steps that first capture the recent and contemporary situation, and second, 
extrapolate its essence, the author presents the argument why he believes his neo-neo 
synthesis, regional hegemonic stability, is for now the most accurate concept for 
answering the research question, but also how the future may change this and 
produce another theoretical “winner”. The three hypotheses were the following: 
H1 (neo-liberal institutionalism): China-Gulf, Asia-Gulf, US-Gulf, and US-Asia 
interdependence prevents direct, hard great power rivalry in the Gulf region, 
incentivizing all actors to institutionally cooperate, with military security provided 
collectively, but playing less and less of a role the more interdependence grows. 
H2 (neo-realism): China’s, the US’s, and other Asian outside powers’ strategic 
interests in the Gulf makes geo-political great power rivalry there inevitable, leading 
the US to adopt a strategy that seeks to prevent China from playing a military security 
role in the region and leading China to a revisionist Gulf strategy. 
H3 (regional hegemonic stability): The Persian Gulf region’s centrality to global 
affairs promotes both diverse interdependencies and geo-political insecurity 
simultaneously, intensifying the need for Asia-Gulf-US cooperation, but reducing its 
likelihood, should economic flexibility and the American-led military stabilizing force 
not be maintained. 
 
Nature and Scope of China-Gulf Relations 
Trade between China and the Gulf states only began in earnest in the 1990s and only 
took off on its skyrocketing trajectory from the new millennium onwards, after China 
had joined the WTO. It was mostly due to China’s increasing need for oil imports, 
which have dominated the Sino-Gulf trade ever since. As a result, China runs a 
substantial trade deficit with the GCC-bloc, covering half of its total oil imports from 
there, which again cover half of its oil consumption, which again covers over 20% of 
its overall energy consumption. With CIT categories, this makes China already 
vulnerably dependent on Gulf oil. Saudi Arabia has been China’s most important Gulf 
oil provider and therefore most significant regional partner since the early 2000s. 
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The Kingdom is thus the biggest contributor to China’s dependence on the Gulf. The 
same can be said the other way around. The Gulf economies are still heavily reliant on 
the export of their hydrocarbons, though in some cases at varying degrees. This is 
true for most of the small Gulf monarchies plus Iran and Iraq, but it is especially true 
for Saudi Arabia, which has become completely accustomed to its reliance on oil for 
everything. Simultaneously, the GCC and Saudi Arabia alone are therefore vulnerably 
dependent on market share in the world’s largest oil importing countries. China has 
recently reached first position in that respect, will likely remain in it for the next two 
decades, and will have a growing oil demand.  
Hence, a disruption of Gulf-China oil trade would have serious and costly reciprocal 
effects. Yet, the vulnerability interdependence between China and the Gulf is slightly 
asymmetrical. Whereas several Gulf economies, including Saudi Arabia, would be in 
danger of eventual collapse after a loss of the Chinese market, and although China’s 
economy would also seriously suffer, it is easier to imagine a relatively faster Chinese 
recovery after some painful and costly adjustments in its energy mix. Nevertheless, 
the Chinese price to pay would be too high for this slight power-asymmetry in the 
energy issue area to translate into a usable Chinese power dividend. 
China’s imports of natural gas from the Gulf have been less important for now, 
relative to China’s energy mix. Yet, they are growing and have much more potential in 
the future, because China is seeking to reduce its dependence on oil as much as 
possible. Qatar is already a large LNG supplier to China, making them 
interdependent, however asymmetrically, as long as China’s economy does not rely 
more on gas, or Qatar diversifies economically. Iran is a future gas exporting 
candidate after the lifting of UN-sanctions, and could even supply China via pipeline, 
but its industry will take many years of upgrading first. 
The China-Gulf non-hydrocarbon trade is almost entirely composed of Chinese 
exports to the Gulf, which come in the form of competitively priced manufactured 
goods, for example electrical and electronic equipment, heavy machinery, and 
textiles. They find large consumer markets in the Gulf, but relative to China’s global 
exports, the region’s importance merely reaches CIT’s level of sensitivity 
interdependence. However, it can be placed in the former category, because many of 
China’s exports to Africa and Europe enter Gulf ports and markets first, before they 
are re-exported. The UAE serves as the regional and trans-continental trade hub for 
384 
 
this business, making it China’s most important Gulf partner in that respect. This is 
proven by the fact that, contrary to China’s trade deficit with the GCC-bloc, China 
enjoys a trade surplus with the UAE. 
Hence, in trade matters, China and the Gulf states are highly interdependent, 
although Gulf energy exports are an issue area that overwhelmingly dominates so far. 
Despite such hierarchies of importance – faraway from CIT’s ideal type – the Sino-
Gulf energy interdependence is high enough for this neo-liberal institutionalist theory 
to be a useful tool. 
This is less the case with regard to Sino-Gulf investment ties, which have trailed 
behind trade value and are not as diversified yet as might have been expected. 
Compared to the GCC states’, but especially China’s, worldwide investment, both 
blocs take up a noticeably lower share in each other’s investments than is the case 
with trade. Though Iran is one of China’s oldest investment destinations in the 
region, many projects stalled or were cancelled from the mid-2000s onwards, due to 
international sanctions on Iran. In Iraq, Chinese energy and construction companies 
have invested substantial amounts, but, for instance, Iraqi oil output has taken long 
to recover and is still in constant security risk exposure. Among GCC countries, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE clearly dominated as China’s capital destinations. Increasing 
numbers of Chinese firms have a presence in both countries. The UAE, as the 
business hub that it is, hosts far more of them for now, although Saudi Arabia’s 
Vision 2030 is seemingly encouraging and partly already succeeding in enticing more 
Chinese FDI. Major Chinese banks are beginning to follow their non-financial 
counterparts. Via EPC-contracting, Saudi Arabia takes up more than half of China’s 
infrastructure investment into the GCC, with the UAE taking around a quarter. The 
dominating sectors are real estate, transport, and energy. In Saudi Arabia’s case, the 
latter sector has so far been confined to Chinese downstream investment, but the 
UAE has recently awarded upstream contracts to Chinese companies. This points 
towards long-term energy trade interests. 
The other way around, Gulf investments into China are likely to be lower in general 
FDI and in EPC. Yet, many FDI, and especially FPI-flows, are classified or at least not 
reported in the press, making it impossible to provide a clear picture beyond a few 
noteworthy examples. Private investors seem to be particularly rare, and the SWFs, 
other than reporting their presence in the country, do not publish their specific 
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portfolio-elements. Saudi Arabian energy companies have invested into China’s 
petrochemicals industry in order to lock in China’s long-term Saudi and GCC oil 
imports. Emirati investment into China has its most prominent cases in transport 
and “Silk Road” connectivity, both in shipping and aviation, and in the future 
possibly also in transport infrastructure on land. Furthermore, Gulf states have been 
enthusiastic supporters for building a trans-Asian Islamic Corridor – with Islamic 
Finance in China being seen as an untapped opportunity. 
However, for bi-directional China-Gulf investment flows to date, the use of the 
interdependence label would be an exaggeration. CIT would describe the current 
state of affairs in this issue area as merely interconnected, even though connections 
are rapidly growing and could in the future add further layers to Sino-Gulf (energy-
)trade interdependence. 
Given the latter, governments of the states involved are deliberately seeking to help 
bring about such deeper and more diverse ties. Although Sino-Gulf diplomatic 
relations have become closer only over the last twenty years, this was primarily in 
reaction to the growing trade. Since the 2000s, numerous visits by heads of state 
were undertaken in both directions, each time accompanied by large business 
delegations producing new trade and investment deals. Towards the end of the 
decade, various institutional fora had been created and large conferences now take 
place on a regular basis in China and the Gulf. Moreover, diplomatic initiatives have 
gone beyond the facilitation of economic transactions, and have increasingly 
incorporated scientific, educational, and cultural exchange agreements. The rhetoric 
is very much focused on bilateral cooperation across the board. 
Therefore, the same rationale that drives CIT is driving the actions of China and the 
Gulf states. Multiple channels connecting their societies are forming both state-
driven, but also independent private networks. These will increasingly contribute to a 
condition described by CIT, even though its ideal type is faraway. 
Nevertheless, it has to be emphasized that China-Gulf diplomatic relations so far have 
remained largely apolitical. On the one hand, CIT would underline that therefore no 
destructive politicization, i.e. issue-linkage, has taken place – thereby leaving the 
lucrative and important trade and investment ties undisturbed. On the other hand, a 
lack of politicization and a creation of a mutual strategy dealing with issue areas 
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beyond the strict bilateral relationships also means that the deeper diplomatic 
cooperation has not created what realists would characterize as an alliance. 
There are largely three reasons why China has constrained itself on the foreign policy 
front. Firstly, Beijing’s mainly business-focused, apolitical foreign engagement, with 
the only exception of its direct neighbourhood, applies all around the world, not just 
in the Middle East, although China’s direct neighbourhood in which China clearly 
acts with geo-political motivations is expanding especially via the Belt and Road 
Initiative. In Pakistan in particular, China’s investments have a strong geo-political 
underpinning which is merely cloaked by the commercial rhetoric of the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor. However, the highly insecure and unstable Greater 
Middle East region, with its many political and violent conflicts, seems to give China 
an extra determination not to get directly involved. Beijing fears that political 
meddling in the Middle East, including the Gulf, would threaten its mutually stable 
and lucrative economic relations with all and the most important regional states.  
The most sensitive and risky case is the enmity between Saudi Arabia and Iran, with 
their regional proxy wars on the Gulf’s periphery. On balance, both countries are of 
equal importance to Beijing, even though Saudi Arabia has provided more oil over the 
last decade than Iran, due to sanctions. As Iranian oil re-enters the market, that 
picture seems likely to adjust though. If that were the case, China would continue to 
refuse to pick sides in the conflict and would aim to maintain equally strong relations 
with both. It can only do so with a hands-off approach, albeit the possibility exists 
that Beijing will step up its neutral mediation efforts. Indeed, there have already been 
a few signs that Beijing has been pressured into accepting such a role, but only to a 
very moderate degree so far. 
Finally, the US is a crucial variable in China’s apolitical Gulf approach. Beijing has 
clearly prioritized its most important economic relationship – and that is with 
Washington. This has meant that China has refrained from upsetting US political and 
security interests in the Gulf, a region that is firmly within America’s prioritized 
sphere of influence. With the exception of condemning the US’s Iraq invasion of 2003 
and by supporting Bashar Al-Assad’s Syrian regime, via UN-resolution-vetoes in the 
country’s ongoing civil war, China has so far not clashed with the US in the Middle 
East. Beijing was less alarmed about the recent Iranian nuclear programme and 
based on economic and strategic interests resisted the harshest American-proposed 
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sanctions. Nevertheless, it largely joined the international community in the attempt 
to sanction Iran and then help bring about the 2015 JCPOA. This multilateral 
cooperation in which globally networked states converge in institutions to solve 
problems collectively by separating sensitive issue areas, engaging in reciprocal 
compromises, and legally seeking to enforce accepted international regimes – in this 
case the WMD non-proliferation regime – is a prime example for an interdependent 
system and neo-liberal institutionalist dynamics. 
However, it is necessary to highlight China’s efforts to constantly water down each 
sanctions-resolution in the preceding years. This has been interpreted as a soft 
balancing strategy against the US and therefore against anti-Iranian Saudi sabre-
rattling. Indeed, this points towards a Chinese hedging strategy for the Gulf. China’s 
current and favoured approach of equally strong relations with both Saudi Arabia and 
Iran is much less likely to work if US-China relations deteriorate, and the Saudi-
Iranian enmity escalates into direct war. For the eventuality of both those things 
happening simultaneously, China is more likely to tilt towards Iran for geo-strategic 
reasons: Iranian oil (and gas) can be pumped to China through pipelines on land, 
away from the Gulf, and outside the immediately US-dominated sea lanes. On a more 
comprehensive scale, Iran is the ultimate economic and geo-political prize for China’s 
Silk Road Economic Belt, connecting China to the central rimland’s only outlet to 
both the sea and the heartland, areas that have also seen large Chinese infrastructure 
investment even prior to the announced BRI. 
All in all, for now, neo-liberal institutionalism including CIT, is the more accurate 
theoretical interpretation of China-Gulf relations, despite shortcomings. Up until 
now, the story has been one of cooperation, and a deeper institutionalization of 
multiple connections following and facilitating ever expanding trade interdependence 
and investment interconnectedness. Although energy is the underlying motivation for 
almost all of this, and the fact that there is thus a clear hierarchy of issue areas, so far, 
these issue areas have not been linked either constructively via an alliance with any 
Gulf state, or destructively via a rebuff of any one either. Yet, if the two most 
important bilateral relations in this equation, Saudi-Iranian and US-China relations 
deteriorate, China’s strategy is likely to face a heavily undesired, but possibly 
necessary change and could turn from multilateral cooperation and occasional soft 
balancing to some form of hard balancing – suddenly making neo-realism the more 
relevant theory. 
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As these considerations show, a sole bilateral analysis of China-Gulf relations and a 
more polarized interpretation via either neo-liberal institutionalism or neo-realism 
does not suffice to interpret strategically relevant structures and developments 
regarding China’s Gulf role. First, other outside actors, including China’s Asian 
competitors in the Gulf need to be included into the discussion. 
 
The Inter-Regional Context and China’s Asian Competitors in the Gulf 
China and its companies not only compete with their Western counterparts, but also 
with other Asian ones. The New Silk Roads have many origins and destinations and 
all of their participants have strong mutual interests, despite economic competition. 
This condition is heavily influenced through growing economic interdependence both 
among Asian countries and with the Gulf states. The free flow of oil and other goods 
gives all these states strong incentives to pursue cooperation under the motivation of 
absolute gains, closely resembling neo-liberal institutionalist assumptions.  These 
include the absence of destructive issue-linkage and the separation of various issue 
areas which are governed by international regimes.  
Japan and the Gulf region are characterized by ongoing, slightly asymmetrical 
vulnerability interdependence in energy trade, with the Gulf states being heavily 
dependent on the large Japanese oil market, but with Japan even more dependent on 
Gulf oil. In FDI and EPC ventures, the Gulf states, particularly pre-1979 Iran and post 
1991 GCC, have received high amounts of Japanese investment and have also 
moderately invested in Japan. However, these capital flows are reduced to mere 
interconnectedness rather than real interdependence and this may further entrench 
itself as Japan faces tough intra-Asian competition. Whereas South Korea has 
recently overtaken Japan in high technology transfer to the GCC, China is by far the 
largest lower-tech investor. 
Japan’s diplomatic relations with the Gulf states have firmly followed the US’s 
regional alignments. The alliance between Tokyo and Washington encompasses 
American security provision for Japan, both at home in East Asia, as well as in Gulf 
energy security. However, Japan is beginning to act in a more realist manner as it 
amends its Peace Constitution, intensifies diplomatic cooperation with the GCC and 
makes use of its recently opened naval base in Djibouti, also to counteract China’s 
growing geo-political involvement there and in the wider Indo-Pacific. 
389 
 
South Korean-Gulf energy and non-energy trade can be characterized as sensitivity 
interdependent in the short run, but possibly vulnerability interdependent in the long 
run. The reliance on each other in energy trade is high but not as high as between 
Japan and the region. Furthermore, South Korea is a small country compared to 
China, India, and even Japan – making the impact of a potential breakup less severe. 
Yet, South Korea’s exports of high tech and other goods to the Gulf have significantly 
grown and have been followed by increased FDI and EPC projects, especially in the 
GCC. There, the Gulf and South Korea are moving from interconnectedness to 
asymmetrical interdependence, with South Korea being able to offer the GCC much 
more than the other way around. 
These economic ties, the most diversified between an Asian country and the GCC, 
have been accompanied by closer diplomatic and even military cooperation in recent 
years. Yet, South Korea’s small size makes it unlikely to have a noteworthy geo-
political impact on the region. Even more so than Japan, South Korea would only 
contribute to Gulf security within a more meaningful alliance of an outside power, 
currently the US, and the GCC. 
This, one day, may be different with regard to India and the Gulf. India’s geographic 
proximity and demographic impact on the GCC especially, is unique, and places the 
region in India’s back-yard and traditional sphere of influence. 
Between the Gulf and India, a relatively symmetrical trade interdependence exists, 
with energy clearly dominating the ties, as well. India is one of the largest oil markets 
in the world and could even overtake China in two decades. Next to China, India will 
be the most important economic partner to the GCC as well as Iran, even if just for its 
sheer size. 
Indian expatriates contribute massively to the GCC economies. However, the figures 
don’t make it into official Indo-Gulf trade and investment statistics, because there are 
often no micro-economic links to the “motherland” other than the substantial amount 
of remittances. Official Indo-Gulf FDI does not yet reach the level of other Asian 
countries in the region. 
Nevertheless, Indo-Gulf diplomatic cooperation is intensifying at multiple levels, 
although it is still without a great strategic impact that it seems destined to have in 
the future. The contours of India’s potential future roles are already visible though as 
India is courting both Iran and the GCC into close cooperation. India is motived not 
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only by energy security, but also by raw national security, because the Gulf is its back-
yard, and the Sino-Pakistani alliance and China’s BRI is fanning India’s fear of 
strategic encirclement. Hence, increasingly realist incentives are guiding India’s 
interests and behaviour. 
Many different variables can influence America’s and China’s, and other Asian 
countries’ grand strategy and their capabilities. The overall situation and Gulf 
conditions at the time of writing clearly point towards critical elements from both 
theories being in play simultaneously, as the Conclusion has so far demonstrated. 
Indeed, the elephant in the room is that both theories to a significant extent seem to 
depend on each other. Before addressing the three hypotheses, it is necessary to 
complete the contextualization by returning to Gulf outside power history in search 
for patterns, differences, and possible analogies that can help illuminative current 
and future Gulf affairs.  
 
Historical Contextualization of China’s and America’s Gulf Role 
Plenty of historic cases where the Persian Gulf has experienced the influential 
regional involvement of one or more outside powers can help to illuminate the 
meaning and consequences of China’s emergence as one of the Gulf states’ most 
important, if not the most important economic partners. They too, offer insights into 
the behaviour of established Gulf outside powers, as well as of course the Gulf states 
themselves. On a very general scale, four historical analogies seem interesting to 
apply to recent and current China-Gulf relations, albeit to different degrees. 
In the first half of the 20th century, when US foreign policy was still very much 
checked by an isolationist strategy, American businessmen were everything but 
isolationist. Saudi Arabia and Persia enthusiastically opened their gates to American 
companies like Standard Oil. In the shadow of the British Gulf security system, 
American oilmen were simply there for business and could ultimately offer more 
investment and trade capacity than their British counterparts, whereas to the locals, 
American diplomats seemed genuinely interested in neutral mediation and in 
fostering development, rather than imperial and military domination. Though the 
Americans did not desire a British withdrawal from the Gulf, since they were free-
riding on its military security umbrella, their businessmen did compete with the 
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British, and their diplomats formed independent political alliances, first with Ibn 
Saud’s Saudi Arabia, and then additionally with Mohammed Reza Shah’s Iran. 
Chinese businesses have also entered the Gulf with sheer competitiveness, financial 
capability, and a large demand for Gulf oil. This is more than the established Gulf 
hegemon, the US, can offer at the time of writing, at least in terms of oil demand, 
trade, and infrastructure investment. Though the Chinese are also free-riding on the 
US Gulf security umbrella, they are simultaneously forming close diplomatic 
partnerships with both Iran and Saudi Arabia – possibly envisaging their own loose 
version of the former American “twin pillar” strategy with both those countries. At 
times, the Chinese also show the same soft balancing approach against the US, that 
the Americans adopted against Britain’s dominating role in those countries. In any 
case, these are hints at a potentially more realist strategy by the Chinese in the future. 
The second analogy can be found in the late 19th- and early 20th-century Gulf history, 
an era in which the British Empire’s regional domination came under a perceived 
threat by another economic and geo-political rival. Imperial Germany’s industrial and 
military rise was clearly also felt in the Greater Middle East, including the immediate 
Gulf neighbourhood. Aflush with revenue, German prospectors and businesses 
entered the Middle East in search for raw materials and to invest into the region’s 
infrastructure. Most prominently, the Hejaz Railway and the Berlin-Baghdad Railway 
– also actively encourage by the German Emperor’s propagandistic branding 
enthusiasm – sought to connect the underdeveloped Middle East with European 
markets, and especially with Germany itself. Although the Berlin-Baghdad Railway 
construction was only completed decades later, having been decisively interrupted by 
World War One, and never came to fulfil its grand promises, it clearly rang alarm 
bells in Britain upon the construction’s launch. Although the financial, logistic, 
geographic, and geo-political obstacles were enormous, London saw its construction 
and Germany’s new economic presence in the Middle East as a threat to the British 
Empire’s sphere of influence in the centre of Eurasia’s strategically vital rimland. This 
was all the more important to Britain, because the Gulf region was part of its 
informally ruled buffer zone that shielded off British India and the British-controlled 
Suez Canal – a highly realist strategy. Furthermore, Germany had entered an alliance 
with the Ottoman Empire, a regional power that, despite its decline at the time, 
thereby turned into a British enemy and threatened Pax Britannica on the Red Sea 
coast and the upper Gulf. Hence, Britain half-heartedly began to sabotage Germany’s 
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and the Ottomans’ expansion of influence there, for example by successfully 
pressuring the parties to not extend the rail to the Gulf port of Basra. Although World 
War One did not originate in the Middle East, this new, more multipolar situation 
there, resulted in a large theatre of conflict in the region when war broke out. 
China’s late 20th- and early 21st-century rise in the era of Pax Americana has often 
been compared to that of Germany’s in the era of Pax Britannica, one hundred years 
before. As evident from this brief description, the comparison also finds its relevance 
in today’s heartland, rimland, Middle East, and Persian Gulf. Similar to the Germans 
in the early 1900s, Chinese businesses and prospectors are eager in their hunt for raw 
materials and large infrastructure deals in the region itself and in Central Asia. 
China’s BRI, its rail-constructions, and its investments in the Gulf, promoted by 
President Xi Jinping with similar fervour as by Kaiser Wilhelm I, have been met with 
the region’s enthusiasm and by simultaneous American opposition to the founding of 
the AIIB, despite its potential global economic promise. Arguably, an American 
embrace of the BRI would have conformed to the absolute gains logic of neo-liberal 
institutionalism, especially due to the AIIB’s subsequent cross-institutional efforts; 
America’s political opposition though clearly resembles neo-realism’s relative gains 
focus. Though Washington has so far refrained from sabotaging China’s plans and 
regional interests in the Gulf, a future in which US-China relations may deteriorate 
could theoretically suck this strategic region into a political or even military conflict. 
The Gulf region has seen a great power clash on more than one occasion. The third 
relevant historic analogy lies back further in time. In the aftermath of Portugal’s Gulf 
exit and the English East India Company’s relatively small presence, the Dutch East 
India Company came to dominate business with Persia and Oman. The company’s 
sheer competitiveness in spirit and, more importantly, in financial power, provided 
the Safavid rulers, and local merchants with what they were seeking: A massive 
expansion of trade with Europe, but also with all parts of Asia. Throughout the 17th 
century the VOC by and large managed what the Portuguese before had only held 
onto over various short periods of time: an intra-Asian trading monopoly. The Dutch 
business partners in the Gulf not only appreciated the VOC’s financial capability, its 
purchasing power, and the supplies of and demands for various goods. Crucially, they 
appreciated the VOC’s pure focus on business and its complete detachment from 
domestic politics in Persia and Arabia.  
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Keeping in mind the obvious difference between an early-modern, armed trading 
company and a 1.3 billion-large 21st century nation-state, this VOC philosophy at least 
is not so different from China’s current Gulf strategy. China’s gigantic economic clout 
and at the same time its huge demand for Gulf goods, in this case oil, has the 
potential to dominate business in the Gulf states and much of the Indian Ocean 
littoral. As China builds its 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and a network of proxy 
ports along the vital sea lanes, the so-called String of Pearls, this echoes the VOC’s 
17th century strategy. In a post-Arab Spring world, China’s refusal to meddle in the 
domestic affairs of the Gulf states is highly appreciated by all of these regimes, 
especially when compared to the occasional habits of their American ally.  
This is one of the reasons why they seem eager to persuade China to play a bigger role 
in Gulf security, just as the Safavids appreciated the VOC’s naval protection, which 
was about nothing more than securing the maritime trade routes. So far, China has 
not matched the VOC’s 17th century relative naval dominance. Yet, China is trying to 
build a blue water navy and has not only participated in counter-piracy patrolling 
around the Horn of Africa, acquiring docking rights in several ports, including in the 
Gulf, but has recently also opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti. It does 
not seem farfetched that this is the shape of things to come elsewhere in the Indian 
Ocean, too. The gun has followed risk, and the flag has followed trade before. 
Even if the Chinese one day wield a blue water navy across the global commons, this 
is far from a complete insurance policy though. The major problem the VOC 
encountered with its apolitical strategy was that when Persia and Arabia stagnated 
economically and then disintegrated politically into violent anarchy, the company was 
in no position to protect its regional business and thus decided to exit the Gulf. In the 
absence of continuous free-riding on an American security umbrella, the same fate 
could befall the Chinese if the region encountered similar instability again. So far, 
when security crises impacted Chinese regional businesses, such as in Libya, Yemen, 
or Iraq, Beijing’s only answer has been evacuation and divestment. The VOC arguably 
never fully recovered from this and other setbacks, and so too, would China face an 
enormous economic challenge at home if oil dependency were not massively reduced. 
China has of course often implemented radical economic and political changes at 
home in reaction to foreign or domestic developments. A fourth set of historical 
analogies to contemporary and future affairs lies in China’s own distant history with 
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the Indian Ocean and the Middle East, although it seems only moderately useful 
when compared to the first three. In the pre-modern era, there were several phases 
that saw intense trade connections between China’s Han Empire and Persia’s 
Parthian Empire or between China’s Tang Empire and the Islamic Abbasid Empire 
which formed the vital arteries of the old Silk Roads across land and sea. Although a 
brief military clash between the Abbasids and the Tang in Central Asia was followed 
by a short alliance between the two that pacified the Eurasian trade corridors for a 
while, and despite regular diplomatic exchanges, the pre-modern Eurasian trade 
system was of course no match to today’s age of hyper-globalization and growing 
interdependence. Even the height of China’s 15th-century Ming Dynasty and its 
unique maritime explorations across the Indian Ocean and the Gulf by Admiral 
Zheng He simply had soft power motivations rather than commercial or colonial 
ambitions. China was seeking to informally expand its neighbouring zone of tributary 
states and to exercise influence through displays of civilizational prowess. When 
these missions were then considered too costly, China fatally set its fortune on 
isolationism, although it only came to realize its mistake centuries later when the 
globalizing West had forged ahead. 
China’s global economic clout today, and the increasing geo-political influence that 
comes with it is historically novel, despite the Middle Kingdom’s millennia-old 
civilization. Hence, there are few analogies in Chinese history that can help illuminate 
possible futures. Nevertheless, China’s ancient concept of a tributary neighbourhood 
kowtowing to its cultural and commercial superiority and political power in exchange 
for economic opportunity has been a relatively constant feature among its various 
dynasties. The legacy of this self-image, diplomacy and statecraft though can still be 
observed in China and its neighbourhood today. As this neighbourhood is more and 
more being absorbed by the country’s economic gravity and as that expands beyond 
East Asia via the New Silk Roads, China’s tributary-model could, at least to an extent, 
one day apply even to Gulf polities, if the region’s dependency on Chinese markets 
grows and diversifies further. Whether such a non-military approach will suffice to 
secure the investments and trade routes is another question. 
As yet, it seems, China does not see itself in the position to address it, because its 
military capabilities do not suffice just yet. Crucially though, Gulf security is still 
heavily underwritten by the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet and US Army and Air Force 
personnel stationed on military bases in all GCC states. This order saw its origins in 
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the wake of the British withdrawal from east of Suez. America's first approach, the 
Nixon Doctrine, or the Twin Pillar strategy, only lasted for a decade. After the fall of 
the Shah, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq War, 
Washington's new strategy was introduced by the Carter Doctrine which called for a 
more direct military role in the region. It was only implemented another decade later 
with the military ousting of Iraq's invading forces from Kuwait, in Operation Desert 
Storm. The preceding two decades had marked a short and violent interregnum, after 
which America finally emerged as the inheritor of Britain's Gulf mantle. Though the 
US-Saudi “oil-for-security-deal” and the petrodollar system, which, in a highly realist 
manner, linked the issues of Gulf security to the dollar’s global hegemony, had been 
forged decades earlier, Pax Americana had its own historic analogy. It closely 
resembled and still resembles the 19th century era of Pax Britannica.  
Determined to protect its economic and geo-political interests, the US used its Gulf 
military presence to dominate the region and create a buffer zone to prevent the 
regional powers, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, from clashing and thereby potentially 
destabilizing the oil-price-sensitive global economy. Essentially, it had already before 
succeeded in excluding another superpower, the USSR, in the Cold War. With the 
establishment of Pax Americana in the Gulf it seemed that no other American peer 
competitor would emerge, even though the Carter Doctrine clearly emphasized this as 
its primary objective. This closely resembled the British Empire’s 19th century 
strategy and the Trucial States system, when Britain maintained relative regional 
peace and open trade routes, but also excluded its great power rivals, ranging from 
Napoleonic France to Czarist Russia. In the 20th century too, it sought to do the same 
with Imperial and then Nazi Germany, although it took two world wars to stop 
Germany’s strategic influence also in the Greater Middle East.  
Yet, Britain itself was ultimately forced to withdraw from the Gulf, through a 
combination of domestic political motivations and financial necessities. Though 
unwelcomed by the small and vulnerable Trucial States, Britain's withdrawal from 
east of Suez had been preceded by a growing number of British political and security 
setbacks in the Greater Middle East – similar to America today. As a result, Britain de 
facto passed the buck to its American ally in 1971.  
As an untarnished China emerges as the region’s new major economic partner, it is 
unclear which of the two strategies America will adopt. Will it follow the British 
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Empire’s earlier examples and seek to deter China from playing a geo-politically 
active role in the region? Or will Washington instead accept China’s greater regional 
interests and invite China to participate in Gulf stabilization efforts, if not militarily 
then at least politically? Moreover, it is feasible that China will continuously see the 
benefits of free-riding, maintaining its apolitical strategy. Much of the answer to this 
question clearly also lies in exogenous variables: general Gulf conditions, global 
energy technology, American and Chinese capabilities and their political intentions, 
as well as, crucially, the US-China relationship itself.  
History points towards the desirability of Gulf stability. The 18th century interregnum, 
in which no outside power was present as a hegemonic stabilizer, is a case in point, 
even though the situation was too complex to attribute an order of causality. 
Economic stagnation and political collapse in Safavid Persia and Yariba Oman was 
followed by a century of several violent conflicts in the region. This deterred outside 
power involvement at least as much as outside power absence contributed to a power 
vacuum that helped to fan it. Only when new regional dynasties in Persia and Oman 
emerged relatively uncontested and when the British Empire helped to quell the 
remaining Qasimi-piracy and Saudi-Wahhabi jihad did the region enter a new period 
of relative stability and “prosperity”. 
Even the short, two-decade interregnum between 1971 and 1991, when the British had 
largely abandoned Gulf security provision and after which the Americans belatedly 
became more directly involved, is an example for the curious correlation between 
outside power absence and regional conflict. Pahlavi Iran’s invasion of several 
disputed Gulf islands was the less dramatic symptom. Yet, the Shah’s reckless over-
spending on American arms – Washington’s buck-passing and offshore balancing 
strategy that replaced Britain’s former regional security role – is said to have 
contributed to both the Iranian economy’s crisis and the Iranian population’s 
hostility to his regime. This partly resulted in the Islamist Revolution of 1979, which 
again partly resulted in the eight-year-long Iran-Iraq War – the Middle East’s most 
violent conflict since World War Two. Additionally, the Iran-Iraq War influenced 
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. It is futile to speculate with certainty whether 
a continued British presence in the Gulf or an earlier American deterrent would have 
prevented these or other conflicts. However, it is important to note such correlations 
when addressing the issue of Gulf security. 
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Nevertheless, on top of that, history also points towards the possibility that Great 
Games and hegemonic exclusion strategies not always bode well either and could 
therefore be the cause as much as the result of regional violence or of a potential 
future US-China conflict. Gulf outside power access ultimately depends on the Gulf 
states themselves and their interests. The Portuguese Empire’s Gulf fate 
demonstrates that it is very laborious, possibly futile, for an established outside 
power not only to maintain an economic monopoly, but to maintain geo-political 
control if market forces go in the other direction. When this happened, the Safavids 
quickly abandoned their Portuguese ally and trading partner in favour of a new one, 
the VOC, who better served Persia’s economic and political interests.  
This realization potentially limits American freedom of action in the face of China's 
Gulf emergence. Since the region’s primary economic interests are now shifting 
towards China and Asia in general, an American strategy that harms these Gulf 
interests could at some stage result in not only an Iranian, but also a GCC policy that 
prioritizes China and Asia at the expense of the American regional role that the GCC 
currently supports completely. And, just as Portugal’s early anti-Islamic clash-of-
civilizations attitude and its active religious-missionary zeal hardly reinforced 
regional and local support, so did America's forceful and failed democratization 
attempt in Iraq hardly strengthen its wider regional legitimacy. 
Despite the very general comparisons, America's Gulf strategy is of course 
fundamentally different from Portugal’s 16th century version. The US has 
underwritten regional security by invitation of the GCC governments. Evidently, it 
has not sought to prohibit these countries’ global economic transactions and 
partnerships either. On the contrary, even more so than its British predecessor, the 
US is strongly supportive of an open Gulf trade system. This openness, protected by 
the US-security umbrella, has brought in, rather than excluded, outside powers like 
China, Japan, South Korea, and India – creating a system of what the author calls 
regional hegemonic stability. 
This is why, at least for recent developments and the status quo, neither Hypothesis 1 
(neo-liberal institutionalism), nor Hypothesis 2 (neo-realism) are satisfactory. 
Rather, the concept of Hypothesis 3 (regional hegemonic stability) is superior to both, 
at least when describing current situations. The author now demonstrates how and 
why this is the case. 
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Neo-Neo Synthesis: Regional Hegemonic Stability 
Hypothesis 3 was enabled via a neo-neo synthesis centred on the concept of regions 
and how it can influence the interplay of neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-realism 
by also incorporating the attribute of geography that had previously not been 
officially integrated into the neo-neo debate. The region-centred concept, represents 
the first of five interlocking elements – with the following four being extracted from 
both theories, but being analysed through the regional prism. These five elements 
feed on each other and thereby create a theory of regional hegemonic stability: 
1. Strategic Regions 
2. Complex Interdependence 
3. International Regimes 
4. Offensive Realism 
5. Defensive Realism 
The author now presents the merits of Hypothesis 3 for the recent and contemporary 
situation regarding the Gulf’s interaction with outside powers via these five steps. 
 
1. Regions matter greatly to international relations also in a non-institutional way. 
Grand strategy has always been heavily influenced by geography which again is a key 
attribute to different regions. For positivist theories in the IR discipline, such as neo-
realism or neo-liberal institutionalism, both of which are structural, system-level 
theories, the concept of geography is a difficult one, because it exists independently 
from the man-made bureaucratic and material structures of the international system 
and does often not conform to the political borders of states. Nevertheless, the 
distribution of geographical properties across the systems units does not destroy the 
structural nature of both theories and can therefore be integrated. 
Many geo-political thinkers have demonstrated geography’s and regions’ criticality to 
international relations and grand strategy. Mahan’s emphasis on sea power, on the 
world’s maritime trade- and conflict highways, such as the Indian or Pacific Oceans, 
is explained by the fact that it enables great powers to flexibly move commercial and 
military capabilities in ways that they cannot on land. Oceanic powers can thereby try 
to intervene on land more or less wherever they wish, if capabilities are strong 
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enough. Crucially, they seek to control the SLOCs and the world’s strategic 
bottlenecks. 
Mackinder on the other hand, when he carved up the world map into various zones 
stressed the Eurasian super-continent, the “world-island”, as the most important geo-
strategic space, since most of humankind lived there and thus engaged in the most 
impactful economic and political interactions. A great power which ruled Central 
Eurasia, the “heartland” of this world island, would thereby rule the world. 
It was Spykman who combined the insights of both grand strategists by inventing the 
concept of the world island’s “rimland” – a gigantic coastal or near-coastal crescent 
semi-circling the heartland, from Europe, via the Middle East and South Asia, to East 
Asia. Not only was this the most heavily-populated part of the world-island and 
where most of history’s civilizations existed and exist, but it also represented the 
crucial middle space or buffer zone between the heartland and the sea – thereby 
connecting to both, influencing both, and being influenced by both. 
Acknowledging these three authors’ influential insights, several later thinkers and 
practitioners, such as Brzezinski and Kaplan have convincingly demonstrated their 
utility for the late 20th and early 21st centuries. What they all have in common though 
is that they do not specify a hierarchy of importance within the various proclaimed 
zones. Regions such as Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East are treated as equally 
important strategically. Upon merging the arguments of all these thinkers, the author 
of this thesis on the other hand has reasoned that the Persian Gulf is indeed the most 
important region of the world, in a geo-political sense, at least with regard to 
involvement with the great powers of the day. In a wider sense, the Greater Middle 
East lies at the heart of three continents with power flowing to it and from it in all 
directions, an insight provided by many historians and geographers across the ages. 
However, it is the Persian Gulf sub-region that, in the geo-political jargon, is the only 
area inside this geographically central region, that has access to both the sea and the 
heartland. 
Consequently, the Gulf region enjoys a superior and more flexible connectivity-
potential to various trade- and invasion routes – key determinants of global strategic 
affairs. This is reflected by history, from the dawn of civilization to the present day. 
The old Silk Roads and pre-modern Indian Ocean trade routes made it a crucial hub, 
just as the Western age’s littoral system in modernity constantly made it strategically 
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vital to control for the great powers of the day. Especially from the 1500s onwards, 
there has often been a curious correlation between global great power status and 
control of the Gulf. Its importance was compounded from the early 20th century 
onwards by the fact that the Gulf holds the lion’s share of the world’s oil (and gas) 
reserves – literally fuelling the global economy and the great powers’ military 
conduct. This helps explain the respective presence of the British Empire and later of 
the American hegemon – both great sea powers – in this region. The latter has 
remained in place to this very day. 
Now, the great global economic re-convergence has engendered the re-emergence of 
Asia and especially the rise of China and also India on the world’s economic, 
diplomatic, and geo-political scene. Following the Gulf region’s own simultaneous 
explosive and ongoing economic development and diversification, its centrality to 
world affairs is being elevated even further, because its established energy provision 
to the world, including especially to rising Asia is presently being accompanied by a 
revival of Asia’s Silk Roads. Once more, these old and new trade and investment 
arteries connect to the Gulf by land and sea, a process that has only just begun, but 
that has already had a significant impact in growing interdependence. 
 
2. This thesis and the first part of this conclusion has thus far demonstrated the merit 
of several elements of neo-liberal institutionalism’s main sub-theory, complex 
interdependence. As evident throughout this thesis, interdependence between China 
and the Gulf and wider Asia has been growing significantly – making certain aspects 
of CIT relatively accurate for these cases. As interdependence grows further and 
becomes more diversified the theory will be even more helpful to describe 
developments, cementing the status quo.  
Hitherto, the story of Asia’s New Silk Roads to and from the Persian Gulf has been 
one of not only bilateral, but de facto multilateral cooperation. The Gulf states, 
excluding Iraq and Iran, have seen their interests realized, just as China, India, South 
Korea, and Japan have. Arguably, so has the US, again, at least with regard to the 
GCC in global economic matters. In CIT terminology, China and the other Asian 
states have managed to maintain a de-linkage of issue areas, not politicizing relations 
in ways that may risk lucrative and harmonious relations with all regional states – 
including both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Since China wants to avoid becoming 
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implicated in Middle Eastern conflicts, it has an interest in the status quo, as do all 
the other Asian countries. These incentives are strong. Therefore it could be easily 
imagined that the GCC states, the US, China and its Asian competitors, continue to 
uphold the status quo or even deepen their cooperation out of an absolute-gains-
rationale. Until today, the Gulf has not seen a serious US-China clash, and both have 
plenty of other worries in their bilateral relationship and in East Asia. The same can 
be said about China and India, or China and Japan. Hence, so far, these states are not 
willing to open potential new problematic issues over the Gulf, when until now, their 
fundamental interests there have not been imperilled. 
However, this CIT interpretation leaves a gaping hole that the theory cannot fill: 
military security still overwhelmingly dominates Middle Eastern and also Gulf issue 
areas, a condition that the theory would negate. The main reason why China and 
other Asian countries have managed to maintain a de-linkage of issue areas in their 
relations with Gulf states lie outside CIT’s explanatory power and are addressed by 
the author in the fourth and fifth step of this section, below. First, it is necessary to 
merge CIT with the concept of regions and underline the actual or potential outcome 
of this, before also briefly examining the means of multilateral cooperation that suit 
the wider neo-liberal institutionalist theory. 
The concept of regions and their strategic attributes and conditions has an important 
impact on CIT. The very real conditions of Middle Eastern and Gulf insecurity are 
coexisting with the Gulf’s growing economic interdependence with the world, 
including Asia. Furthermore, throughout East- and South Asia, economic 
interdependence is also present and growing among those states, but simultaneous 
conditions of inter-state rivalry are clouding the picture. China-Japan and China-
India relations, to name just the great power examples, are somewhat antagonistic. 
Consequently, these actors who are well aware of their own and each other’s 
dependence on the Gulf region view each other suspiciously in that respect too – one 
not wanting to be outperformed by the other in terms of influence there. These are 
geo-strategic concerns that Keohane and Nye – in their assumption that gains mainly 
matter absolutely – have not addressed, with potential diametral consequences. 
Although all contenders would benefit from absolute gains, fear of relative losses 
could trump the fear of absolute losses. In other words, inter-regional 
interdependence may spark competitive intra-regional rivalry, which leads back to 
neo-realist dynamics. 
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Up to now though, trans-Eurasian alliance politics, resembling realism, have not 
taken over. On the contrary, as this section has shown, economic and diplomatic 
coexistence of Asian countries in the Gulf region have prevailed. One of the reasons, 
is the entrenched utility of multilateral cooperation and international regimes 
corresponding to globalization. 
 
3. Robert Keohane has illustrated how the condition of interdependence groups 
issues into issue areas constructively and “governs” them productively and 
cooperatively via international regimes. The increasingly globalized Asian economic 
giants and their smaller counterparts in various regions, including the Gulf are 
integrated into this system and actively make use of it. The open trade regime and the 
free flow of commerce at sea, the global monetary regime and also its associated oil 
trade regime, as well as the WMD non-proliferation regime have found the support of 
most Asian and Gulf states and have not seen a serious and immediate attempt at 
overthrow.  
Even though this might change in the future, so far, China, for example, has 
supported the US dollar as a global transaction and reserve currency, including in the 
energy trade which generated the “Petrodollar”, by conducting most of its energy and 
non-energy trade in dollars, and by buying trillions worth of US Treasury securities 
and hording vast amounts of corresponding currency reserves. These incidentally are 
also used by the sovereign wealth funds of China and the Gulf states in their global 
investments – thereby intensifying the interdependence between this crucial US-
Gulf-China-triangle. Furthermore, the relatively novel institution of the SWF has 
itself engendered the multilateral creation of a set of rules – the Santiago Principles – 
which may mutate into a rigorously governed new regime itself. The AIIB too can be 
viewed as a complementary multilateral institution for development finance that can 
be integrated into the (at least formerly US-led) liberal world order, even though it is 
the US itself that nowadays often appears as a spoiler of its own system. Then, in the 
Gulf, the WMD non-proliferation regime meanwhile had celebrated a success as well, 
by seeing Iran, Germany, and the five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council, including the US and China negotiate and sign the JCPOA. By deliberately 
separating the nuclear issue from other sensitive ones associated with Iran, such as 
its regional support for various terrorist groups, the international community 
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managed to tackle the nuclear issue constructively. The JCPOA prohibits Iran from 
acquiring nuclear weapons in the short- to mid-term at least, even though this also 
might again be a called into question. 
What makes this multilateral cooperative system work is the certainty that regimes 
spread – to the appreciation of most participants, who see the benefits of productive, 
diffuse reciprocity at work. Keohane’s iterated prisoners’ dilemma, where rational-
acting and egoistic states choose the long-term interests that spawn absolute gains 
can be a representative model for this system. 
However, he points to the problem of free-riding – when at least one member of the 
system invests more than it reaps in returns, whilst other members invest less and get 
away with it, because punishment may cause a chain reaction of bad-for-bad 
reciprocity. This is correct also in the case of Gulf affairs and China’s and Asia’s 
engagement in the region. Yet, since Keohane and neo-liberal institutionalism in 
general do not account for the reality of certain unstable and insecure regions existing 
simultaneously to their global interdependencies, his theory misses a key ingredient 
that keeps the system alive in the first place: military security provision – the issue 
area that CIT had assumed as irrelevant, but which in fact, in the Gulf, is not. 
 
4. According to the logic of John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, the United States, 
since the end of the Cold War, has been the world’s only superpower. All the same, 
since then, the world has become more visibly multipolar again due to the rise of 
China primarily, and to a lesser extent the rise of India and the resurgence of Russia. 
Nonetheless, offensive realism would define the US as a hegemon. Despite the West’s 
relative decline over the past two decades, Mearsheimer specifies that US dominance 
is to be defined as regional hegemony – meaning that the US dominates its own 
backyard, the Americas, and is therefore free to roam worldwide, because it need not 
fear another great power directly threatening it in its own region. Furthermore, the 
US’s freedom to roam has enabled it to selectively engage in the world’s other 
strategic regions that are of critical importance to American interests – and dominate 
them either via offshore balancing or via a direct military presence there. 
In that respect, Mearsheimer acknowledges Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf, 
as those kinds of regions. For reasons outlined above, the author of this thesis argues 
that geo-politically the Gulf is indeed the most important region of the world and that 
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therefore, Mearsheimer does not go far enough, because he “merely” sees oil, and not 
wider geo-strategic factors as the determinant. 
Either way, the American military presence in the Persian Gulf has far-reaching 
consequences, not only for the region, for US security interests, and for US overall 
power, but for the entire oil-dependent global economy – and thus for rising, energy-
hungry Asia and China. Admittedly, the existence of American military bases in all 
GCC states and the constant patrolling of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet through Gulf 
waters and the Hormuz bottleneck has created serious political and security problems 
in their own right, both for the region and the US itself. Al-Qaeda’s 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, as well as the recent Iranian nuclear programme were the most impactful ills 
“produced” by American regional domination. However, given the insecurity of the 
Greater Middle East and Persian Gulf, momentarily especially the enmity between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, the US military in the Gulf represents a vital buffer zone 
between the regional antagonists. Simultaneously, America thereby polices the world 
economy’s most critical sea lanes in what otherwise would likely be a major security 
vacuum. Oil prices have long been respondent to regional geo-political conflict or 
tranquillity accordingly. It can be stated that the Gulf region’s conditions hold global 
energy markets, and thus the global economy as a whole, hostage. US security 
provision in the Gulf is arguably the all-important stabilizing force that enables the 
very phenomenon of growing economic interdependence between the Gulf and China 
and Greater Asia. 
CIT, regime theory, and neo-liberal institutionalism more broadly were too quick to 
dismiss the explanatory power of hegemonic stability theory, especially in certain 
regions. The New Silk Roads between the Gulf and Asia that increasingly resemble 
certain conditions of complex interdependence by seeing China maintaining a de-
linkage of issue areas and a largely apolitical Gulf strategy, are doing so not because 
the entire theory is accurate. Rather, US security provision in the Gulf has allowed 
China to free-ride and not contribute to the security of the region and its sea lanes. In 
effect, the US has linked the issues of (energy) trade and security “for” China and 
others. In this region, at least for now, CIT is thus merely helpful for some aspects, 
because offensive realism has filled neo-liberal institutionalism’s gaping hole. 
Ironically, with American power and military policing of the Gulf, offensive realism in 
this case may be preventing its “usage” by other actors. Since neither China nor India 
405 
 
nor Japan have had to worry in the short term about Gulf security due to their own 
free-riding, they could all afford to not worry about their own lack of military 
capability just yet. They have thus not even tried to become major geo-political forces 
in the Gulf in order to insure their vital interests, even though, crucially, that would 
have been highly difficult if not impossible at this stage of their military capability 
anyway. However, serious diplomatic engagement seeking to solve regional problems 
has also been almost completely absent from China’s, India’s, and Japan’s regional 
role. This fortunate reality has possibly had the effect of excluding their very own 
rivalry from that region. As shown above, inter-regional interdependence has the 
potential to perpetuate intra-regional rivalry. This dynamic has only moderately 
shown itself so far, also because the US-led regional hegemonic stability in the Gulf 
has sent out stabilizing ripples across a much wider geography, containing a potential 
intensification of intra-Asian rivalry in the Gulf and beyond. 
Neo-liberal institutionalists would argue that free-riding frustrates the public goods 
provider. This might be so, and recent American administrations have indeed begun 
to demand more support from allies to shoulder the burden. Even offensive realism 
points towards the desirability of offshore balancing, rather than direct military 
presence in critical regions as long as that is possible. Yet, Mearsheimer seems to 
underestimate the level of Gulf importance for the very distribution of global power 
in a much wider sense, as this thesis has shown. Hence, the Gulf region’s centrality 
should lead to the realist insight that a rival’s free-riding is a price worth paying for 
the hegemon. The overall power dividends that come with being the world’s 
policeman are out of question and the Gulf’s importance should not make continued 
US military presence there surprising. 
However, the delicate balance created between both theories via the concept of 
regional hegemonic stability depends not only on American power, but also on 
American restraint. The New Silk Roads between the Gulf and China are themselves a 
crucial variable for America’s strategic freedom in the Gulf. There is still one missing 
element for the contemporary utility of regional hegemonic stability theory.  
 
5. Stephen Walt’s defensive realism can be viewed as the other side of the realist coin. 
He shows that states in general only tend to bandwagon to a powerful and aggressive 
state when its threat is so great that balancing would not save them, owing to the 
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unavailability of allies. If allies are available, states favour balancing against a 
stronger side rather than bandwagoning, because it elevates their relative power in 
their coalition and therefore their self-preserved security. 
The US is, first and foremost, an “empire by invitation” by most regional states who 
see a use in their alliance with Washington. Most of the Gulf states, especially the 
coastal Gulf monarchies, and even Saudi Arabia, consider themselves too small and 
relatively weak to defend themselves from conventional regional insecurity. 
Consequently, they see a need for a more powerful ally from outside. This is because 
defensive realism convincingly demonstrates that weaker regional states, or any 
states for that matter, perceive a greater danger by geographically proximate threats 
than by distant states, even if the latter hold more aggregate power.  
This balance of threat theory is highly accurate in regard to the Gulf region, where 
historically Iraq, but in the past two decades, Iran has been considered the greatest 
threat to the GCC countries. Hence, the US serves as a patron to the GCC, whose 
member states are its regional clients as long as they cannot guarantee a regional 
balance of power in their favour. This gives the GCC strong incentives to keep the US 
military in the Gulf, at least in the short-to-mid-term, because for now, no other 
outside actor has the capability or will to replace the Americans.  
However, as that might change over the next few years and decades, an American-
dominated Gulf is in no way set in stone. The delicate balance between neo-liberal 
institutionalist and neo-realist dynamics that, via the concept of strategic regions, 
have formed a relatively accurate neo-neo synthesis will experience gravitational 
pulls in both directions. It is far from clear whether regional hegemonic stability will 
last.  
 
Pax Americana or Interregnum Redux 
Since the future is unknowable, the best hope for the scholar, lies in extrapolating 
recent and current trajectories and pointing towards potential variables that may 
upset them. Enriched with historical analogies, the theoretical framework represents 
a guideline to formulate trajectories and the imaginable reactions to them by the 
relevant actors. 
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The Conclusion has so far demonstrated the merit of several elements from both neo-
liberal institutionalism and neo-realism, but especially, has shown the superiority of 
Hypothesis 3, based on the concept of regional hegemonic stability. Thereby, the 
Persian Gulf’s geographical, economic and geo-political centrality to global affairs in 
the 21st century has produced both economic interdependence and insecurity 
simultaneously, intensifying dynamics captured by neo-liberal institutionalism and 
neo-realism but making both sets of dynamics feed on each other. A system has been 
created where trade, investment, and cooperation between the Gulf states and its 
outside partners, including in Asia, is to a great extent dependent on American 
security provision in the region. Yet, this system depends firstly on most influential 
actors in the Gulf and Asia accepting this order, secondly on them not being capable 
and willing to replace it, and thirdly on enduring American capability and will to 
function as the hegemonic stabilizer. In short it depends on the current structure of 
the international (and regional Gulf) system, which is admittedly already highly 
multipolar, but which can still be characterized as relative American hegemony. 
If China and India were not to continue to economically grow at an impressive level, 
but the US would at least remain economically and politically stable, and if therefore 
the structure of the international system would not change dramatically in the 
following decades, the most likely outcome for the Gulf would be a continuation of 
the status quo in terms of outside power presence. Enduring regional hegemonic 
stability underwritten by the US military in the Gulf would have the same motivations 
and explanations that have recently mattered to all relevant participants of that 
regional system. Although it comes with compromises for some actors, it has been the 
least of all evils for them. So, if, for whatever reason, China and India stagnate 
economically and thus diplomatically, they would continue to trade with the region, 
but would not be in the best position to realistically transform the current Gulf order 
– nor would they be more willing than they are today, if their energy imports declined 
together with their GDP. Hence, inside such a scenario, the only imaginable reasons 
for an end to American-led regional hegemonic stability would be changing 
conditions in the Gulf, in the US, in global energy technology, or in completely 
exogenous variables not discussed in this thesis. 
A US withdrawal might come about due to various imaginable incentives: financial 
priorities shifting the Pentagon’s lion’s share of the budget to other theatres 
considered more vital for national security and economic stability; a US default on its 
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debts for example due to another financial crisis and great depression in concert with 
a further widening fiscal deficit; a spill-over of violence and instability into the Gulf’s 
rich petro-states creating a situation the US cannot efficiently handle without 
dramatically breaching its core values; a greatly reduced US appetite for political and 
military involvement in a conflict ridden Middle East seemingly guaranteeing nothing 
but US blunders and anti-Americanism; an outright failure of Pax Americana due to 
reduced capabilities; a dramatic decline of US foreign policy’s legitimacy in the eyes 
of not only Gulf populations and their governments, but also Americans themselves; 
also less dramatic developments that do not seem fanciful, such as either a US energy 
self-sustainability empowering neo-isolationists in Washington or indeed a global 
transformation in energy technology and consumption significantly reducing global 
oil demand. 
Such developments are purely hypothetical and should be treated with caution. Yet, 
that does not mean they can be discarded. Historically, there is nothing unusual 
about eroding hegemony or sudden imperial retreat due to shifting interests. After 
all, the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971 had been announced only three years 
beforehand and it occurred under comparable circumstances – the UK’s decline in 
overseas power and illegitimacy of empire, a military prioritization towards the UK’s 
own back-yard, growing insecurity in the Middle East, political pressure due to the 
Labour Party’s ideological motives, as well as economic troubles and financial 
priorities shifting inwardly. 
If, for whatever reason, the US decided to greatly reduce its Gulf security provision or 
even withdraw its troops in the near to mid-term future, this move would likely 
perpetuate many of the region’s geo-political risks. Though Iraq has more recently 
been taken out of the equation for the time being, the enmity and power competition 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran is currently as dramatic as it has ever been. Without 
the de facto buffer zone created by the US military’s regional presence, it is entirely 
credible that the Saudi-Iranian conflict could take on a more direct character. 
Furthermore, the Greater Middle East’s current turmoil in places like Syria and Iraq, 
but also Afghanistan, Yemen, and Libya, almost all of which feature the Saudi-Iranian 
and Sunni-Shia conflicts by proxy, would have a higher chance of spilling over into 
the hitherto stable GCC-countries. This threat would be even more pronounced in a 
post-American Gulf security vacuum – having potentially dangerous local, regional, 
and global economic consequences with political ramifications. There would even be 
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dangers for the GCC alliance to completely disintegrate, because already, its members 
seem to put more trust into their US protector than into each other. The recent Qatar 
crisis is a dramatic, but only the latest proof of this. 
All in all, under a different global and regional trajectory from what has been 
happening over the past two decades (China’s and India’s relative catch-up), a 
continuation of the status quo, US-led regional hegemonic stability is the most likely 
development. However, if the current trajectory of China’s and India’s growth 
continues, then the international system will develop into a different structure than 
today’s. It would propel an even more visible re-balance towards a truly multipolar 
world – in which US hegemony necessarily declines relatively. This is more likely 
than unlikely to transform also the regional order in the Gulf, thereby challenging 
US-led regional hegemonic stability. The last sections of this Conclusion now make 
clear how and why and follows the same five theory-guided interlocking steps that 
had created the current Gulf order. 
 
The Sino-Indian Great Game 
Over the coming years, China will experience the same geo-strategic incentives as 
previous great powers to maximize its connection to and overall power in Eurasia’s 
heartland, much of its rimland, and at sea. Hence, the Persian Gulf, where all these 
zones meet to form the centre, will be the most important region for China outside its 
immediate periphery. The BRI and its slightly older, non-sloganized predecessor 
projects have already moved China in this direction. China’s infrastructure 
investments and trade expansion into Central Asia, which it now calls the Silk Road 
Economic Belt, is penetrating the heartland economically and thereby, indirectly, 
geo-politically. The same has happened on much of the rimland, where Chinese 
investments into port infrastructure has started to create a String of Pearls. 
Although the Gulf region had already developed some crucial port infrastructure 
before China’s Indian Ocean initiatives, there is still potential in that respect, for 
instance on Iran’s coastline. In Kuwait, where Chinese investments seek to contribute 
to a new “Silk City”, in the UAE’s Fujairah, where numerous strategic Chinese 
construction projects have taken place, and in Oman, whose own port, rail, and trade-
enabling logistics infrastructure is being modernized by the AIIB, China’s new impact 
is already becoming visible. The same can be said about China’s investments into 
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Saudi Arabia, especially on the Red Sea coast – a more open, multi-polar “back-door” 
to one of the most important Gulf countries. On the Arabian Peninsula’s direct 
periphery, the Pakistani port of Gwadar is a de facto Chinese proxy port with much 
economic and geo-strategic potential, including Chinese naval access. Then, China’s 
first overseas military base in Djibouti within just a few miles of the Arabian 
Peninsula is the most dramatic example of China’s intended geo-political expansion 
and Indian Ocean security architecture for the future – and may be the shape of 
things to come also elsewhere in the wider area. 
Japan and South Korea, having enjoyed even longer trade- and investment ties to the 
Gulf region at the highest level throughout the last decades, will also continue to 
trade, invest, and cooperate heavily in and with Indian Ocean littoral states, including 
the Gulf. Yet, their geo-strategic impact, despite recent initiatives to play a larger 
military role in the Arabian Sea (Japan) and Persian Gulf (South Korea), does not 
have the same potential for the future as does China’s. Both countries are simply too 
small in size to compete as great powers, if China and India continue to grow 
impressively. 
India, crucially, is trailing behind China in its economic, diplomatic, and military 
development, which puts it at a disadvantage, but nevertheless will seek to also 
maximize its connectivity and influence in the Gulf. A new Great Game is unfolding. 
From a security viewpoint moreover, India’s incentives are not only driven by energy 
security, the way China’s are, but also by national security, because the Gulf is part of 
India’s back-yard. Considering particularly China’s alliance with India’s arch-rival 
Pakistan and the planned CPEC, India will go to great lengths to pull not only 
Afghanistan further into its geo-political orbit, but also Iran and the GCC. New 
Delhi’s alliance with Kabul and India’s courting of Tehran especially is motivated by 
two things: commerce, in order to build trade corridors to Central Asia, Russia, and 
Europe, to rival China’s Silk Road Economic Belt; and geo-politics, to maximize the 
number of important allies in its back-yard. India’s ideal type situation in the future 
would thereby mirror something of the subcontinent’s 19th century history, when it 
was governed by the British, and was protected by an eastern, northern, and western 
buffer zone which shielded off rivals and also gave it access to the rimland’s Gulf 
outlet and the heartland. The China-Pakistan partnership and China’s economic head 
start though, makes this a difficult if not impossible Indian goal, with profound 
influences also on India’s Gulf role vis-à-vis China. 
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Nevertheless, if both countries continue to grow, so will their interdependence not 
only with each other, but also with many of the Gulf states, provided at least these are 
spared from the same kind of turmoil which is currently haunting the likes of Syria 
and Yemen. 
 
The Asianization of the Persian Gulf 
This interdependence has been growing significantly over the past two decades, as 
both China and India have imported increasing amounts of Gulf oil. As trade 
diversified further, especially with large amounts of Gulf imports of Chinese and 
Indian manufactured goods, but also Chinese infrastructure investments and Indian 
services, diplomatic and wider institutional interconnectivity at multiple levels has 
been the result. Continuing the current trajectory, this would entail ongoing oil and 
gas flows from the Gulf to China and India, increased upstream and downstream 
investment into Gulf countries especially by China, but, crucially, a much greater 
diversification in the constant flow of goods, capital, and people between the Gulf and 
these two Asian giants. The “Asianization” of the Gulf will be highly visible and deep 
institutional ties will spawn diplomatic cooperation across a variety of issues, 
reducing, but not levelling the current hierarchy of issue areas which is highly 
weighted on oil.  
These conditions will move closer towards the CIT ideal type, even if they are very 
unlikely to ever match it. Yet, as the China-Gulf networks grow denser and more 
diverse, it will be even more complicated for China to link issue areas that, in the 
Gulf, almost demand to be linked. China’s answers to these political pressures are 
likely to be two-fold, at least as long as they seem to suffice: firstly, China will 
increasingly tend to use its economic power, already profound now, but possibly all-
dominating in the future, to coerce Gulf states into the desired direction that suit 
China’s overall interests. Secondly, given the existing and possibly lasting 
antagonisms between the GCC and Iran, and as China sees the need to maximize 
trade and investment with both, it will also be less and less able to avoid mediating 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia. If China’s economic power by then is profound 
enough that neither of those two Gulf states can really do without China, such a 
strategy of economic coercion and diplomatic mediation stands a not too small 
chance of success. Despite the Gulf region’s centrality in China’s energy demand and 
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the power symmetry between the Gulf as a region and China as a market will 
continue to be surprisingly even, China can nevertheless use the overall power 
asymmetry between itself and individual Gulf states in its favour in order to get the 
outcomes it wants. Divide and rule is the quintessential imperial strategy that China, 
often in subtle but effective ways, has historically been no stranger to. 
India will face similar incentives to China’s, but even with its current trajectory, its 
lagging behind China will constrain it in the Gulf when compared to China’s likely 
economic impact there. That being said, India may be able to cushion its looming 
underperformance relative to China’s, through two structural advantages: firstly, 
India’s geographic proximity to the Gulf reduces its energy insecurity, because it 
“merely” faces a “Hormuz dilemma” and not China’s additional “Malacca dilemma” 
and thus makes it relatively easier for India to intervene in one way or the other in the 
Gulf, should its diplomatic influence and military capability be high enough at the 
time. Furthermore, the geographic proximity has, over the decades, centuries and 
even millennia created a much closer cultural proximity between India and the Gulf 
than China ever enjoyed and will enjoy with that region. The Mughal Empire for 
instance was heavily influence by Persian culture and people. The recently renewed 
Indian migratory dominance in the smaller GCC countries will not go away, but will 
only intensify, creating ever stronger links at all levels with the motherland, and the 
political cooperation that such demographic and economic interdependence 
demands.  
The second possible Indian advantage over China is Delhi’s potential future alliance 
with the current Gulf hegemon, the United States, an issue discussed further below. 
Yet, it would tie into what may become another, unintended consequence of the 
growing inter-regional interdependence between Asia and the insecure Gulf region, 
as outlined above: intra-regional rivalry, especially between China and India, but also 
between China and Japan. An outbreak of direct geo-political rivalry in the Gulf, 
though, could not only pose serious threats to all of these states’ regional interests 
there, but could also threaten conflict, a scenario that none of them find appealing 
anyway, but especially not in a condition of increasing vulnerability interdependence. 
Continued multilateral and respective bilateral cooperation will be desired by all 
actors and would deepen multiple ties and create denser networks at all levels, and 
thereby generate less uncertainty over each other’s intentions – which is the ultimate 
realist ghost. This in turn would lessen the incentive for a relative-gains-rationale and 
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strengthen appreciation of the absolute-gains-rationale, in line with CIT’s 
assumptions. Appropriate international regimes though would seem necessary for 
this new Asian world. 
 
China’s International Regime Change and the Gulf 
The need for multilateral cooperation between Asian countries and the Gulf will be 
even more urgent in the future. Efforts to work together via established international 
regimes would follow from an even higher level of interdependence. However, as the 
Western-dominated 20th century becomes more and more distant and Asia returns to 
its historic place of economic dominance, at least across many spheres, the urge and 
necessity to update or change the current regimes will be hard to avoid. 
The international monetary regime is one example. For now, and for the immediate 
future, the dollar’s near-unipolar dominance as the international reserve and 
transaction currency seems unlikely to be replaced. Yet, the first signs of a potentially 
more multipolar monetary order for the future have appeared, as China’s renminbi 
has been upgraded into the A-list of currencies in the IMF’s basket, as China is 
looking for different options than its traditional purchase of US government bonds, 
and as China is pushing for Belt-and-Road investments in its own currency. 
The most dramatic game-changer in that respect would be a future initiative to 
conduct oil trade – for long a dollar-domain – in renminbi. This would create the 
emergence of the so-called “petroyuan” and would fundamentally alter the balance of 
global monetary and geo-political power in China’s favour. Given its own dependence 
on lower interest rates which are partly connected to the world’s use of the dollar, 
America’s monetary, fiscal, financial, and economic dominance could experience an 
earth-shaking disruption – with all the global power reduction that would accompany 
it. Its reduced leverage over Gulf politics would merely be one example. This is why 
Washington will do whatever it takes to prevent such a scenario. For now, it does not 
need to fear it just yet, because many prerequisites in China’s economic readiness and 
the world’s incentives seem faraway from such a profound shift. Yet, since energy 
trade is of monumental importance to the global economy and since a scenario of 
ongoing Chinese growth will entrench China as the world’s largest energy consumer, 
the Gulf states will search for the most cost-effective way to export their oil and gas. 
Furthermore, if Iran continues to be isolated from access to the dollar, it would be the 
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first Gulf state to push for the petroyuan. Even though the UAE and Qatar recently 
opened renminbi clearing houses on their soil and seem more open to a different 
system in the future, what is holding them back is their alliance with and security-
dependence on the US military. As long as American-led regional hegemonic stability 
represents the only viable option, such regime changes in oil and money are not really 
on the table. Still, just a few decades from now the range of options may also have 
changed. 
A more informal and never uncontested regime in global finance that has prevailed 
since the dawn of American global dominance post-World War Two, is the so-called 
Washington Consensus in international development finance. Tagging conditionality 
of not only economic but also political liberalization to loans by developing countries 
has long been the IMF’s and the World Bank’s mantra. Non-democratic China – 
disinterested in the domestic political institutions of its business partners – has 
already been a spoiler in that respect in many countries around the world. Most Gulf 
states, still aflush with their oil rents, are in no need for development finance, 
although in the next few decades that might change for some, like Oman. Iran and 
Iraq also, despite their hydrocarbon-wealth require huge volumes of infrastructure- 
and other foreign direct investment. And for many other countries along the Belt and 
Road and in Africa, China’s pure focus on business and blind eye to human rights 
issues have already been highly cherished by many autocratic regimes, even as this 
approach often creates local resistance. The AIIB has been viewed as a dramatic 
example of China building new mulitlateral institutions that suit its interests. The 
argument can be made that the AIIB does not contradict the rules-based 
international order, but in fact complements it. What also counts though is China’s 
accepted dominance of the AIIB. This erosion of Western financial power may be 
compounded once China’s economic power is so overwhelming that it creates its own 
set of conditionality, including political support for China’s policies in contested areas 
in East Asia, for instance. Such a strategy will also increase China’s global power. 
Another regime with tremendous importance to Gulf geo-politics is the WMD non-
proliferation regime. Though it has recently seen a successful enforcement with the 
JCPOA, curtailing Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons, and although China is 
supportive of the regime and participated in those negotiations, Beijing has never 
been as invested in it to the same degree as the West. China has no interest in seeing 
a WMD-proliferation cascade, including in the Gulf. This seems likely to continue. 
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However, under certain circumstances, it is imaginable that China will not move 
against a potential future nuclear weapons acquisition by Iran. Should China’s 
hedging strategy for the Gulf one day result in Iran falling fully into China’s geo-
political orbit, a nuclear armed Tehran would not pose a threat to Beijing but would 
potentially serve as an asset. The same way Pakistan’s nuclear status gives that 
country a certain security and flexibility and extends China’s geo-political power vis-
à-vis India, Iran’s nuclear safeguard, together via an alliance with China would give 
China a considerable power boost in the Gulf, vis-à-vis the United States. Admittedly, 
other regional countries, especially Saudi Arabia would see this as the ultimate 
security nightmare, endangering Beijing’s relations with and oil imports from Riyadh. 
Yet, if China by then enjoys an even greater amount of economic importance to the 
Kingdom, China and Pakistan could reassure the Saudis by providing them with a 
nuclear deterrent of their own – resulting in a new, but nuclear-armed and Beijing-
led “Twin Pillar” order that could keep Riyadh and Tehran from each other’s throats 
and would ensure ongoing Chinese energy imports from both. 
It is clear that as long as US regional hegemonic dominance in the Gulf prevails, such 
a nuclear scenario is far-fetched. Still, if the future sees a much greater Chinese 
economic and overall power and a simultaneous Chinese willingness to give Iran and 
Saudi Arabia nuclear security guarantees, it is not impossible. For Beijing to go down 
that road though, a serious escalation of Sino-American relations would be the only 
imaginable circumstance that could propel it onto this risky course. Unfortunately, 
such a development is everything but far-fetched. 
 
Unbalanced Multipolarity in Asia and the Gulf 
The type of institutional and regime changes that China may push for whilst it 
continues its growth trajectory are likely to be resisted by the US, wherever possible. 
Washington’s and Japan’s AIIB-boycott was the first hint. America’s AIIB-resistance 
has not occurred because the bank breaks the rules-based international order, but 
because of structural stress on the international system that China’s rise produces. 
Irrespective of proclaimed intentions, the US and China will see an increasingly 
intense rivalry, according to Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism, because, if 
China continues to grow, relative US hegemony will erode, and the emerging 
structure of the international system will be characterized by unbalanced 
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multipolarity. According to Mearsheimer, this is the most unstable, uncertain, and 
most fear-generating type of systemic structure for two reasons. Firstly, the 
imbalance, which is in favour of the hegemon, causes frustration among the other, 
increasingly capable great powers who could form alliances against it. Secondly, new 
emerging alliance-formations are unpredictable in this system, because the 
increasing number of great powers allows for various alliance options – intensifying 
the uncertainty, thereby the fear, and thereby the security dilemma and relative-gains 
instinct. 
Russia is still a great power, India may become one, Japan is a great power in an 
economic sense, but China may turn into a potential superpower in the not too 
distant future. Washington has so far succeeded in preventing the emergence of a 
peer competitor in other regions of the world, including in East Asia. Such a peer 
competitor would be dominating its own back-yard and would be free to roam 
beyond its own region. The US will therefore go to great lengths to continue to 
dominate East Asian waters and to contain China within its own region. American 
military presence there, intended for an upgrade since former President Obama 
announced an American pivot to Asia, is contributing to this containment just as the 
first signs of a potential future anti-Chinese balancing coalition between the US, 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the ASEAN countries, Australia, and India are visible. 
Given that China’s neighbours greatly fear a complete Chinese dominance and given 
that many of the them are more than uneasy of playing a role akin to China’s ancient 
tributary vassals, the balancing coalition stands a chance of success, but only under 
two circumstances: firstly, China would have to aggressively overplay its hand, rather 
than merely offer investment and trade. Beijing is faced with a difficult dilemma in 
that respect. On the one hand, it is keen to restrain itself because it knows about the 
dangers of disgruntlement. On the other hand, in the South China Sea disputes, it has 
failed to re-assure many of its neighbours, because it also wants what its neighbours 
fear. China is structurally compelled to dominate its own back-yard according to the 
logic of offensive realism. It is aiming to exclude the US from East Asia, become a 
hegemon there itself, break through the first- and second-island chains, and mutate 
from a one-ocean power into a two-ocean power. Japan and India, but also the 
smaller nations in East Asia are as eager as the US to prevent this from happening. 
Here lies the second necessary circumstance for a Chinese containment: the US 
regional military presence and alliance-preparedness. 
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Yet, such an outcome is far from certain. As both Mearsheimer and Walt show, 
forming a multilateral alliance faces numerous challenges, such as different degrees 
of motivation, lack of capability, and the dynamics of free-riding, buck-passing, or 
bandwagoning that could make the future East Asian map look far more diversified in 
terms of alliance structures than the still hypothetical image of a clean balancing 
coalition might suggest. Again, if China continues to grow impressively, and if the US 
continues to refrain from signing or ratifying multilateral free-trade-agreements in 
the Asia-Pacific, many of China’s smaller neighbours may have no other choice than 
to bandwagon towards China in the face of economic necessity. 
For now, such an alliance has not been formed and basic global cooperation among 
Asian countries and great powers has endured due to the still substantial power-
imbalance between the US and China, but also due to growing interdependence. This 
has allowed China to accept ongoing free-riding on its main rival’s Gulf security 
provision. 
For if the US truly pivots to Asia in order to contain China, this grand strategy is 
likely, to include an enduring US military presence in the Persian Gulf – precisely 
because the Gulf will become “Asian” and because it thus serves as a possibly decisive 
element in an anti-Chinese containment strategy. China’s immediate concern 
remains its own back-yard in a geo-political sense, simply because there are few 
alternatives. Without becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia first, China will not 
be free to roam beyond its region. Consequently, China’s worries over US presence in 
East Asian waters could even result in a mid-term Chinese preference for American 
prioritization of the Middle East, provided it does not directly upset China’s energy 
security. Hence, as long as this has not happened, the possibility of a Chinese military 
dominance in and around the Gulf region is remote at best. 
Nevertheless, the BRI is motivated as a long-term hedging strategy which already 
seeks to maximize China’s influence in the heartland, rimland, and sea in geo-
political terms. In that respect China is following its millennia-long strategic 
philosophy of filling vacuums in order to encircle and possibly outmanoeuvre rivals, 
and winning competitions without having to confront them directly and fight. From 
much of Africa to Djibouti, to Gwadar and Duqm, from Central Asia to Burma, 
China’s strategic infrastructure investment and String of Pearls architecture has 
occurred in less contested but highly strategic spaces all around the Gulf region and 
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along the Indian Ocean’s increasingly multipolar SLOCs. A Chinese military base 
inside the Gulf would be a more provocative move, although in an age of increasing 
Chinese economic and diplomatic importance to many Gulf states, it is not an 
impossibility even whilst China is not (yet) free to roam. For instance, the lesser 
degree of anti-Iranian hostility in GCC states like Oman or even the UAE may offer 
potential candidates for such a future decision, if by then China is the most important 
economic partner to them. A far more provocative location for a Chinese base in the 
Gulf would be Iran itself – not only to the GCC, but also the US. Admittedly, any 
stationed Chinese military assets in the Gulf would be highly unwelcomed by 
Washington. Yet, in a world of Chinese economic dominance it is less clear whether 
the US would be in a position to prevent any Gulf state from agreeing to what would 
be presented as simply another brick in the desired multilateral security wall. 
If the US-China rivalry and Saudi-Iranian rivalry escalates though, a scenario in 
which China sacrifices its interests in Saudi Arabia and completely shifts to Iran 
could be a possible outcome. In that situation the US and China may one day be 
facing each other across the Gulf via two antagonistic clients in a Cold-War-like 
manner. As stated above, China would identify Iran as the ultimate pivot state for 
geo-strategic reasons. If the Silk Road Economic Belt receives enough investment and 
security, China would try to maximize the potential to pump Iranian and Caspian Sea 
oil home via pipeline rather than via oil tankers from the Arabian Peninsula. Together 
with the intended pipelines through Pakistan, from Gwadar to Kashgar, and the 
already existing pipelines from the Bay of Bengal through Burma into Yunnan 
Province, and even a potential Kra Canal through Thailand, China would seek to 
reduce its Hormuz- and Malacca dilemmas as much as possible. 
For now, this is not a viable option which continues to make China vulnerable to a 
potential US-naval blockade of its energy imports. Whilst there are few if any 
indications for now that a general US-China rivalry is likely to escalate over potential 
Gulf issues, as explained above, other issues could bring this about much more easily. 
These range from the already serious US-China rivalry in East Asia, to destructive 
issue-linkage in trade, financial, or monetary matters, to fundamental disagreements 
over a handling of any potential crisis. If this happens the already significant realist 
dimensions in the US-China relationship could easily dominate. The more dramatic 
the conflict, the more probable would be its comprehensive spill-over into the world’s 
strategically vital regions and issues. Since the Gulf is a region of paramount 
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importance to the US and China, it is entirely possible that both seek to outdo the 
other in strategic control.  
China would try to form bilateral anti-Western alliances also with regional and 
peripheral powers. At the moment, Iran and Pakistan would be the most likely 
candidates. If the escalation were to turn so serious that a military confrontation was 
possible, either via proxy or even directly, then Washington could seek to set up a 
military blockade on China’s oil imports. The US Navy by and large controls all the 
relevant SLOCs, including bottlenecks such as the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of 
Hormuz, and the Bab Al-Mandab. Though it would be highly difficult to uphold such 
a blockade for a longer period, China’s odds are not yet in its favour. Without a blue 
water navy of similar proportions China’s hands would be tied in this scenario, and 
the country would likely suffer a significant economic hit at least. Even if China by 
then had a military base in the Gulf, as it now has in Djibouti, its strategic utility 
would firstly be inferior to the US’s capabilities in the Gulf, and secondly, it would 
also be in danger of a cut-off from reinforcements. As offensive realism underlines, a 
great power can only become a globally intervening superpower if it becomes a 
hegemon in its own region before. China’s aim is to become one and dominate East 
Asia the way the US dominates the Americas, but it has not achieved this, due to the 
US military presence in China’s backyard, and due to the potential anti-Chinese 
balancing coalition in East and South Asia. Hence, in Mearsheimer’s words, China, 
unlike the US, would not be free to roam in the Gulf without establishing East Asian 
hegemony first. 
Consequently, due to the current distribution of military capabilities across the great 
units of the international system, the US would stand a bigger chance than China to 
come out on top in a potential near-future escalation. In the longer run, if China’s 
economic and growing military capabilities increase, such American tactics will be 
much harder to implement.  
Yet, another variable in this equation would be India’s growth to become a stronger 
economic and military power. If this happens, the US is not China’s only obstacle. As 
stated above, a fusion of complex interdependence with both Gulf insecurity, and 
intra-Asian rivalry is likely to perpetuate that rivalry and create a realist power 
competition between China and India throughout Asia and the Gulf. There are 
already signs signalling such potential future dynamics taking over across Asia. 
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Whereas the China-Pakistan de facto alliance has sparked Indian fears of 
encirclement, particularly since China’s announced BRI and the String of Pearls, the 
new strategic India-Japan partnership has echoed similar concerns in China. The 
Gulf region has not yet been pulled into this dynamic, but may be so in the future, as 
both China and India are courting both Iran and the GCC into close bilateral 
partnerships. 
It remains to be seen how this will play out. Contrary to the GCC, Iran has long 
craved the absence of any outside power. Though the GCC-states desire a greater 
Asian involvement in regional security, they do not seem to favour any country over 
another, provided it can uphold mutual interests and contribute to stability. 
Consequently, the Gulf states will look dispassionately to both the intensity of their 
economic and political ties to China and India and compare their raw military 
capabilities. 
Stephen Walt has underlined that international alliances often resemble chessboards 
according to the logic of one state aligning with its neighbour’s neighbour. This logic 
would see Iran pivot to the India-Japan axis, and Saudi Arabia to the China-Pakistan 
axis. Yet, this “smooth” order on the map, despite having many incentives, also has 
many obstacles, not least America’s crucial part in the equation. Though the future 
could see a US-Iranian rapprochement, it does not seem likely in the absence of a new 
Iranian revolution. At the same time, China’s rise is not only pushing India closer to 
Japan, but also closer to the US. A potential Indo-American alliance, as part of an 
anti-Chinese balancing coalition, could credibly include the US military sharing the 
burden of Gulf security provision with India, the region’s large neighbour, or could 
even see Washington pass the buck to Delhi. For the latter to happen, the US would 
need to feel the urgency to shift most of its assets to the East Asian theatre. And, 
crucially, India would require not only the will, but enough military capabilities to 
take on such a role. 
For the short-to-mid-term future however, these requirements are simply not given. 
China’s economic and military head start vis-à-vis India are likely to see China to be 
more powerful than India even decades from now. Furthermore, China’s increasing 
military assets on the contested Indo-Chinese border in the Himalayas may force 
India to provide a greater budget for its non-naval capabilities which are already the 
priority on its border with Pakistan. Simultaneous to this development, the PLAN’s 
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increasing Indian Ocean presence will not find the biggest of obstacles in the Indian 
Navy. And in a scenario where China wins the East Asian security competition against 
the US and becomes free to roam, its head start, and the unviability of a comparable 
“Indian Monroe Doctrine”, may be decisive in the question of outside power 
competition in the Gulf. The US would remain as China’s primary obstacle in 
becoming – with or without forces there – the next dominating Gulf outside power. 
Or would it? 
 
The Gulf’s Pivot to Asia 
In a potential US-China rivalry that spills over into the Gulf theatre, the military 
balance is not the only relevant variable. Precisely due to the Gulf’s vulnerability 
interdependence with the world’s major economic powers, the prospects of 
destructive issue area-linkage would harm all countries involved, including the GCC 
states. Since it is particularly China and other Asian markets that are and will be 
relatively more important to the Gulf’s oil exporting countries, a potential anti-
Chinese US strategy in the Gulf would be highly unwelcome even among America’s 
GCC allies. The security issue area clearly dominates in the region, yet, the GCC’s, and 
especially Saudi Arabia’s domestic political security, stability, and regime survival 
depend to a significant extent on economic growth, which in turn continues to 
depend largely on energy exports. The GCC’s demand security and China’s energy 
security would incentivize GCC states and China to firmly cooperate in order to 
prevent a disruption of their vital commodity trade. In the short run, the Gulf’s 
requirements of the US security umbrella, which the US can threaten to dismantle, 
admittedly could dominate GCC fears. However, if a potential crisis is long or severe 
enough to critically harm Gulf economies and their domestic stability, it is imaginable 
the GCC states could pivot towards China, just like Iran. This would either mean that 
the US backs down and refrains from oil-blockades, or it would mean that it ignores 
the GCC’s wishes. In the latter case, no actor of course would be in any position to 
oust the US militarily. In the longer run though, it is difficult to imagine a de-
legitimized US maintaining its Gulf hegemony only by its military power, and without 
producing serious harm to its standing and to the global economy. Moreover, if China 
by then is free to roam, it would present a much more formidable military challenge 
to the US than it would be under current circumstances. 
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Still, it needs to be highlighted that even if India’s lagging-behind puts China at an 
overall power advantage, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf are likely to be multipolar, if 
India continues to grow simultaneously to China. If the GCC-Iran rivalry or any other 
new intra-Gulf rivalry prevails too, then the GCC or any weaker regional coalition will 
choose the outside power that is more willing to guarantee regional stability. Any 
candidate, including India, would either face the choice between the Gulf blocs or 
have enough capability and credibility to impose restraint on the regional actors. 
Another possible outcome could be that an antagonistic China and India acquire 
opposing clients in the region – with potentially destabilizing, not stabilizing 
consequences. 
In any case, all these imaginable developments contain defensive realist elements 
when describing potentially new, interest-based alliance formations out of a balance-
of-threat-rationale. On the other hand, the overall Asia-centric scenario equally 
enables a neo-liberal institutionalist interpretation, because the vulnerability 
interdependence on the Gulf’s New Silk Roads could ironically be the cause of a 
regional change of guard. If the US found itself incapable of preventing a Chinese or 
generally Asian Gulf dominance, because military power alone would not suffice to do 
so, then most of CIT’s assumptions would turn out to be very accurate. China need 
not even station troops in the region in order to be the next dominating Gulf outside 
power but could succeed by political alliances – new regional “pillars”. It could 
threaten to abandon each simply by adopting trade protectionism against the spoiler 
as a penalization. 
Yet, a largely non-securitized order would depend on a more tranquil Gulf 
environment. Otherwise, it seems unlikely Beijing could afford to resist the opening 
of Chinese military bases in the Gulf and a strong naval presence there, even if it did 
not want to initially. If India’s military capabilities by then are not sufficient to pose 
as a serious Chinese rival in the Gulf, then such a development could be the dawn of 
Pax Sinica and therefore a revival of regional hegemonic stability – provided by 
China. This would truly end the West’s global dominance, because it would entail 
China controlling its back-yard and, crucially, the geo-politically most important 
region in the world – sending strategic ripples far beyond the Middle Eastern 
periphery. 
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However, it necessitates a substantial Chinese military upgrade, a blue water navy, 
high-technologized amphibious and air force capabilities, and the kind of full-
spectrum dominance that currently only the US enjoys. Inside a trajectory where 
China continues to grow impressively, this would be imaginable. Thus, Pax Sinica is 
clearly a long-term scenario, if it indeed were ever to occur, and depends on many, 
highly sensitive and potentially conflict-ridden prerequisites. 
The international system’s structure that would follow from the China/India-growth 
trajectories though, together with ongoing US capability does not point towards a 
clearly unipolar Gulf order through any candidate. Whether complex 
interdependence is strong enough to produce a Sino-American agreement on spheres 
of influence, or even produce a multilateral pan-Asian security order including in the 
Gulf, the multipolar structure makes this highly difficult to achieve. 
The most important, defensive realist insight from these extrapolations, is the that 
the Gulf regional states are the ultimate arbiter in which direction power flows. The 
tail can wag the dog by threatening realignment to a new outside power patron who 
seems least threatening, but most useful to the regional clients – as many centuries of 
Gulf history demonstrate. 
 
In the end, reality could see a mixture of some of these eventualities. Though the 
current structures and conditions point towards the superiority of Hypothesis 3, two 
things are clear. Firstly, American-led regional hegemonic stability is likely to come 
under increasing pressure not in the short term, but in the mid-to-long term. 
Secondly, history rarely operates in a linear fashion. Accidents, surprises, and 
contingencies happen frequently and have the potential to suddenly disrupt current 
and future trajectories. 
So, is China going to be the Persian Gulf’s next dominating outside power in a geo-
political sense? In the short run, this is unlikely. Yet, although in the longer run it is 
much more likely than is generally assumed, it is also not predetermined. For now, 
China, the US, and others, enjoy different types of power in the Gulf. Although only 
the US dominates geo-politically, China is close to dominating economically. In 
history, the latter has often led to the former, particularly in this central region of the 
world. 
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